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Abstract
Comparative political economy studies of welfare states have focused on either 
general processes of modernization or the evolution of different welfare state 
‘regimes’ - such as the social democratic, liberal and conservative types identified by 
Esping-Andersen. Variations in women’s role in the workforce tend to be seen as 
closely allied with ‘welfare regime’ types or associated with welfare state 
modernization. But there are relatively few empirical studies in the political economy 
field of how, within the overall policy configuration of the state, welfare policies 
influence women’s labour force participation.
First, using a quantitative analysis of country-level data for 17 OECD countries from 
1960 to 1987, this study identifies clusters of countries consistent with the Esping- 
Andersen classification, which share distinct patterns of women’s role in the 
workforce and have different paths of development over time. However, the analysis 
shows that important anomalies exist and key questions remain unresolved. Second, 
case studies are used to analyse policy configurations and developments in women’s 
employment over time. ‘Core’ examples are drawn from each main welfare regime - 
the USA (liberal), Sweden (social democratic) and Germany (conservative). The 
Netherlands is examined as a key anomalous case. Third, the lessons from the 
empirical analyses are used to reconsider aspects of the ‘social democratic’ and 
‘modernization’ models of welfare state development.
Across the period as a whole female labour force participation has grown in most 
countries. The most rapid growth of women’s involvement has taken place in core 
countries with either liberal or social democratic welfare configurations (the USA and 
Sweden). There has been less change in ‘conservative’ countries (such as Germany) 
and in the Netherlands despite its ‘social democratic’ classification. Yet apparent 
linkages between labour market trends and welfare policies do not necessarily stand 
up to close over-time or comparative analysis. In the USA there are only weak 
connections between welfare policies and women’s changing role in the labour 
market, whereas the two factors are closely and directly linked in Sweden. Particular 
policies contributed to expanding women’s employment in Germany, but the overall
policy configuration has bolstered broader patterns of social stratification inimical to 
women playing a larger role. In the Netherlands, welfare policies have clearly 
restrictive effects on women’s participation in job markets, although some growth has 
occurred since the ‘welfare explosion’ of the 1960s.
These findings show that welfare states’ impacts on women’s employment do not fit 
neatly into the ‘modernization’ or ‘social democratic’ models. ‘One path fits all’ 
models perform particularly poorly, but even differentiated analyses of ‘welfare state 
regimes’ pay insufficient attention to the location of social welfare within the state’s 
overall policy configuration. A clearer distinction between the ‘welfare state’ 
construed as form of state and as a particular sector of state activity can help 
comparative analysis eliminate the residual influence of ‘one-path’ models, and 
provide more compelling analyses of variations in women’s employment trajectories.
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Chapter One: Introduction
This thesis is concerned with the welfare state and the entry of women into the paid 
workforce. Its central contribution is to use the position of women in the workforce to 
shed new light on welfare state theory. The interest in the position of women is not 
simply instrumental. I also examine patterns of, and developmental paths taken by, 
women’s involvement in the workforce. Indeed, women’s labour market participation 
trajectories in various states may be key aspects of convergence and divergence in 
comparative political economy. Moreover, the explosive growth of a (mainly) 
feminist literature indicates that gender and the welfare state are closely entwined with 
one another. A good deal of this literature is relevant to - and considered within - the 
present study, although my main focus of attention is on ‘mainstream’ welfare state 
theory.
The thesis has been structured to ‘open out’ from empirical analyses to theoretical 
reflection, rather than adopting the conventional ‘focus down’ approach drawn from 
the natural sciences. Implicitly, the latter reflects assumptions about method rooted in 
an hypothetico-deductivism. The structure used here is not based on such 
assumptions, reflecting a certain unease about them. However, the adoption of an 
‘opening out’ stmcture raises certain problems of its own, which I address here. First, 
it requires a clear ‘map’ of the thesis be presented early on, a function performed by 
the ‘theoretical chapter(s)’ with which a conventional thesis would open. Secondly, 
although theory should not be discussed fully initially, its general outlines need to be 
sketched in early on, alongside discussion of the derivation of ‘hypotheses’ examined 
in the empirical chapters. After clarifying the somewhat distinctive terminology used, 
I will go on to treat these two issues in turn.
1.1 Terminological clarifîcation
The use of term ‘policy configuration’ to describe welfare states is deliberate.
Together with the placing of quotation marks around the word ‘welfare states’ in my 
thesis title, this choice reflects discontent with the ‘welfare state regime’ concept. The 
conventional usage suggests that all these ‘regimes’ are welfare states of some sort. 
This usage effectively elides the distinction between two meanings of the welfare state 
concept (welfare state as form of state and as sector of state activity) and
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consequentially exaggerates the welfare state’s role in the wider political economy.
My title does, of course, play on the ambiguity in the ‘welfare state’ expression. On 
the one hand, I am concerned both the configuration of ‘welfare states’ understood as 
a sector of state activity - otherwise referred to as ‘social policy’. On the other, 
although I wish to call into question the implication of most comparative analysis that 
all states qualify as welfare states of some sort, the title also signals my interest in the 
overall policy configuration of western democratic states. Indeed, my approach 
suggests that the configuration of social policy within the state, and indeed within the 
broader configuration of the political economy, are central issues. However, 
‘configurative’ analysis is based on a distinction between these concepts, as well as 
considering their relationship. It should not be taken as an invitation to blur concepts.
The ‘configuration’ expression is used somewhat differently in other welfare state 
analyses and the comparative literature. In her massive and innovative study of the 
political origins of social policy in the United States, Skocpol developed a ‘structured 
polity’ approach to political analysis (1992). She ‘...views the polity as the primary 
locus of action, yet understands political activities, whether carried out by politicians 
or by social groups, as conditioned by the institutional configurations of governments 
and political party systems’ (1992: 41, emphasis added). She does not discuss 
‘configuration’ concept in detail, but her usage shares some characteristics with mine, 
although important differences remain. First, although Skocpol’s is an analysis of the 
US placed in comparative context, it is not a fully comparative analysis. Secondly, 
while she moves some distance from her earlier ‘statist’ posture, while refusing to 
return to the more structurally determinist position of her earliest major work 
(Skocpol 1979), important ambiguities remain in her view of the relationship of the 
state and society (see Katznelson 1997: 105-106 for a discussion).
Skocpol has tried to introduce an element of contingency into the study of politics and 
society. Ironically, while her formulation of the ‘structured polity’ approach 
acknowledges that both politicians and social groups ‘act’, it places this action 
primarily within political (rather than other social or economic) structures. Moreover, 
Skocpol tends to privilege political actors (politicians and bureaucrats), in arguing
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against positions she depicts as socially determinist. Consequentially, she tends to 
locate creativity in politics, rather than elsewhere in society, emphasizing that 
‘politicians and administrators must be taken seriously’ as ‘actors in their own right’ 
not merely as ‘agents of other social interests’ (1992: 41). This point needs to be made 
carefully. In contrast, with her earlier (rhetorically) strong/exclusive focus on states 
rather than society, social factors come into the theoretical and empirical discussion of 
Protecting Soldiers and Mothers powerfully. However, in her theoretical statements, 
Skocpol retains a tendency to associate emphasis on social interests with structural 
determinism, rather than as containing potentially creative or partially autonomous 
actors, whose behaviour cannot be read off jfrom their structural location.
In the end, Skocpol’s use of the notion of configuration is largely synonymous with 
the notion of structure. Indeed, when she writes of ‘institutional configurations of 
governments and political party systems’ her use of the plural suggests that she is not 
primarily concerned with the articulation of these structures, instead seeming focusing 
on them individually. Although any use of the notion of configuration does have 
structural resonances, as I have already indicated, my use of the term signals a concern 
with relationships, in the present case between state social policy, welfare provision, 
the state and the political economy.
The concept of ‘configuration’ is associated with another, albeit related, strand in 
comparative analysis famously developed by Barrington Moore (1966; see Katznelson 
1997 for a recent evaluation). Comparative macro social history is concerned with 
tracing distinctive paths of development, or trajectories, to the modem world. My 
analysis ultimately raises questions about trajectories of development, or patterns of 
divergence and convergence ‘after the golden age’ of the welfare state. In common 
with the ‘heroic’ macro approach I am concerned with overall political economy 
configurations. In this sense my analysis differs from Pierson’s (1994) less heroic 
comparative analysis of welfare, which uses the notion of policy feedback to identify a 
common absence of change, suggesting a structuralist tendency to emphasize inertia. 
Nevertheless, I am concerned with the location of welfare and role of women within 
overall political economy configurations. In other words it is less holistic, more 
analytic, than the macro historical sociology tradition of configurative scholarship.
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Questions about the trajectories of women’s employment in advanced capitalist 
democracies and their impact on the developmental paths of OECD states are raised 
throughout this thesis. In the conclusion patterns of change and stability in welfare 
states and gender roles are considered as different aspects of the more abstract issue of 
convergence and divergence among advanced industrial societies. The argument that 
divergent patterns of development characterize welfare states in advanced industrial 
societies has become dominant. Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom remains that 
all advanced industrial societies have welfare states. The emphasis on divergence thus 
exists within some essentially common features. Turning to the position of women, 
gender roles are widely assumed to have changed according to a common pattern. 
However, patterns of difference in gender roles or welfare provision may exist within 
these common features and may even overwhelm the commonality.
Interest in questions of convergence and divergence has renewed in the light of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and globalization debates. Indeed, the ‘victory’ of 
arguments that the policy configurations of welfare states diverge may need to be 
reconsidered, as the demise of one national ‘model’ after another is announced. The 
construction of new forms of political economy will take place in conditions inherited 
from the various configurations of welfare states even if they are reconstructed or 
dismantled. Among these conditions the patterns and trajectories of women’s 
involvement in the paid workforce may be particularly significant.
1.2 A ‘map’ of the thesis
The body of this thesis is organized into three main sections; a data analysis, a series 
of country case studies, and an analysis of welfare state theories. The first section 
considers hypotheses derived from two main ‘welfare state’ theories - modernization 
and social democratic/‘politics matters’ approaches - in an examination of women’s 
involvement in the paid workforce. It is important to remember that modernization 
and social democratic analyses are subtle and complex bodies of theory. There are 
important differences of emphasis among the authors I group together. It is therefore 
unlikely that a large-scale comparison using aggregate data could constitute an 
authoritative ‘test’ of these theories. Thus this section is presented in an exploratory.
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rather than confirmatory, spirit. It seeks to set empirical parameters for the 
subsequent analysis and is a preliminary sorting device for potential explanations, 
rather than a means for testing hypotheses and finally adjudicating between them. For 
these reasons 1 choose to discuss ‘derived’ hypotheses, rather than ‘theories’ in this 
section.
The data analysis suggests that variables associated with the political mobilization of 
women may be more important than those political sociological and party political 
measures of mobilization typically found to be significant for the explanation of 
welfare state development. Once in existence the welfare state does seem to have an 
impact on women’s involvement in the labour force. This impact can be seen both in 
terms of variables which represent ‘clusters’ of welfare states and those which 
operationalize the ‘magnitude’ of welfare effort. The same can be said about the 
impact of variables operationalizing the wider employment patterns found in welfare 
states. General measures of economic development also seem to have an impact. 
However, the more specific and ‘fine-grained’ hypotheses, often developed in the 
context of the study of a single case, about the impact of economic variables such as 
inflation and the level of personal taxation have more equivocal impacts.
Particularly important for the subsequent analysis, however, the quantitative results 
seem to show that convergence ‘one path fits all’ models do not fare well, with states 
instead following divergent patterns and arranged into clusters to some extent similar 
to the regimes identified by Esping-Andersen (1990). Nevertheless, anomalies exist 
in the results of the data analysis and important questions remain unresolved by it. 
While theory suggests that welfare state regimes encompass or construct labour 
market regimes, no one-to-one correspondence exists between them (cf. Stephens 
1994). While a relationship exists between the form of welfare provision and the 
labour market, it is more complex than existing theories allow. Welfare provision 
should be more clearly located within broader features of the political economy. In 
order to address these questions and anomalies, and to go beyond surface level 
analysis to consider questions of causality, these issues are analyzed ‘over time’ in 
country case studies.
14
The first lesson of the case studies (of Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
USA) is that dramatic cross-national differences exist in patterns of women’s 
participation in the paid workforce and paths of its development over time. Secondly, 
national configurations of welfare policy are deeply implicated in these paths and 
patterns. ‘One path’ models are further called into question. Moreover, detailed 
examination reinforces the impression that welfare policies impact on patterns of 
women’s employment in puzzling ways in the context of established theory. For 
example, some ‘conservative’ welfare policies in Germany may have aided women’s 
entry into the workforce, albeit in a generally unsupportive context. Making sense of 
this puzzle requires that welfare is placed in the context of the configuration of the 
state and political economy.
A key contribution of the case studies is their development within a common 
framework, to facilitate cross case comparison to bring similarities and differences 
into focus. The developmental paths followed by social policy and the pattern of 
women’s entry into the workforce are periodized in each case. While in some cases 
the broad outlines of the developmental path(s) followed is relatively uncontroversial, 
in others competing explanations suggest particular periodizations. Consideration of 
the ‘periods’ into which they divide history provides is a method of assessing these 
competing explanations.
Each individual country study challenges some aspect of the conventional wisdom on 
that case. Thus the Swedish case contributes to debates about the distinctiveness of its 
welfarism, when this structure was ‘locked in’ and about the role of gender in welfare 
state construction. In Sweden welfare policy was central to the political economy and 
was integrated with labour market policy. Consequentially, state welfare policy 
largely structured the development of women’s role in the workforce.
The theoretical expectation for the US ‘liberal’ welfare regimes is less clear. 
Developments in the USA are sometimes attributed to the ‘unfettered’ market, whilst 
at others they are laid at the door of the welfare state. The major role played by state 
policy in the development of female labour force participation is clear, but it is less 
obvious that this role can be appropriately classified under the ‘welfare state’ heading.
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This analysis challenges the rather confused ‘power resource’ interpretation of the US 
welfare regime and its impact on women. It also raises difficulties for the widespread 
view that the welfare state has played a key role in the political mobilization of 
women in the US (Piven 1985; Flammang 1987 and Erie and Rein 1988).
Women’s participation in the German workforce grew very little between 1960 and 
1989 and was relatively low at the end of that period, as might be expected in a 
conservative welfare regime. However, the role of welfare policy in producing this 
result is puzzling. The pattern of female labour market participation seems to reflect 
broader characteristics of the political economy. The segmented form of welfare 
(including labour market) policy appears to bolster existing labour market and 
political economy structures, but labour market policy may improve the generally 
weak position of women in the German workforce. Again this interpretation 
challenges aspects of the ‘power resource’ interpretation of the German case.
In the Netherlands welfare provision dovetailed with broader patterns of social and 
political structure to restrict Dutch women to one of the weakest labour market 
positions in the western world. However, this pattern was associated with a strictly 
limited role for the state in welfare provision. During the 1960s welfare provision and 
state involvement in welfare expanded dramatically. Subsequently, female labour 
force participation began to grow. However, the relationship between welfare 
expansion, a general weakening of traditional social values/control and the growth of 
women’s role in the paid workforce are difficult to disentangle. Indeed, the 
reconceptualization of ‘pillarization’ - a key concept in the analysis of Dutch politics 
is a key contribution. This reconceptualization makes it difficult to attribute changes 
in women’s employment directly to developments in welfare policy. Moreover, 
although it grew significantly, women’s labour market position remained weaker in 
the Netherlands than elsewhere, while welfare provision remained strikingly sexist 
well into the 1980s.
Overall, the case studies support the view that different configurations of welfare are 
associated with distinct patterns of women’s involvement in the workforce. They also 
deepen skepticism about some of the claims made by mainstream welfare state
1^
theories. ‘One path’ models certainly perform badly and there are problems with the 
welfare state regime ‘clusters’ associated with predictions of multiple developmental 
paths. The difficulties with all these theories are profound enough to beg questions 
about their conception of the welfare state, questions that are tackled below.
Empirical analyses did not support modernization theory predictions of a common 
path of women’s entry into the workforce. Nevertheless, the theory provides a basis 
for the influential and persistent view that western states share a common political 
economy model. It merits careful theoretical consideration. Despite predicting 
significant variations in and clustering of welfare states, the social democratic theory 
does not have a clear ‘welfare state’ concept. It slips between conceptions of the 
welfare state as a form of the state and a sector of state activity. The first notion 
allows the welfare state to be defined in an encompassing manner, but implies that 
very few states are welfare states. The second implies that advanced industrial 
societies have welfare states. The theory develops an overall model that illegitimately 
selects fi-om these two conceptions of the welfare state. As a consequence it implies 
that all western democracies are welfare states of some sort, and this status is a key 
characteristic of the state and political economy, however marginal social policy 
seems to be. A clearer conception is needed of the relationship between the 
configuration of; a) a state’s welfare policy, b) state policy in general, c) the public- 
private welfare mix and d) the overall political economy.
1.3. Welfare State theory and the derivation of hypotheses
The boundaries used to modernization and social democratic theories are considered 
in detail below - in neither case is the definition of the boundary straightforward.
Here, the major elements included within these boundaries are stated. In addition to 
the well known application of modernization theory to the welfare state associated 
with the work of Harold Wilensky (1975; 1981; Wilensky, Luebbert, Hahn and 
Jamieson 1985) I include the ‘economic approach’ associated with the Chicago 
School of Political Economy (particularly Becker 1981/1991).
Work by the ‘power resource’ school (particularly Korpi 1983 and Esping-Andersen 
1985; 1990) lies at the heart of the social democratic theory, but it also covers a
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number of other elements. I propose to treat the approach relatively broadly, 
including some work that is explicitly critical of ‘social democratic’ biases of the 
theory. I do not wish to exclude important works which designate themselves as 
‘politics matters’, ‘non-right hegemony’, ‘family of nations’ ‘comparative public 
policy’, ‘working class mobilization’ or ‘power resource’ (including its gender and 
Christian democratic variants) analyses. The social democratic label may appear 
problematic. Core proponents of the theory have themselves attempted to throw off 
some of these biases (Esping-Andersen 1990). Nevertheless, I argue that these 
theorists remain trapped within social democratic assumptions. Moreover, many 
analyses share common roots with the social democratic model (for example asserting 
that ‘politics matters’ - see Castles 1978; 1982; 1989; 1993) and remain engaged in 
debates about social democracy. Still other analyses have developed through a critical 
engagement with social democracy (van Kersbergen 1995, Orloff 1993; O’Connor 
1993; Lewis 1992). In all these senses the social democratic model remains central.
A question might be asked about why influential approaches to the analysis of the 
welfare state - such as institutionalism or feminism - are not considered in their own 
right here. Part of the answer is that elements of these approaches are analyzed, 
particularly in as much as they suggest dimensions of variation appropriate for a 
general comparison, although not as distinct bodies of theory. This is particularly the 
case for some feminist or ‘gendered’ analyses. However, little of this work covers the 
seventeen or eighteen capitalist democracies. The frameworks for such an analysis 
that have been developed, for the most part, have emerged out of a critical 
engagement with social democratic and power resource theories. They often present 
themselves as gendered variants of that approach (see especially Orloff 1993; 
O’Connor 1993; and also Lewis 1992; Sainsbury 1996; Daly 1994).
Institutionalist theory, by its nature, has tended to concentrate on particular cases and 
explanations. It has thus tended to focus on single country or very small ‘n’ studies. 
The differences between institutionalist and social democratic/power resource analysis 
have been exaggerated (Pierson 1994: 27-39 and Skocpol 1992: 1-62 divide the two 
approaches from one another - but see Skocpol 1992: 59 footnote 119; Skocpol and 
Amenta 1986). The distinction between them is based largely on claims made by
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institutionalists (but see also Korpi 1989) which attribute a social determinism to the 
social democratic or power resources approach (Pierson 1994: 28-30; Skocpol 1992: 
23-26, 38-40). These two traditions are much closer than is often thought.
Power resource analysts are centrally concerned with the (re)shaping of society by 
public policy - what institutionalists call policy feedback/legacies. Power resource 
analysts describe a social democratic welfare ‘strategy’ aimed at increasing the space 
for socialist politics, just as Bismarck used social policy to reduce such space (see 
Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984; Esping-Andersen 1985; 1990). As soon as the 
welfare state is used as an independent variable (as in Esping-Andersen 1990: 141- 
229 for example) variations in the policy configurations of welfare states are likely to 
produce divergent outcomes. Greater emphasis on the specificity of particular cases 
(or clusters of cases) to some extent mirrors the concerns of the institutionalists. The 
attention paid to the impact of the welfare state also suggests that it is inaccurate to 
attach a ‘social determinist’ tag to these analyses. At a more abstract level the balance 
between general and specific factors in the explanation of welfare state development 
and women’s employment trajectories is important.
Modernization Theory
Modernization theory is wide ranging and has been influential within social science. 
Applied to the welfare state it is particularly associated with Harold Wilensky. 
Although the language of modernization theory was consistently present in his work, 
Wilensky particularly emphasized the importance of ‘the logic of industrialism’ and 
‘industrial society’. This view of modernization theory which focuses on ‘the 
economic’ is, I believe, dominant within the welfare state literature, a dominance 
which will be reflected in my treatment of the theory. Modernization theories are 
concerned with the relationship between the agricultural, industrial and service sectors 
of the economy. By contrast, some other proponents of modernization construed the 
approach more broadly, to include urbanization, democratization, and increasing 
density of communications (see Flora and Alber 1981: 37-8; Hage, Hanneman and 
Gargan 1989: 100-110; and Pierson’s discussion 1991: 32).
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Differences between versions of the modernization approach may be a question of 
emphasis. Even in Wilensky's work the ‘logic of industrialism’ and ‘modernization’ 
are presented as complex and multi-dimensional. These features are less clearly 
apparent in later work, although they are implied by his continued use of the language 
of modernization. Emphasis on complexity and multi-dimensionality raises the 
possibility that modernization may be a partially ‘open’ process, in the sense that 
individual and group choice may change it. Understood in this way, it may be 
possible partially to reconcile the ‘modernization’ perspectives with other approaches 
(see Pierson 1991). However, even in Wilensky’s early work, complexity and 
multidimensionality are seen as superficial. The explicit, if flexible, fimctionalism of 
this work reduced the appearance of complexity to an underlying unity (see Wilensky 
and Lebeaux 1965). Wilensky’s later work focused on the development of causal 
propositions and operationalization of measures suitable for statistical analysis. In 
both his ‘early’ and the ‘late’ work, Wilensky conceives of causation - the 
determination of outcomes - as itself a determined, rather than a contingent or open, 
process.
In addition, modernization theory was shaped through debate with ‘politics matters’ 
perspectives which perhaps increased the emphasis on economic factors. Even where 
political variables were acknowledged, they were presented as accounting for 
similarity (emphasising the ‘functional equivalence’ of Christian and social 
democracy). Modernization theorists share a tendency to emphasize the convergent 
character of ‘modem (industrial) societies’.
As traditionally conceived within the comparative welfare literature, modernization 
theory is primarily concerned with the origins and development of the welfare state. 
Numerous factors converge to produce welfare state development, but little attention 
is paid to the ‘policy feedback’ impact of the welfare state on political, economic or 
social arrangements. Indeed, despite the attention seemingly focused on the welfare 
state, it was mainly used to test general theories of modernization (see Esping- 
Andersen 1990: 18-19). This position reflects and reinforces the tendency to view 
welfare state development as determined by common general trends.
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Modernization theorists have not made strong predictions about the impact of welfare 
provision on gender roles. Rather than being integrated into the theoretical 
framework, remarks on this relationship generally result from the observation that 
women are comparatively well represented in ‘welfare occupations’. However, 
changes in gender roles are seen as a characteristic of modernization. Indeed, a 
defining image of ‘modernization’ is the ‘change’ from the ‘traditional’ to the 
‘modem’ household. Changes in gender roles tend to be presented within the 
complex configuration of factors causing welfare state development. Changes in 
gender role are presented as produced by ‘modernization’ and as a key characteristic 
of modernization, as well as a factor giving rise to (the functional need for) the 
welfare state. The primary hypotheses derived from these theories concern the impact 
of economic development and the rate of economic growth on women’s role in the 
workforce. I also analyze the impact of developments in the sectoral character of the 
economy, focusing particularly on manufacturing and services. Finally, although not 
well integrated theoretically, I also analyze the impact of government - especially 
welfare - spending on women’s involvement in the labour force.
The emphasis on economic factors within the modernization approach is strengthened 
further by my inclusion of the ‘Chicago School’ of economics within it - an apparently 
surprising move. In their analysis of long-run change and extension of the economic 
approach to cover all human behaviour Chicago School members work within an 
essentially functionalist modernization framework. They suggest that convergence on 
a single model of ‘modem society’ has largely occurred (Posner 1988: especially 206). 
They also tend to conceive of the process of causation as determined. These 
characteristics of the Chicago School are particularly clear in work on gender and the 
welfare state.
By contrast with mainstream modernization analyses, the Chicago School is 
unconcerned with welfare state origins, and more interested in changes in gender roles 
especially in the workforce. The primary causes of these changes are economic, with 
the overall level of economic development and the rate of economic growth both 
important. The emphasis on prices within ‘Chicago School’ analyses means that 
wages - a factor unconsidered in other theories - are given an important causal role. It
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is less clear whether the appropriate measure of wages should be the level of women’s 
money wages, women’s ‘real wages’ or women’s wages relative to men’s? What 
empirical evidence Becker deploys on this issue is concerned with women’s real 
wages (1981: 247). However, a focus on relative wages would fit better with 
conventional micro-economic emphasis on relative prices. The lack of clarity on this 
issue is ironic, given the theoretical emphasis on wages. It proved difficult to find 
appropriate measures of wages for comparative analysis. No such measure was 
available for the full range of states. The best comparable index of women’s wages 
relative to men’s was available for a sub-group of eleven states. As a consequence, a 
second set of pooled analyses was undertaken on a smaller data-set.
Considerable play is made of welfare state impacts on gender roles within Chicago 
analyses. The hypothesis that welfare state ‘size’ has an impact on women’s 
involvement in the workforce can be derived from this analysis. However, it is 
unclear how economic and welfare state factors interact. There is economically 
determinist strain within the approach - as well as being ‘economic’ in methodology, 
substantively economic explanations are preferred to political or technological ones. 
Although effects are attributed to it, the welfare state is seen as part of the overall 
process of economic modernization. However, considerable complexity is generated 
by extending the economic approach from ‘traditional’ markets in labour, goods and 
capital to include a variety of political and social markets as well. The assumption that 
all these markets ‘clear’ stretches credulity. Instead, the Chicago approach collapses 
complexity into an underlying unity - these factors are seen as aspects of the 
development of modem society - a strategy which is ultimately functionalist.
Inconsistency exists even within ‘Chicago’ analyses focused on politics and the state. 
An analysis of the welfare state could be reconstructed from general ‘Chicago’ work 
on politics (Becker 1983; 1985). While these analyses have a panglossian character, 
they are not necessarily functionalist in form. However, when Chicago School 
analysts consider the welfare role of the state explicitly, they do not simply extend 
these insights. Although competition between interest groups remains important (the 
claim is that ‘public policy results from competition among interest groups’ Becker 
1991: 378), no discussion is offered of this competition in relation to (welfare) state
9?
provision. Instead, the idea that the state intervenes to correct inefficiency in family 
arrangements (due to the inability of children to make effective contracts) is attributed 
to parental altruism. Altruism is insufficiently strong to cause parents to leave 
bequests, but strong enough to cause redistribution between generations through 
politics. This argument is functionalist - concerned with aggregate social ‘efficiency’ 
(it ‘is remarkable how many state interventions in family decision appear to contribute 
to the efficiency of family arrangements’ Becker 1991: 362-364, 378-379).
While both mainstream modernization theory and the Chicago School are basically 
optimistic about modernization - its impact on the welfare state and gender roles - a 
number of authors focus on pathologies of modernization. Some authors seem to 
suggest that modernization is generally pathological, advocating a return to a ‘golden 
age’ of family capitalism (Falwell 1981; Vigurie 1981). Others imply that 
modernization has some pathological features, particularly the development of the 
welfare state and changes in gender roles (Gilder 1981). While I will not discuss this 
strand of modernization theory in detail here, the suggestion that high inflation and 
increasing levels of personal taxation play a significant role pushing women into the 
paid workforce needs mention.
My main purpose here is to derive hypotheses from modernization theory. However, 
it is worth pointing out that I consider this theory in detail in chapter seven. The 
theoretical analysis justifies drawing together sociological modernization and the 
‘Chicago School’- which are traditionally thought of as in opposition to one another. 
This treatment provides the basis for a distinctive critique of the ‘Chicago School’ 
analysis of gender, including women’s entry into the workforce, showing that it 
assumes what it ought to explain - the gender division of households.
‘Politics matters’: social democratic and ‘power resource’ models 
If modernization theory is basically associated with predictions of convergence in 
welfare state development and women’s role in the workforce, ‘politics matters’ and 
‘social democratic’ theories suggest that common patterns are less significant than 
differences. This focus on the emergence of a number of distinct welfare state 
‘clusters’ has been extremely influential - although the number and nature of these
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clusters has generated debate. Although I am primarily concerned with the ‘social 
democratic’ or ‘power resource’ approach, particularly associated with Korpi and 
Esping-Andersen, I see this as an especially important strand within a broader 
literature which emerged from the assertion that ‘politics matters’ in public policy 
outcomes, some of which is critical o f ‘social democratic’ work.
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Table 1.1 - The Clustering of Welfare States
CONSERVATIVE W.S.R.
‘Strong manifestation o f  the 
welfare state regime attributes ’
Austria
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
‘Moderate manifestation o f  the 
welfare state regime attributes '
Finland
Ireland
Japan
Netherlands
Norway
LIBERAL W.S.R. SOCALIST W.S.R.
Australia
Canada
Japan
Switzerland 
United States
Denmark
Finland
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Denmark
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands 
United Kingdom
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Germany
New Zealand
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Austria
France
Ireland
Italy
Japan
United States
'Low manifestation o f  the 
welfare state regime attributes ’
Australia Austria
Canada Belgium
Denmark Finland
New Zealand Ireland
Sweden New Zealand
Switzerland Norway
United Kingdom Sweden
United States
(From Esping-Andersen 1990, page 74 Table 3.3)
Although divergent patterns are primarily identified within welfare provision, these 
theories are concerned with the consequences of welfare divergence for differentiation 
in other areas of social, economic and political life - effectively treating welfare state 
form as an independent variable. These theories are concerned with the feedback 
effects of public policies, despite some claims to the contrary (in Skocpol 1992 and 
Pierson 1994). Notwithstanding this emphasis on feedback, the relationship between 
the welfare state as an independent variable and the social, economic and political 
factors traditionally deployed to explain welfare state development and variation.
The main hypothesis derived here is that welfare state form impacts on patterns of
women’s participation in the workforce. Versions of Esping-Andersen’s (1990)
welfare state regime schema are operationalized in both the cross sectional and pooled 
analyses. We expect strongly positive results for the socialist regime, moderate 
positive ones for liberalism, and negative results for conservatism. Although it did 
not prove possible to operationalize Castles and Mitchell’s categorization in cross 
sectional analysis, a variant worked in the pooled analysis. Non-right hegemony and 
liberalism might be positively, and conservatism negatively, associated with women’s 
formal workforce entry. However, these expectations are not clear or strong. States 
such as Belgium fall within the non-right hegemony category but fail to follow 
Scandinavian growth patterns in women’s labour market participation. The 
theoretical expectation about the impact of the ‘radical’ welfare regime is not strong. 
Measures of the public, particularly welfare, expenditure and the level of government 
employment are analyzed.
These theories are also concerned with the social, economic and political context.
The level and rate of economic development, patterns of male labour force 
participation and levels of employment and/or value added in various sectors of the 
economy, as well as divorce rates and levels of religious - particularly Catholic - belief 
within a society, are key variables here. In addition, several ‘political’ measures of 
partisan representation in parliament and government are also analyzed, with 
particular emphasis on socialist (positive impact expected) and religious (negative) 
representation in pooled analyses. In addition, given the ‘political sociological’ logic 
of this analysis, the measure of proportion of women in the legislature was also 
analyzed (positive impact expected).
As with modernization theory, my main concern in this chapter is with the description 
of social democratic and power resource theories. Again, the thesis ‘opens out’ to 
consider the theory in chapter eight. The theoretical analysis provides a basic critique 
of the dominant ‘welfare state regime’ perspective, arguing that it conflates two 
distinct interpretations of the idea of the ‘welfare state’; 1) an ontological ‘form’ of 
the state - something a state is - and 2) a sector of state activity. This conceptual 
confusion pervades much of the existing comparative literature and is a barrier to 
understanding patterns of convergence and divergence in contemporary capitalism.
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1.4 Conclusion
For the past twenty years the welfare state literature has been bound up with wider 
debates about the nature of capitalism and democracy. During the 1990s these debates 
have intensified. Are capitalist democracies converging due to pressures of 
globalization or will they continue to develop as distinct ‘models’? This study adds a 
consideration of women’s employment trajectories in OECD countries to these 
debates. These trajectories do not simply constitute a potential dimension of variation 
among capitalist states - they may also feed back into ‘models’ of capitalism.
Convergence theories tend to emphasize general trends (and to view them as 
determining outcomes), while those pointing to divergence, or continuing difference, 
focus on the particularities of specific cases (and on contingency and choice in their 
development). To some extent, the balance between the general and the specific 
results from the closeness of focus on particular cases. A single case study or pairwise 
comparison would concentrate on particularities, while broader comparisons tend to 
identify common trends.
There is a strong sense that a general change is occurring/has occurred in gender roles. 
Yet, these changes are partly shaped by the policy configurations of welfare states, 
which differ cross-nationally. Evidence of the degree of commonality and difference 
in women’s employment trajectories is presented throughout this thesis. I will return 
to the issue of the balance between general and specific factors in the explanation of 
these trajectories (and of convergence and diversity among modem capitalist states) in 
the conclusion.
For now it is sufficient to note that a balance will need to be struck between the 
general and deterministic analysis associated with some forms of modernization 
theory and the increasing emphasis on differences across ‘welfare states’ associated 
with ‘regime’ theory. It might be fhiitful to contextualize the state and resist the 
temptation to attribute differences in outcomes to variation in state stmctures (as do 
‘power resource’ and social democratic theories). Equally, the continuing importance 
of cross-statal variations suggests a move away from deterministic and economistic 
variants of modernization theory. Attention could be focused instead on the diffusion
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of ideas about the economy, state policies and social movements across space. This 
double shift might produce an analytical framework for making sense of patterns of 
divergence and convergence in contemporary capitalism.
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Part One: Empirical Analyses
29
Chapter Two: The Entry of women into the paid workforce: A data 
analysis
30
This chapter presents analyses of the causes of cross-national differences in, and changes 
over time of, female labour force participation. It is divided into two main parts. The 
first part presents a variety of cross-sectional analyses. It analyses a data set made up of 
17 advanced industrial democracies, although data are not available for all variables and 
every state, so even this small number of cases is not always available. As a result of the 
limits of the application of these techniques to a small cross-national data set the 
dependent variables are tested against models derived from a number of different 
theories, and combinations of theories. First it is tested against an economic or 
modernization model, then a populist new right model, and then a combined 
economic/new right model. Next it is tested against a social democratic theory of the 
welfare state, a political sociological model of the mobilization of women, and a 
combined political sociological model. Finally an attempt is made to develop an overall 
model, out of variables which are not mutually inconsistent theoretically. The advantage 
of this approach is that it demands less of the data. Thus we can gain some understanding 
of issues for which there is relatively little data.
The second part presents two pooled time-series and cross-section analyses. This part 
uses two data-sets. The first includes data for a smaller number of variables, but a larger 
number of cases. This data set is used to investigate the various categorizations of 
different welfare state types or regimes, as well as the impact of other variables 
considered in the social democratic literature. The second considers a smaller data-set, 
but one for which a particular variable, women's wages, is available. Although this data­
set does not include a sufficiently large number of states to test the various welfare state 
regimes usefully, an attempt is made to analyze as inclusive a model as possible.
Section One - Cross-sectional analysis
In this part I explore first, the overall level of female labour force participation and 
second, the proportion of female labour force participation which is part time.
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Table 2.V.1 Variables and data sources for cross-sectional analyses
sflp84
sgdpc7984
ssoc84
svas84
sge84
scpi79-84
sgnp8
spwcb
spwlg
change in the 
consumer price 
index between 1979 
and 1984 - OECD 
historical statistics
gross national 
product in 1980 - 
Sivard 1985 
proportion of the 
cabinet made up of 
women in 1984 - 
Sivard 1985 
proportion of the 
legislature made up 
of women in 1984 - 
Sivard 1985
ssoc
slib
female labour force sdecom 
participation in 1984
- OECD historical 
statistics 
change in gdp 
between 1979 and 
1984 - OECD 
historical statistics 
social security 
spending in 1984 - 
OECD historical 
statistics
value of the service 
sector in 1984 - 
OECD historical 
statistics 
government 
employment in 1984
- OECD historical 
statistics
scon
spwlg75
spwlg5575
swwm80
sitptr
sptfe83
decommodification 
index - Esping- 
Andersen 1990
welfare state regime 
‘socialism’ - Esping- 
Andersen 1990
welfare state regime 
‘liberalism’ - 
Esping-Andersen 
1990
welfare state regime 
‘conservatism’ - 
Esping-Andersen 
1990
proportion of the 
legislature made up 
of women in 1975 - 
Inter-Parliamentary 
Union
change in the 
proportion of the 
legislature made up 
of women between 
1955 and 1975 - 
Inter-Parliamentary 
Union
women’s wages as a 
proportion of men’s 
1980 - ILO data 
individual taxation 
as a proportion of 
total revenue in 1982 
- OECD 1983 
women’s part time 
employment as a 
proportion of full 
time employment - 
EUROSTAT
The sources for these measures can be found in the methodological appendix.
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2.1 Overall female labour force participation
For the first part of this first section the labour force participation of women is used as the 
dependent variable. All the theories analyzed here are concerned with the ‘welfare state’, 
although some of them treat it primarily as a dependent variable rather than an 
independent one. The theories also suggest hypotheses about the causes of changes 
(increases) in female labour force participation can be derived firom all of these theories 
(even if the primary focus of the theorists considered was not with these changes). I 
consider modernization and ‘economic’ theories first. The most important of these 
theories provides a basically positive evaluation of ‘modernization’. However, some 
authors (particularly those associated with the US new right) draw attention to 
pathologies of modernization (Gilder 1981, Falwell 1981, Viguerie 1981). Sometimes 
these authors are relatively critical of modernization, preferring a romantic vision of 
small-scale capitalism, otherwise they are less critical, focusing on the impact of 
economic pathologies on gender roles. Within the modernization model I examine, in 
turn, 1) mainstream modernization hypotheses, 2) the ‘pathologies of modernization’ 
variant, and 3) a model which combines elements of the two. Next I examine a series of 
political sociology hypotheses, drawn fi'om 4) the social democratic theory, 5) a gender 
critique of the social democratic analysis focusing on women’s political mobilization, and 
6) combined ‘political sociological’ model (made up of social democratic and political 
mobilization of women variables). Finally, I analyze 7) an overall model combining 
variables which performed well in various regressions. I attempt to ensure that 
theoretical arguments exist to justify the combination of variables in any individual 
equation - theoretically incompatible variables should not be run together simply because 
they seem statistically adequate. The purpose of all these analyses is heuristic. I wish to 
see what we can learn fi’om the data, rather than attempting a final adjudication between 
complex theories on the basis of the data analysis.
Before going on to the individual regressions, a chart is presented which provides an 
overall guide to them. All the independent variables are listed - for each of them the sign 
of the coefficient (+ or -) is provided. If a coefficient is statistically significant, at least at
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the 0.1 level, it is marked by an asterix (*). Thus by reading along a row, the direction or 
influence of a single variable can be seen in a variety of regression equations. Of course, 
this table does not give any indication of the magnitude of the influence of the variables. 
Both the magnitude and the sign of the coefficient for a variable fully make sense only in 
context of a particular equation. The justification for the decision to report the signs of 
coefficients in this sort of table, in the context of the regressions reported here, is that as 
their robustness is doubtful, the confidence with which we can interpret the influence of a 
particular variable will be greater if its influence is fairly consistent across various 
equations. The magnitude of influence of a variable would be expected to change more 
markedly in equations which are specified differently. Reporting the magnitude of 
coefficients in a table of this sort would be too misleading. In addition to information 
about the impact of the independent variables, this table also provides a general map of 
the ways in which the independent variables are combined in the various models 
analyzed.
Table 2.1 Overview of influences on Female Labour Force Participation
4a 4b 4c 4d 5a 5b 6 7la lb Ic Id 2 3a 3b
sgnpS +♦ +* +♦ +* +* +•
sgdpc7984 +* +* +* +♦ +* +*
swwm80 + + +
ssose84 - .♦ .* -*
svas84 +♦ +♦ +* +*
sitptr - -*
scpi7984
sdecom +
ssoc + +* +* +
slib + + +* +*
scon
spwlg75 + +* +•
spwlg5575 + +*
spwcb +
spwlg
In order to place this table in some context, I list, in equation form, the most successful of 
the regression analyses.
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2.1.1c) SFLP84 = 0.055 + 04.58 SGNP8 + 0.567 SVAS84 + 0.668 SGDPC7984 
2.1.3b) SFLP84 = 0.107 + 0.507 SGNP8 + 0.499 SGDPC7984 + 0.49 SVAS84 -0.339 SSOSE84 
2.1.4c) SFLP84 = 0.53SSOC - 2.256E-9 
2.1.5b) SFLP84 = 0.032 + 0.67 SWL5575
2.1.6) SFLP84 = 0.006 40.751 SPWLG75 + 0.465 SLIB + 0.373 SGE84 - 0.355 SSOSE84
2.1.7) SFLP84 = 0.34 + 0.585 SPWLG75 + 0.68 SLIB + 0.549 SGE84 + 0.492 SGDPC7984
Modernization Models
Modernization theorists, general treat the level of economic development as the crucial 
determinant of differences between states and societies, in this case in relation to the 
female participation rates, although the rate o f change/growth of the economy also 
sometimes treated as important (see Becker 1981/1991). The ‘economic’ variant of 
modernization theory also places considerable emphasis on relative prices, in this case in 
the form of women’s wages (relative to men’s). Within the modernization perspective 
various other changes, particularly changes in the structure of the economy, are also 
considered to be important.
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Table 2.1.1a. A basic economic model.
Multiple Regression Y) :sflp84 3 X variables
Residual Information Table 
0: e < 0: DW test:
12.413 6 10 1.586
Note: 2 cases deleted with missing values. 
Multiple R egression Y <\ :sflp84 3 X variables
DF: R: R-squared: Adj. R-squared:Std. Error:
15 .725 .526 .407 .808
Source DF:
Analysis of Variance Table
Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSlOf 13 8.673 2.891 4.432
RESIDUAL 12 7.828 .652 p =.0257
TOTAL 15 16.501
Beta Coefficient Table
INTERCEPT -029
sgnp8 .512 .201 .511 2.547 .0256
swwm80 .259 .216 .247 1.2 .2532
sgdpc7984 .437 .236 .378 1.851 .0889
Multiple R egression Y<f :sflp84 3 X variables
Parameter: 95% Lower:
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table 
95% Upper: 90% Lower: 90% Ui Partial F:
INTERCEPT
sgnp8 .074 .95 .154 .87 6.488
swwm80 -.211 .729 -126 .644 1.441
sgdpc7984 -.077 .952 .016 .858 3.427
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The results of this regression suggest that the model has some merit as an explanation of 
variation in female labour force participation. Overall the model explained about 40% of 
the variation in female labour force participation rates across countries. In the context of 
the model, the level of economic development had the most influence, followed by the 
rate of economic change. The influence of women's wages was smallest and not 
significant. This variable plays a crucial role as the mechanism by which economic 
change transforms gender relations, according to the ‘Chicago School’ (Becker 
1981/1991).
Table 2.1.1b. Economic model with state welfare policy effects
The influence of state welfare policy was considered by running an expanded regression
including a measure of the level of social security transfers across countries
Multiple Regression Yi :sflp84 4 X variables
Residual Information Table 
0: e < 0; DW test:
12.611 6 9 2.025
DF: R: R-squared: Adi. R-squared:Std. Error:
14 .776 .602 .443 .789
Analysis of Variance Table
Source DF: Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSION 4 9.42 2.355 3.781
RESIDUAL 10 6.229 .623 p = 0401
TOTAL 14 15.649
Note: 3 cases deleted with missing values.
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Multiple R eg ression  Yi  :sflp84 4  X v ariab les
Beta Coefficient Table
INTERCEPT .065
sgnpB .469 .212 .459 2.213 .0513
ssose84 -.228 .257 -.213 .885 .3969
sgdpc7984 .434 .298 .354 1.46 .1751
swwm80 .237 .211 .232 1.121 .2886
Multiple Regression Y1 :sflp84 4 X variables
Parameter;
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table 
95% Lower: 95% Upper: 90% Lower: 90% U Partial F:
INTERCEPT
sgnp8 -.003 .942 .085 .853 4.895
ssose84 -.802 .346 -.695 .239 .783
sgdpc7984 -.229 1.098 -.105 .974 2.13
swwm80 -.234 .708 -.146 .62 1.256
The inclusion of a measure of social security in the model did not improve the overall 
proportion of variability explained by very much (AR-squared 0.443). Also the overall 
significance of the equation falls. Social security itself seems to have a negative impact 
on the labour force participation of women (Std Beta -0.213), which is not the sign 
predicted by the theory, if social security is taken as a measure of the influence of the 
welfare state. The value of this variable is small, and, in any case statistically 
insignificant. The short run economic growth variable is also not statistically significant. 
In combination with the value for SGNPS, the only variable to achieve statistical 
significance, it indicates that the labour force participation of women is more susceptible 
the level of economic development than to short run changes in the economy.
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Table 2.1.1c. Economie model plus service sector effects
A regression of the basic economic model including a measure of the importance of the 
service sector was run. This model was much more successful than the previous ones.
Multiple Regression Y 1 :sflp84 4 X variables
DF: R: R-squared: Adj. R-squared: Std. Error:
14 .872 .761 .665 .628
Analysis of Variance Table
Source DF: Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSION 4 12.549 3.137 7.953
RESIDUAL 10 3.945 394 p = .0038
TOTAL 14 16.493
Residual Information Table 
0: e < 0: DW test:
8.673 6 9 2.199
Note: 3 cases deleted with missing values.
Multiple Regression Y i  :sflp84 4 X variables
Beta Coefficient Table
INTERCEPT .043
sgnp8 .519 .2 .45 2.593 .0268
sgdpc7984 .675 .2 .582 3.37 .0071
swwm80 .019 .198 .017 .096 .9258
svas84 .564 .198 .508 2.844 .0174
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Multiple R egression Y i :sflp84 4 X variables
Parameter: 95% Lower:
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table 
95% Upper: 90% Lower: 90' Partial F:
INTERCEPT
sgnp8 .073 .966 .156 .882 6.725
sgdpc7984 .229 1.122 .312 1.039 11.357
swwmSO -.422 .46 -.34 .378 .009
svas84 .122 1.006 .205 .924 8.088
Over 66% of the total variation in levels of female labour force participation was 
explained by the model. The measure of women's wages relative to men's is even smaller 
and failed the test of statistical significance more dramatically than in equations la  and 
lb.
Modernization theory places some considerable emphasis on changes in the structure of 
the economy. In the case of the expansion of female labour force participation special 
emphasis is placed on the development of the service sector (Wilensky and LeBeaux 
1958/1965 Wilensky 1968 and from an ‘economic’ perspective Fuchs 1983) some 
characteristics of the service sector can be construed in terms of potentially quantifiable 
costs and benefits. For example, Fuchs suggests that services are more likely to be 
located in residential areas, thus reducing the costs associated with getting to and from 
work (Fuchs 1983; 132). These costs may be especially high for women, if they have to 
juggle formal labour market participation with domestic work. Nevertheless, as 
considerations of this kind creep into the analysis it will begin to feel like a sociological 
analysis of industrial or urban change, rather than an economic analysis of human 
behaviour.
Furthermore, by excluding this variable from the model both the overall proportion of the 
variation of the dependent variable explained by the model (66.5% up to 71%), and its 
statistical robustness (F-test 7.953 to 14.06) improved.
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Table 2.1.Id  Economie and service sector model without wage effects 
Multiple Regression Y i  :sflp84 3 X variables
DF: R: R-squared: Adi. R-squared: Std. Error:
16 .874 .764 .71 .555
Analysis of Variance Table
Source DF: Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSION 3 12.979 4.326 14.06
RESIDUAL 13 4 .308 D = 0002
TOTAL 16 16.979
Residual information Table 
0: e  < 0: DW test:
Note: 1 case deleted with missing values.
Multiple Regression Y i ;sflp84 3 X variables
9.321 7 10 2.33
Beta Coefficient Table
INTERCEPT .055
sgnpS .527 .167 .458 3.166 .0074
svas84 .584 .167 .567 3.491 .004
sgdpc7984 .671 .153 .668 4.392 .0007
Multiple Regression Y 1 :sfip84 3 X variables
Parameter: 95% Lower;
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table 
95% Upper: 90 % Lower: Partial F:
INTERCEPT
sgnpB .167 .887 .232 .823 10.021
svas84 .223 .945 .288 .88 12.189
sgdpc7984 .341 1.001 .4 .941 19.286
SFLP84 = 0.055 + 04.58 SGNP8 + 0.567 SVAS84 + 0.668 SGDPC7984
Relative to the results of other equations considered here these results seem to lend strong 
support to a modernization theory, and perhaps a sociological, rather than an economic, 
version of the theory of economic and social change. An expanded model based on this
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theory will be explored below, but first models based on new right hypotheses that 
changes in gender relations result fi-om economic and political pathologies.
Pathologies of Modernization
Some elements in the US new right draw particular attention to the pathologies of 
economic modernization. Their arguments take the family as a collective decision making 
unit with conventionally or socially set money income targets. Economic ‘pafiiologies’ 
(caused by big government), such as taxation and inflation, result in families being unable 
to attain these target on a single income, and so lead women to work outside the home 
(Gilder 1981; Falwell 1981; Viguire 1981). Ironically, a more rigorously economic 
perspective, taking account of the economic value of domestic production, and 
particularly the fact that this production is untaxed and not subject to inflation, would 
suggest that these phenomena should lead to a lowering of participation in the formal 
labour market. The new right also suggest that a ‘new class’, associated with 
employment in government, amongst other things, has waged an ideological war on the 
family, particularly by promoting feminist ideology and thereby encouraging women to 
work (arguably against their better judgment). A regression did not lend general support 
to ‘pathologies of modernization’ hypotheses, although the model explained just over 
53% of the variation in the independent variable.
42
Table 2.1.2 Modernization Pathologies Model
Multiple Regression Y i  :sflp84 4 X variables
DF: R: R-squared: Adi. R-squared: Std. Error:
15 .811 .658 .533 .706
Analysis of Variance Table
Source DF: Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSION 4 10.519 2.63 5.282
RESIDUAL 11 5.476 .498 D = .0127
TOTAL 15 15.994
Residual Information Table
Note: 2 cases deleted with missing values. 
Multiple Regression Y i  :sflp84 4 X variables
9.315 7 9 1.701
Beta Coefficient Table
INTERCEPT -.057
sge84 .796 .21 .686 3.794 .003
ssose84 -.562 .212 -.543 2.65 .0226
sitptr -.312 .257 -.251 1.216 .2493
scpi7984 -.317 .194 -.296 1.636 .13
Multiple Regression Y <\ :sflp84 4 X variables
Parameter: 95% Lower:
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table 
95% Upper: 90% Lower: 90% U Partial F:
INTERCEPT
sge84 .334 1.257 .419 1.172 14.394
ssose84 -1.029 -.095 -.943 -.181 7.022
sitptr -878 .253 -.774 .149 1.479
scpi7984 -.744 .109 -.665 .031 2.678
The variables measuring the impact of inflation and taxation each had a small impact. As 
neither variable was statistically significant, no strong conclusions can be drawn from the
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signs of their Beta coefficients. Nevertheless it may be worth noting that the inflation and 
taxation variables had negative signs, whereas the theory predicted positive signs.
Government employment (used here as a measure of the 'new class') and the level of 
social security both have stronger influence on the level of female labour force 
participation. Although a negative, but insignificant, influence of social security was 
reported in equation lb, here the variable showed a strong, statistically significant, 
negative influence on the female labour force participation. While this result might be 
compatible with the argument that female labour force participation is a (positive) 
product of economic growth, which is hampered by the (dire) consequences of the 
welfare state - this is not an argument made by any of the authors under consideration 
here. Instead the authors analyzed here who emphasize the pathologies of modernization 
regard both social policy, and the labour force participation of women as undesirable. 
Government employment showed a moderately large and fairly strong influence on 
female labour force participation. This influence is relatively consistent with the ‘new 
class’ hypothesis, although other interpretations of this variable are possible.
An expanded economic model
A regression for the overall model of the economic theory was run, which explained over 
85% of the variation in the dependent variable.
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Table 2.1.3a Expanded Economie Model
Multiple Regression Y i  :sflp84 5 X variables
DF: R: R-squared: Adj. R-squared: Std. Error:
14 .953 .908 .856 .405
Analysis of Variance Table
Source DF: Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSION 5 14.486 2.897 17.706
RESIDUAL 9 1.473 .164 p = .0002
TOTAL 14 15.958
Residual Information Table
4.52 6 9 3.07
Note: 3 cases deleted with missing values. 
Multiple Regression Y i  :sflp84 5 X variables 
Beta Coefficient Table
INTERCEPT .063
sgnpB .481 .147 .404 3.282 .0095
ssoseB4 -.616 .187 -.591 3.288 .0094
sitptr -.507 .236 -.383 2.148 .0602
sgdpc7984 .41 .177 .332 2.316 .0458
svas84 .67 .149 .61 4.509 .0015
Parameter:
Multiple Regression Y i  :sflp84 5 X variables
95% Lower:
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table 
95% Upper: 90% Lower: 90% U Partial F;
INTERCEPT
sgnp8 .15 .813 .212 .75 10.773
ssose84 -1.041 -.192 -.96 -.273 10.81
sitptr -1.04 .027 -.939 -.074 4.616
sgdpc7984 .009 .81 .085 .734 5.362
svas84 .334 1.007 .398 .943 20.333
Further, it tends to confirm the skepticism about the populist new right suggested by the 
regression testing pathologies of modernization. That is, variables such as the measure of
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taxation have a negative influence on the level of female labour force participation. 
However the taxation variable just fails the test of significance at the 0.05 level.
A number of other variables were tested in expanded versions of this model, including a 
measure of government employment, inflation and women's wages as a proportion of 
men's. Including any of these variables reduced the overall explanatory power of the 
model. Individually each of these variables had a weak, statistically insignificant 
influence on the model.
Excluding the taxation variable (which just failed the test of significance at the 0.05 level) 
the regression explained over 80% of the variation in the dependent variable.
Table 2.1.3b Expanded economic model without taxation effects 
Multiple Regression Y i  :sflp84 4 X variables
DF: R: R-squared: Adj. R-squared: Std. Error:
15 .926 .858 .806 .455
Analysis of Variance Table
Source DF: Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSION 4 13.727 3.432 16.583
RESIDUAL 11 2.276 207 D = .0001
TOTAL 15 16.004
Residual Information Table 
0: e < 0: DW test:
5.938 8 8 2.608
Note: 2 cases deleted with missing values.
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M ultiple R eg ress io n  Y <\ :sflp84 4 X v ariab les
Beta Coefficient Table
INTERCEPT .107
sgnpS .593 .153 .507 3.875 .0026
ssose84 -.339 .147 -337 2.3 042
sgdpc7984 .512 .161 .499 3.178 .0088
svas84 .504 .141 .49 3.567 .0044
Multiple Regression Y <\ :sflp84 4 X variables
Parameter:
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table 
95% Lower: 95% Upper: 90% Lower: 90% I Partial F:
INTERCEPT
sgnp8 .256 .93 .318 .868 15.016
ssose84 -.663 -.015 -.603 -.074 5.289
sgdpc7984 .157 .866 .222 .801 10.097
svas84 .193 .815 .25 758 12.721
SFLP84 = 0.507 SGNPS + 0.499 SGDPC7984 + 0.49 SVAS84 -0.339 SSOSE84 +
0.107
The social security variable, which had a negative sign but was statistically insignificant 
in equation lb, is still negative, but now significant. In modernization theories social 
security is often used as a measure of the level of development of the welfare state, but 
according to these theories (see for example Becker 1981/1991) the welfare state ought to 
have a positive impact on female labour force participation. On the other hand, the 
consistently positive association between the level of economic development and female 
labour force participation poses difficulties for the new right, which regards female labour 
force participation as a result of economic, social and public policy pathologies.
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Social democratic and power resource models
Social democratic analysis of the welfare state implies that social policy can take a variety 
of forms, or have various aspects. There are three characteristic styles of welfare 
provision identified in this literature: socialist, liberal and conservative. These 
characteristics are shown to varying degrees in the welfare regime of any particular state. 
Indeed, welfare provision of a state can show characteristics of more than one style of 
welfare simultaneously. Each style has different implications for the evolution of labour 
markets, in general, and the labour force participation of women in particular.
A regression was run to test the impact of styles of state welfare and the extent of 
decommodification on female labour force participation. Overall the regression was not 
successful. Only 17.5% of the variation of female labour force participation was 
explained. The only slight relief for the theory was that the individual independent 
variables did show the signs expected of them.
Table 2.1.4a Welfare state regimes and de-commodification
Multiple Regression Y i  :sflp84 4 X variables
DF: R: R-squared: Adi. R-squared: Std. Error:
17 .608 .369 .175 .908
Analysis of Variance Table
Source DF: Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSION 4 6.275 1.569 1.902
RESIDUAL 13 10.725 .825 0 = 1 7 0 2
TOTAL 17 17
Residual Information Table 
0: e < 0: DW test:
21.615 10 8 2.015
48
M ultiple R e g ressio n  Y i  :sflp84 4 X v ariab les
Beta Coefficient Table
INTERCEPT -2.265E-9
sdecom .188 .33 .188 .568 .5797
sconservative -.123 .251 -.123 .49 .6325
ssocialist .506 .339 .506 1.492 .1597
sliberal .307 .256 .307 1.197 .2525
Multiple Regression Y :sflp84 4 X variables
Parameter: 95% Lower:
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table 
90% Lower: Partial F:
INTERCEPT
sdecom -.526 .901 -.397 .772 .323
sconservative -.666 .42 -.568 .322 .24
ssocialist -.227 1.239 -.095 1.107 2.225
sliberal -.247 .86 -.147 .761 1.434
A regression was run excluding the two weaker variables, those for conservative 
characteristics of welfare states and the decommodification of labour power.
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Table.2.1.4b Socialist and Liberal welfare state regimes
Multiple Regression Y \  :sflp84 2 X variables
Residual Information Table 
0: e < 0; DW test:
21.838 10 8 1.973
DF: R: R-squared: Adj. R-squared: Std. Error:
17 .591 .349 .262 859
Analysis of Variance Table
Source DF: Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSION 2 5.934 2.967 4.022
RESIDUAL 15 11.066 .738 D = 04
TOTAL 17 17
Multiple Regression Y i  :sflp84 2 X variables
Beta Coefficient Table
Parameter: Value: Std. Err.: Std. Value: t-Value: Probability:
INTERCEPT -1.912E-9
ssocialist .656 .231 .656 2.836 .0125
siiberal .29 .231 .29 1.253 .2293
Multiple Regression Y 1 :sflp84 2 X variables
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table
Parameter: 95% Lower: 95% Upper: 90% Lower: 90% Upper: Partial F:
INTERCEPT
ssocialist .163 1.149 .251 1.062 8.043
siiberal -.203 .783 -.116 .696 1.571
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Clearly these results do not lend much support to the notion that the welfare regime 
approach developed by Esping-Andersen can be applied to female labour force 
participation.
A simple regression of the socialist character of welfare provision on female labour force 
participation is slightly more encouraging for the social democratic case. However, the 
very slight character of this support provides that the overall implication of this analysis 
is that the problems feminists have identified in extending the logic of social democracy 
to gender issues are well illustrated by these results.
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Table 2.1.4c The socialist welfare state regime
Simple R egression Xi : sso c ia lis t Y i  : sflp84
OF: R: R-sauared: Adj. R-squared: Std. Error:
17 .53 .281 .236 .874
Analysis of Variance Table
Source DF; Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSION 1 4.775 4.775 6.25
RESIDUAL 16 12.225 .764 d =.0237
TOTAL 17 17
Residual Information Table 
0: e < 0: DW test:
21.108 9 9 1.727
Simple RegressioniX sso c ia lis t Y^: sflp84 
Beta Coefficient Table
Parameter: Value: Std. Err.: Std. Value: t-Value: Probability:
INTERCEPT -2.256E-9
SLOPE .53 .212 .53 2.5 .0237
Confidence Intervals Table
MEAN (X.Y) -.437 .437 -.36 .36
SLOPE .081 .979 .16 .9
SFLP84 = -2.256E-9 + 0.53SSOC
Although measures of quantitative variation in expenditure on various 'aspects' of social 
policy have come in for criticism as indicators of the ‘welfare stateishness’ of a state 
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Castles and Mitchell 1993), measures of individual factors, such 
as the size of the public sector in terms of employment, are still considered important 
within the social democratic tradition. A regression including some measure of 
government employment and the level of social security transfers, as well as the index of 
the socialist character of the welfare state was run. It explained over 43% of the variation 
in the dependent variable.
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Table 2.1.4d An expanded ‘social democratic’ model
Multiple RegressloniYsflp84 3 X variables
DF: R: R-squared: Adj. R-squarecBtd. Error:
16 .735 .541 .435 753
Source DF:
Analysis of Variance Table 
Sum Squares:Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSIO 8.674 2.891 5.099
RESIDUAL 13 7.372 .567 D = 015
TOTAL 16 16.045
Residual Information Table 
10; e < 0: DW test:
16.432 8 9 2.229
Note: 1 case deleted with missing values.
Multiple Regression Y:sflp84 3 X variables
Beta Coefficient Table
INTERCEPT .056
ssocialist .375 .238 .386 1.572 .1399
ssose84 -.459 .19 -.458 2.422 .0308
sge84 .302 .247 .302 1.225 .2424
Multiple Regression Y:sflp84 3 X variables
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table
Parameter:
INTERCEPT
ssocialist -.14 .89 -.047 .797 2.471
ssose84 -.869 -.049 -.795 -.123 5.864
sge84 -.231 .835 -.135 .739 1.5
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However, only one of the independent variables achieved statistical significance. That 
variable, the level of spending on social security, showed a negative sign. If this variable 
is taken as a measure of the level of development of the welfare state, then the result is 
theoretically perplexing. However, according to some leading proponents of the social 
democratic account (see Esping-Andersen 1990), social security - a variable which 
measures transfers, rather than wider characteristics of the welfare state - is a divisive, 
rather than a solidaristic, form of social policy, allied to the ‘conservative’ welfare state 
regimes of continental Europe. Others evaluate this pattern of social policy more 
positively, associating transfers with a distinctive Christian democratic welfare regime 
(van Kersbergen 1995). On either of these accounts transfer oriented social policy might 
be expected to have a negative impact on female labour force participation. Running the 
regression including the measure of liberal aspects of the welfare state as well, explained 
slightly less of the variation in the independent variable. The liberalism variable was not 
statistically significant.
The mobilization of women
The basis of much social democratic reasoning is political sociological. One implication 
of this style of reasoning is that the mobilization of women should be considered as 
potentially important independent variables in the explanation of variation in the labour 
force participation of women.
A model of the political mobilization of women made up of a measure of the 
representation of women in cabinets, of measures of the representation of women in 
legislatures at various points in time, and of the change in the representation of women in 
legislatures between 1955 and 1975, was not very successful. Under 29% of the variation 
in the labour force participation of women was explained, and the overall regression was 
not significant.
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Table 2.1.5a Women’s political mobilization
Multiple Regression Y:sflp84 4 X variables
DF: R: R-squared: Adi. R-squaredStd. Error:
14 .7 .49 .286 .732
Source DF:
Analysis of Variance Table
Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSIOI 44 5.145 1.286 2.401
RESIDUAL 10 5.356 .536 p = 1191
TOTAL 14 10.501
Residual Information Table 
10: e < 0: DW test:
Note: 3 cases deleted with missing values. 
Multiple Regression ysflp 84  4 X variables
8.992 9 6 1.679
Beta Coefficient Table
INTERCEPT .0 3 8
s p w l g 7 5 .4 2 2 6 3 3 . 4 5 4 .6 6 6 . 5 2 0 4
s p w i g - .4 9 . 5 7 4 - . 5 5 6 .8 5 4 . 4 1 2 9
s p w c b .0 4 5 . 3 4 6 0 4 8 .1 3 2 . 8 9 7 9
S W I5 5 7 5 .6 2 7 . 3 7 8 7 2 4 1 .6 6 1 . 1 2 7 6
Multiple Regression jgsfip84 4 X variables
Parameter:
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table
INTERCEPT
spwlg75 -.989 1.832 -.726 1.569 .444
spwIg -1.769 .788 -1.53 .55 .73
spwcb -.725 .816 -.581 .672 .017
SWI5575 -.214 1.469 -.057 1.312 2.76
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Even the strongest of the variables in the equation, the change in the political 
mobilization of women from 1955 to 1975, failed to achieve statistical significance.
A simple regression of the position of women in the legislature from 1955 to 1975 
showed a much more significant result. This regression explained over 40% of the 
variation in the dependent variable.
Table 2.1.5b Women in the legislature, 1955-1975
Multiple Regression \ |  :sflp84 1 X variables
DF: R: R-squared: Adj. R-squaredStd. Error:
14 .67 .448 .406 .668
Source DF:
Analysis of Variance Table
Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSIOr 11 4.708 4.708 10.564
RESIDUAL 13 5.793 .446 p =.0063
TOTAL 14 10.501
Residual Information Table 
I  0: e  < 0: DW test:
8.725 8 7 1.506
Note: 3 cases deleted with missing values.
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M ultiple R e g re ss io n  X :sflp84 1 X variab les
Beta Coefficient Table
Parameter: Value: Std. Err.: Std. Value: t-Value: Probability:
INTERCEPT .032
S W I5 5 7 5 .68 .178 .67 3.25 .0063
Multiple Regression ysflp84  1 X variables
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table
Parameter: 95% Lower: 95% Upper: 90% Lower: 90% Upper: Partial F:
INTERCEPT
S W I5 5 7 5 .194 .965 .264 .896 10.564
SFLP84 = 0.032 + 0.67 SWL5575
A simple regression run using the percentage of women in legislatures in 1975 as the 
independent variable explained a very slightly smaller percentage of the variation in the 
independent variable (AR squared .398) and scored higher on the F-test (12.223). This 
latter score may be an artifact of the fact that the measure of the political mobilization of 
women from 1955 to 1975 has three missing values. However in a regression including 
both the change in the political mobilization of women between 55 and 75, and the level 
of the political mobilization of women in 1975, the former variable both had more of an 
impact (Std Beta (0.619 compared to 0.061) and had a much larger T-statistic (1.638 
compared to 0.162).
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More interesting than the comparison of these variables with each other is the comparison 
of them with more recent measures of the political mobilization and representation of 
women. Both as part of a multiple regression model, and comparing simple regressions 
on the same independent variable measures of the earlier political mobilization of women 
show stronger results than later measures of these patterns of mobilization. (Simple 
regressions which used SPWLG and SPWCB as independent variables explained 29.7% 
and 29.2% respectively.) These results suggest that the political mobilization of women 
may act with a time lag.
Social democracy and the political mobilization of women 
Some hypotheses generated from the 'social democratic' and 'political mobilization of 
women' perspectives can be regarded as complementary. A combined 'political 
sociological' model can be developed. This approach would suggest that the character of 
welfare state provision and other patterns in public policy, as well as the political 
mobilization of women can have an influence on women's labour force participation 
decisions.
A regression was run which used measures of'welfare stateness' and of the political 
mobilization of women. It explained over 71% of the variation in the dependent variable.
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Table 2.1.6 Welfare, regimes and women
Multiple Regression X:sflp84 4 X variables
DF: R: R-squared: Adi. R-squared Std. Error:
16 .888 .785 .714 .536
Source DF:
Analysis of Variance Table 
Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSIOI 14 12.602 3.15 10.977
RESIDUAL 12 3.444 .287 p = 0006
TOTAL 16 16.045
Residual Information Table 
10: e  < 0: DW test:
Note: 1 case deleted with missing values. 
Multiple Regression ^ s flp 8 4  4 X variables
9.198 11 6 2.671
Beta Coefficient Table
INTERCEPT .006
siiberal .469 .178 .465 2.642 .0215
ssose84 -.355 .14 -.355 2.548 .0256
sge84 .373 161 .373 2.322 .0386
spwlg75 .734 .173 .751 4.25 .0011
Multiple Regression Y:sflp84 4 X variables
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table
Parameter:
INTERCEPT
siiberal .082 .856 .153 .786 6.979
ssose84 -.659 -.051 -604 -.107 6.493
sge84 .023 .723 .087 .66 5.393
spwlg75 .358 1.111 .426 1.042 18.061
SFLP84 = 0.006 +0.751 SPWLG75 + 0.465 SLIB + 0.373 SGE84 - 0.355 SSOSE84
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The results show that percentage of women in legislatures in 1975 has a strong positive 
influence on the labour force participation of women (other variables measuring aspects 
of the political mobilization of women did not performs as well). They suggest that a 
liberal, 'market reinforcing' approach to social policy facilitates the labour force 
participation of women, as does the level of government employment, while increasing 
social security spending hinders that participation, consistent with the pattern of results 
we have seen so far. It is also worth pointing out that the variable measuring the socialist 
quality of the welfare state regime could not be run successfully alongside the political 
mobilization of women variables, and when used in the place of these variables 
performed less well. This might draw attention to the distinctiveness of Scandinavian 
countries for the period under question. As the variables which operationalize the 
political mobilization of women show a cluster of very high values for the Scandinavian 
countries, while the socialist variable includes high values for the Netherlands. Indeed, 
given the distinctiveness of these countries, there is the risk the political mobilization of 
women variables are serving as a proxy for some other feature of the Scandinavian 
countries.
An overall model
Using variables which are not mutually inconsistent in terms of their theoretical influence 
on the dependent variable an overall model explaining female labour force participation 
was built. It explained almost 80% of the variation in the dependent variable.
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Table 2.1.7 An overall model
M ultiple R eg ress io n  Y :sflp84 4 X v ariab les
DF: R: R-squared: Adi. R-squaredStd. Error:
16 .921 .848 .797 .451
Source DF:
Analysis of Variance Table
Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSIOI 14 13.603 3.401 16.706
RESIDUAL 12 2.443 .204 p = 0001
TOTAL 16 16.045
Residual Information Table 
10; e < 0: DW test:
Note: 1 case deleted with missing values. 
Multiple R egression ysflp 8 4  4 X variables
3.82 9 8 1.564
Beta Coefficient Table
INTERCEPT .034
spwlg75 .572 .156 .585 3.668 .0032
siiberal .686 .147 .68 4.66 .0006
sge84 .55 .145 .549 3.789 .0026
sgdpc7984 .503 .134 .492 3.751 .0028
Multiple R egression ysflp 8 4  4 X variables
Parameter:
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table
INTERCEPT
spwlg75 .232 .912 .294 .85 13.456
siiberal .365 1.006 423 .948 21.715
sge84 .234 .866 291 .808 14.359
sgdpc7984 .211 .796 .264 742 14.072
SFLP84 = 0.585 SPWLG75 + 0.68 SLIB + 0.549 SGE84 + 0.492 SGDPC7984 + 0.34
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The overall conclusion of the exercise in model building suggests that none of the 
theories has a monopoly on satisfactory explanation of the labour force participation of 
women. Clearly elements of political mobilization, the character of the state, and the 
performance of the economy all have important influences on the dependent variable. 
However, none of the variables has an influence on the dependent variable which 
supports the political motivation of those who wrote the theory.
Thus the political convictions of those who emphasize the positive influence of political 
variables in explanations of economic outcomes are usually social democratic. The 
'welfare state regime' variable which has a significant positive influence on female labour 
force participation measures the liberal rather than the socialist character of the welfare 
state.
It might be expected, then, that a general liberal explanation of the labour force 
participation of women would be successful. Indeed the annual average rate of economic 
growth between 1979 and 1984 has a significant impact. Also the political mobilization 
of women could be accommodated as an important influence in some versions of 
liberalism.
This version of liberalism would be different fi’om Becker's economic liberalism. Becker 
would be skeptical about the independent influence of a political variable, such as the 
percentage of women in legislatures in 1975. Further, the key variable for a liberal price 
or economic theory such as Becker's is the relative wage rate. This variable does not 
feature in the final regression presented here, nor has it shown an important influence in 
any of the regressions run here.
It is difficult to place the influence of the rate of government employment discerned here 
in theoretical context. A new right, ‘new class’, interpretation of the influence of SGB84 
is not satisfactory in the context of a model which suggests a broadly liberal and 
optimistic interpretation of cross national variation in female labour force participation
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rates. Equally it is difficult to place the variable in a social democratic theoretical 
context. Perhaps the most that can be said is that women are disproportionately involved 
in public sector work, so the larger the public employment sector, the more women work.
Even this interpretation tends to undermine a strong (not rigourously economic) liberal 
interpretation of the model. Perhaps the most that can be said is that the model supports a 
broad political sociological interpretation of international variation in the labour force 
participation of women.
2.2 The proportion of female employment which is part-time
The increasing proportion of female employment which is part-time is much commented 
on, although many of the theories considered here do not have unambiguous explanations 
for it. It is, nevertheless, worth considering, as it may throw further light on confidence 
with which the social democratic argument can be extended to cover gender as well as 
class. If the socialist welfare regime is associated with women working part time, then its 
universalism may be regarded as dented. Because the normative significance of women 
working part time is disputed, measures of the impact of women’s political mobilization 
and influence have been included in the regression. If they show positive influence on the 
dependent variable then a less pessimistic interpretation of the growth of part time work 
might be justifiable.
Over 79% of the variation in the proportion of part-time work in female employment was 
explained by a regression using the socialist character in welfare states, the conservative 
character of welfare states, the proportion of women in cabinets and the proportion of 
women in legislatures in 1975 as independent variables.
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Table 2.2 Part-time work
M ultiple R eg ress io n  Y :sptfe83 4  X v ariab les
DF: R: R-squared: Adj. R-squaredStd. Error:
16 .918 .844 .791 .457
Source DF:
Analysis of Variance Table 
Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSIOI 14 13.496 3.374 16.172
RESIDUAL 12 2.504 .209 p =.0001
TOTAL 16 16
Residual Information Table 
10: e  < 0: DW test:
Note: 1 case deleted with missing values. 
Multiple R egressionffsptfe83 4 X variables
5.913 8 9 2.362
Beta Coefficient Table
INTERCEPT -.006
ssocialist .909 .177 .937 5.135 .0002
sconservative -.386 .123 -.376 3.141 .0085
spwcb .493 .207 479 2.378 .0349
spwlg75 -.816 227 -.841 3.598 .0037
Multiple R egression y sp tfe8 3  4 X variables
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table
INTERCEPT
ssocialist .523 1.294 .593 1.224 26.366
sconservative -.655 -.118 -.606 -.167 9.863
spwcb .041 .944 .123 .862 5.657
spwlg75 -1.311 -.322 -1.221 -.412 12.946
SPTFE83 = 0.937 SSOC + 0.479 SPWCB - 0.841 SPWLG75 - 0.376 SCON - 0.006
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These results show that the ’welfare state regime' variables do have an important influence 
on the pattern of female labour market participation, although not in a way which is 
especially supportive of the social democratic argument. Social democratic regimes seem 
to be characterized by women working part-time. The association of a pattern of gender 
segmentation in the labour market with socialist welfare state characteristics is at odds 
with the universalist thrust of the social democratic theory of social citizenship.
Esping-Andersen associates conservative welfare states with low growth in general 
employment, and little change in the dominant type of employment, as well as little 
development of female labour force participation. The results reported here are in line 
with his interpretation. We would not expect the labour markets regulated by 
conservative welfare regimes to have developed as much part-time employment as 
elsewhere. We would expect relatively little combining of labour market and domestic 
work by women in these countries. The laggard status of these states in terms of the 
development of female labour force participation, seems to be associated with a 
traditional labour market structure, and what female labour force participation does take 
place seems to be full time.
The results for the political influence and mobilization present a paradox. They show a 
large negative influence of the percentage of women in legislatures in 1975, but a positive 
influence of the level of cabinet participation of women, on the percentage of part-time 
work in female employment. Using the percentage of women in legislatures at later date 
changes the strength of the association, but not its sign. These results do not help with 
the interpretation of the dependent variable.
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Section Two - Pooled Cross-section Time Series Analyses
The following two sections present analyses of the impact of the welfare state on the 
economic participation of women. The discussion is based on regression analysis of two 
different data sets, both composed of pooled time series and cross sectional aggregate 
data. The presentation of the analysis will be organized using two principles. First the 
analyses of each data set will be presented together. Thus the results of (the more 
comprehensive) analysis of the larger data-set will be presented first, followed by results 
of the analysis of the smaller data-set.
Secondly, the discussion of results for each data set will be organized into sections based 
on groups of similar variables which will be considered together. For both data sets the 
groups of variables are as follows: 1) particular welfare state regimes, or particular groups 
of states, 2) the impact of Catholicism, 3) aspects of the social and economic status or 
political mobilization of women, 4) economic development, especially the rate of 
economic growth, 5) the structure of employment, 6) the character of state expenditure, 7) 
the impact of inflation and personal taxation, 8) patterns of partisan politics, 9) control 
variables, such as the time trend and total population. The previous chapter presented a 
discussion of the expected impact of these variables in a range of theoretical frameworks.
Before going on to detailed analysis the general pattern of results should be mentioned. 
Generally, although not universally, it was possible to make (theoretical) sense of the 
results. They were also fairly stable across the various data sets and different regressions. 
The main difficulties of interpretation which derive from the analysis concern labour 
market characteristics. Here, significant negative coefficients were present for service 
employment (in both data sets) and government employment (in the larger data set) 
variables in most of the models. These results are not easy to reconcile with a widespread 
expectation (if for different reasons) that both these variables would have a positive 
impact on female labour force participation. The partisan political mobilization variables 
and the inflation and personal taxation variables also produced results which are difficult
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to interpret. In the latter case this empirical difficulty compounds a theoretical conflict 
over the expected impact of these variables. In order to aid the comparison and 
interpretation of the results presented in TABLES 2.3 and 2.4 report unstandardized 
coefficients from all the pooled regressions reported here. In these tables statistical 
significance is indicated by giving three stars (***) for coefficients significant at the 99% 
level, two stars (**) for the 95% level and one (*) for the 90% level. Coefficients which 
are statistically indistinguishable from zero are given no stars.
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Table 2.V.2 Variables and data sources for the pooled analyses
Low dummy variable for GDP
the Low Countries
Schcath
Womleg
Womwag
Div
Leftpmen
a measure of Malelab
Catholicism based 
on Schimdt (1993)
presence of women Femlab 
in the legislature - 
Inter-Parliamentary 
Union data
women’s wages Servemp 
relative to those of 
men - ILO data
divorce rate - UN Govtemp 
data
left presence in Socsec
parliament - based
on Lane, MacKay
and Newton 1991
and Keesings
Contemporary
Archives.
Change in GDP - 
OECD Historical 
Statistics (from 
Eileen Minhane) 
male labour force 
participation rate - 
OECD Historical 
Statistics (from 
Eileen Minhane) 
female labour force 
participation rate - 
OECD Historical 
Statistics (from 
Eileen Minhane) 
employment in the 
service sector - 
OECD Historical 
Statistics (from 
Eileen Minhane) 
government 
employment - 
OECD Historical 
Statistics (from 
Eileen Minhane) 
spending on social 
security- OECD 
Historical Statistics 
(from Eileen 
Minhane)
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Leftgovt
Relpment
Relgovt
Totpop
left presence in Govtcd
government - based
on Lane, MacKay
and Newton 1991
and Keesings
Contemporary
Archives.
religious parties in CPI 
parliament -  based 
on Lane, MacKay 
and Newton 1991 
and Keesings 
Contemporary 
Archives.
religious parties in Ptax 
government -  
based on Lane,
MacKay and 
Newton 1991 and 
Keesings 
Contemporary 
Archives.
total population - Time 
OECD Historical 
data and UN Data
current
disbursements of 
government - 
OECD Historical 
Statistics (from 
Eileen Minhane)
change in the 
consumer price 
index - OECD 
Historical Statistics 
(from Eileen 
Minhane)
a measure of 
personal taxation 
based - OECD 
revenue statistics 
(from Jeff Owens)
Time trend variable
Dummy variables for individual countries are signified by the standard three letter 
abbreviations used by the OECD. All quantitative independent variables have been lagged 
one period in the pooled data analysis.
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2.3. Pooled analysis - the full data set 
Table 2.3
Dependent Variable: Female Labour Force Participation
SOCIAL
SOCN N LD
CON
LIB
8.5536 
-6 I025*** 
18032
T A B L K 2 3 2
9 0 5 7 3 " »  
-5 7122 • • •  
I 5100
TABLK 2.3. 3 
W /oul Netlicrlatids 
8 7 2 4 5 " »
-5.0413»»»
I 8196»»»
TABLE 2 3 4 TABLE 2.3 5
5.9587»*
NLD
LOW
CASCON 2
CASLIB2
CASRAD2
CASNRH 2
-19.885 
-3 1788 
-5.4097 »»» 
-4.5555
-12.472»*
1.2868
-2.8261»»' -2.8284
-15.713» 
0.31627 
-3.8951» 
0 54832
SCHCATH
W O M LEG
DIV
0 32239» 
0 37752*
0 28904 
0 48554
0 28973* 
0.35694*
0.54820
0.36933
029072*
045201*
0.29813
0.37826
0.51188** 
0 44467»»
0 41930»» 
0 32342»»
BUSE R- 
SOUARL
0 73542E-01" 0.68273E-01* 079I43E -O I* 0.73384E-01*
M A L E l^ B
SERV EM P
G OV TEM P
0.17221**» 
-0 25808*** 
-0 56647L- 
0 1 * * *
0.21780 *** 
-0 231 17 
-071101E-01
0 18460*»* 
-0.28966***
-0 5I349E-01*
0 47673 *
-0 30358**»
-0 I7380E-01*
0.20565*»»
-0 22784»*»
-0 36628E-01 '
0.21847 
-0.25369 
-0 25253E-01*
0 30806»»» 
-0.53002»»*
-0 21582E-01 '
0.27096»**
-0 37502»**
-0 26915E-01*
SOCSEC
G O V TCD
-0 88424E-01 
0 24072
-0 64741E-01 
0 23779
-0 29231* 
0 31501*'
-0 14193* 
0 22306**
-0 16689*** 
0.23345***
-0 11518' 
0 21533 <
-0.11434* 
0 32539***
-0 18394* 
0 29719»*’
0 59462E-01* 0.57633E-01
-0 76962E- 
0 1 ** *
LEFTGOVT 0.51045E-02
-0.97250E-02 -0.33162E- -0.63187E-03
0 1 * * »
0 59250E-02 »»» 0.50343E-02»»» 0.47499E-02»»*
RELPMENT
RELGOV T
-0.54395E-01* -0.24275»»» -0.16132»»*
0.61198E-03 0 56138E-02*
TO TPO P 0 58723E-04*** 0 17592E-04 0.25000E-04*** 0.26708E-04***
CO N STA N T 30.071 30 433**
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Welfare state regimes (WSR)
Neither the operationalization nor the interpretation of the welfare state regime variables 
was straightforward. Although useful results were eventually generated from these 
categorizations, it should be noted that in their pure forms none of the welfare state 
categorizations produced the expected results, even where they produced results at all. In 
other words, the main welfare state regime theories do not receive direct support from the 
analysis of changes in the economic position of women. Welfare state regime theories 
attempt to account for the different extent and form of either (social) citizenship or 
patterns of equality and inequality in various states. These theories implicitly or explicitly 
suggest that aspects of gender roles, including women’s role in the formal workforce, fall 
within the scope of their core concepts. Thus, the failure of these theories to account for 
patterns of female labour force participation must be taken seriously. Modified versions 
of the welfare state regime categorizations did prove helpful in the analysis of female 
workforce participation. Before going on to discuss the results of these regressions, it 
must be noted that they should not be treated as supporting the theory in its pure form. 
Moreover, as the WSR categorizations are grounded on detailed empirical investigation 
and theoretical argument they should not be altered without good reason. In addition, 
results produced by modified categorizations need to be interpreted with particular care.
With slight modifications of the categorizations, the pooled regression could be run 
successfully. In general, the results obtained with the regressions on modifications of the 
Esping-Andersen categorization were as expected, at least for the larger data set (the 
second data set produces unexpected results, probably due to the small number of 
countries some of the categories). Although regressions were run on a version of the 
Castles and Mitchell categorization, the results proved difficult to reconcile with 
theoretical expectations. In addition to the results on the theoretical categories, these 
regressions also drew attention to interesting characteristics of the particular states. As I 
have already noted, the interpretation of results from modified categorizations needs to be
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carried out with care, however, these results may also contribute to the on-going process 
of theoretical and empirical debate about welfare state regime typologies.
Esping-Andersen and WSR
It proved to be impossible to run pooled regressions on the pure version of Esping- 
Andersen's theory (taking those states classified as 'strong' examples of the socialist, 
liberal and conservative WSR). However, by cutting the Netherlands out of the Socialist 
category, and running a regression including a separate dummy variable for it, a 
successful regression could be run. (An unsuccessful attempt was made to estimate an 
equation using the Esping-Andersen categorization plus a dummy for the Netherlands and 
Belgium together as the 'Low' countries.) This grouping left only Scandinavian countries 
(Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland) in the Socialist category. The regressions run 
including this categorization produced a common pattern, in which the variables were 
significant at the most exacting statistical levels (see TABLES 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). The 
modified Socialist or Scandinavian variable consistently showed a positive impact on the 
dependent variable and showed the largest absolute value of any of the state form 
variables. The Conservative variable showed the second largest absolute value, and had a 
negative sign. The Liberal variable showed the smallest value, and took a positive sign.
In as much as the modified categorization can 'test' the application of Esping-Andersen's 
theory to gender relations, these results are broadly in line with his expectations (Esping- 
Andersen 1990). One of the more controversial elements of Esping-Andersen's 
interpretation is his view that liberal welfare regimes generally encourage women to 
participate in the labour force. His interpretation is supported by the analysis presented 
here and in particular by the positive sign for the Liberal variable.
However, the results obtained for the Netherlands variable (alongside the fact that it had 
proven impossible to estimate an equation for the full Esping-Andersen theory) suggest 
that his version of WSR requires significant modification before it could be applied to 
gender relations. The Netherlands variable consistently produced coefficients with very 
large, statistically significant negative values. In other words the model/ independent
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variables consistently overpredicted the level of female labour force participation in the 
Netherlands by a large amount.
The character of the Dutch welfare state and the pattern of female labour force 
participation in the Netherlands have both been subject of critical analysis from social 
democratic and feminist perspectives (van Kersbergen 1995; Therbom 1986, Therbom 
1989; Van Kersbergen and Becker 1988; De Vries, 1981). Social policy in the 
Netherlands has been characterized as a Social Democratic Welfare State in a Christian 
Democratic society. While the characterization of the Dutch experience in this way begs 
important questions about the generality of the explanation of the development of welfare 
regimes by this model, nevertheless it does provide a context for the interpretation of the 
results presented here. A more detailed consideration of these questions is presented 
below, in the country case studies.
Esping-Andersen and WSR without the Netherlands
In order to provide an additional test that the striking results found for the Netherlands 
was not an artifact of some mis-specification in the model or a statistical artifact of some 
other kind, the data for the Netherlands were cut out of the data-set and the same model 
was tested on this smaller data-set. The results of this regression are reported in TABLE 
2.3.3 below. The same pattern of signs for the regression resulted, with an essentially 
similar pattern of magnitude of the coefficients for individual independent variables. The 
statistical significance of the social security variable was slightly stronger in the 
regression excluding the Netherlands, and its magnitude increased (we will return to this 
point later), while the statistical significance of the personal taxation variable weakened 
in this second regression. The overall explanatory power of the regression, as measured 
by the Buse R-square statistic, excluding the Netherlands was slightly smaller than the 
regression on the full data-set (BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9327 compared to BUSE R- 
SQUARE = 0.9575). However both figures indicate that a very sizable proportion of the 
variation in the independent variable has been explained. All in all the impression that 
the result obtained for the Netherlands does not reflect an inaccuracy of the regression on
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the full data-set. Instead it seems to demonstrate a genuine characteristic of Dutch 
political economy.
Castles and WSR
With a number of collaborators Castles has developed a critique of Esping-Andersen's 
approach which has both empirical and theoretical elements. The alternative 
categorization he proposed produced four welfare state regimes: conservative, liberal 
radical and non-right hegemony. Because the full categorization of welfare states 
provided by Castles placed every state subjected to empirical analysis in a category, is 
impossible to estimate an equation using dummy variables to represent the categories. 
However in the analysis he developed with Mitchell, Castles identified groups of states in 
which political configurations are matched by welfare state types (Castles and Mitchell 
1993: 123 Table 3.7). Using this categorization it was possible to estimate equations.
Running the regressions on this modification of Castles' categorization produced a set of 
results which were not altogether convincing (See TABLE 2.3.4 below). All of Castles' 
four categories had strong, statistically discernible, negative impact on female labour 
force participation. Castles' conservative category produced strongest negative influence. 
The remaining categories and an impact of roughly similar magnitude, in the following 
descending order; Radical, Non-Right Hegemony and Liberal. The overall explanatory 
power of regressions alone should not be taken as an indication of their comparative 
adequacy. However in addition to the odd signs of the WSR variables it is worth noting 
that the overall explanatory power of this regression, as measured by the BUSE R- 
SQUARE of 0.8716 remains high, although noticeably lower than the same regression 
with the Esping-Andersen categorization. The general pattern of the signs and 
magnitudes of the other variables in the regression remains basically the same as in the 
earlier regressions, with the exception of the overall 'level' of the regression, which is 
much closer to the origin, as indicated by the smaller coefficient for the constant.
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The results obtained from the application of Castles' categorization of welfare states pose 
a problem of interpretation. The strong negative influence of the Conservative category 
of states is what might have been expected. The theoretical expectation for the Radical 
group of states is more ambiguous, as is the expectation about the Liberal states. However 
the strong expectation would be for the Non-right hegemony variable to have a positive 
impact on female labour force participation. It suggests that categorizations which include 
non-Scandinavian states and/or take some of the Scandinavian states out of the 
socialist/NRH category do not produce the expected large positive sign in a regression 
explaining female labour force participation.
As TABLE 2.3.8 shows, when variables for the patterns of partisan politics are included 
in the regression, different results are obtained. Negative, statistically significant values 
(at the 99% level) for the conservative and radical classifications were obtained, while the 
liberal and non-right hegemony categories showed small positive coefficients, which 
were statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Mixed models
In order to test the idea that it is the Scandinavian states which exhibited a powerful 
pressure for women's economic mobilization, regressions were run which cut out the non­
right hegemony category. These regressions (TABLES 2.3.5 and 2.3.6) strongly support 
the idea that the Scandinavian countries alone have a strong positive impact on female 
labour force participation. Moreover, given that Belgium (included in non-right 
hegemony) and the Netherlands (Socialist) share a certain number of social and political 
characteristics (both are 'plural' societies, with consociational political systems), a new 
category of the Low countries. This variable shows a negative sign (but not as strong an 
influence as an equation estimated with just the Netherlands dummy in the same 
equation).
As well as telling us something about the Netherlands and Belgium, these results also beg 
a question about the situation in Scandinavia. The typologies of welfare states developed
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by both Esping Andersen and Castles include one or other of the Low Countries in a 
category dominated by Scandinavian states. To what extent can the welfare state 
characteristics of the Scandinavian states be considered as the cause of their distinctive 
pattern of women’s participation in the paid workforce? If these typologies do measure 
important characteristics of the configuration of state welfare policy, then a puzzle 
appears, if welfare policy is an important influence of women’s participation in the paid 
workforce. Countries which, according both Esping-Andersen and Castles, share key 
welfare features show strikingly divergent patterns. Either there are other dimensions of 
variation in welfare policy which Scandinavian countries share but which mark them out 
from other states, or some other feature of the Nordic states or societies accounts for their 
distinctiveness in terms of female labour force participation.
Catholicism
In the context of one of the few attempts explicitly to use quantitative public policy 
analysis to understand gender issues Schmidt (1993; see also Castles 1994) has argued 
that Catholicism has a strongly negative influence on female labour force participation. 
This influence is not simply a matter of the social power of the church. It is also a 
question of the political influence mediated through certain Christian Democratic political 
parties. This kind of influence is also measured, to some extent, by other variables used in 
the analysis presented here, in particular the impact of religious parties in parliament and 
in government. However, important differences exist between these variables and 
Schmidt's measure. First, the religious parties variables include non-Catholic religious 
parties. Secondly, Schmidt's variable seems to include an important element of 
qualitative assessment about the social and political significance of Catholicism, whereas 
the religious parties variables are more purely quantitative (although, there is, of course, 
an element of qualitative evaluation in the decision of which parties to include in the 
religious parties categories). TABLES 2.3.6 and 2.3.8 show contradictory influences 
from the Catholicism dummy variable. In TABLE 2.3.6, in the context of a general 
model mixing elements of the Castles and Esping-Andersen approaches, a negative 
impact was reported, significant at the 95% level. In TABLE 2.3.8 the Catholicism
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variable was statistically indistinguishable from zero. These results lend some support - 
albeit of a limited character - to the theoretical claim that Catholic countries restrict the 
labour market participation of women.
Aspects of the socio-economic status and political mobilization of women 
Two variables are included in the regression in order to capture some other aspects of the 
situation of women - the proportion of the legislature made up by women and the divorce 
rate. The impact of these two variables was consistent across the various models 
analyzed here both in terms of the sign of the variables and in terms of their relative 
impacts as measured by the (relative) magnitude of the coefficients for them. The 
variables were statistically significant to the most stringent levels.
The expected impact of the political variable is a matter of dispute between the various 
theoretical perspectives analyzed. The grounding of the social democratic perspective in 
political sociology and the consistent theme in this literature that 'politics matters' leads to 
a strong expectation that gendered politics should have an impact on gendered labour 
force participation. By way of contrast the economic perspective, particularly as 
developed by Gary Becker, treats the political mobilization of women as a dependent 
variable - a consequence of economic growth rather than a cause of the expansion of 
female labour force participation. An empirical analysis of the kind developed here 
should not be treated as the decisive element in a resolution of a theoretical difference of 
this sort. Nevertheless, the consistent presence of a positive sign for the women in the 
legislature variable and the fact that the size of the coefficient for this variable was fairly 
large in comparison to other non-dummy variables in the analysis provide some support 
for the 'political sociological' approach rather than the 'economic' one (see inter alia 
TABLES 2.3.1 and 2.3.5).
The divorce variable was included in the analysis mainly in order to control for changes 
in the social character and significance of gender. The divorce rate is also considered to 
have had an impact on patterns of women’s work in some economic and new right
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analyses. The consistently positive and statistically significant results for the divorce 
variable provide some general support for these positions. However the relative 
magnitude of the coefficients for this variable in most of the models estimated suggest 
that its influence has been relatively small (see inter alia TABLES 2.3,1 and 2.3.5).
Economic development
Economic growth plays a considerable role in modemization theories of social and 
political development. It would be expected have a significant positive impact on female 
labour force participation. In particular, some aspects of Becker's economic theory place 
considerable emphasis on the rate of economic growth as well as the level of economic 
development. Moreover, although early debates pitched modemization and ‘politics 
matters’ approaches against one another, those who place emphasis on partisan politics 
can integrate elements of economic development into their analyses (see Pierson 1991). 
With the exception of some new right or ‘pathologies of modernization’ approaches, most 
analyses would suggest that economic growth would have some positive impact on the 
dependent variable, although not all theories would place economic variables at the heart 
of their accounts. The economic growth variable consistently showed a statistically 
significant positive impact on female labour force participation, as expected in the 
theoretical discussion. However, the magnitude of this positive impact was consistently 
fairly small, relative to the other variables in any given regression (see TABLE 2.3.6, 
inter alia). Although these results do dent some ‘pathologies of modernization’ accounts, 
they do not discriminate decisively between other approaches.
The structure of employment
A number of variables representing the structure of employment were included in the 
regressions. These variables produced unexpected results which are generally difficult to 
rationalize. Against the strong expectation of almost all of the various literatures 
(modemization, new right and social democratic) the variables representing the level of 
service sector and government employment consistently proved to have a negative.
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statistically significant (although occasionally at the 95% rather than the 99% level) 
impact on the female labour force participation rate (see, for example, TABLE 2.3.6).
Although this result is not reported here, the level of employment in manufacturing 
consistently failed to achieve statistical significance and was dropped from the model.
The theoretical expectations of the impact of manufacturing employment were not 
especially strong. The male labour force participation rate has a positive impact on 
female labour force participation despite the fact that the former variable typically 
exhibited a secular decline at the same time as the latter grew.
Although we remain some distance from a satisfactory explanation of these counter­
intuitive results, they may imply that the retention of what might be called 'traditional' 
labour market structures both help to sustain male levels of labour market participation, 
and provide support for female labour force participation. It should be emphasized again 
that this interpretation is weak and these results are unexpected.
The impact of government spending
Two variables have been included to measure the impact of state expenditure on female 
labour force participation. These variables are a traditional measure for the level of 
development of the welfare state. They are included to supplement the structural 
characterization of welfare state regimes given by Esping-Andersen and Castles. 
Theoretical expectations about the impact of these variables are mixed.
In general, the more accurately a state can be characterized as a welfare state the higher a 
level of labour force participation by women we might expect. In principle, welfare state 
provision could make it easier for women to combine their 'traditional' domestic role with 
formal labour force participation. Moreover, in a longer term perspective the welfare 
state could take over some of the tasks which the extended family undertakes in more 
traditional societies. Most analysts expect there to be a strong relationship between 
government spending and women’s labour market participation. This theoretical
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expectation has been consistently supported by positive statistically significant results for 
inclusive measures of government spending, such as the current disbursements measure 
in the regressions reported here (See, inter alia, TABLES 2.3.1 and 2.3.2).
However, the social democratic school makes a rather different prediction about the 
social security as a social policy technique. Social security, based on transfer payments, 
is pictured as one form of social policy, particularly dominant in corporativist rather than 
universalist welfare regimes, and also used in residually oriented systems. Thus high 
levels of social security spending are associated with restrictive welfare regimes which 
reproduce work-based status, and could not be expected to promote female labour force 
participation. The skepticism about the progressive impact of social security seems to 
gain some support from the results reported here. Consistently social security received a 
statistically discernible coefficient with a negative sign, although its magnitude was 
generally small (see TABLES 2.3.1 and 2.3.6, for example). It is worth noting that this 
result contradicts the general expectations of modemization authors, including those who 
emphasize the pathologies of modemization, although some care is needed to make this 
point. The economic approach might suggest that the employment of women would fall 
as a result of higher social security (although, in some circumstances the domestic work 
of women might confound the relationship between these variables). Nevertheless, 
labour force participation is a more inclusive category than employment. Those on social 
security are included in labour force participants. The most straightforward of economic 
analysis suggests that raising the price of a good increases its supply - so we should 
expect social security to have a positive impact on labour force participation.
It is worth noting that TABLE 2.3.3, which reports a regression on a data-set excluding 
data from the Netherlands, shows a larger negative result for the social security variable 
than any of the other equations and a very much larger result than in a regression of the 
same independent variables on the data-set which includes Dutch data. This result is 
somewhat counter-intuitive. On the face of it the logic of the Dutch case (as well as of 
welfare provision in conservative or Christian democratic states) is that an expensive.
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transfer-oriented, welfare state is associated with restrictions on women’s entry into the 
paid workforce. That being the case, we would expect the removal of a key example of 
this pattern to weaken the negative association between spending on transfers and 
women’s involvement in the labour market - but we find that one of the influences of the 
Dutch case is to strengthen its negative impact (compare TABLES 2.3.1 and 2.3.3). 
Bearing in mind that the extremely large negative coefficient for the Netherlands in the 
other regressions can be interpreted as meaning that women’s participation in the labour 
market falls a long way below the general prediction of the model, this result might 
suggest that factors other than those included in the model restrict Dutch women’s 
involvement in the formal workforce. In turn, this suggests that there may be dangers in 
taking the welfare state regime out of the wider political economy context. On the other 
hand, while the exclusion of the Dutch case from the model produces results remarkably 
similar to those for the full data set (suggesting some stability in the model), it may be 
that the full data set underestimates the negative impact of high social security/transfer 
spending, loading these negative effects into the variables for the Netherlands and 
Conservative welfare state regimes. The decline in the magnitude of the coefficient for 
the Conservative variable may be significant here. Nevertheless, the strengthening of the 
negative influence of the social security variable with the exclusion of the Dutch case 
does present something of a puzzle.
The impact of inflation and personal taxation
These variables, which are emphasized only in the literature which stresses the 
‘pathologies of modernization’, proved difficult to interpret. The literature suggests that 
these variables have a positive (though pathological) impact on women’s participation in 
the paid workforce. However they are the only variables which did not show a consistent 
pattern of influence across the various models. Thus the signs of the variables did not 
consistently support the theoretical prediction of positive influence. The inflation 
variable consistently showed a positive sign, although it moved out of statistical 
significance in TABLE 2.3.4, while the personal taxation variable moved from a 
statistically significant negative sign (TABLES 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3), through to positive
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signs (TABLES 2.3.4, 2.3.7, 2.3.8), by way of some coefficients which failed to achieve 
statistical significance (TABLES 2.3.5, 2.3.6). In other words, in regressions involving 
Esping-Andersen's formulation of WSR the inflation variable (CPI) showed a positive 
impact while personal taxation (PTAX) showed a negative impact. In other regressions, 
both variables showed a positive sign, but the influence of one or the other (and this 
varied) was impossible statistically to distinguish from zero. Finally, the magnitude of 
the influence of these variables was small. Often, these variables had the weakest 
influence on the dependent variable of any in the model.
Patterns of partisan mobilization
These variables, which represent factors which bulk large in the comparative political 
economy literature, were very difficult to operationalize successfully. The magnitude of 
these variables was very much smaller than the literature suggests and some did not have 
the sign which theory would have predicted. On occasions it proved impossible to 
estimate equations which included all these variables (generally see TABLES 2.3.7 AND 
2.3.8).
Across a number of regressions left influence in parliament seems to have had a negative 
impact on female participation in paid work. This influence is small in size and falls 
from statistical significance in some of the models. In addition, control of government by 
religious parties seems to have had a small positive impact. The two variables with 
coefficients of the expected sign, left control of government, and religious representation 
in parliament generally retained statistical significance even when the other variables 
failed to do so. The influence of religious parties in parliament always showed the 
strongest influence. The left politics variables include another puzzle. In the absence of a 
strong pressure from below, consistent positive influence of left control of government on 
women’s participation in the paid workforce might not be expected by those social 
democratic theorists skeptical about 'state-centred' approaches (see Korpi 1983).
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It might be possible to construct an account within which this pattern of results makes 
sense. Such an account might suggest, for example, that left parliamentarians have been 
preoccupied with the concerns of the male working class, while left governments are 
open to plural influences - including the political mobilization of women - rather than 
controlled by their parliamentary mandates. To be successful such an interpretation 
would require some statement of why left governments should be particularly influenced 
by political forces other than their parliamentary groupings. A certain caution is required 
in the post hoc development of an account of this sort in order to make sense of 
unexpected empirical results, especially when these results are mutually inconsistent in 
the context of established theories. These difficulties are particularly deep given the 
significance attributed to the social bases of policy in the relevant bodies of theory. Even 
Scandinavian ‘state’ feminists see political power building fi'om the bottom up. They 
suggest that women have managed to gain representation at or access to lower, less 
influential levels of political power in Scandinavia, while the centre of power has 
remained male.
One implication which might be drawn from this overall pattern of results is that the 
variables which identify structural characteristics or ‘policy configurations’ shared by 
groups of states (generally Esping-Andersen) or nations (Castles and his collaborators) 
seem to have a much more important direct impact on gender issues than do patterns of 
party political mobilization or short run control of government. In other words, although 
the partisan political characteristics of particular societies may have influenced the form 
of the state and the configuration of welfare policy, their impact on women’s involvement 
in the formal workforce does not seem to have been direct. Instead, it seems that it is 
(what the social democratic model depicts as) the product of these factors (the form taken 
by the state or the welfare ‘policy configuration’) which influences women’s role in the 
paid workforce. This interpretation is generally consistent with the explicit claims made 
in the social democratic literature. Claims are made about the causes of variation in (the 
policy configurations of) welfare states, which may then have feedback effects on the
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forces which initially formed them, but have other effects as well, including those on 
gender roles.
This interpretation requires that the policy configurations of welfare states have a fairly 
clear impact on women’s role in the workforce. However, we have already seen that 
there are difficulties in interpreting the variables operationalizing different ‘welfare state 
regimes’. Given that no unmodified typology of welfare states produced satisfactory 
results in (and some produced no results at all), the possibility was raised that these 
variables were acting as proxies for some feature of the societies in question aside from 
their welfare state regimes. Given that the partisan character of parliament and control of 
government are obvious candidates as other features of western democracies which might 
help to account for this variation, the interpretation as having a mainly indirect impact 
women’s participation in the paid labour market may require modification. Either some 
other features of the policy configuration of welfare states, or other features of the broader 
societies, need to be identified which clusters them in a new way, rather than reproducing 
the established typologies.
Control variables
The two control variables used here are a time variable and a population variable to try to 
control for variations in the size of the states analyzed. The time variable showed a 
consistent moderately strong statistically significant impact on the dependent variable. 
This fits with the assumption, which is too low grade to be designated as 'theoretical', that 
women have become increasingly active in labour markets as time has gone by (see, for 
example TABLES 2.3.1 and 2.3.7).
The second variable was introduced in order to control for differences in the size of 
states. It is worth noting that the inclusion of this variable made very little difference to 
the overall pattern of results of the regressions. A numbers of regressions were run 
excluding this variable which are not fully reported here - they show very similar patterns 
of results to those which include it. Nevertheless, the impact of this variable is of
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interest. Its coefficient was consistently positive and statistically significant at the most 
demanding levels. Larger states have larger labour markets, which are usually thought to 
be more difficult to manage through inclusive national or state level social bargains, but 
may arguably afford a more diverse range of opportunities for employment. Other things 
being equal, then, this result might suggest that the latter facilitates female labour force 
participation more than the former (see, inter alia, TABLES 2.3.1 and 2.3.7).
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TABLE 2.3.1 Baseline model
Dependent Variable: Female Labour Force Participation
Variable Unstand. Coeff. S.E. T-Ratio Stand. Coeff.
SOCNNLD 8.5536 *** 0.6630 12.90 0.3358
CON -6.1025*** 0.5220 -11.69 -0.2574
LIB 1.8032 *** 0.3827 4.711 0.0760
NED -20.487*** 0.5575 -36.75 -0.4462
WOMLEG 0.32239*** 0.2474E-01 13.03 0.2249
DIV 0.37752*** 0.8909E-01 4.237 0.0353
GDP 0.62693E-01*** 0.1171E-01 5.356 0.0150
MALELAB 0.17221*** 0.2998E-01 5.744 0.0816
SERVEMP -0.25808*** 0.4088E-01 -6.313 -0.1828
GOVTEMP -0.56647E-01*** 0.9415E-02 -6.017 -0.0370
SOCSEC -0.88424E-01** 0.3418E-01 -2.587 -0.0472
GOVTCD 0.24072*** 0.2127E-01 11.32 0.2813
CPI 0.73940E-01*** 0.1759E-01 4.204 0.0175
PTAX -0.76962E-01*** 0.1952E-01 -3.942 -0.0488
TOTPOP 0.31919E-04*** 0.2798E-05 11.41 0.1582
TIME 0.84905*** 0.3484E-01 24.37 0.4986
CONSTANT 33.147*** 3.811 8.697 0.0000
357 DF
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9575 
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.6243 
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.6286 
RHO = 0.12375
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TABLE 2.3.2 Baseline model plus left politics effects
Dependent Variable: Female Labour Force Participation
Variable Unstand. Coeff. S.E. T.-Ratio Stand. Coeff.
SOCNNLD 9.0573*** 0.6298 14.38 0.3556
CON -5.7122*** 0.5080 -11.24 -0.2409
LIB 1.5100*** 0.3547 4.258 0.0637
NLD -20.226*** 0.5961 -33.93 -0.4405
WOMLEG 0.28904*** 0.2580E-01 11.20 0.2016
DIV 0.48554*** 0.924 lE-01 5.254 0.0453
GDP 0.70198E-01*** 0.1282E-01 5.477 0.0168
MALELAB 0.21780*** 0.3329E-01 6.542 0.1032
SERVEMP -0.23117*** 0.4486E-01 -5.153 -0.1638
GOVTEMP -0.71101E-01*** 0.1067E-01 -6.666 -0.0464
SOCSEC -0.64741E-01* 0.3785E-01 -1.711 -0.0345
GOVTCD 0.23779*** 0.2169E-01 10.96 0.2779
CPI 0.67545E-01*** 0.1896E-01 3.563 0.0160
PTAX -0.82953E-01*** 0.2008E-01 -4.132 -0.0526
LEFTPMEN -0.19746E-01*** 0.6836E-02 -2.888 -0.0277
LEFTGOVT 0.72455E-02*** 0.1551E-02 4.673 0.0263
TOTPOP 0.33797E-04*** 0.3443E-05 9.816 0.1675
TIME 0.87632*** 0.3388E-01 25.86 0.5146
CONSTANT 28.069 *** 4.174 6.725 0.0000
355 DF
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9566 
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.5830 
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.5872 
RHO = 0.14461
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TABLE 2.3.3 Baseline model, excluding Dutch data 
Regression on data-set excluding data for the Netherlands 
Dependent variable: Female Labour Force Participation
Variable Unstand. Coeff. S.E. T-Ratio Stand. Coeff.
SOCIAL 8.7245*** 0.7009 12.45 0.3800
CON -5.0413*** 0.6794 -7.420 -0.2350
LIB 1.8196*** 0.3978 4.574 0.0848
WOMLEG 0.28973*** 0.2639E-01 10.98 0.2238
DIV 0.35694*** 0.1022 3.492 0.0368
GDP 0.73542E-01*** 0.1330E-01 5.530 0.0193
MALELAB 0.18460*** 0.3134E-01 5.890 0.0926
SERVEMP -0.28966*** 0.4556E-01 -6.357 -0.2230
GOVTEMP -0.51349E-01*** 0.1107E-01 -4.638 -0.0374
SOCSEC -0.29231*** 0.7049E-01 -4.147 -0.1519
GOVTCD 0.31501*** 0.2942E-01 10.71 0.3964
CPI 0.95498E-01*** 0.2112E-01 4.521 0.0251
PTAX -0.39183E-01* 0.2156E-01 -1.818 -0.0277
TOTPOP 0.33037E-04*** 0.3327E-05 9.929 0.1822
TIME 0.83579*** 0.3792E-01 22.04 0.5333
CONSTANT 32.772*** 3.998 8.197 0.0000
336 DF
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9327
DURBIN-WATSON= 1.5681 
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.5726 
RHO = 0.15077
TABLE 2.3.4 Families of welfare model
Dependent variable: Female Labour Force Participation
Variable Unstand. Coeff. S.E. T-Ratio Stand. Coeff.
CASC0N2 -19.885 *** 0.8049 -24.70 -0.7016
CASLIB2 -3.1788 *** 0.9451 -3.363 -0.1122
CASRAD2 -5.4097 *** 0.5471 -9.888 -0.1909
CASNRH2 -4.5555 *** 0.4955 -9.193 -0.1788
WOMLEG 0.54820 *** 0.2425E-01 22.60 0.3823
DIV 0.36933 *** 0.8782E-01 4.206 0.0345
GDP 0.68273E-01*** 0.1085E-01 6.291 0.0163
MALELAB 0.47673 *** 0.3355E-01 14.21 0.2259
SERVEMP -0.30358*** 0.3413E-01 -8.896 -0.2150
GOVTEMP -0.17380E-01* 0.1017E-01 -1.708 -0.0113
SOCSEC -0.14193*** 0.3653E-01 -3.885 -0.0757
GOVTCD 0.22306*** 0.2487E-01 8.969 0.2607
CPI 0.2043 lE-01 0.1831E-01 1.116 0.0048
PTAX 0.15453*** 0.2409E-01 6.414 0.0980
TOTPOP 0.58723E-04*** 0.4728E-05 12.42 0.2911
TIME 0.77037*** 0.3581E-01 21.51 0.4524
CONSTANT 8.0698** 3.878 2.081 0.0000
357 DF
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.8716 
DURBIN-WATSON =1.7416 
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.7463 
RHO = 0.07052
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TABLE 2.3.5 Mixed welfare and partisan politics model
Dependant Variable Female Labour Force Participation
Variable Unstand. Coeff. S.E. T-Ratio Stand. Coeff.
CASC0N2 -12.472*** 0.9614 -12.97 -0.4401
CASLIB2 1.2868 0.9878 1.303 0.0454
CASRAD2 -2.8261*** 0.5293 -5.339 -0.0997
SOCNNLD 5.9587*** 0.6631 8.987 0.2339
LOW -5.0427*** 0.7074 -7.128 -0.1504
WOMLEG 0.29072*** 0.2560E-01 11.36 0.2028
DIV 0.45201*** 0.7944E-01 5.690 0.0422
GDP 0.79143E-01*** O.lllOE-01 7.130 0.0189
MALELAB 0.20565*** 0.3106E-01 6.621 0.0974
GOVTEMP -0.36628E-01*** O.lOOOE-01 -3.661 -0.0239
SERVEMP -0.22784*** 0.3597E-01 -6.334 -0.1614
SOCSEC -0.16689*** 0.3801E-01 -4.391 -0.0890
GOVTCD 0.23345*** 0.2169E-01 10.76 0.2728
CPI 0.59462E-01*** 0.1630E-01 3.647 0.0141
PTAX 0.21380E-01 0.2131E-01 1.003 0.0136
LEFTGOVT 0.51045E-02 *** 0.1237E-02 4.128 0.0186
RELPMENT -0.87080E-01*** 0.1717E-01 -5.071 -0.1476
TOTPOP 0.17592E-04*** 0.5132E-05 3.428 0.0872
TIME 0.88489*** 0.3048E-01 29.03 0.5196
CONSTANT 29.398 *** 3.449 8.522 0.0000
354 DF
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9680 
DURBIN-WATSON= 1.7082 
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.7128 
RHO = 0.08156
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TABLE 2.3.6 Families o f nations model, with low country effects
Dependent Variable: Female Labour Force Participation
Variable Unstand. Coeff. S.E. T-Ratio Stand. Coeff.
CASC0N2 -12.778 *** 1.095 -11.67 -0.4508
CASRAD2 -2.8284 *** 0.5978 -4.731 -0.0998
SOCNNLD 5.8798 *** 0.7215 8.149 0.2308
SCHCATH -2.3640 ** 1.056 -2.238 -0.0928
LOW -6.3273 *** 0.9792 -6.462 -0.1887
WOMLEG 0.29813 *** 0.2570E-01 11.60 0.2079
DIV 0.37826 *** 0.8160E-01 4.636 0.0353
GDP 0.73384E-01*** 0.1145E-01 6.410 0.0175
MALELAB 0.21847 *** 0.3198E-01 6.830 0.1035
GOVTEMP -0.25253E-01** 0.1033E-01 -2.444 -0.0165
SERVEMP -0.25369 *** 0.3870E-01 -6.555 -0.1797
SOCSEC -0.11518 *** 0.3915E-01 -2.942 -0.0615
GOVTCD 0.21533 *** 0.2056E-01 10.47 0.2516
CPI 0.57633E-01 *** 0.1707E-01 3.376 0.0137
PTAX 0.25535E-01 0.2155E-01 1.185 0.0162
LEFTPMEN -0.97250E-02 0.6200E-02 -1.569 -0.0137
LEFTGOVT 0.59250E-02 *** 0.1326E-02 4.467 0.0215
RELPMENT -0.54395E-01*** 0.1713E-01 -3.175 -0.0922
TOTPOP 0.2425lE-04 *** 0.2194E-05 11.05 0.1202
TIME 0.87422*** 0.3152E-01 27.74 0.5133
CONSTANT 30.071 *** 3.618 8.311 0.0000
353 DF
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9585 
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.7083 
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.7129 
RHO = 0.08273
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TABLE 2.3.7 Partisan politics model
Dependant Variable: Female Labour Force Participation
VARIABLE UNSTAND STAND T-RATIO STAND.
COEFF ERROR COEFF
WOMLEG 0.5II88*** 0.1388E-01 36.89 0.3570
DIV 0.44467*** 0.7195E-01 6.180 0.0415
GDP 0.10771*** 0.9689E-02 11.12 0.0257
MALELAB 0.30806*** 0.203 lE-01 15.17 0.1460
SERVEMP -0.53002*** 0.2281E-01 -23.24 -0.3754
GOVTEMP -0.21582E-01*** 0.7957E-02 -2.712 -0.0141
SOCSEC -0.11434*** 0.2539E-0I -4.504 -0.0610
GOVTCD 0.32539*** 0.I810E-01 17.98 0.3803
CPI 0.39679E-01*** 0.1376E-01 2.883 0.0094
PTAX 0.11158*** 0.1621E-01 6.883 0.0708
LEFTPMEN -0.33I62E-01*** 0.5616E-02 -5.905 -0.0466
LEFTGOVT 0.50343E-02*** 0.1169E-02 4.308 0.0183
RELGOVT 0.61198E-03 0.2626E-02 0.2330 0.0015
RELPMENT -0.24275*** 0.9037E-02 -26.86 -0.4115
TOTPOP 0.25000E-04*** 0.1881E-05 13.29 0.1239
TIME 0.83070*** 0.2228E-01 37.28 0.4878
CONSTANT 33.417*** 2.350 14.22 0.0000
DF357
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9616 
DURBIN-WATSON= 1.8068 
VON NEUMANN RATIO= 1.8116 
RHO = 0.03956
92
TABLE 2.3.8 Families o f nations with partisan effects
Dependant Variable: Female Labour Force Participation
VARIABLES UNSTAND COEFF .SE T-RATIO STAND COEFF
CASC0N2 -15.713*** 1.242 -12.65 -0.5544
CASRAD2 -3.8951*** 0.3969 -9.814 -0.1374
CASLIB2 0.31627 1.014 0.3120 0.0112
CASNRH2 0.54832 0.4862 1.128 0.0215
SCHCATH 1.1721 0.8934 1.312 0.0460
WOMLEG 0.41930*** 0.2050E-01 20.45 0.2924
DIV 0.32342*** 0.7675E-01 4.214 0.0302
GDP 0.87956E-01*** 0.9117E-02 9.647 0.0210
MALELAB 0.27096*** 0.3160E-01 8.574 0.1284
SERVEMP -0.37502*** 0.3257E-01 -11.51 -0.2657
GOVTEMP -0.26915E-01*** 0.9889E-02 -2.722 -0.0176
SOCSEC -0.18394*** 0.3365E-01 -5.467 -0.0981
GOVTCD 0.29719*** 0.2119E-0I 14.03 0.3473
CPI 0.29977E-01* 0.1538E-01 1.949 0.0071
PTAX 0.12905*** 0.1826E-01 7.069 0.0818
LEFTPMEN -0.63187E-03 0.7148E-02 -0.8840E-01 -0.0009
LEFTGOVT 0.47499E-02*** 0.1346E-02 3.530 0.0173
RELPMENT -0.16132*** 0.1519E-01 -10.62 -0.2735
RELGOVT 0.56138E-02* 0.2982E-02 1.882 0.0140
TOTPOP 0.26708E-04*** 0.5044E-05 5.295 0.1324
TIME 0.81394*** 0.3187E-01 25.54 0.4779
CONSTANT 30.433*** 3.618 8.411 0.0000
DF352
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9493 
DURBIN-WATSON= 1.7840 
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.7888 
RHO = 0.04255
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2.4 Pooled analysis - the supplementary data set
The overall pattern of results of the regressions on this smaller, more 'European' data-set 
was not as consistent across models as the pattern for the larger data-set. For example, 
women's wages, the variable in which we are most interested here achieved statistical 
significance in some, but not all of the models. As with the larger data-set, a table (Table
2.4) of the unstandardized coefficients is presented (with an indication of statistical 
significance) in order to facilitate comparisons of the various models tested.
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TABLE 2.4
Dependent variable: Female labour force participation
Vnriable
SOCIAL
SOCNNLD
CON
LIB
13.851* 
1.3822* 
8 9884*
15 367** 
0 80074 
6 3089**
II 505* 
11.375* 
8 4203*
IA BLE 2 4 4 1A B L E 2 4 5 TABLE 2,4.6 2 4.7 Variables TABLE 2.4.7
DNK 22 846***
2.7098** EIN 24.505***
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0.79788***
0 45084E-0I 
0 3I596E-01*
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0 42879***
0 81372***
-0 3887IE-02 
0 I7675E-0I
0 18529*** 
O.63273E-0I 
O .872I4E-0I*
0 59501***
0 49267**
-0 49I57E-01 
0 50438E-0I*
0 39163***
-0 52028E-0I 
-0 1746 IE-01
0.44621***
0.72829***
0 15560***
-0 I7226E-01
0 26464***
O 763I5E -0I 
0.63099***
0 60395*** 
044300** 
0.27289***
0 I5I40E -0I
069613*** 
-0.92089E-0I 
0 33596***
-1.1916
0.43529***
0.69994***
0 15253*** 
-0 I9840E-
01
0.27084***
0 4 8 3 23E -0I
0.60420***
SWI
AUS
GBR
IRL
12.368***
- 1 1.094***
-93.909***
-0.57088E-0I
0.30867***
0.33849***
0 .I5 I3 7 E -0 I
0.I4633E-02
0.13523***
-0.98497E-0I
0.47373***
G O V rC D 0 58642E-0I* -0 I5792E-OI
0 5898IE- 
01 **
-0.38709**
-0 54368E- 
0 1 **
0 38605E-0I
-040242E -
0 1 **
0 37236E-0I
-0 89 II2E - 
01 **
0 78853E-0I 
-0 28773E-0I
I .El I GOVT
0 874I3E - 
01* * *  
0.62335E- 
0 1 ** *
0.20225E-03
0 17121***
0.60972E-
0 1 * **
-0.30664 E-02
0 88892E- 
0 1 * * *  
0.54890E- 
0 1 * * *
0.3534IE-03
-0 8I727E- 
0 1 * * *
-0 29123**
BUSE R- 
SQUARE.
0 I4245E- 
03***
0 64124***
0 I55I9E - 
03***
0 52364***
0 I4520E- 
03***
0 55213***
-0 I4I90E - 
0 1 * * *
0 29265E- 
03***
0.55540***
-09I472E -
0 1 * **
-0 59050E-02
0 I0480E- 
03***
0 56340***
-0 14080***
-0 I5376E- 
01* * *
0 29 0 0 IE- 
03***
0 59597***
0 .2 II26E -
0 2 * * *
0.51309**’
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Welfare state regimes
As with the larger data set an estimation of Esping-Andersen's welfare state regime 
categorization illustrated that the socialist category required disaggregation. The 
Scandinavian welfare states showed a strong positive impact on female labour force 
participation, while the Dutch welfare state showed a strong negative impact in the 
model. This model included only two states in each of the Conservative and Liberal 
categories. An oddity of this model, by comparison with results obtained from the larger 
data set is that the Conservative welfare regime had a positive impact on female labour 
force participation (at the 95% significance level), in a regression which included a 
variables measuring the impact of Catholicism, against the predictions of the theory 
(TABLE 2.4.1). Indeed this positive association was even stronger in a regression 
including variables measuring the partisan politics. In such regressions the variable 
measuring the representation of religious political parties showed a negative, statistically 
significant, impact on the dependent variable, in some cases of a large magnitude (see, for 
example Table 2.4. 3). Even where the Catholicism variable was left out of the 
regression the Conservative welfare state did not get the predicted negative coefficient, 
instead producing a very small positive result, which was not statistically from zero 
(TABLE 2.4.2). Clearly there is some sort of interaction between the variables 
operationalizing the influence of religious parties in politics, Catholicism and 
conservative welfare state regimes.
Aside from the ‘Socialist’ variable relatively few states fell into each category of welfare 
state regime. Moreover, the core example of the Liberal welfare state regime - the USA 
was excluded from the analysis. In order to check whether these characteristics of the 
reduced data set produced any idiosyncratic results for particular countries, a regression 
was run using dummy variables for the states. Some care is required in the interpretation 
of the results for this regression, particularly in comparison with a regression in which the 
country variables were replaced by regime ones, but all the other variables remained the 
same. This caution is required because the values, and sometimes the signs, of those 
variables present in both models differ. In other words, we cannot read the impact of the
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liberal variable as a simple aggregation of the impact of variables for the ‘liberal’ states in 
the regression. That having been said the results from this regression are quite striking. 
Germany, the archetypal conservative regime, shows a huge negative coefficient as does 
Britain, and the Netherlands and Australia show substantial negative coefficients. All 
these results suggest that these countries show lower levels of female involvement in the 
labour market than the model would imply. Ireland shows a very small negative 
coefficient. The remainder of the states show positive coefficients, which suggests that 
their levels of women’s labour market participation are higher than that predicted by the 
model. These states include the four Scandinavian ones (showing the highest values) and 
Switzerland.
Catholicism
In keeping with the theoretical expectation, the Catholicism variables showed a negative 
coefficient where it was included in a regression (TABLES 2.4.1 and 2.4.6). It achieved 
statistical significance in TABLE 2.4.1. This generally confirms the pattern of results 
shown by regressions on the larger data-set.
Aspects of the socio-economic status and political mobilization of women 
The proportion of the legislature made up of women and the divorce rate both showed a 
statistically significant positive impact on the dependent variable, just as they did on the 
larger data-set (compare TABLES 2.3 and 2.4).
Women’s wages
The main reason for running the regression on this smaller data-set is to test the impact of 
women's wages on female labour force participation. This relationship is of the highest 
importance for the economic theory, although a measure of this kind can at best give only 
a very general indication of its character. The variable gave a mixed performance, 
ranging from results which are statistically indistinguishable fi-om zero to moderately 
strong positive results. Thus these result lend some support to the theoretical claim that 
wages have an impact on labour force participation (see TABLES 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6).
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Economie development
The impact of this variable was much less consistent in regressions on the small data-set, 
than those on the large data-set. It never achieved statistical significance at the most 
demanding level, and indeed was statistically indistinguishable from zero in three 
regressions reported here (TABLES 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6).
The structure of employment
As with regressions on the larger data-set, the male labour force participation variable 
showed a consistent positive statistically significant impact on female labour force 
participation, despite the fact that male labour force participation appears to be in a 
secular decline, while female labour force participation is growing. This result suggests 
high levels of female labour force participation develop in high labour force participation 
states (see TABLE 2.4.5, inter alia).
Service employment and government employment were both subject to strong theoretical 
expectations of a powerful positive impact on female labour force participation, which 
was consistently contradicted by the empirical results reported in the previous section. 
The regressions which were run on the smaller data-set showed less consistent results.. 
Thus the service employment variable showed only one statistically significant (and 
negative) result (TABLE 2.4.1). All the other results reported here were statistically 
indistinguishable from zero (see TABLES 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6).
The government employment variable also showed inconsistent results, failing to achieve 
statistical significance in regressions reported in TABLES 2.4.1 and 2.4.3, but showing 
the theoretically expected positive results in those reported in TABLES 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 
2.4.6. These results might indicate that government employment may have a more 
important impact in the smaller group of states, dominated by European states and in 
which the Scandinavian states bulk comparatively large, than in the more inclusive set of 
states. It may be worth noting that these regressions either did not include the dummy
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variable representing the Socialist WSR (excluding the Netherlands), or showed 
surprisingly small (TABLE 2.4.6) or statistically insignificant coefficients (TABLE
2.4.4). Nevertheless the results for the government and service employment variables 
remained something of a puzzle.
The impact of government spending
The results of the regressions on the smaller data-set were much less consistent than were 
those for the larger one. Across the various models reported here both the social security 
and the current disbursements of government variables showed significant coefficients of 
both positive and negative signs, as well as statistically insignificant ones. As a result 
the relatively strong conclusions dravm from the results of the regressions on the cross- 
sectional and larger pooled data-sets might have to be modified. In the regressions which 
tested the (adjusted) Esping-Andersen categorization of welfare state regimes, the pattern 
of results for the variables testing the impact of patterns of state expenditure showed 
results broadly consistent with those reported above for the full data set (TABLES 2.4.1 
and 2.4.3), although the negative sign for the social security coefficient in TABLE 2.4.3 
was not statistically significant. A second qualification is also in order: the argument 
which emphasizes the conservative character of high levels of social security within 
government spending is rooted within the general framework developed by analysts 
including Esping-Andersen (1990 - see also van Kersbergen 1995). Any interpretation 
based on the Esping-Andersen analysis would have to account for the variable 
representing the Conservative welfare regime showing an unexpected positive impact on 
female labour force participation.
The remaining regressions reported here showed a pattern of results which is very 
difficult to interpret. The social security variable showed a statistically insignificant 
positive result (TABLE 2.4.4), a negative, significant result (TABLE 2.4.5) and a 
positive, significant result (TABLE 2.4.6). Although social security could be understood 
as a measure of overall welfare state effort, allowing for easy interpretation of the positive 
result, in the context of the overall pattern of results reported for the variable in this
99
chapter, the positive coefficient is better understood as a qualification of the general 
conclusion that social security has a negative impact on female labour force participation.
The results for the wider government spending variable in the regressions reported in 
TABLES 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 are even more difficult to rationalize. In each of these 
regressions the coefficient of current disbursements of government had a negative sign 
(although the regression reported in TABLE 2.4.5 was statistically insignificant). These 
results are difficult to interpret, both in the context of the general pattern of results for the 
larger data set and individually. Elsewhere this variable has gained positive, statistically 
significant coefficients. Moreover, making sense of this result in theoretical terms this 
result is not easy. In the light of the overall pattern of results those reported in TABLES 
2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 are probably better understood as qualifying the general result that 
government spending contributed to female labour force participation. The element of 
qualification in this case is even larger than that entered in the case of the social security 
variable considered above.
The impact of inflation and personal taxation
The results for these variables, again, contradict the results from regressions on other 
data-sets. The results for the inflation variable flatly contradict those for the other data 
set. The results reported here have consistently shown a negative impact, which achieved 
statistical significance in three cases (TABLES 2.4.1, 2.4.3 and 2.4.5). This set of results 
generally weakened the argument advanced by those concerned with the pathologies of 
modernization, that inflation contributed to female labour market participation. Personal 
taxation showed an inconsistent pattern of results in the regressions on the larger data-set. 
The results reported here generally support the contention that higher levels of personal 
taxation contributed to higher levels of female labour force participation, lending some 
support to this element of ‘pathologies of modernization' arguments. The results for the 
regressions reported in TABLES 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 showed positive coefficients, 
significant at the most demanding level, while the results for the other regressions showed 
the same sign, but were not statistically significant.
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Patterns of partisan political mobilization
The results for these variables were much more encouraging than the results for the larger 
data-set. The contrast between the results for the two data-sets might be partly explained 
by claiming that partisan politics has had more of an impact in the European states, which 
remained in the smaller data-set, than the non-European states, which tended to drop out 
of it. In general the impact of the religious parties was more impressive than that of left 
parties. The left control of government never achieved statistical significance, by contrast 
with the results from the larger data-set, where left control of government moderately 
strong results. The left control of parliament showed small, but positive and statistically 
significant results in the regressions reported in TABLES 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6. It 
gained a negative, but statistically insignificant result in one of the other regressions 
(TABLE 2.4.3). It is worth noting that these results were for regressions which did not 
include the full range of Esping-Andersen's welfare state regime categorizations. The 
welfare state regime variables and the partisan political mobilization variables may have 
measured the same, or closely related, phenomena. These results also contradict the 
results for the larger data-set.
For the religious parties variable, again the control of parliament showed a stronger set of 
results than the control of government measure. The first variable showed consistent 
negative results which were statistically significant at the most demanding levels. This 
pattern is consistent with the results from the regression on the larger data-set, and with 
the general theoretical expectation for this variable. The control of parliament by 
religious parties is the only one of these variables to achieve a consistent set of results 
across all these regressions.
The religious control of government showed negative, statistically significant coefficients 
in two regressions (see TABLES 2.4.4 and 2.4.6). It also showed two statistically 
insignificant coefficients, one of which was positive (TABLE 2.4.3), the other negative 
(TABLE 2.4.5). These results might indicate some weak support for the general
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contention that governments controlled by religious parties uphold traditional family 
patterns and thereby hold back female labour force participation.
Control variables
The results for both the total population time variables showed the same pattern of results 
as those for the larger data-set. Both variables have consistently shown statistically 
significant, positive coefficients.
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TABLE 2.4.1 Welfare state regime model with Catholicism effects
Dependent Variable: Female labour force participation
VARIABLES UNSTAND COEFF SE T-RATIO STAND
COEFF
SOCNNLD 13.851*** 0.8603 16.10 0.5238
CON 1.3822** 0.6743 2.050 0.0419
LIB 8.9884*** 0.7085 12.69 0.2726
NLD -9.4446*** 1.381 -6.839 -0.2135
SCMCATH -3.8559*** 0.9964 -3.870 -0.1350
WOMLEG 0.49337*** 0.3229E-01 15.28 0.3500
DIV 0.79788*** 0.9722E-01 8.207 0.0514
WOMWAG 0.45084E-01 0.2871E-01 1.571 0.0272
GDP 0.31596E-01** 0.1353E-01 2.336 0.0057
MALELAB 0.28113*** 0.4341E-01 6.476 0.1126
SERVEM -0.25968*** 0.7630E-01 -3.404 -0.1275
GOVTEMP 0.48932E-01 0.6500E-01 0.7527 0.0234
SOCSEC -0.16045** 0.7188E-01 -2.232 -0.0609
GOVTCD 0.16012*** 0.3639E-01 4.400 0.1134
CPI -0.54368E-01** 0.2143E-01 -2.537 -0.0091
PTAX 0.38605E-01 0.2940E-01 1.313 0.0167
TOTPOP 0.14245E-03*** 0.1503E-04 9.478 0.2247
TIME 0.64124*** 0.6468E-01 9.915 0.2178
CONSTANT 16.631*** 4.976 3.342 0.0000
DF 145
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9280 
DURBIN-WATSON =1.5118 
VON NEUMANN RATIO =1.5210 
RHO = 0.13469
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TABLE 2.4.2 Welfare state regime model
Dependent Variable: Female Labour Force Participation
VARIABLES UNSTAND SE T-RATIO STAND
COEFF COEFF
SOCNNLD 15.367*** 0.82759 18.568 0.58118
CON 0.80074 0.55847 1.4338 0.24281E-01
LIB 6.3089*** 0.63308 9.9654 0.19131
NLD -10.066*** 1.2474 -8.0700 -0.22751
WOMLEG 0.42879*** 0.30918E-01 13.869 0.30417
DIV 0.81372*** 0.89587E-01 9.0830 0.52451E-01
WOMWAG -0.38871E-02 0.25921E-01 -0.14996 -0.23433E-02
GDP 0.17675E-01 0.13600E-01 1.2997 0.32130E-02
MALELAB 0.18529*** 0.35346E-01 5.2423 0.74234E-01
SERVEM 0.63273E-01 0.61809E-01 1.0237 0.31061E-01
GOVTEMP 0.87214E-01* 0.49810E-01 1.7509 0.41629E-01
SOCSEC -0.16978*** 0.64026E-01 -2.6518 -0.64417E-01
GOVTCD 0.58642E-01* 0.31140E-01 1.8832 0.41524E-01
CPI -0.40242E-01** 0.16098E-01 -2.4998 -0.67667E-02
PTAX 0.37236E-01 0.25649E-01 1.4518 0.16113E-01
TOTPOP 0.15519E-03*** 0.10314E-04 15.046 0.24479
TIME 0.52364*** 0.58090E-01 9.0143 0.17787
CONSTANT 14.532*** 4.8831 2.9759 0.0000
DF 147
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9295 
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.4870 
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.4960 
RHO = 0.15212
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TABLE 2.4.3 Welfare state regime model, with partisan political effects
Dependent variable: Female labour force participation
VARIABLES UNSTAND COEFF SE T-RATIO STAND
COEFF
SOCNNLD 11.505*** 1.557 7.387 0.4351
CON 11.375*** 1.233 9.227 0.3449
LIB 8.4203*** 1.041 8.085 0.2553
NLD -0.24812 1.835 -0.1352 -0.0056
WOMLEG 0.59501*** 0.4448E-01 13.38 0.4221
DIV 0.49267** 0.2037 2.418 0.0318
WOMWAG -0.49157E-01 0.5402E-01 -0.9099 -0.0296
GDP 0.50438E-01* 0.2748E-01 1.835 0.0092
MALELAB 0.39163*** 0.5681E-01 6.894 0.1569
SERVEM -0.52028E-01 0.8759E-01 -0.5940 -0.0255
GOVTEMP -0.17461E-01 0.9109E-01 -0.1917 -0.0083
SOCSEC -0.21981 0.1415 -1.554 -0.0834
GOVTCD 0.19899*** 0.6795E-01 2.929 0.1409
CPI -0.89112E-01** 0.4018E-01 -2.218 -0.0150
PTAX 0.78853E-01 0.3766E-01 2.094 0.0341
LEFTPMEN -0.28773E-01 0.1900E-01 -1.515 -0.0263
LEFTGOVT 0.18528E-03 0.2288E-02 0.8098E-01 0.0006
RELPMENT -0.32166*** 0.3092E-01 -10.40 -0.4431
RELGOVT 0.75872E-02 0.4985E-02 1.522 0.0155
TOTPOP 0.14520E-03*** 0.1229E-04 11.81 0.2290
TIME 0.55213*** 0.8651E-01 6.382 0.1875
CONSTANT 5.2715 7.154 0.7369 0.0000
DF 143
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9395 
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.4364 
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.4451 
RHO = 0.16931
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TABLE 2.4.4 Families of welfare model
Dependent variable: Female labour force participation
VARIABLES UNSTAND COEFF SE T-RATIO STAND
COEFF
SOCNNLD 1.8469 1.299 1.422 0.0699
CASC0N2 -9.5251*** 1.322 -7.208 -0.2888
CASRAD2 -13.595*** 1.665 -8.163 -0.4122
CASLIB2 -0.50548 1.182 -0.4277 -0.0153
WOMLEG 0.44621*** 0.3909E-01 11.41 0.3165
DIV 0.72829*** 0.1775 4.103 0.0469
WOMWAG 0.15560*** 0.4577E-01 3.400 0.0938
GDP -0.17226E-01 0.2852E-01 -0.6041 -0.0031
MALELAB 0.26464*** 0.5287E-01 5.006 0.1060
SERVEM 0.76315E-01 0.9050E-01 0.8433 0.0375
GOVTEMP 0.63099*** 0.8584E-01 7.351 0.3012
SOCSEC 0.5121 lE-01 0.1062 0.4822 0.0194
GOVTCD -0.38437*** 0.6308E-01 -6.093 -0.2722
CPI -0.43240E-01 0.3334E-01 -1.297 -0.0073
PTAX 0.87413E-01*** 0.3260E-01 2.681 0.0378
LEFTPMEN 0.62335E-01*** 0.1705E-01 3.656 0.0571
LEFTGOVT 0.20225E-03 0.2215E-02 0.9130E-01 0.0006
RELPMENT -0.15387*** 0.3219E-01 -4.780 -0.2120
RELGOVT -0.14190E-01*** 0.4785E-02 -2.966 -0.0289
TOTPOP 0.29265E-03*** 0.2396E-04 12.22 0.4616
TIME 0.55540*** 0.8984E-01 6.182 0.1887
CONSTANT 5.4180 7.025 0.7713 0.0000
DF 143
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9486 
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.5301 
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.5394 
RHO = 0.12153
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TABLE 2.4.5 Partisan politics model
Dependent variable: Female labour force participation
VARIABLES UNSTAND COEFF SE T-RATIO STAND
COEFF
WOMLEG 0.60395*** 0.3354E-01 18.01 0.4284
DIV 0.44300** 0.2008 2.206 0.0286
WOMWAG 0.27289*** 0.3910E-01 6.978 0.1645
GDP 0.15140E-01 0.2436E-01 0.6216 0.0028
MALELAB 0.69613*** 0.5600E-01 12.43 0.2789
SERVEM -0.92089E-01 0.1024 -0.8997 -0.0452
GOVTEMP 0.33596*** 0.8373E-01 4.013 0.1604
SOCSEC -0.21458* 0.1217 -1.764 -0.0814
GOVTCD -0.15792E-01 0.5713E-01 -0.2764 -0.0112
CPI -0.14107*** 0.3766E-01 -3.746 -0.0237
PTAX 0.17121*** 0.3900E-01 4.390 0.0741
LEFTPMEN 0.60972E-01*** 0.1765E-01 3.455 0.0558
LEFTGOVT -0.30664E-02 0.2629E-02 -1.167 -0.0091
RELPMENT -0.91472E-01*** 0.2562E-01 -3.570 -0.1260
RELGOVT -0.59050E-02 0.4133E-02 -1.429 -0.0120
TOTPOP 0.10480E-03*** 0.1367E-04 7.666 0.1653
TIME 0.56340*** 0.8061E-01 6.989 0.1914
CONSTANT -41.130*** 8.947 -4.597 0.0000
DF 147
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9177 
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.6791 
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.6893 
RHO = 0.06746
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TABLE 2.4.6 Clusters of welfare model with partisan effects
Dependent variable: Female labour force participation
VARIABLES UNSTAND COEFF SE
SOCNNLD
CASC0N2
CASRAD2
SCMCATH
WOMLEG
DIV
WOMWAG
GDP
MALELAB
SERVEM
GOVTEMP
SOCSEC
GOVTCD
CPI
PTAX
LEFTPMEN
LEFTGOVT
RELPMENT
RELGOVT
TOTPOP
TIME
CONSTANT
2.7098**
-8.8061***
-12.988***
-L1916
0.43529***
0.69994***
0.15253***
-0.19840E-01
0.27084***
0.48323E-01
0.60420***
0.58981E-01**
-0.38709***
-0.35429E-01
0.88892E-01***
0.54890E-01***
0.35341E-03
-0.14080***
-0.15376E-01***
0.29001E-03***
0.59597***
6.9885
DF 143
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9477 
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.5155 
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.5247 
RHO = 0.12788
1.279
1.451
1.622
1.098
0.4050E-01
0.1717
0.4423E-01
0.2902E-01
0.5088E-01
0.9643E-01
0.8434E-01
0.1037
0.5998E-01
0.3257E-01
0.3243E-01
0.1631E-01
0.2181E-02
0.3092E-01
0.4722E-02
0.2158E-04
0.9393E-01
6.843
T-RATIO
2.119
-6.068
-8.007
-1.085
10.75
4.077
3.448
-0.6836
5.323
0.5011
7.164
0.5685
-6.454
-1.088
2.741
3.365
0.1620
-4.554
-3.256
13.44
6.345
1.021
STAND
COEFF
0.1025
-0.2670
-0.3938
-0.0417
0.3088
0.0451
0.0919
-0.0036
0.1085
0.0237
0.2884
0.0224
-0.2741
-0.0060
0.0385
0.0502
0.0011
-0.1940
-0.0313
0.4575
0.2024
0.0000
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TABLE 2.4.7 Country effects model
Dependent Variable: Female labour force participation
VARIABLES UNSTAND SE T-RATIO STAND
COEFF COEFF
DNK 22.846*** 1.014 22.52 0.5163
FIN 24.505*** 1.130 21.68 0.5539
NOR 16.207*** 1.080 15.00 0.3663
SWE 15.318*** 0.8773 17.46 0.3462
NLD -20.419*** 0.9449 -21.61 -0.4615
DEU -108.10*** 4.920 -21.97 -2.4431
SWI 12.368*** 1.072 11.54 0.2795
AUS -11.094*** 1.120 -9.905 -0.2507
GBR -93.909*** 4.197 -22.37 -2.1225
IRL -0.57088E-01 1.090 -0.5240E-01 -0.0013
WOMLEG 0.30867*** 0.141 lE-01 21.87 0.2190
DIV 0.33849*** 0.444 lE-01 7.621 0.0218
WOMWAG 0.15137E-01 0.1548E-01 0.9777 0.0091
GDP 0.14633E-02 0.1042E-01 0.1405 0.0003
MALELAB 0.13523*** 0.2809E-01 4.814 0.0542
SERVEM -0.98497E-01 0.6278E-01 -1.569 -0.0484
GOVTEMP 0.47373*** 0.3565E-01 13.29 0.2261
SOCSEC -0.30695*** 0.5208E-01 -5.893 -0.1165
GOVTCD 0.16052*** 0.2808E-01 5.717 0.1137
CPI -0.81727E-01*** 0.1508E-01 -5.418 -0.0137
PTAX -0.29123*** 0.1642E-01 -17.74 -0.1260
TOTPOP 0.21126E-02*** 0.9260E-04 22.81 3.3325
TIME 0.51309*** 0.4383E-01 11.71 0.1743
CONSTANT 11.270*** 4.261 2.645 0.0000
DF 141
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.9960 
DURBIN-WATSON = 1.6808 
VON NEUMANN RATIO = 1.6911 
RHO = 0.08318
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2.5 Overall conclusions
The data analyses discussed in this chapter make it clear that relationships exist between 
the policy configurations of ‘welfare states’ and patterns and paths of development of 
women’s involvement in the paid workforce. While the analyses presented here suggest 
that some of the variables emphasized by modernization theorists do have an impact on 
women’s role in the workforce, they do not support ‘one path fits all’ models. Instead, 
clear evidence that women’s participation in the workforce group into a number of 
clusters. These clusters mirror typologies of ‘welfare state regimes’, at least to some 
extent. Nevertheless the data analyses suggest that several important anomalies exist and 
key questions remain unanswered. In particular, causal claims made about the impact of 
welfare state regimes and patterns of labour market organization do not seem sustainable, 
particularly as the labour market organization of some states does not match their welfare 
state regime. Moreover, the data analyses raise questions about the relationship of 
welfare states, conceived of as independent variables, with other independent variables.
In general, these results suggest that the welfare state needs to be more clearly located 
within broader configurations of welfare policy (especially in relation to the public- 
private mix in welfare), of state policy, and of the overall pattern of national political 
economy. It is to these issues - as well as the reconstruction of the unfolding of complex 
causal chains over time - that we now turn in the country case studies. In the cases of 
Sweden, Germany and the USA the countries have been chosen because the existing 
literature and the data analysis both indicate that they are exemplars of particular welfare 
regimes. The Netherlands emerged as a key anomaly in the data analysis - it is also 
receiving increasing theoretical attention in the literature, as we shall see.
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Chapter Three: Towards social citizenship? The impact of the social 
democratic welfare regime on the economic position of women 
Sweden
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3.1 Social Policy and the path of women’s participation in the 
workforce
The Swedish welfare state has had a major impact on gender relations. Female labour 
force participation and state welfare (even defined narrowly as social policy) are more 
directly connected in Sweden than elsewhere. Particularly since 1970 wom en’s work 
has been increasingly concentrated in the extensive public welfare sector (see Rein 
1985: generally and Table 16: 167; Esping-Andersen 1990: 211-212; Ruggie 1984; 
1988). The division o f  the labour market along gender lines is particularly clear in 
Sweden. The private sector is largely a male domain and women are concentrated in 
public employment.
However, it is misleading to focus exclusively on this picture. The pattern o f  
comparatively high levels o f  female labour force participation concentrated in the 
public sector is a characteristic o f  the 1970s and 80s. The emergence o f  this pattern 
needs to be explained by going further back into history. Tracing female labour force 
participation since the 1930s reveals connections between it and the development o f  
Sweden’s ‘welfare state’ characteristics. In doing this tracing, however, we have to 
confront divergent interpretations o f the position o f  women in the labour force and 
rely on data which are less consistently available and comparable.
Chart 3.1 Sweden - Female Labour Force Participation
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Chart 3.2 Smooth o f Female Labour Force Participation
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According to OECD data - the most comprehensive broadly comparable data 
available - female labour force participation seems to have gone through three phases
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since the war. Although the data are not wholly consistent with those available for the 
later period, it seems that the post-war starting point was one of comparatively low 
female labour force participation, which suggests it went through a stagnant period 
(female employment seems to have been comparatively high in the 1930s). The first 
post-war phase lasted until the late 1950s or early 1960s. It was characterized by 
steady growth from a comparatively low starting point to a position towards the top of 
comparative league tables. Female labour force participation rates were stagnant in 
the mid 1960s - the second phase. The final phase, which began in the late 1960s and 
early 70s, saw a dramatic take-off of female labour force participation to levels 
unmatched outside Scandinavia.
The a closeness of the relationship between welfare and gender in Sweden is widely 
recognized (Esping-Andersen 1990; Rein 1985; as well as, inter alia Hemes 1987; 
Lewis and Âstrom 1992). However, a number of issues remain to be resolved 
concerning the nature of this relationship. The first concerns whether or not the 
impact of welfare on gender was intended and relatedly whether welfare changes 
which influenced gender were partly produced by gendered political mobilization or 
debate. Third, these issues need to be considered in relation to the ‘mainstream’ 
debate on Swedish welfare state development. Positions in this debate variously 
emphasize working class mobilization and left control of government, the formation 
of cross class political and policy alliances (especially between workers and farmers), 
the political role of capital or business in politics, or the form of the state. Most 
‘mainstream’ analysts implicitly suggest that the impact of the welfare state on gender 
was an unintended, they do not consider gender explicitly, for the most part. They do 
vary in the degree to which they are open to modification to take account of gender.
Finally, welfare state analysts mn a clear risk of anachronism. They may define the 
welfare state on the basis of its characteristics in the 1970s or 80s and read them back 
into earlier periods in history. The presence of strong social democratic control of 
government dating back to the 1930s might suggest the dominance of a single social 
democratic ‘social model’ throughout the period of left control of government.
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3.2 Periodîzing the Swedish case: when was the ‘universal’ or ‘social 
service’ welfare state ‘locked in’?
One way of addressing these problems and engaging with debates about welfare 
development and changes in gender in Sweden, is to consider the way they divide 
history into periods. Explicit consideration of the periodization of the development of 
the Swedish ‘welfare state’ helps to alleviate the risk of anachronism. Although they 
are rarely compared in these terms, competing interpretations of the Swedish welfare 
state rely on distinct (implicit or explicit) periodizations. Each identifies a particular 
‘formative moment’ at which the basic character of the welfare state was ‘set’. Factors 
present at the ‘formative moment’ - including the balance of (class, gender and other) 
forces, the character of the state, and so on - become embedded in, and largely 
reproduced by welfare state institutions. Subsequent ‘turning points’ when the initial 
settlement was somewhat modified are sometimes identified. Space can be created 
for the impact of gender mobilization on the welfare state and the issue of whether 
subsequent welfare state impacts on gender were intended. Analyses do not include 
gender explicitly, but identify change at moments when a gender mobilization or 
debate occurred are more likely to be open to the suggestion that gender had an 
impact.
A careful look at the historical record suggests that changes in the position of women 
may be connected to welfare reform patterns. This periodization of Swedish history is 
claims that there have been two phases of relevant social policy innovation. The first 
started in the 1930s within an important debate about ‘democratic population policy’, 
partly in reaction to the depression. Reforms were adopted from the late 1930s until 
the end of the 1950s. The second phase began during the 1960s and continued in the 
1970s, beginning with a period of intense debate about welfare priorities and gender. 
Change in both female labour force participation follow a similar pattern of gradual 
growth, sustained until early 1960s, a stagnation during the 1960s, followed by 
explosive growth in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
This periodization of the Swedish ‘welfare state’ development is not universally 
accepted. Key features of the development of the Swedish model are variously dated
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from the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century; the 1930s and 40s; and the 
post-war period (attributed by Baldwin 1992 and Rothstein 1991 to the first of these 
phases; by Mydral 1938 and Sainsbury 1994 to the second and by Esping-Andersen 
1985 and Lewis and Astrom 1992 to the third). Each of these approaches is 
associated with a particular claim about the character of the (welfare) state. My 
approach is closest those who focus on the 1930s and 40s, but also emphasizes the 
1960s and 70s. Important changes are identified during the second period, albeit in 
the context of other legacies of earlier policies and adopting some of their institutional 
forms.
Baldwin’s purpose is to demolish the social democratic analysis. He dates the origins 
of the Scandinavian model to the 1913 universalist pension reform, before the social 
democrats attained power. In contrast to his account of continental European social 
policy, he fails to explain how this early choice precluded alternatives (for, say, 
‘capital’ or the middle classes) and locked Sweden into a social citizenship state form. 
Baldwin’s analysis mixes breathtakingly comprehensive comparative archival 
research with an overblown general argument and significant distortions of the 
positions of others. For example he ignores the emphasis placed on class alliances by 
power resource analysts. (Baldwin 1992: 62-63, 93, 113 on the 1913 reform; Esping- 
Andersen 1985: 153 provides a contrasting interpretation).
Others who emphasize the early period account for its continuing impact more 
plausibly, either by examining capital/labour bargains (this analysis could be extended 
to show the ongoing benefits yielded to both parties) or by emphasizing the Swedish 
state’s unique character. Even these more differentiated analyses fail to show how 
social service oriented social policy was determined by early policy choices. 
(Rothstein 1991 emphasizes on the distinctive form of the Swedish state; Swenson 
1991 stresses the detailed patterns of capital/labour bargains. Both provide analyses 
which place the ‘Swedish Model’s’ formative moment before the first world war; as 
well as Baldwin see Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984 on how early choices locked 
continental states into social policies which restricted social democracy; Esping- 
Andersen and Friedland 1982 and Esping-Andersen 1985 discuss class alliances.)
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By contrast, mainstream power resource analysis largely bypasses the interwar period. 
The implicit periodization developed privileges social democracy. Esping-Andersen’s 
consideration of the interwar period is limited to economic crisis and unemployment 
policy. He suggests that the social democrats did not develop a blue print of the 
welfare state (1985: 154). Policies created at the end of the 1940s are treated as 
distinctive post-war phenomena. They are not considered in the light of the debates 
and reforms of the previous ten or fifteen years. The power resource approach 
emphasizes one strand within Swedish ‘social democratic’ state and society, reflecting 
its masculinist and workerist bias. The policies of the 1930s and 40s seem not to be 
regarded as significant, presumably because they were not primarily concerned with 
de-commodifying workers.
Authors concerned with feminist questions usually treat the 1930s more carefully. 
Here the debate revolves around whether or not Swedish experiment in democratic 
family and population policy can be considered ‘feminist’ (A. Myrdal: 1945; compare 
Lewis and Âstrom 1992 and Ginsburg 1992 with Sainsbury 1994 and Therbom 1989a 
for varying evaluations of its ‘feminist’ quality). Interesting though this discussion 
may be it has meant that the legacy of the 1930s and 40s has not been considered in a 
balanced way. Authors who see little feminism in the debate of the 1930s tend to 
view it as a constraint on subsequent developments, which are usually evaluated more 
positively (Lewis and Astrom 1992; Lewis 1992; Ginsburg 1992). They have 
distracted attention from whether or not the debates and policies of the 1930s and 40s 
helped to construct the space for, as well as restrictions on, subsequent reforms. 
Ginsburg disparages the Mydrals’ approach as ‘certainly not feminist in orientation’. 
While listing some reforms introduced during this period, he emphasizes the absence 
of ‘liberal abortion reform, and day care and nursery education for the under sevens ... 
both of which represented too much of a challenge to traditional ideology’ (1992: 49 
and 50).
The 1930s and 40s set the pattern for subsequent reforms, others argue. Debate 
around population policy in the 1930s and 40s rooted the ‘universalist, ‘popular’
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conception’ of social policy deeply in Sweden. ‘The population policies of the 1930s’ 
have even been traced as the origin of ‘the principle of care as a basis of entitlement to 
benefits and the origins of the ‘social service state” . The social service state 
delivering individual and collective benefits in kind became firmly established as a 
dominant ethos, at the expense of cash benefits. The Myrdals’ seminal work on the 
Crisis in the Population Question concluded with a chapter entitled ‘In Cash or in 
Kind’. In it they argued strongly that the state should deliver services rather than just 
transfer cash (published in Swedish in 1934, reproduced in A. Myrdal 1945: see 133- 
153, and G. Myrdal 1938: 209-210; Therbom 1989a: 219 and Sainsbury 1994: 162- 
163 both discuss the universalist popular conception of social policy and the ‘social 
service state’).
Most early reforms were aimed at families - particularly children and mothers.
Initially policy sometimes took the form of individualized and means tested benefits. 
However, in the 1940s the number of generally available services for families and 
children expanded ‘to include free school lunches, school medical services, social 
services for families, and day nurseries’. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the 
individualized means tested benefits in kind which had been characteristic of some of 
the early programmes were phased out, to be supplanted by ‘cash benefits and 
collective benefits in kind’ (Sainsbury 1994: 163).
The structuring of space for later reform by early concern with gender in democratic 
population policy may have contributed to the subsequent development of a 
(relatively) decommodifying welfare state. However, choices made in the 1930s are 
not the whole story. Changes in the 1950s and 60s were also significant. The power 
resource approach claims that gradual social policy development during the late 1940s 
and early 1950s was largely consensual, but was followed by a distinct politicization 
around the ATP pension plan. The Social Democrat’s eventual success on this issue 
strengthened them substantially, and opened further space for gradual welfare state 
development (Esping-Andersen 1985: 160-163), particularly after the 1960s ‘sex-role 
equality’ debate and leadership change in the SAP.
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The relationship between the periodization of Swedish welfare policy development 
and women’s path into the paid workforce since the second world war is key.
Dividing women’s entry into the paid workforce into three phases shows an initial 
phase of growth, followed by an episode of stagnation and finally a period of 
sustained growth from the mid 60s until the end of the 1980s. This periodization begs 
a number of questions. How and why did female labour force participation grow in the 
period up to the early 1960s? Why did it stagnate during the mid 1960s, a period of 
rapid economic growth and intense debate about the role of women in Sweden? How 
and why did female labour force participation explode during the late 1960s and 70s? 
In relation to this last question, the politics of welfare were clearly crucial. However, 
the extent to which the change was motivated by gender concerns is less obvious - 
was women’s desire to work accommodated by the state, or was growth in women’s 
employment an unintended consequence of the expansion of social welfare work? 
(Rein argues that both ‘interpretations are strongly held by many observers and 
participants in Swedish society’ 1985: 77, on the argument generally see 76 - 88; see 
also Jenson and Mahon 1993.)
There is some disagreement about this periodization. During the 1950s and early 60s 
‘the labour force participation rate of women over fifteen remained constant at about 
30 percent’ argue Lewis and Astrom. Moreover, they suggest that ‘participation rates 
were lower during the 1950s and early 1960s that in countries such as the United 
States or Britain’ (1992: 66; 70). However, the balance of evidence suggests that 
women’s rate of the workforce grew during this period. The rate rising from roughly 
35 per cent to 50 per cent between 1950 and 1960. By 1960, according to these data 
the Swedish rate had topped those in the USA or the UK (OECD Historical Statistics, 
various years; OECD 1985 Table 1.2: 14; Ginsburg 1992 Tables A. 12 and A. 13: 203). 
The impression left by the Lewis and Astrom analysis is misleading in a further 
respect. They suggest that a period of stagnation which continued into the early 1960s 
was replaced by rapid growth of female labour force participation (1992: esp. 66-70). 
The OECD evidence shows a stagnation in female labour force participation during 
the mid 1960s.
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3.3 The Initial Phases: from before the war to the 1960s
The pre-war background
The historical development of women’s employment in Sweden shows little evidence 
of a decisive shift in the character of female labour force participation having between 
1930 and 1950, although a number of trends continued, gradually changing the pattern 
of women’s employment. By the end of the 1930s women’s work in domestic service 
and agriculture was clearly declining. Women’s industrial employment was 
concentrated in certain areas - such as textiles, tobacco, chocolate and preserves. 
Private sector clerical and service work accounted for an important and increasing 
proportion of women’s work. Finally, public sector and social service employment 
were already established as important sectors of female employment, despite 
significant decline in some traditional areas, such as midwifery. Within the public 
sector, however, women were largely excluded from the higher levels of the civil 
service, being concentrated in health care and teaching (A. Myrdal 1938: 223-229).
Despite the fact that this was a period of growth in many other countries female 
labour force participation growth was not dramatic during the 1940s,. Sweden’s 
neutrality during the Second World War may be a factor - many countries involved in 
the war actively mobilized women, although there is evidence that women were 
brought into employment to replace men conscripted as a precaution against invasion. 
Even before the war Alva Myrdal described the situation of Swedish women as 
‘closer to a complete equality with ... men than in most other countries’ in terms of 
‘economic standard,... legal status,... civil rights,... daily work environment, and .... 
general attitude to life’(1938: 216). Whether this relatively equal status was reflected 
in female labour force participation rates is unclear - reliable comparative data are not 
available for this period. She presents data which suggests that the proportion of 
‘gainful employment among all adult women’ was 36 per cent in 1920 and 38 per cent 
in 1930 (1945: 406, the passage is slightly ambiguous, and may refer to rates in 
Stockholm, which would be higher rate than elsewhere). Although not directly 
comparable, OECD data for 1950 provides a helpful contrast. It shows female labour 
force participation as a proportion of the female population aged 15-64 at 35.1 per
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cent in 1950 (OECD 1989; Ginsburg 1992: 203 Table A. 13; see Ruggie 1984: 255 on 
women’s mobilization during the war).
Growth in participation during the 1950s
During a single decade - the 1950s - Sweden’s laggardly position disappeared. 
However, there is little evidence that this growth was caused by a decisive break in 
the character of, or causal factors behind, women’s work. Within the general pattern 
of women’s work from the late 1930s until the 1950s, the balance between different 
elements changed. Thus the decline of certain traditional sectors of female 
employment, such as midwifery, was largely complete by 1950, it no longer offset 
growth in other sectors. During the 1950s the importance of women’s employment in 
the public sector continued to grow, while that of low wage private sector work was 
broadly maintained. Between 1950 and 1960 the proportion of women employed by 
the central government grew substantially (calculated from data in Peters 1985: 219 
Table 6.8)
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s public sector social welfare employment grew 
gradually due to of the extension of direct service provision. Although the origins of 
the ‘social service state’ can be found in the 1930s, a series of reforms incrementally 
extended it in the 1940s, 50s and early 60s. The reforms changed the ethos of 
provision of benefits in kind from selective means tests to general availability. At this 
stage the impact of policy changes on women’s labour force participation was 
relatively limited and apparently largely unintended, despite debate explicitly 
touching on gender. Private sector work remained very significant for women. 
Subsequently, Swedish women came to be disproportionately employed in state social 
services. Gradual social service expansion between 1938 and the early 1960s 
contributed to growth in female labour force participation. It helped to create 
conditions within which subsequent expansion could occur. (Sainsbury 1994: 163 on 
the ‘social service state’ - she sometimes refers to generally available, but individually 
consumed, goods - such as free vitamins and minerals - as ‘collective’; on gender in 
political debate see A. Myrdal 1938; 1945 and Jenson and Mahon 1993: 80 - 84.)
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The (neglected) stagnation of the mid 1960s
During the mid 1960s female labour force participation in Sweden was stagnant. This 
episode - which, ironically, coincided with the sex-role equality debate - has not been 
widely recognized in the comparative literature (although the restriction of 
employment opportunities may have triggered the debate). ‘Rapid economic growth’ 
in the 1960s which ‘spread prosperity to almost all social and occupational groups’ 
makes female labour force participation stagnation more puzzling. An important part 
of the explanation of stagnation during the 1960s lies in changes to the solidaristic 
wage policy at the end of the 1950s. The existing approach, created in 1951, required 
job evaluation to ensure equal pay for equal work. A simpler and more vigorous 
policy using the mean wage as a benchmark replaced it. All wages falling below this 
level were considered ‘low’. Powerful collective bargaining ensured that low paid 
workers gained disproportionate wage increases to ‘catch up’. The solidaristic wage 
policy was also meant to facilitate structural economic change, by putting pressure on 
low-wage, low productivity sectors (on this period see Heclo and Madsen 1987: 116- 
117).
The solidaristic wage policy had a dramatic impact on private sector jobs historically 
taken by women. From the 1930s, women made up a high proportion of textile 
industry employees. ‘During the 1960s and early 1970s’ employment in this industry 
was ‘ravaged because the labor movement’s solidaristic wage policy resulted in wage 
rates that made Swedish textile products uncompetitive in world markets’.
Consumer, particularly retail, services suffered a similar fate. Employment in this 
sector grew rapidly in other countries during the 1960s and 70s but suffered a sharp 
fall in Sweden. A consequence of the solidaristic wage policy was that ‘fewer 
women (were) employed in retail stores, and more use (was) made of automated 
processes’. The decline in private sector low wage female employment took hold 
during the 1960s, but continued into the 1980s. It was part of a general fall in private 
sector employment. The labour market participation of women suffered as an 
unintended consequence of a policy pursued for general welfare reasons. (See A. 
Myrdal 1938: 225 on women in the textile industry; Heclo and Madsen 1987: 325 on
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the devastation of textiles and Rein 1985: 35; 167 Table 16 on the fate of consumer 
services).
3.4 Continuity and Change: from the mid 1960s to the 1980s
The explosion of female employment
By the end of the 1960s women’s workforce participation was expanding rapidly - an 
expansion which continued into the 1980s. It occurred despite stagnation in private 
sector employment. Stable or declining employment in the private sector, meant that 
full employment and growth in female labour force participation were due to 
explosive public sector and welfare employment growth (see Peters 1985: 208 on 
employment patterns between 1960 and 1980; Jenson and Mahon 1993; and Ruggie 
1984). I differ most from mainstream analyses by identifying the mid 1960s and early 
1970s as a ‘turning point’ (while acknowledging that establishment of the social 
service welfare orientation in the 1930s and 1940s helped to shape the context for 
choices made in the 1960s and early 1970s).
The growth in female labour force participation in the 1960s and 1970s was closely 
bound up with the expansion of welfare services and employment. It requires an 
account of the renewal and expansion of ‘the welfare state’. After 1960 public sector 
employment exploded in size. The most dramatic growth in government employment 
occurred after 1965 and remarkable rates of growth continued throughout the late 
1960s and 1970s. Within public employment, strongest growth was in welfare work, 
within which women had traditionally been strongly represented (see Peters 1985: 207 
on the 1950s and on OECD statistics for the later period). The welfare expansion and 
related female labour force participation growth beg questions of the balance between 
policies directly concerned with gender and unanticipated consequences of other 
policies (see Scott 1982; Ruggie 1984; Eduards 1991a; Rein 1985).
Women had long been strongly represented in some parts of the Swedish public 
sector. Women dominated county and local employment - largely in social service 
jobs - but were much less well represented in central government employment. The 
proportion of women in central government grew more rapidly between 1975 and
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1980, the period of bourgeois control of government, than it had in the previous 25 
years. Employment in central government gre\v steadily but strongest growth was at 
local and county levels, particularly in social welfare work. It was primarily 
responsible for the growth of female labour force participation (Peters 1985: 213 
Table 6.5 on gro’wth at local and county levels; 209 Table 6.3 and 211 Table 6.4; Rein 
1985 on growth in social welfare work).
The proportion of county and local government employment taken by women fell 
between 1965 and 1970. Although it grew again later, it had not regained its 1965 
level (82.7 per cent) by 1980. This decline in the percentage of female employment 
occurred in the context of massive growth in their absolute number. In 1975 there 
were nearly 2 1/3 times as many female local and county government employees as 
there had been in 1970. The 1980 level was just over 5 times that of 1965. By 1980, 
840 900 women were employed by local and county government (based on Peters’ 
data, 1985: 219 Table 6.8). The explanation of expansion in women’s workforce 
participation returns us to the identification of the purpose of welfare state growth. I 
examine first at ‘needs’ which the growth of the welfare state was intended to meet (in 
relation to gender and poverty) and ask how far meeting these needs necessarily 
required, or was likely to produce, an explosive welfare employment growth. Then I 
consider the use of the welfare state to sustain the ‘full employment’ state.
Welfare ‘needs’ and welfare expansion
The expansion of ‘the welfare state’ was partly motivated by an attempt to meet newly 
identified ‘welfare needs’. These ‘needs’ were identified within a wide-ranging 
equality debate which pre-occupied Swedish politics during the 1960s and into the 
1970s. A number of distinct, if intertwined, elements made up the ‘equality 
movement’. The two most important were concerned with ‘sex-role equality’ and the 
(re)discovery of poverty. The overall movement became concerned with ‘social 
equality of outcome in the welfare state’. The movement was associated with a 
radicalization of Swedish social democracy following its ‘victory’ on ATP pensions. 
(On radicalization and the ‘equality movement’ generally see Ginsburg 1992: 32, 50 
and Jenson and Mahon 1993, also discuss the 1960s as a ‘golden age’; on the SAP
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after the ATP reforms Esping-Andersen 1985 and Wilson 1979: 13 -14; on ‘sex-role’ 
equality, generally Scott 1982 and on poverty Wilson 1979: 12-13.)
The concern with gender relations predated the rediscovery of poverty. The gender 
debate developed initially in academic and journalistic circles, outside formal politics. 
Opinion on the manner and order in which the political parties took up this issue is 
divided. Those associated with the radical gender critique of social democracy argue 
that the issue was first taken up by the Liberal Party. Those sympathetic to the SAP 
provide evidence that the party had formed a study group as early as 1960, with 
Erlander, the Prime Minister, as its honorary chair. The work of this group 
culminated in the ‘The Erlander Report’ which was adopted by the party in 1964 and 
was eventually incorporated into the 1969 Programme for Equality. The terms of 
debate within the SAP, and the wider ‘social democratic movement’ changed 
gradually through the 1960s. (For an relatively critical analysis of the SAP’s role in 
these debates see Lewis and Âstrom 1992: 66-67; Scott 1982: 4-6 discusses the 
origins of the debate outside of formal politics, the SAP study group, the Erlander 
Report and the 1969 Programme', Ginsburg also discusses most of these developments 
1992: 50.)
In the mid-1960s poverty was ‘rediscovered’ in Sweden. This rediscovery is often 
attributed to a report of the Royal Commission on Taxes published in 1964, which 
argued that ‘numbers of people were still living at standards unacceptably low in an 
affluent society and, worst of all, many of these were children’. It triggered a wave of 
research within trade unions, the civil service and universities. In 1966 ‘a large scale 
investigation ... by the government to analyze the ‘characteristics and causes’ of the 
new poverty’ was undertaken (Wilson 1979: 13; also Ginsburg 1992: 32, 50; Scott 
1982: 18-19).
Debates sparked by the equality movement continued throughout the 1960s. They 
influenced state policies and the corportatist partners during this decade. However, 
the major impact on political elites and policy occurred in the late 1960s and early 
70s, after the equality movement’s ‘heyday’. 1969 stands as a turning point, marked
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by two events. First, the ‘Equality Programme’ was adopted as official SAP policy; 
second Palme (more sympathetic to the New Left) treplaced Erlander as Prime 
Minister. Under Palme the SAP won the 1969 election on a reformist agenda 
‘Increased Equality for a More Just Society’ (see Wilson 1979: especially 13; Scott 
1982: especially 6-7; Heclo and Madsen 1987: 164, 173-178; Jenson and Mahon 
1993: especially 84; Esping-Andersen 1985).
The policies advocated by the equality movement (and subsequently pursued as state
policy or through corporatist arrangements - albeit in modified and diluted form)
demonstrate that sex-role equality was integrated into the broader equality movement.
For example, the demand of the sex-role feminists for gender egalitarian labour-
market policies was partly recognized. However, it was subsumed within attempts to
help a variety of underprivileged groups. The significance of this ‘integration’ is
unclear. Gender equality policies were blended together with other aspects of the
programme in ways which made gender issues both less clear and more acceptable.
Hilda Scott states that
‘the sex role equality program was assimilated because it was part of an 
‘equality program’ that had something for everybody. ... The program’s overall 
purpose was to ‘restore the balance’ for all less-privileged groups - the young, 
the old, the handicapped, the unemployed, the low-income groups, and the rural 
dwellers - as well as women. Thus some of the more fiercely debated measures 
relating to the status of women (or the status of men) were packaged so that the 
inclusion of women was only implicit’ (1982: 7; see also Ginsburg 1992: 50- 
51).
The equality initiatives sought to transform ‘sex roles’ domestically and in private 
sector employment as well as in the public sector. Three types of initiative were used. 
First, policies, such as adequate childcare (which might be expected to result in an 
increase in public welfare employment) were aimed at providing the supportive 
conditions necessary for women to participate equally in the general workforce. 
Secondly, policies were adopted to alter the patterns of incentives for women and men 
to participate in domestic unpaid labour and paid work. They included parental leave 
(open to both women and men) and changing tax arrangements (as well as patterns of 
eligibility for benefits - increasingly based on employment) to increase incentives for
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wives/female partners to work, even on a part-time basis and reduce those for 
husbands/male partners to work additional hours. Finally, there were policies directly 
to challenge conventional attitudes towards sex roles, both those of men towards 
domestic work and of employers towards employing both women and men in non- 
traditional occupations. While the increase in childcare would expand welfare 
employment, many of these policies would not necessarily result in welfare 
employment expansion.
However, the anti-poverty aspect of the equality movement did increase welfare 
employment. Here we see a legacy of earlier welfare policy development. The 
reforms of the 1930s and 1940s introduced a form of welfare which was biased 
towards the provision of welfare services and benefits in kind, more than cash 
transfers. ‘New poverty’ was tackled in line with the established tradition, and 
reinforced it. The resulting welfare expansion led to growth in female employment.
Welfare expansion and flill employment
The expansion of welfare employment soon became a vehicle for sustaining full 
employment, as much as poverty eradication (although employment was seen as key 
to tackling poverty). During the 1960s aggregate private sector employment stopped 
growing. The state attempted to maintain full employment for men and women partly 
through labour market policies, but increasingly through public employment. The 
Swedish state’s commitment to full employment was integral to its ‘welfarist’ 
character (Peters 1985: especially 208 discusses the decline in private sector 
employment; Ruggie 1984: 82-83 and 155 analyzes the expansion of public sector 
employment to sustain full employment; Esping-Andersen 1990: 28 considers the 
centrality of full employment to Swedish social democracy).
A number of changes which encouraged women to participate in the labour market 
occurred during the optimistic 1960s and early 70s, before decline in private sector 
employment and general economic climate became obvious. Not fully appreciated at 
the time, their significance became clear subsequently. Once in the labour market, 
women came to be covered by the framework of workers rights (if only so as not to
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‘undercut’ male workers) - Swedish employment is significantly mediated through 
politics. Women came to be included in the full employment target - to have the 
‘right’ to work. These changes were not wholly motivated by gender egalitarianism 
(see Ruggie 1984: especially 83-84; 155; 342-346; Rein 1985; Peters 1985; Scott 
1982.)
Part of the explanation of women’s inclusion in the formal labour force concerns a 
change in the attitude of the trades unions during the 1960s. This change was not 
primarily concerned with gender equality. Instead the unions became increasingly 
hostile towards immigration which rose sharply during the 1960s. They chose to 
support the employment of Swedish women instead. It had been actively encouraged 
by the Swedish state (only slackening in the 1970s) bringing (mainly male) workers 
into goods production. However, if the unions’ posture was intended to deliver 
women into goods production, it failed. The change in union attitudes was broadly 
contemporaneous with the end of private sector employment growth. While this 
change facilitated (perhaps even as a necessary condition) the subsequent employment 
of women for example altering the role of unions in labour market policy (see below), 
it was not its main cause. Immigrants and Swedish women were employed in 
different sectors - the former mainly in private sector and goods production; the latter 
in the public sector and service provision. (Jenson and Mahon 1993; Ruggie 1984; 
Scott 1982; Ginsburg 1992.)
Active labour market policy is a crucial facet of the ‘Swedish Model’. Women, and 
particularly married women, came to be important participants in, and beneficiaries 
of, Swedish labour market policy during the 1960s. By 1970 46 per cent of those in 
training at any one time were married women, up from fourteen per cent in 1960 
(Wilson 1979: especially 79). However, women were concentrated in training for 
‘traditional female occupations, such as domestic and secretarial work and nursing’.
At the same time as women were gaining greater access to training a change occurred 
‘in training and public works towards the service occupations’. This mirrored a 
change in employment generally. The shift in training may have been a consequence 
of increased priority for (married) women’s employment or perhaps it was partly led
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by changes in employment, as the government turned to the public sector to maintain 
full employment in spite of declining private employment. It is worth noting that in 
county and local government (the area of most rapid public and also welfare 
employment growth) a smaller proportion of the work force was female in 1980 than 
it had been in 1965. Women made up over 75 per cent of employees throughout the 
period, and absolute numbers of women employed expanded rapidly during. (Wilson 
1979: 79; Ruggie 1984: 83-84; 155; Peters 1985: 219-220, especially table 6.8.)
The introduction of individual taxation, notably for married couples gave the clearest 
indication of the increased priority given to women’s work. This reform had the 
effect of strongly increasing the incentive for both marriage partners to work, even if 
one did so part time. The impact on incentives was particularly strong given the high 
levels of marginal tax rates in Sweden - in 1981 the marginal rate for a typical first 
(male) wage earner was 90 per cent, compared to 68 per cent on second (female) 
earners (data from Lewis and Âstrom 1992: 67; see also Scott 1982: 72). Taxation 
reform was demanded by the (sex-role) equality movement. Lewis and Âstrom state 
that this approach was introduced on a voluntary basis in 1968 (1992: 67), while 
Sundberg dates its introduction from 1965 (1971:231; Glendon 1977: 178 misquotes 
Sundberg and dates it from 1960). It was formalized in 1971, making separate 
assessments the general practice (Scott 1982: 8, 72; Ginsburg 1992: 51; Lewis and 
Astrom 1992: 67). The change in the structure of taxation influenced the incentives 
for women to work, rather than the availability of work for women. The explanation 
of the growth of employment for women remains key. In a country strongly 
committed to full employment, with institutionalized active labour market policies to 
achieve it, growth in the demand for work draws forth a strong state response. 
Powerful ‘social partners’ might have the capacity to stymie this response, hence the 
importance of the change in union attitudes.
This analysis suggests that explosive growth of female labour force participation in 
Sweden was less the consequence of a clear political decision, or the decisive outcome 
of a political struggle around gender (associated with the sex-role equality movement) 
than it might appear. Important policy changes were made but the consequences of
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these changes often appear to have been poorly understood at the time - as the case of 
unions seeking to substitute Swedish women for foreign migrant workers illustrates. 
The unanticipated change from expansion to stagnation in private sector employment 
may have thrown reforms to extend equality off course. The cause of this change 
might be debated itself, - how far did it result from increasing employment costs, 
associated with state welfare? A clear concern with gender existed, but the expansion 
of women’s workforce participation depended on welfare employment growth (among 
other things). Although this growth emerged from the same political conjuncture as 
gender egalitarianism, it occurred for other reasons (particularly meeting new welfare 
needs). Moreover, welfare expansion took a labour intensive form partly as a legacy 
of earlier policy choices.
Two illustrative policy areas; non-traditional employment and childcare 
Examination of two cases illustrates the extent to which gender equality policies had 
unanticipated consequences and occurred in a changing, unpredictable environment. 
Several policies were clearly aimed at increasing equality, but often failed to achieve 
their particular targets. One attempted to place men and women in ‘nontraditional 
employment’, the other concerned childcare. The attempt to give rights to men in the 
domestic sphere and women in formal employment was an aspect of the equality 
agenda. Some new rights, such as those for parental leave, seem to have had some 
impact. However, encouraging women (and men) in non-traditional areas of 
employment was a spectacular failure, despite the attention it received. The Swedish 
labour force became one of the most gender segregated in the world (Esping- 
Andersen 1990: 212 and Ruggie 1984 especially 158-161; Scott 1982: 25-28; Wilson 
1979: 102; Rollen 1980: 193).
Swedish childcare policy development is particular revealing, although its gender 
implications are difficult to interpret. The sex-role equality movement drew attention 
to the importance of childcare for women’s access to employment. As the issue was 
taken up more broadly, its benefits to children and contribution to inculcating them 
with collective social democratic values were emphasized (compare Rothstein 1996 
on the weakness of ‘social democracy’ in secondary education). From the mid 1960s
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onwards childcare provision expanded dramatically. From 1965 to the end of the 
1980s the Swedish state played a considerable role childcare expansion. However, the 
growth of direct state childcare provision took a considerable time to get started and 
failed to meet its target levels. The significance of childcare in facilitating labour 
market participation was almost matched by its importance as an employment sector. 
Although Family Commissions in the early 1960s had made recommendations about 
childcare ‘the government did not respond directly to the increase in the number of 
working women by immediately expanding day care provision’. A good deal of the 
expansion before 1965 was either part-time or in traditional ‘child minding’ in private 
homes. A Commission on Child Centres was appointed in 1968, reported in 1972, 
and resulted in legislation which was passed in 1973. Further legislation was passed 
in 1975 and 1976 (on childcare expansion see Scott 1982: 99-117 and Ruggie 1984: 
249-293, especially at 262 on the initial failure to expand day care; and at 256 on the 
Commission on Child Centres).
Childcare provision increased dramatically during the 1970s, with full time municipal 
preschools taking in the lead, providing nearly 100 000 more places in 1980 than 
1970. Despite the authorities’ strongly expressed preference for municipal 
preschools, throughout the 1980s other forms of day care continued to represent large 
segment of provision. After 1980, the increase in childcare provision seems to have 
continued, although it fell short of the (1982) target of a place for all preschoolers by 
1991. (Ruggie 1984: 263, provides data on the expansion of the 1970s; see also 
Wilson 1979: 99-101; Lewis and Âstrom 1992: 68 state that public childcare 
accommodated 27 percent of the age group 1979 and 47 per cent in 1987.)
As a significant sector of employment, mainly for women, the childcare system 
reveals a good deal about the nature of employment in Sweden. A significant amount 
of day care provision occurs in private homes. From 1966, as a result of a Family 
Commission Report in 1965, child minding in private homes began to be integrated 
into the municipal system and came to be known as Family Day Homes, or Family 
Day Nurseries. As a consequence, many of the (largely female) workers in this sector 
have become salaried public employees, enjoying the considerable rights and benefits
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which are attached to this status in Sweden, whereas (private sector) childminding is a 
notably unprotected occupation in many other countries. However, the fact that 
childcare became a relatively secure sector of employment invested with important 
rights was probably as much due to the general policy towards employment security 
in Sweden, as any particular concern with the position of women. (See Ruggie 1984: 
259-260; Ginsburg 1992: 55 on the rights of childcare workers and Peters 1985: 210 
on the formalization - what others might call the commodification - of work done 
informally by women in other countries.)
Of course, once begun, the increase in women’s employment is likely to set up a 
dynamic of demand for childcare. Due to the legacy of earlier policies, the Swedish 
state accepted significant responsibility for, and partly carried out the expansion of, 
day care. However, if the increase in female employment was set in train primarily by 
other factors (such as the change in the taxation regime) the assumption that public 
childcare provision implies a much higher rate of female labour force participation 
than a private system may not be accurate.
Purposes and consequences: welfare expansion and gender 
It is easy to assume that the explosive growth of female labour market participation 
must have been politically intended and/or planned espeically given the politicized 
character of the labour market. Moreover, the Swedish state did pursue policies 
designed to improve the labour market position of women. From a comparative 
perspective some of these policies have been remarkably successful. However, the 
particular path taken by female labour market participation in Sweden can only be 
understood as the contingent coming together of a variety of factors. These include 
the legacy of past welfare reforms, the use of the public sector as a means of 
sustaining full employment, the achievement of extensive rights for workers in 
Sweden, and the impact o f ‘women’s’ or ‘feminist’ demands on the Swedish state.
The legacy of past welfare reforms gave Swedish welfare policy particularly labour 
intensive service oriented character, as some ‘gendered’ analysis distinctively 
emphasizes (Sainsbury 1994 - by contrast, mainstream authors concentrate on
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universalism). Particular concerns with the family and gender - and female activists - 
bulked large in the politics of creating the ‘social service state’, along with other 
important factors. Welfare expansion in a social service state was likely to create large 
scale employment. Moreover, in the face of private sector employment stagnation, 
welfare expansion was an obvious tool to sustain full employment. The implications 
of adopting policies which tend to increase the proportion of women looking for work 
simultaneously with a fall in private sector employment may not have been 
appreciated at the time. This double shift helps to explain the failure of policies to 
combat labour market segregation. The sector in which women generally worked was 
expanded to sustain full employment, just as more women sought formal 
employment. (We might speculate on what would have happened had private sector 
employment been sustained. Would women’s employment have expanded rapidly, 
but more evenly across public and private sectors? Would the state have expanded 
welfare employment rapidly had full employment for men not come under threat?) 
However, focusing on the direct role of the central state in full employment policy 
overestimates its strategic capacity. Much of the expansion in welfare and women’s 
employment took place in local and regional government, which provide most welfare 
employment. Rather resulting from central state control, a widespread - perhaps even 
hegemonic - commitment to full employment which pervaded the state (and society), 
produced a policy climate within which all levels of government contributed to public 
employment expansion.
The way in which women came to benefit from the generally strong rights associated 
with the status of ‘worker’ in Sweden is relatively well understood. Policies to 
improve the position of women in the Swedish labour market can only be understood 
adequately in this context. Many of the benefits which women gained - for example 
associated with comparatively high part time wages - resulted from general workers 
rights not policies specifically aimed at women. This far, Ruggie is quite correct - 
that women have rights as workers and, in as much as their position is comparatively 
strong, it reflects the position of workers generally in Sweden (1984: 342-344). This 
emphasis underestimates the impact of policies more immediately concerned with 
sex-role equality - especially the move to individual taxation. The equality movement
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- especially its sex-role component - influenced the development of policies which 
triggered, facilitated or supported female labour force participation. Accurate 
assessment of its impact is difficult - many analysts argue that ‘feminism’ was weak in 
Sweden, resulting in the attribution of an autonomous feminist agenda to the state, or 
granting inadequate attention to gender policy initiatives (on the weakness of 
feminism see Lovenduski 1986: 98-100; Kaplan 1992: 71-72, this is also an 
implication of Ruggie 1984).
A balanced account would pay attention to the co-optation (and consequent dilution) 
of women’s demands by the state. Policy changes which pushed women into the 
labour market (such as tax regime change) need emphasis alongside ‘supportive’ 
policies including those in the labour market. ‘Gender’ concerns and explicit demands 
made by women in the early 1960s and the 1930s helped to create a comparatively 
egalitarian context which influenced welfare policy and the level of female 
participation in the labour market. However, the actual processes by which female 
employment and welfare provision expanded seem to have been neither anticipated 
nor fully managed by the state. Instead, the legacy of earlier policies resulted in a 
labour intensive social service state. Welfare expansion, in the context of decline in 
private sector employment, a state commitment to full employment and a climate of 
opinion concerned with sex-role equality, resulted in rapid growth in female 
employment. Extreme segregation of the labour market along gender lines was an 
unintended consequence of this expansion, which contradicted other aspects of the 
‘drive’ for equality.
3.5 Conclusions: the implications for welfare state theory
My broad conclusion is that the Swedish state’s welfarist character is deeply 
implicated in changes in gender. By contrast, the general condition of the Swedish 
economy features relatively little here. Contrary to modernization theories, changes in 
gender relations are not to a direct product of economic growth. The possibility 
remains that the level of economic development could act as a threshold through 
which a society must pass before such changes could occur. During the period from 
1960 to 1989 economic change in Sweden was largely achieved through bargaining
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and other political mechanisms, not through ‘the market’. If the explanation of 
change in gender relations is sought in economic causes, then the importance of 
politics in the Swedish economy would need to be acknowledged. Conversely 
‘perverse’ economic factors - high inflation and high taxation - may have had some 
impact in Sweden. However, the Swedish economy grew for most of the period under 
question, suggesting these ‘perversities’ should not be given too strong an emphasis. 
While patterns of personal taxation probably did influence the growth of female 
labour force participation especially after 1971, it was the structure more than the 
level of these taxes which was crucial in Sweden.
The Swedish ‘welfare state’ has influenced female labour force participation in a 
number of ways, some deliberate, others unintended. For example, the 
disproportionate destruction of women’s jobs by the solidaristic wage policy was 
unintended. The general commitment to full employment, operationalized thorough 
active labour market policy and public sector employment, committed the state to 
finding work for women (including those put out of work by the wage policy). 
Equally, many policies to improve the status of women - such as the movement of 
women into ‘male’ occupations - were (initially) resisted by unions and eventually 
largely failed. However, women benefited from the general commitment to strong 
workers rights.
Possibly as a result of the extremely powerful position of the Social Democratic Party 
during the 1960s (noted and explained by Esping-Andersen 1985), the equality debate 
and the politicization associated with it, took place mainly, but not wholly, within the 
social democratic movement. The apparent weakness of autonomous second wave 
Swedish feminism is usually attributed to Swedish social democracy’s capacity to co­
opt and redirect feminist demands, which is partly rooted in the debates and reforms 
of the 1930s (Lovenduski 1986: 98-100; Kaplan 1992: 71-72). Without opening the 
question of whether the debates and reforms were ‘feminist’, the fact that gender 
issues were debated immediately before the two periods (1930s/40s and 1960s/70s) of 
major (re)orientation of the Swedish welfare seems significant.
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Non-gender factors contribute to the politicization of gender at particular moments in 
history. It would be a grave error to infer from my argument that that the evolution of 
gender was controlled by the state or that the state consistently supported women’s 
interests. Nevertheless, the definition of key historical moments and the contests 
between various conceptions of gender that occur during them cannot be reduced to 
these factors. Notions of gender in the debates of the 1930s and 1960s had a certain 
autonomy. Conceptions of gender directly influenced subsequent changes in welfare 
policy and in female labour force participation. Rather than seeing the welfare state as 
a product of working class social democratic strength alone (or in alliance with middle 
class or agrarian interests), social democratic strength took on a particular gender 
character. This resulted in there being more ‘for’ women in the welfare state’s 
institutional form. A generous, service oriented and market displacing form of social 
policy became possible during this conjuncture. In other words, the ‘gender’ aspects 
of these debates influenced the developing possibility of a social democratic welfare 
state and influenced the particular form it took.
The attribution of some autonomy to the notions of gender which were generated in 
the 1930s and 1960s also helps to get us out of a potential trap. Analysis of the 
Swedish case has recently come to emphasize its peculiarity. The historical path of 
social democracy there is increasingly depicted as unique even when compared to 
other Scandinavian countries. Thus, Rothstein attributes much of the social 
democratic model’s success to labour market policies and argues that those developed 
elsewhere in Scandinavia do not compare to them (1996). Generally he emphasizes 
the unique character of the Swedish state (1991; Knudsen and Rothstein 1994). Leira 
argues that Norway falls a long way behind Sweden in policies for working mothers 
(1994) and other feminists suggest that Sweden and Denmark, which Knudsen and 
Rothstein treat as unique and contrasting cases, share relatively ‘woman friendly’ 
characteristics (Borchost and Siim 1987). According to these analyses, and much of 
the discussion of Sweden here, the particular path taken by Sweden ought to mark it 
out. Although Sweden stands out in a general comparison of OECD states, it also 
does within a group of similar Scandinavian states. Although Scandinavian states 
collaborate on policy, this collaboration has not ironed out all differences among
them. They also share ideas - the debates provoked by the Myrdals in the 1930s or on 
sex-role equality in the 1960s rapidly became Scandinavian, not just Swedish. A 
comparison of this sort suggests that the particular path taken by an individual state 
may be less important than the broad outlines of policy, ideas and social values.
The claim that Sweden is a welfare state has a gender dimension - most conceptions 
of social citizenship imply women and men should enjoy it on equal terms. The 
image o f Sweden as a model welfare or social citizenship state is bolstered by casual 
international comparison. However, development of (something approaching) an 
ungendered social citizenship cannot be confirmed simply by dint of Sweden 
occupying a ‘leading’ position in the comparative ranking of women’s labour market 
participation, any more than it can by similar comparisons of expenditure levels 
(Shalev 1983). More detailed analysis of the relationship between state welfare and 
gender has been ambivalent in its conclusions, suggesting that citizenship remains 
gendered (particularly focusing on occupational segregation and the high proportion 
of women in part time work) while acknowledging the important resources for women 
provided by worker/citizenship based welfare rights. Thus there is ambivalence and 
disagreement about the validity of interpreting Sweden along social citizenship lines 
in the light of the condition of gender, mirrored by a less obvious ambivalence about 
the development of social citizenship or the welfare state itself.
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Chapter Four: Must an active, social state be a welfare state? The 
German state and the path of female participation in the labour 
market
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4.1 Social Policy and the path of women’s participation in the 
workforce
To explain the development o f  German female labour force participation, we need to 
have a clear image o f  the pattern of, and change in, this participation. The German 
case is somewhat puzzling, particularly comparatively. Despite a relatively high level 
o f  w om en’s labour force participation in the early post-war period, by the end o f the 
1980s it had increased by less than six percentage points, and its level was 
comparatively low. The level o f  wom en’s participation in the labour force actually 
declined during the 1960s. From a low point in 1967, the level rose again during the 
early 1970s. However, in the mid to late 1970s, wom en’s rate o f labour market 
participation was stagnant (even falling slightly) before growing briefly, but 
explosively, at the turn o f  the decade. Another phase o f  stagnation occurred in the 
early to mid 1980s, before growth returned in the later 1980s.
The proximate cause o f  periods o f decline or stagnation and growth in wom en’s 
workforce participation seems straightforward. The former correspond general 
economic recessions, the latter to phases o f  economic growth. Some o f  the variability 
o f  wom en’s workforce participation results reflects general influences labour market 
rather than its gender structure. However, the general performance o f  the economy is 
not the whole story.
Chart 4.1 Germany - Female Labour Force Participation
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Chart 4.2 Smooth o f Female Labour Force Participation
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Chart 4.3 Rough o f  Female Labour Force Participation
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The impact o f  economic slowdown on the position o f  women in the labour market 
weakens with successive recessions. A comparison o f  female and male labour market 
patterns shows a striking gender pattern, which dividing the period into two phases - 
changing in 1969-70. Before that date, the relationship was stable, after it the relative 
proportion o f  women in the workforce increased steadily. Finally these economic
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factors do not account for the position o f  women in Germany in international 
comparison.
Chart 4.4 Observed series and smooth o f  female labour force participation as a 
proportion o f  male labour force participation
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Women were hit disproportionately hard during the recession o f the mid 1960s, 
although the decline in participation can be dated from before 1965. Nevertheless, in 
1967 the rate fell below the trend both for female labour force participation and 
female as a proportion o f  male labour force participation. The two periods shown in 
Chart 4.B would seem to indicate that a structural change occurred in the late 1960s or 
early 1970s. The recession o f  the mid 1960s may have triggered a change in the 
position o f  women in the labour market. From 1970 onwards, female labour force 
participation grew while male employment declined, producing a consistent pattern o f  
increase in female relative to male participation. Since 1967 to the female labour force 
participation has grown in absolute terms, except during periods o f  recession. Even 
during periods o f  recession female labour force participation remained reasonably 
stable while male employment fell sharply.
From a comparative perspective the initial issue is why wom en’s workforce 
participation grew so slowly and remained at a relatively low overall level. Given
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generally strong economic performance the weakness of female labour force 
participation is a particular puzzle for modernization theory. ‘Power resource’ 
theorists suggest that the ‘conservative’ form of the German ‘welfare state regime’ 
accounts for women’s comparatively weak presence in the labour market. There is a 
good deal in this argument - the form of welfare provision did not provide extensive 
incentives for women to work (through the taxes and benefits) nor did it provide many 
welfare employment opportunities, often taken up by women elsewhere. However, 
arguments of this sort can be overplayed. They may exaggerate the role of the 
(welfare) state in the political economy and misdescribe its direct impact on social 
relations.
4.2 Periodizing the German case: ‘normalizing’ gender, blocking 
social democracy
There is less controversy about the periodization of social policy development in 
Germany than there was in Sweden. Here again the periodization of the path taken by 
female entry into the employment market corresponds in some respects to that of 
social policy development. The importance of the post-war settlement consolidated 
by a lengthy period of CDU dominance of government is widely acknowledged, both 
from the point of view of the (re)establishment of ‘the family’ and in terms of welfare 
policy. The immediate post-war period was one of particularly extensive social, 
political and economy reconstruction in Germany in which social policy and gender 
roles were important. The social insurance system was one area in which traditional 
German policies could claim not to have been tainted by Nazism, and could therefore 
play an important symbolic - as well as practical role.
Although the meaning of, and balance between, the social and market elements of the 
social market economy altered during the 1950s and 60s, the next major shift in 
welfare policy was by the SPD from the late 1960s onwards. The take off of relative 
growth in female labour force participation coincided with innovation in social and 
economic policy by the Social Democrats in government. Of course, the evidence that 
they were contemporaneous does not mean they were causally related. Labour market 
policy - a key aspect of welfare and economic policy which emerged in 1969 -
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had an impact on employment patterns. However the ‘social democratization’ of the 
Federal Republic was only ever partial. It was significantly stymied by the restrictive 
Bundesbank monetary policy in reaction to fiscal expansion during the first oil crisis 
of the 1970s. Finally, it is unlikely that growth in women’s workforce participation 
was driven by one set of factors fi*om 1970 to the end of the 1980s. During the latter 
half of the 1980s the process seems to have had some distinctive features.
I will analyze the place of social policy and gender in the post-war German settlement 
to account for the relatively high level of female labour force participation in Germany 
at the start of the 1960s. It is particularly difficult to account for this level of 
participation given that German society had taken a distinct ‘domestic turn’ during the 
1950s, celebrating the traditional family. Moreover, a number of analysts argue that 
social policy had played a key role in reconstructing the German family, in a form 
which allocated women to the domestic sphere. I contest elements of this analysis. 
Next I will turn to the relative growth in women’s participation in the workforce 
especially from the 1970s onwards, placing it in the context of the comparatively low 
level of female labour force participation and focusing on the role of state welfare in 
accounting for it.
4.3. The initial phases: The limited role of social policy in the 
(re)construction of gender roles in post-war west Germany
The immediate post-war period provides important context for developments between 
1960 and 1989 and draws out the distinctiveness of the German experience. Women 
undertook significant ‘economic’ work. Initially this work was significantly in the 
black market, subsequently, however, it featured a comparatively large and growing 
proportion of women in formal employment. By the 1960s women’s role in the 
workforce had ceased to grow. Although often exaggerated, the image of the post-war 
reconstruction of the state and society from nothing plays an important part in German 
history. Institutions created immediately after the ‘zero hour’ - Stunde Null - helped to 
set the pattern for subsequent developments. The processes of post-war stabilization 
and reconstruction were deeply and explicitly gendered and there was considerable 
political struggle over gender in this period of German history. Social policy was also
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instrument in the reconstruction of West German politics, with the Bismarckian 
system of social insurance defended by the likes of Adenauer as representing a long 
German tradition, largely untainted by Nazism.
There is an acute risk of exaggerating the role of the state here. The dominant 
historical interpretation depicts social policy as an explicit instrument for moving 
women from the workforce into motherhood (while acknowledging that it may have 
also improved the position of, and been supported by, many women). The argument 
is that social policy, ‘defined the social and political status of women’ and, without 
doing violence to the argument, one could add ‘economic’. Although Moeller’s focus 
remains on the traditional family’s political reconstruction (1989a: 137 -  138) 
elsewhere he acknowledges that a number of other perspectives might also be useful 
(1993: 3 -  4.) This analysis dovetails with the ‘power resource’ perspective on the 
impact of the German ‘welfare state regime’ on the position of women. Claims that 
social policy was instrumental in the reconstruction of gender roles are not fully 
supported by the historical evidence on which they are based. The timing of gender 
‘reconstruction’ fits uneasily with this interpretation. Women’s role in the formal 
workforce increased during the early 1950s. In 1960 the level of female labour force 
participation was comparatively high. Only during the 1960s did it begin to appear 
low by international standards. My argument is that the position of women was only 
‘normalized’ in the 1950s. Earlier debates were hotly contested, a contestation 
reflected in both constitutional construction and social policy. However, this contest 
had ambiguous implications for the position of women, particularly in the labour 
market. Social policy was not wholly effective as an instrument for the reconstruction 
of traditional gender roles in the 1940s and 50s, despite the hopes of some Christian 
Democratic politicians.
Women had substantial political resources they could deploy to enhance their position 
in the post-war situation. Several initiatives shortly after the war illustrate women’s 
public influence and power, which had various sources. The illegitimacy of 
conventional domestic politics women’s contribution to wartime and post-war 
economic and social life and the influence of the Allies in German governance were
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particularly important. Ironically in the later context of the ‘economic miracle’ the 
first and second of these factors seem to have contributed to German women focusing 
their attention on the ‘little circle’ of the domestic sphere (Kolinsky 1989: 78-80).
The extraordinary post-war gender situation was gradually ‘normalized’, but not 
primarily through the development and operation of social policies. Instead, it 
occurred through a combination of 1) political rhetoric and the construction of social 
ideologies of gender (particularly through the media) and 2) the emergence of a 
remarkably successful industrial base. By the mid 1950s the Christian democrats 
dominated the terms of political debate and sexist attitudes among many employers 
seem to have weathered the post-war gender ‘storm’. Of course state policy, 
including social policy, contributed to the ‘economic miracle’. As such it had an 
indirect impact on the position of women. The structure of social insurance may have 
been particularly significant here. It supported the stratification of the labour market 
along traditional status lines. Together with the assumption that employees were male 
breadwinners, this status orientation meant that social policy provided few additional 
incentives for women to work. In addition, it was not a system likely to result in rapid 
growth of ‘women friendly’ welfare employment.
The remainder of this section will develop four lines of analysis. First, I consider the 
position of women in the German labour market in a little more detail. Second, I 
examine the development of the constitutional and social policy context for women. 
Third, I analyze other influences on the ‘normalization’ of gender relations, with a 
view to explaining the internationally unusual decline in the level of female labour 
force participation in the mid 1960s.
Labour Market
An accurate image of the position of women in the labour market is a prerequisite for 
my argument. Women’s workforce participation was comparatively high during the 
1950s. The explanation of this high level of participation is complex. Several 
analysts argue it was partly an artefact of the Nazi mobilisation of women. Older 
women remained economically active after the war, particularly in agriculture, many
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unpaid. These analysts imply that female labour force participation in paid 
employment manufacturing and services was not unusually high (Rein 1985; Haug 
1986: 72; Ginsburg 1992: 78).
However, the much vaunted ‘scarcity’ of men after the war probably pushed women 
into paid work. Women - divorcees and widows - headed almost one-third of 
households in 1950. Evidence exists that women’s participation in paid work 
increased sharply between 1947 and 1955 by some two million women, a 
proportionate increase of 48 per cent (total employment grew by only 28 per cent). 
The expansion of women’s waged work reversed the immediate post-war situation 
when the Allied authorities failed to entice the female ‘silent reserve’ into regular paid 
work. Until the currency reform of 1948 rewards for formal work were probably 
more limited than for informal and black market activity. (Moeller 1993: 25-27 and 
148 on Allied failure to mobilize women; 150 on the subsequent increase in women’s 
waged work; generally see Moeller 1989: 140 - 141; Kolinsky 1989/1993 24 - 37; 
Frevert 1989: 255 -  264.)
The legislative context
The equality provisions of the 1949 Basic Law are a legacy of women’s contribution 
to the reconstruction, together with some ‘egalitarian’ pressure from the Allies. The 
story of their inclusion in the Basic Law is instructive. Initial drafts drawn up by 
heads of state governments contained no equality clause. Its absence of such a 
provision suggests that even the SPD did not rate it as constitutionally central.
Despite political party reticence and outright hostility from Christian parties, 
interventions by Elisabeth Seibert, an SPD delegate, backed by mobilisation of 
pressure from women’s organizations introduced the equality provisions. Although 
these provisions influenced later legislation, their impact was mixed and tardy - partly 
reflecting the special protection for the family also provided by the Grundgesetz in 
Article 6. {Grundgesetz Articles 3 and 6; Kolinsky 1989/1993: 41 - 74; Moeller 1993: 
45 on the early absence of gender equality provisions and generally 38-75; Moeller 
1989: 141-143; Glendon 1977; 1987.)
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Gender issues remained on the political agenda after the Basic Law Debates and 
attendant mobilisation of women. The Basic Law itself recognized that it was 
inconsistent with the Civil Code - the legal foundation of social life - on family 
organization. The Civil Code prescribed a patriarchal family organization, which 
subordinated wives to husbands. It contributed to the restriction of women’s labour 
market participation. Wives did not have full independent authority to enter and 
maintain employment contracts, as husbands had some power to end them. Despite 
the constitutional requirement for change by March 1953, the Christian Democrats 
opposed changes to the Civil Code. A political stand off resulted in the legislature.
No reforming legislation was passed (Glendon 1977; 1987: 92 -93; Kolinsky 
1989/1993: 48-49; Moeller 1993: 180 - 228; Frevert 1989: 278 - 286).
After March 1953 the Courts used the Basic Law to override some patriarchal 
elements of the Civil Code. For example, husbandly control of the wife’s paid 
employment was ruled unconstitutional. Despite anticipation of ‘legal chaos’ due to 
gradual judicial review of the Civil Code, no legislation ‘implementing’ Article Three 
was passed until 1957. Even then, the ‘Equality Law’ confirmed the Civil Code’s 
sexist character as much as it altered it, underlining patriarchal authority over children 
while declaring spouses equal with one another. After the legislation passed the 
Constitutional Court reversed many of its elements swiftly {Urteil vom 29 Juli 1951\ 
Gesetz iiber die Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau auf dem Gebiete des 
bürgerlichen Rechts - GleichberG; Moeller 1993: 180 - 209, especially 203; Glendon 
1977; 1987: 92-93; Kolinsky 1989/1993: 48-49; Frevert 1989: 278 - 286).
Social Policy
The Christian democratic view of gender and the family was amply illustrated in 
social policy debates of the 1940s and 50s. However, claims that the ‘welfare state’ - 
even interpreted to include the constitution and social policy - restricted women’s 
workforce participation are overstated. These policies were the subject of intense 
political debate and contestation. Several provisions were passed which apparently 
supported some groups of working women. Legislation which did attempt to push 
women into more traditional roles mostly had little impact. Even some evidence
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presented in accounts of the reconstruction of the family by social policy contradicts 
the argument (see Moeller 1989: 137). For example, policies to encourage large 
families - the ‘will to children’ - benefited only families with three or more children 
and the proportion of families of this size continued to fall. As Kindergeld or ‘family 
allowances’ helped few people they could not have been instrumental in restricting 
women to the domestic sphere (Moeller 1989a: 154 and generally 142-145, 151-155, 
he seems not to notice the damage this evidence does to his general argument about 
social policy reconstruction of gender; Moeller 1989b; 1993; Ginsburg 1992: 77-79; 
Frevert 1989: 284).
Some policies which ‘eased’ the situation of working mothers were passed in the early 
1950s. The Mutterschutzgesetz (1952) extended maternity leave and protected 
pregnant women from being sacked, reversing a decision of 1948 which had 
suspended this protection. Unlike Kindergeld, which divided the political parties, the 
protection of working mothers was generally supported. Despite increasing Christian 
Democratic concern about the detrimental social impact of working mothers, they felt 
unable to oppose it (see Moeller 1993: 142 - 179; Kolinsky 1989/1993: 36). Before 
we are too carried away by this evidence of support for working mothers, the practices 
of the factory inspectors and Labour Courts charged with the enforcement of the 
Mutterschutzgesetz need to be examined. Often the law appears to have been 
honoured in the breach. Inspectors frequently ignored the sacking of pregnant 
women, sometimes on the basis of moral judgements about the women concerned.
The practices of state officials often contradicted egalitarian constitutional and 
legislative provisions. During the late 1940s and early 1950s women were sometimes 
sacked from public employment when they married, on the basis of a 1937 Nazi law. 
The Allies opposed these sackings, albeit somewhat inconsistently. In November 
1949, shortly after the passage of the Basic Law, Adenauer’s government Federal 
government employment regulations which allowed for married women to be sacked. 
Because it was temporary the Allies reluctantly accepted this legislation. It is probably 
the most direct legislative attack on women’s employment during the period (Moeller 
1993:142- 179; 1989b; Gamer 1995: 52 - 63).
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The temporary legislation remained in force until replaced by the (1953) Federal Civil 
Service Law. Well organized attempts to introduce a clause allowing for the 
termination of married women’s employment in the public sector eventually failed. 
Legislation which had the potential to restrict women’s access to paid work did not do 
so - for instructive reasons. Many Christian Democrats in the Bundestag failed to 
vote for it: more than 40 per cent abstained or failed to attend the decisive vote. They 
may have been concerned that the Courts would strike down restrictive rules. The 
prospect of the 1953 election also seems to have weighted heavily on them (female 
considerably outnumbered male voters) despite strong evidence that women backed 
the CDU much more strongly than men. At this stage Christian democratic vision of 
gender and family life seems not to have pervaded women’s consciousness. However, 
the Christian Democrats had little to fear from women voters - their margin over the 
SPD increased beyond 10 per cent (Gamer 1995 52-63; on the CDU-CSU position 
on gender see Moeller 1989a; 1989b; 1993; on the gender gap in west German 
elections see Rusciano 1992, especially at 341; Kolinsky 1989/1993).
The terms of social and political debate about gender 
After 1949 public policy did little to encourage or hinder women’s employment, but 
neither did federal legislation do much to hinder it. The reconstruction of ‘the 
patriarchal family’ was not primarily a result of social policy. However, social policy 
debate was informed by a clearly articulated image of women’s domestic and 
reproductive contribution to the social market economy, particularly associated with 
Christian Democracy. There was a strongly natalist element within it, especially after 
the 1953 confirmation of Christian Democratic electoral dominance. The CDU 
government was particularly concerned with the ‘one child families’. However, SPD 
Bundestag members also generally saw women primarily as wives and mothers 
(Moeller 1989; 1993; Kolinsky 1989/1993: 82- 84; but compare with Frevert 1989: 
282-283 who nevertheless acknowledged official concern about one child families on 
284).
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The terms of political debate shifted during the ten or fifteen years after 1949. Liberal 
feminism had never been a strong force - ‘difference’ was stressed in all Parties. At 
the end of the 1940s, a powerful mobilisation occurred around a certain conception of 
equality. Despite earlier opposition, the CDU eventually supported Article 3. They 
also asserted that ‘There is a natural right to work. Women should have equality of 
opportunity’ {Diisseldorfer Leitsatze der CDU, 15.7.1949). Subsequently the CDU 
position hardened. Cold War images depicted the family as Christian and Western as 
against an Eastern, Atheist/Communist totalitarian anti-familialism became increasing 
evident after 1953. The creation of a new Ministry of Family Affairs and Ministerial 
appointment of Franz-Josef Muermeling - a traditionalist - marked and deepened these 
trends. Even SPD increasingly used an image of the family to distinguish itself from 
Soviet Communism. In Basic Law debates, SPD delegates insisted that they were not 
anti-family and that women had a special familial vocation. Even before the 1953 
election, the SPD position was that, ideally, working mothers would not exist 
(Moeller 1989a; 1989b; 1993: 88).
A shift of focus from public policy to political discourse might partially ‘rescuing’ the 
notion that the family was ‘politically’ reconstructed. However political debate 
largely reflected of developments outside formal politics; the normative ideal of the 
traditional family and the desire for a (re)construction of comfortable domestic life 
were strong social forces in post-war Germany, partly reflecting a ‘shifting 
involvement’ from the Nazi politicisation of everyday life and the deprivations of 
military defeat and occupation. This climate of opinion placed women primarily in 
the domestic sphere (the ‘shifting involvement’ notion is Hirschman’s 1982). The 
terms of social discourse were not just constructed by politicians. The popular media, 
particularly magazines aimed at women were also important. Popularized academic 
analyses were surprisingly direct about the economic value of women’s domestic 
work. The centre and right dominated academic discussion - the left, including the 
Frankfurt School, had a more marginal position following its exile during the Third 
Reich (on the academic and political debate see Moeller 1989: 146-155; on the social 
construction of women’s role after the war see Heineman 1996; Hohn 1993; Harsch 
1993; Kolinsky 1989/1993: 46, 78-84; Moeller 1993).
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Moreover, electoral evidence suggests that women did not, on balance, strongly resist 
this interpretation. The Christian Democrats always had ‘female bonus’ over the 
Social Democrats which grew from 1949 to 1957, the period during which CDU 
familialist rhetoric developed most powerfully. On the other hand, growth in the 
CDU’s ‘female bonus’ largely reflects the overall pattern of support for the party - 
men as well as women turned to them in the 1950s. Moreover, although the CDU 
parties never re-gained their 1957 level of support, until the mid 1960s they had more 
than an eight per cent advantage amongst women (Rusciano 1992; Kolinsky 
1989/1993).
My general argument is that the ‘domestic turn’ in post-war western Germany had an 
irreducibly social element. Politicians did adopt and promote this discourse of 
domesticity. In line with the national mood the CDU concentrated on economic 
success and celebrated the family, emphasizing its contribution to the economic 
miracle. Nevertheless, the legislative manifestations of this discourse were not 
themselves the major forces taking women out of the labour market. The CDU failed 
to achieve many of their specific family policy objectives (see Moeller 1989: 140 
generally on Christian democracy, domesticity and the economic miracle; Kolinsky 
1989/1993: especially 46, 78-84; Frevert 1989). Of course, public policy contributed 
to the German economic miracle. Economic strength allowed wives to play a largely 
domestic role. So policy had an indirect impact on gender. The structure of social 
insurance supported labour market stratification along status lines. Moreover, social 
benefits were mostly constructed after the image of a male worker - supportive of full 
time permanent employees - and their families. Thus they provided few additional 
incentives for wives to join the workforce. Even so, social policy was not the origin of 
the ‘domestic turn’.
By the mid 1960s the position of women in the German workforce had reached a 
remarkable position. Over the previous fifteen years a social ideology of domesticity 
had become deeply entrenched. By 1963 women’s labour force participation was 
actually falling, reaching its lowest point in the recession year of 1967. Only in 1973
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that female labour force participation exceed its 1960 level. In the late 1960s 
women’s labour force participation fell, even relative to the male rate. Cross- 
nationally perceptions of this period are coloured by feminism home women’s 
increasing integration in the workforce - while in Germany the rate of women’s labour 
force participation fell.
4.4 Continuity and Change: the 1970s and 80s
The character of female labour force participation seems to have changed during the 
late 1960s or 1970s. Compared to that of men, women’s labour market position 
appeared remarkably static during the 1960s. Indeed, as we have seen women 
suffered particularly during the late 1960s. However, during the 1970s and 80s 
relative to men, women’s labour force participation grew consistently. In absolute 
terms it grew during periods of expansion - and levelled off, rather than falling, during 
recessions (see Chart 4.A and especially Chart 4.B). Although it is tempting to 
assume that these changes reflect a single structural change, unless it can be 
empirically substantiated such an assumption is dangerous. Instead, it seems likely 
that distinct dynamics operated in the 1970s and late 1980s.
In this section 1 concentrate on the timing, nature and causes of the change from a 
steady state to growth in female relative to male labour market participation.
However, the comparatively low levels of labour market participation in Germany 
must be kept in mind. This section strives to sustain balance between the cause of 
change and the explanation of continuity. Social policy seems to be important in both 
processes. In terms of continuity, the general, largely indirect impact of the structure 
of social and labour market policy helped to sustain a pattern of economic-industrial 
structure which was remarkably successful and left little scope for female 
employment. This form of social provision also provided relatively few welfare 
employment opportunities.
If its comparatively low level requires explanation, so too does the relative pattern of 
increase in women’s employment from 1970. Once underway, this change may be 
partially self-sustaining, if it reflects and sustains a change in women’s aspirations.
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Nevertheless, self-sustaining change is not the whole story. Special explanation of the 
rapid growth after the mid 1980s is required. It occurred under CDU political 
leadership traditionally concerned to restrict women’s entry into the workforce. 
However, the general political context was changing significantly at this stage, in 
ways which reflected and reinforced changes in gender roles.
The change from stasis to growth
The initial change from stasis to growth requires explanation. A mixture of structural 
change in the German economy and policy changes resulting from the SPD coming 
into government is important. Of course, the SPD maintained most of the social 
policy legacy of post-war Christian democracy. However, the SPD innovated in 
labour market policy, an area which falls within social policy broadly defined and is 
particularly relevant to employment patterns. This policy area also illustrates the 
complex, even contradictory, impact of policy on the relative position of men and 
women. It also emphasizes the limitations imposed on the SPD’s Keynesian and 
welfarist strategies by the Bundesbank’s restrictive monetary reaction to the fiscal 
expansion with which the government met the oil crisis.
The economic context
The general economic context for women’s labour force participation from the late 
1960s to the late 1980s was of a comparatively strong economy which experienced at 
least three serious recessions. Rather than necessarily attributing change to recession, 
they may have disclosed and deepened changes already under way. The first began the 
period under question and reached its trough in 1967 and tested confidence in the 
German economic miracle. The others occurred in the mid to late 1970s and in the 
early 1980s. There is an implicit disagreement about the character of these recessions 
in the literature. Some commentators interpret the recession of the late 1960s as a 
major turning point, when a structural change occurred or was revealed, others regard 
it merely as a cyclical downturn, depicting the recession of the mid 1970s as 
‘structural’ (Leaman 1988 sees the late 1960s recession as a structural turning point; 
while Therbom 1986: 144-146 claim the second recession was structural as does 
Dyson 1981: 45 who identified the earlier one as cyclical).
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From a gender viewpoint the recessions of the 1960s and 1970s appear different. It is 
less clear whether, either of them was a primary cause of gender change or that change 
occurred during the intervening years. Decline in male employment is a key part of 
women’s relative increase. This decline is largely due to changes in manufacturing 
employment, which reached its peak in 1970 and then declined consistently.
Ironically the decline in manufacturing employment was comparatively slow, and 
non-development of other sectors accounts for the relatively low level of employment 
(Esping-Andersen 1990 discusses employment patterns; Vogelheim 1988; Therbom 
1986; Leaman 1988; Dyson 1981).
Concentrating on economic recessions and related structural changes pays insufficient 
attention to politics and policy. Decline in male employment is attributed to a state 
strategy of dis-employment by power resource analysts (see Esping-Andersen 1990: 
especially 185; von Rhein-Kress 1993, especially 149-154, 160-163 and Schmidt 
1993). This approach involved repatriating guestworkers as well as encouraging older 
workers to retire earlier and marginal or sick workers out of the workforce onto 
benefits. Relatively generous benefits, at least for those workers who had held 
employment consistently, facilitated dis-employment. Many of those who left the 
workforce did not suffer dramatic standard of living decline.
Labour Market Policy
A strategy of dis-employment would represent the defeat of active labour market 
policy - at least in social democratic form. It was introduced by the Employment 
Protection Act {Arbeitsforderungsgesetz vom 25 Juni 1969 Bundesgesetzblatt Tell I 
Nr 51 28 Juni 1969 - AFG) as the Grand Coalition’s final flourish when the SPD 
gained the upper hand over increasingly directionless Christian Democrats. Many see 
the AFG as the apex of ‘social democracy’ in German social policy (Esping-Andersen 
1990; Ginsburg 1992). ‘Active’ policies on placement, job creation and training. Four 
main categories of training were created by the AFG: initial job training; retraining for 
victims of economic and technological change; advanced training for those in work; 
and on the job training for narrow jobs in specific firms (Janoski 1990; Schmid 1985).
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The recessions of the 1970s restricted the capacity of public policy to counteract 
trends in the labour market. The Federal Employment Office {Bundesanstalt fiir 
Artbeit - BfA), which is responsible for the AFG, received a significant proportion of 
its funds from employee contributions, which shrank during periods of 
unemployment. Also, as the BfA’s primary responsibility is the payment of 
unemployment compensation, high unemployment diverted funds from ‘active’ 
training and job creation initiatives. Thus labour market policy’s countercyclical 
capacity was limited. Specific reversals in labour market policy were mirrored in a 
confi*ontation between the federal government and the Bundesbank over general 
economic policies. Social Democrats responded to recession with attempted fiscal 
expansions - the Bundesbank thwarted these expansions through a restrictive 
monetary stance. However, the suggestion that a strategy of dis-employment was 
adopted between 1961 and 1983 (the period which Esping-Andersen analyzes) is 
misleading. Dis-employment was not the preferred choice of the dominant element, 
never mind the unified totality, of the German state. Policies promotive of dis­
employment emerged fi'om a stand off between state agencies, and the consequent 
failure of the federal government’s social democratic strategies. These policies 
required only marginal modifications of existing welfare policies and cut with the 
grain of the broader economic structure.
Active labour market policy was largely transformed into a tool of a paradoxical 
conservative modernization. It became a tool to enhance the skills and productivity of 
core workers. Despite its limitations - perhaps a consequence of thwarted ambitions - 
as a counter-cyclical tool for expanding labour force participation, the AFG had an 
important impact on the labour market. Largely unsuccessful in relation to marginal 
workers, it nevertheless helped to improve the quality of core workers and maintain 
the comparative efficiency of German industry. Priority shifted from retraining 
largely benefiting workers in declining industries, to advanced training, which 
improved the skills of workers in their existing industries. In the AFG’s first year 
retraining and advanced training were more or less equal in size. Over the next few 
years advanced training outstripped retraining. Even retraining became focused on
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skilled workers rather than the unemployed and disadvantaged. Eligibility for most 
training programmes depended on having spent between three and six years in work 
(Janoski 1990: 117; 119. Periods spend as a housewife counted towards eligibility for 
some training - see MacLennan and Weitzel 1984: 220).
From an early stage, rather than concentrating on expanding the workforce, training 
policy was largely focused on upgrading the skills of core employees. It is a moot 
point whether it contributed to dis-employment. The policy illustrates how a 
seemingly ‘social democratic’ initiative became imbued with ‘conservative’ 
characteristics of the wider political economy, perhaps even before the recessions of 
the 1970s. Moreover, some analysts identify ambivalence about labour market policy 
within Christian Democratic ‘welfare regimes’ (Janoski 1994: 80; van Kersbergen 
1995: 144). Although perhaps not directly responsible for dis-employment, if labour 
market policy developed around a conception of the core workforce, it is at least 
compatible with the destruction of many marginal jobs. With an image of the 
Germany as a ‘low employment’ economy and society, and a fortiori, if dis­
employment policy was pursued, the changes in women’s employment between 1970 
and 1989 start to seem odd. Comparatively German female labour force participation 
looks weak, but against a background of labour market shrinkage it is the steady 
growth in women’s participation relative to men’s and more erratic absolute growth 
that appear puzzling.
Women made up over 40% of the unemployed fairly consistently throughout the 
1970s, a figure which reached 51% in 1978 (MacLennan and Weitzel 1984: 223; 
compare with Cook 1984: 68), a remarkably high figure given the relatively low level 
of female employment. Clearly the unemployed were a significant element in female 
labour force participation in the 1970s. Changes in private sector employment 
provide little help in explaining the growth of female relative to male labour force 
participation. Some areas in which women were over-represented, such as 
electronics, were relatively stable, but others, including leather, textiles and clothing 
were hit particularly hard in the recession of the 70s (Daubler-Gmelin 1980: 335; 
Dyson 1981: 44).
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Ironically, a key part of the explanation of the relative strength of women’s labour 
market participation - relative to its weaker character in earlier periods and the 
weakening position of men outside the ‘core’ - is the role of government - labour 
market policy. The assessment of the AFG’s impact on women is generally harsh, 
presenting it as reflecting and confirming their inferior labour market position. Most 
analysts read women’s participation rates in training schemes as low, especially 
compared female unemployment levels. Women were worst represented in 
prestigious advanced or further training (25 per cent of advanced training schemes 
1981) and more poorly represented on advanced training than in the general 
workforce. Critics suggest that the AFG’s failed to mention female workers explicitly 
when helping ‘hard to place’ - for example through integration allowances which 
subsidise wages. (On training see MacLennan and Weitzel 1984: 223 - 224 and 226; 
Cook 1984: 69; Daubler-Gmelin 1980; Janoski 1990: 144 criticizes integration 
allowances although this critique seems rather harsh as the AFG included key groups 
of women among the ‘hard to place’ - Arbeitsforderungsgesetz BGBl Teil 1 Nr. 67: 
1421.)
During the 1970s the position of women in active labour market policy largely 
reflected their position outside the ‘core’ workforce. As we have seen, women were 
under-represented on advanced training, which concentrated on upgrading the skills of 
existing employees. In the west German context the AFG’s support for women 
workers is perhaps more remarkable than its poor quality compared to that given to 
‘core’ male workers. The AFG explicitly sought to integrate women into the labour 
market, especially the ‘hard to place’ (due to family commitments). Consequently 
women were better represented in re-training than the advanced programme. Mothers 
returning to the labour force made up 40 per cent of retaining participants in 1981 
(data on women in training from MacLennan and Weitzel 1984: 226; Cook 1984: 69 
and, generally, Daubler-Gmelin 1980).
Labour market policy influences on women’s position become clearer in the light of 
the sectoral structure of women’s employment. The relatively stronger position of
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women in labour market during the 1970s and early 80s was not due to private sector 
employment, whatever the role of state training. Despite the small amount of, and 
weak position of women within, public employment, growth of female public sector 
employment offset a potential decline in female employment. ‘Government’s share of 
net total female-job growth’ between 1961 and 1983 was 149% (Esping-Andersen 
1990: 201-202).
Following traditional conceptions of the sexual division of labour, labour market 
policy channelled women into part-time public - especially social - sector 
employment. An ad hoc, federally funded job creation policy introduced in April 
1977 attempted to place women in part-time social service jobs. The Special 
Employment Programme (as part of AFG’s 1979 ‘Fifth Change’) developed this 
approach further. The Special Employment Programme contributed to the sharp 
increase in female labour force participation between 1979 and 1980. It had such a 
quick impact because of its ‘greyhound’ - first come first served - mechanism for 
funding allocation. It was massively oversubscribed on the very first day that 
applications could be approved (funding was meant to be allocated over a full year). 
The first day for approval of funding became the last day and the budget was 
immediately doubled to cover the crisis. Thus, although still weak, the strengthened 
labour market position of women after about 1970 owes a good deal to labour market 
policy. (Fiinftes Gesetz zur Ànderung des Arbeitsforderungsgesetz', on the 
channelling of women in part time public sector work see Janoski 1990: 146-7; 
Schmid and Peters 1982 analyze the Special Employment Programme.)
The 1979-80 increase in women’s workforce participation cannot be attributed wholly 
to the Special Employment Programme. In 1978-9 a general reflation was attempted 
which influenced manufacturing employment. It increased slightly between 1979 and 
1980, a single exception to the general decline pattern. Its impact on government and 
service employment is harder to discern, both simply continued to grow modestly (on 
the reflation see Janoski 1994: 80; Esping-Andersen 1990: 185; Dyson 1982: 58 - 59).
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The recession of the early 1980s hit the (ambiguous) achievements for women in 
training policy hard, even before the CDU replaced the SPD in government. In 1981 
the BfA issued new guidelines which used women’s family obligations to cast doubt 
on the commitment to seek work and eligibility for training. Moreover married 
women would qualify for training only if their husband could not guarantee economic 
upkeep. In 1982 further changes to the AFG removed some training for women 
returning to work after having families (Kolinsky 1989/1993: 58). Remarkably the 
level of female labour force participation broadly was maintained, despite these 
changes.
After the Wende: the CDU in power
When the CDU took office in 1982 the newly restrictive pattern seemed to be 
confirmed. Several changes were introduced by 1985 which seem to be aimed at the 
reconciliation of women’s demands for employment with the Christian democratic 
vision of family life in the context of a new gender dynamic in party politics. Some 
changes improved women’s labour market position. For example, women retained 
their qualification for retraining and special employment programmes for five (rather 
than three) years after they left employment. Thus, labour market policy partially re­
affirmed its support for certain forms of female labour market participation (Frevert 
1989: 298 - 299 on the attitude of the incoming CDU government and Kolinsky 
1989/1993: 59-60).
Part-time work increased in significance for women. The CDU-led government 
sought to promote it to increase the flexibility of the economy (at least outside of its 
core sectors) and particularly to reconcile its traditional views on women’s domestic 
role with their increased desire to enter the workforce (as political attention on gender 
increased after ‘Green’ political successes). The new government improved the legal 
status of part-time work (against the background of earlier union hostility, led by their 
women’s sections). However, too much concentration on part-time work as an 
explanation of increased female workforce participation would be mistaken. Between 
1983 and 1989 the proportion of working women in part-time employment remained 
fairly consistent at 30 per cent. Despite government policies to promote it, the
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increase in female labour force participation in the late 1980s was not due to part-time 
work. (See Kolinsky 1989/1993: 60 on the CDU and part time work; Frevert 1989: 
271-272, 300; on the hostility of unions towards part time work see Cook 1984: 69; 
data on part-time work from EUROSTAT, various years.)
4.5 Conclusions: implications for welfare state theory
Modernization and social democratic power resource theories suggest that the welfare 
state is a key influence on the path of gender relations. Modernization theories suggest 
that economic development and the evolution of social policy cause large increases in 
female labour force participation. Power resource theories delve deeper into welfare 
state form and purposes suggesting that some of its variants can constrain women’s 
labour market participation. German experience provides a test of the relative merits 
of these two approaches. Modernization theorists would expect Germany to have high 
levels of female labour force participation, due to comparatively expensive social 
sector and a relatively strong economy. Power resource theorists expect the 
‘conservatism’ of the German ‘welfare state regime’ to restrict women’s labour force 
participation.
However, the path of change in women’s involvement in the workforce does not fit 
neatly with these theoretical expectations. The expense of German social policy has 
not been associated with major increases female labour force participation, 
confounding modernization expectations. Equally, the pattern of change is hard to 
accommodate within power resource theory, as it is difficult to explain the changes 
that have occurred. More fimdamentally, while moving in the right direction 
compared to most welfare state literature, power resource theory does not go far 
enough to identify the specificity of national forms of social policy. Differentiating 
usefully between liberal, conservative and social democratic regimes, power resource 
analysts apply the generic ‘welfare state regime’ concept to all western capitalist 
democracies. While the ‘welfare state regime’s’ conceptual scope and limits remain 
unclear, its analytical usefulness is potentially undermined.
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Modernization theorists might want to alter the focus from economic growth and 
expensive social policy. The character of the German economy is as distinctive as its 
overall performance. Its manufacturing sector is comparatively strong, in terms of 
productivity and employment levels. Various explanations of the relative strength of 
manufacturing in Germany exist. They include factors over which the state has 
responsibility such as relatively stable monetary environment, often credited to the 
Bundesbank, and the impact of labour market policy on the skill levels of the core 
workforce. Other factors such as the long term financial support for industry are more 
difficult to attribute to state institutions.
Employment in service and government, two sectors which provided most job growth 
elsewhere, remained low in Germany. The low level of non-manufacturing 
employment is not simply a corollary of the success of manufacturing, because overall 
labour force participation levels are low. The privileged character of government 
employment in Germany may help to explain its limited extent. The weak 
development of private services may be due to the attitudes of the social partners and 
finance - concentrating on (providing funding for) manufacturing. State policy to 
support industry may also be implicated here. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to 
explain the limited development of government and services. Slow growth of services 
may be partly due to continued domestic rather than market or state provision, 
reversing the direction of causation generally asserted.
Even variants of the modernization theory that eschew economism and determinism 
have difficulty explaining the path of German female labour force participation. Post­
war west Germany has the general qualities of modernity. Existing insitutional 
frameworks seem capable of absorbing and modifying external modernizing ideas 
about gender rather then being disrupted by them. Examples of ‘subverted’ diffusion 
include the Allied influence on the initial form of social policy and gender equality 
and the lessons learnt from Swedish on active labour market policy. Outside 
influences on German feminism after 1970 also seem to have been incorporated into a 
distinct ‘German’ tradition.
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Social democratic power resource theories might seem to have a stronger explanation 
of women’s labour force participation in Germany, The conservative, restrictive 
character of the welfare state regime is reflected in the weak position of women in 
welfare policy, especially social security. The conservative welfare regime is seems 
responsible for the weakness of female labour force participation (van Kersbergen 
1995: especially 144-147; Esping-Andersen 1990: 27, 201-202, 214), although the 
mechanisms by which this responsibility operate are insufficiently spelt out, gives the 
argument a slightly slippery feel.
Power resource analysts mistake correlation for causation. For van Kersbergen (1995: 
especially at 144) because Christian Democracy is associated with low female labour 
force participation, the latter is due to the Christian Democratic welfare state regime. 
Instead weak female labour force participation it might be due to other aspects of 
Christian Democracy or a prior factor, such as Catholicism might ‘cause’ both.
Simple association does not allow us to attribute pattern of women’s workforce 
participation to the structure and practice of the welfare state regime.
Power resource theory tends to lead to a false attribution of changes in or 
characteristics of the political economy to the (welfare) state. For it to explain gender 
changes it must be possible to 1) attribute them to the state and 2) characterize the 
state as a welfare state. While narrower than the ‘welfare state’, social policy likely to 
play an important part in accounts of change. Although Esping-Andersen carefully 
argues that no actual regime is wholly consistent (all have attributes of various regime 
types), nevertheless he tends to attribute an overall coherence to state policy 
emphasizing the dovetailing of various aspects of a political economy (Esping- 
Andersen 1990).
The misattribution of social and economic outcomes to public policy is not limited to 
welfare state analysis. The Bundesbank, is widely credited with controlling inflation 
in Germany. On closer investigation its ‘success’ owes something to the structure 
and success of German industry. In other words, non-statist factors play a crucial 
role. In turn, low inflation (alongside, for example, long term stable investment
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finance) contributes to economic success and thus to the preservation of its particular 
industrial structure. The analytical distinction between the state and society is 
important - but so too are the complex and mutually supportive ways in which the two 
to interlock (it may be difficult to break into the relationship analytically).
The Federal Republic of Germany might not qualify as a welfare state at all. The 
tough definitional criteria that Esping-Andersen sets are not met. Arguably neither 
the primary purpose nor main activity of the state is welfare (1990: 18-23; compare 
Therbom 1989). The Federal Republic may be better characterized as a Sozialstaat 
than a Wohlfahrtsstaat. The former concept is entrenched in the Basic Law (Articles 
20 paragraph 1 and 28 paragraph 1) while some argue that the latter has a generally 
negative and patronizing ring (see Zapf 1986: 132; more equivocally Ginsburg 1993: 
68; but compare Schmidt 1989: 66-69). The caution of Orloff, Therbom, and Esping- 
Andersen (compare Orloff 1993; Therbom 1983; Esping-Andersen 1990: 20 with 
Esping-Andersen 1994: 716) about the claims of states to be welfare states may be 
appropriate in the German case.
It is debatable whether the main purpose of the Sozialstaat - or even social policy - is 
‘welfare’. If the market is regarded as self-sustaining, then the Sozialstaat might be 
assimilated to the welfare state. Social policy is not an egalitarian or socialist incubus 
within German capitalism. Within it the ideology and practices of equality and 
vertical redistribution are weak. Instead, it reflects and (re)produces status divisions 
associated with employment (blue collar, white collar and higher Civil Service see 
Schmidt 1989: 66-67; Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984; Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Social policy further strengthens those in a strong labour market position. Women’s 
perilous position in the Sozialstaat reflects and reinforces rather than primarily 
causing their weakness in the labour market (see Schmidt 1993; van Kersbergen 1995 
and Esping-Andersen 1990; and Schmidt 1989: 66-67 on labour markets and social 
policy interaction). This general insight seems to be confirmed historically. Social 
policy did not establish the post-war retum to domesticity. During the 1970s and into 
the 1980s active labour market partly counteracted a potential decline in women’s
163
labour market position. To the extent that ‘the welfare state’ is based on ideals of 
equality, or common social citizenship, it may be inappropriate in the German case.
Even if the German state is ‘active’ and ‘social’ state (possibly attributing it with too 
much coherence) its ‘purposes’ may be with industrial performance not welfarism 
(Schmidt and Rose 1985 on the ‘active’ state; Zapf 1986 on the Sozialstaat, Titmuss 
1974 discusses the industrial performance ‘welfare’ state). In turn, comparatively 
stabile industrial structure contributed to ‘core’ male workers’ ability to win ‘family 
wages’, perhaps reducing pressure on women to work outside the home and prevent a 
critical mass of women workers emerging which might have sustained a new service 
sector - a strikingly limited sector in Germany. The state, partly through social policy, 
indirectly sustained traditional gender roles, for example, through its influence on 
economic success in manufacturing industries. Social policy and political discourse 
also directly influenced gender. Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to attribute the 
German gender pattern primarily to social policy, the state, or the welfare state 
regime. Although difficult to separate from the state’s role, non-statist factors, such as 
religion or industrial success had a more important impact
The claim that Germany is not a welfare state may logically extend core power 
resource claims. First the state is always and everywhere deeply engrained in 
economic and social life, almost to the point of vitiating the analytical distinction 
between them (Block 1994). Secondly, that the institutional form of the state varies, 
with important economic and social consequences. The further development of these 
insights is now hindered, not helped, by an insistence that all developed capitalist 
democracies are welfare states.
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Chapter Five: Women and work in the USA: liberal welfare state 
regime or liberal feminism and legal rights?
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Chart 5.1 USA- Female Labour Force Participation
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Chart 5.2 Smooth of female labour force participation
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The main candidate for a single (cluster of) force(s) acting consistently throughout the 
period is economic -  specialization, marketization or economic development. While 
described by ‘process’ phrases these developments are sometimes attributed to step- 
changes. A pattern o f steady growth is consistent with either incremental or ‘step’
168
images of change. Becker hypothesises that the character of US female labour supply 
changed in about 1950, when women’s wages passed a particular threshold 
(1981/1991, although, he also attributes significance to causal forces with varying 
values - ‘variables’ such as the economic growth rate compare with Power’s 1988:
142 Marxist influenced feminism). If a deep change occurred in women’s workforce 
participation, OECD data suggests 1965 as a turning point, not 1950 unless the change 
was subject to a fifteen year lag. Women’s workforce participation was more than 4 
percentage points higher after each half decade between 1965 and 1990, the difference 
between the level in 1965 and 1960 was only 1.7 points. Moreover, data on women’s 
participation rate shows growth by 3.8 percentage points for the whole decade of the 
1950s only slightly higher than that between 1960 and 1965 (Power 1988: 143).'
Closer study of the data reveals distinct developmental phases between 1960 and 1980 
despite its comparative overall consistency. Little attention has yet been paid to the 
‘path’ of development (or periodization) of US female labour market participation. If 
the period after 1965 differs from that before it, even it is not homogeneous. During 
each half decade between 1965 and 1990, except one, women’s workforce 
participation grew by between 4.1 and 4.6 percentage points. Between 1975 and 1980 
the increase was as high as 6.5 percentage points. The variability of female labour 
force participation growth might suggest that general forces may not operate in 
immediately or straightforwardly. Public policy also played an important, and 
probably more immediate, part. Both welfare and the state (for example in the form 
of gender equality policies) were important in the development of female labour force 
participation between 1960 and 1990. However, I do not necessarily accept that ‘the 
welfare state’ was responsible for female employment growth.
The US may be distinctive in comparison with other cases. The analysis of aggregate, 
national level data always disguises what happens at an individual or local level. 
However, the attempt to make sense of US labour market, political or public
' It should be noted that these data also show smaller increases than the OECD data used for the 
subsequent 25 year period. These differences are to be expected as the first series records working age 
population, while the second considers all those over 16. However, as the size of the population aged
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(especially welfare) policy changes at the national level is particularly problematic. 
Politics and public policy operate at Federal, State and City levels (producing 
pressures for divergence) moreover the regional working of the labour market and the 
sheer size and complexity of the US exacerbates difficulties that are also encountered 
in other countries. The extent and complexity interaction between public and private 
sectors of ‘welfare services’ provision generates further difficulties. Taken together 
these problems beg the question of whether a single US welfare state regime exists.
The US ‘state welfare’ sector is less uniform than other (even federal) states analysed. 
Practices vary across locations. ‘AFDC ... has very uneven standards of eligibility, 
coverage, and benefits across states, generally providing the least to poorest and 
weakest people in the poorest states’. Nevertheless, federal level sets the framework 
for social policy development, arguably justifying a national ‘macroscopic and 
historical perspective that highlights political institutions and processes’ (on variation 
generally see Ginsburg 1992: 99 for a useful statement of this sort; the quote on 
variability is from Skocpol (with Ikenberry)1995: 137; while the justification for 
treating the US as a whole is due to Weir, Orloff and Skocpol 1988: xi). The 
complexity of welfare service organization also reflects the integral role of 
commercial and private charitable institutions. Spatial variation in these institutions 
adds to the difficulties for the identification of a single welfare regime. Their 
importance raises a question about the role of the state in welfare, further 
problematizing the application of the welfare state idea to the analysis of US welfare 
services.
5.2 Periodizing the US case: when did social democracy become 
impossible?
Unlike much of the literature, I analyze the relationship between welfare and gender 
over time. Static analyses risk a collapse into anachronism. Periodizations of the 
relationship between gender and welfare may help to untangle complex causal chains 
and patterns of interaction (but Abramovitz 1988 does consider change over time).
over 65 was growing throughout the period, we would expect the 16 plus data to be closer to the that 
for ages 16-65 during the 1950s than during the 1980s
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Questions about its ‘exceptionalism’ are the perennials of studies of the US case in 
comparative perspective. While there are disagreements about the periodization of 
US social policy development, they are not as intense, nor do they hear as strongly on 
the present analysis, as similar dehates about Sweden. In relation to social policy, the 
preoccupation is with the iaggardly’ status of the US, its ‘failure’ to develop a 
‘European’ style ‘welfare state’, an issue entangled with the issue of the weakness of 
US socialism. As analysts of European welfare states have come to pay increased 
attention to non-socialist forces in social policy development, this issue has faded into 
the background. Concern about the ‘stunted’ character of the US ‘welfare state’ 
remains. Many analysts suggest that a more ‘fully developed’ welfare system was 
historically possibility in the US. There is less agreement about the periodization of 
the passing of this historical opportunity.
For present purposes the key question concerns the post war period, particularly the 
1960s. It is tempting to see the Johnson Administration as the key turning point. 
Moynihan, centrally involved in the ‘Great Society’, has argued that ‘an immense 
opportunity to institute more or less permanent social changes - a fixed full 
employment program, a measure of income maintenance - was lost’. Emphasis on 
the 1960s might suggest that changes in welfare and in women’s role in the labour 
market dovetailed with one another. A number of influential analysts dispute this 
periodization. They see the social policy initiatives of the Great Society as occurring 
‘too late’ after the possibility for a ‘fully developed’ welfare state had already 
vanished (Moynihan 1969: 193; for alternative views see Katzenelson 1989 and 
Skocpol 1992). While these alternative views do not necessarily mean that changes in 
welfare in the 1960s did not influence gender roles, they problematize the 
conceptualization of these changes in ‘welfare statist’ terms.
Katznelson argues that the opportunity for welfare policy supportive of labour 
movement, cross-race politics was lost in the 1940s rather than the 1960s. Less 
convinced of the centrality of class, Skocpol focuses instead on the creativity of 
administrators, but also on non-socialist collective actors - the Grand Army of the 
Republic and a network of women’s organizations. While acknowledging that after
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the Great Depression the US would take ‘new paths’ associated with the New Deal, 
she seems to suggest that the possibility for a ‘fully developed’ welfare state - of a 
distinctive ‘matemalist’ type - disappeared in the 1920s (Skocpol 1992: 526 and 
generally 525-539; Katznelson 1989).
Welfare policy and government social spending has experience several phases since 
1960. Coverage was extended and expenditure grew from the 1960s until the mid 
1970s, followed by stagnation and retrenchment, during the 1980s. Although there is 
disagreement about its precise timing, welfare policy transformation and expenditure 
expansion, it is usually dated from the early or mid 1960s, contemporaneous with 
acceleration of female labour force participation growth. Standard texts on welfare 
describe a politically ‘unsung’ revolution in welfare dating jfrom 1965 (Patterson 
1994: 157-198 dates the ‘revolution’ between 1965 and 1973, for DiNitto 1991: 24-26 
the key dates are 1965 to 1975).
Turning to women’s workforce participation, two distinct, although interconnected, 
dynamics help to define its development between 1960 and 1989. One was associated 
with welfare, which played a role throughout the period, but was particularly 
important in the 1960s and early 1970s. Although some change occurred outside 
social welfare during the 1960s, from the early 1970s movement of women into 
corporate America became increasingly important. This became the main source of 
new female employment when welfare expansion initially weakened and was later 
attacked. The movement of women into corporate America was strongly influenced 
by equal employment and affirmative action policies.
The intersection of these two dynamics produces a number of periods. Welfare 
employment grew rapidly, although not wholly consistently up to the early 1970s. It 
continued a gradual, if no longer dramatic, growth throughout the rest of the 1970s. 
During the Reagan years, it stagnated, despite growth in some private sector welfare 
services. Female private and corporate sector employment did not grow strongly 
during the 1960s, but began to take off in the early 1970s. By the 1980s substantial 
opportunities existed for (some) women in the corporate sector, which appear
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unmatched in other countries. Unfortunately, many available sources do not organize 
data in these periods. Rein’s (1985) particularly useful data are presented from 1962 
and 1982, although he sometimes presents data for 1972. Nevertheless, these data, in 
combination with data from the OECD, corroborate my argument.
Temporal coincidence does not demonstrate that female employment expansion 
occurred within welfare. Other arguments and pieces of evidence suggest that it did. 
Many suggest that welfare was a strong - even the primary - influence on women’s 
entry into the workforce (Ginsburg 1992; Eisenstein 1984; Abramovitz 1988; Piven 
1985; Rein 1985; Erie and Rein 1988; Steinberg 1988). While there is a good deal of 
truth in these arguments, they are often presented in misleading forms. They overplay 
the extent to which the US can be characterised as a welfare state, in particular by 
overemphasising the role of government employment in the transformation of the 
position of women. As a corollary, they also underestimate the part played by non­
welfare private sector employment, particularly after the early 1970s.
Even in the US social welfare industries played an important role in female 
employment growth. While direct government (particularly federal) employment was 
relatively unimportant throughout the period (representing 3 per cent of human 
services employment) government has had significant indirect consequences. Federal 
social spending has an important impact on local and state government welfare and, 
albeit often mediated by other levels of government, on private (profit and non-profit) 
welfare services (Rein has demonstrated that social welfare industries were important 
in women’s employment growth; see especially Rein 1985; Erie and Rein 1988: 179, 
show the limited importance of direct government employment the figure of 3 per 
cent seems to refer to 1980; on the indirect impact of government see Erie and Rein 
1988: 178-181 and Rein 1985: 43).
Comparative analysis reinforces the impression that state’s impact on (women’s) 
welfare employment was less direct and significant than elsewhere. The most striking 
comparison is with Sweden where the public sector became increasing important in 
social welfare between 1964 and 1983; 81 per cent of women in welfare services were
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public sector employees by the mid 1980s. The US trend was towards greater private 
sector involvement, with only 46 per cent of women employed in social welfare 
industries in the public sector (Rein 1985: 43). While we have evidence that the 
expansion of ‘welfare’ played an important part in the development of female labour 
force participation, the relationship between the developments will be addressed by 
means of an analytic periodization of state regulation, welfare and female employment 
expansion. Welfare did provide an important impetus to women’s employment, 
particularly during the 1960s. However, the political conjuncture out of which 
welfare expansion emerged also precipitated a feminism movement and pressure for 
the extention of women’s legal (especially employment) rights, on the model of the 
civil rights movement. Together these factors seem to have contributed to some 
women gradually gaining greater access to corporate sector employment after 1970.
5.3 The initial phase: social policy and the path of women’s 
employment in the 1960s and early 70s
Between 1962 and 1972 female employment grew by 35 per cent, 47 per cent which 
occurred in (public and private) social welfare industries. Growth in social welfare 
employment was not as important as that in other sectors (data from Rein 1985: 161 - 
Table 10). Female employment in non-social welfare (except in agriculture and 
household services) grew roughly proportionately to the overall growth in female 
employment. The proportion of employed women working in social welfare grew by 
seven per cent, slightly less than the fall in agriculture and household services.
Female employment increased more rapidly between 1962 and 1972 than between 
1972 and 1982 only in goods production and social welfare. In 1962 and 1972 
roughly one in five employed women worked in goods production. (Data from Rein 
1985: 157 - Table 6 and 153 - Table 3.)
During the mid 1960s female employment in welfare grew largely as an unintended 
consequence of the ‘unsung’ welfare revolution. This point is controversial - scholars 
debate whether welfare provision primarily regulates the poor or gender. Legislators 
were conscious of gender issues - the Equal Pay Amendment (1963) and Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act (1964) were passed in the early 1960s. They were products of
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the political conjuncture which produced welfare expansion. They might be regarded 
as different facets of the transformation of the US ‘welfare state’ or ‘regime’ (see 
Patterson 1994 and DiNitto 1991 on the ‘unsung revolution’; Gordon 1988 and Piven 
and Cloward 1988 take opposite sides in the gender and welfare debate).
However, these laws were not passed to ameliorate the position of women (although 
the stories told about laws are not wholly consistent compare Steinberg 1988: 189- 
190; Flammang 1987: 290 and Meehan 1985: 62-63 with Greenberger 1980:122 and 
Freeman 1987: 220). It seems that the legislation was not strongly grounded in a 
coherent supportive feminist coalition, nor was it implemented consistently. Welfare 
expansion contributed significantly to female employment growth during the 1960s, 
but that growth was not intended. If female employment growth was intended it was 
not consistently quick - for a number of years (1968, 1970, 1971) female labour force 
participation grew rather slowly. For the five years from 1967 to 1971 (or 1969 -72) 
the growth in women’s workforce participation was under four percentage points.
The equality legislation was largely dormant until new political phase which began in 
the late 1960s. Processes of politicization - particularly of women - ‘activated’ the 
legislation. This politicization may have resulted partly when middle class women 
welfare workers interacted with poor female welfare clients (see, particularly Piven 
1985; Piven and Cloward 1988, but also Erie and Rein 1988).
5.4 Continuity and change: slowdown and stagnation in welfare and 
the growth of female employment in the private sector
Changes in law, opportunities and consciousness occurred in the late 1960s and 
1970s. They appear to have influenced gender patterns in general and welfare 
employment. I will look first at the overall trajectory of welfare employment as well 
as the gender pattern within it. From the early 1970s the growth rate of welfare 
provision began to slow alongside a partial feminization of welfare employment. 
Women’s private sector employment opportunities seem to have increased as well, in 
‘junk’ and executive employment, a growth which strengthened in the 1980s. Neither 
of these developments was due to ‘welfare statism’ perse  - the development of liberal
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feminism and equality of opportunity was influential especially in legal ‘equality’ 
rights.
Changes in women’s welfare employment in the 1970s and 80s 
Apparently paradoxically the most rapid growth of female labour force participation 
occurred as the rapid expansion of welfare - one of its putative main causes - began to 
slow. Although other factors sustained female labour force participation growth, 
changes in social welfare employment also help to resolve the apparent paradox. 
Although overall social welfare employment grew more quickly from 1962 to 1972, 
the proportion taken by women grew more rapidly between 1972 and 1983. Male 
social welfare employment change was 77.5 per cent of female between 1962 and 
1972, but only 52.7 per cent between 1972 and 1982 despite, the inclusion in the data 
of the early Reagan years during which welfare employment was cut, particularly for 
women. This pattern is slightly at odds with images of gender equality in employment 
promoted by the legal changes of the early 1970s (data from Rein 1985 153 -Table 3; 
see Eisenstein 1984 and Brackman, Eire and Rein 1988 on how cutbacks impacted 
upon women.)
Reagan’s welfare retrenchment introduced the final phase women’s social welfare 
employment development. In the early 1980s women’s labour force participation 
grew more slowly than it had done since the 1960s, partly as a result of Reagan’s cuts, 
which hit women particularly hard, and offset continued growth elsewhere. Female 
federal employees, were laid off ‘at rate 150 percent higher than men’, because the 
concentration of women employed in social agencies which were hardest hit, 
‘veteran’s preference’ and ‘seniority’ which tended to protect men. State and local 
government felt the most significant impact as did private sector employment, where 
it depended on federal funding. (Abramovitz 1988: 377 and Eisenstein 1984: 117-118 
both mention the rate; Erie and Rein 1988: 186-87 specify the mechanisms).
Viewed over time, welfare work has been an important area for women’s 
employment, but comparative analysis casts this experience in a different light. The 
(public and private) social welfare employment contribution to US female
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employment growth has been comparatively small. From the early 1960s to the early 
1980s only 38 per cent of US female employment growth was in welfare industries, 
compared to 64 per cent in Britain and over 90 per cent in Sweden. Government’s 
role in social welfare is smaller (and less direct) in the US than elsewhere; as is social 
welfare’s contribution to the labour market, particularly for women (data from Rein 
1985: 46 and 161 Table 10 - the Swedish figures are inconsistent - 92 per cent in the 
text and 91 per cent in the Table).
Women in private sector employment
If welfare work contributed to female employment growth for women between 1960 
and 1989, the gradual opening up of corporate America to women during the 1970s 
(Gilbert-Shaffer 1980) helped to transform women’s labour market position. Many 
analyses of welfare and women’s employment explicitly disparage the ‘much-touted 
move of women into corporate America’ (Brackman, Erie and Rein 1988: 217) 
arguing that ‘private industry does not have a good record of hiring professional... 
women’ (Eisenstein 1984: 118). Judged over time and comparatively these 
assessments seem too harsh.
Over time, the assessment that private sector employment was of little significance for 
women during the 1970s and 80s is not convincing. Evidence from the mid to late 
1980s, after the main Reagan retrenchment taken effect, suggests that female labour 
force participation continued to grow. Earlier evidence also suggests that non-welfare 
private sector employment increased in importance over time. Women’s welfare 
work expansion was much faster during the 1960s than the 1970s. The proportion of 
working women employed in goods production fell away quite sharply between 1972 
and 1983, having held its own during the 1960s. The proportion of employed women 
working in consumer and social welfare services remained roughly the same in 1972 
and 1983 (about a quarter and just under three tenths), while the proportion increased 
most sharply (from 13 to 17 per cent) in business services (Rein 1985: 157 - Table 6).
In comparative perspective the US labour market looks remarkably dynamic. 
Elsewhere employment has declined (as in Germany), or the increase has been
177
strongly dominated by public employment. Although US women are under­
represented in managerial and professional employment, that under-representation is 
less severe - and has declined more rapidly - than elsewhere. In some countries 
women’s under-representation actually worsened (see Esping-Andersen 1990: 209 
compares the US, Sweden and Germany).
The early 1970s seem to have been the turning point in private non-welfare 
employment as both women’s consciousness and the legal framework for female 
employment changed. Legal changes occurred in the interpretation and 
implementation of equal opportunities. They resulted from executive actions and 
judicial decisions. Congress passed over 70 laws concerning the women’s movement 
during the 1970s (Steinberg 1988: 190; see also Katzenstein 1987 on the relationship 
between changes in women’s consciousness and public policy).
Many of these changes concerned pay equality or ‘comparable worth’. This issue 
bubbled up through various localities to surface on the national political agenda in the 
late 1970s. As Carter’s Administration took office, Eleanor Holmes Norton, the Chair 
of the EEOC, placed the issue at the centre of the Commission’s priorities. 
Considerable opposition developed from business groups. However, Reagan did not 
target it until 1984. At this stage, the issue became entangled with bureaucratic 
politics and inter-agency competition (Steinberg 1988: 198-205). While comparable 
worth policies helped to attract women into the workforce, they did not increase the 
availability of work for women, for which we must turn to other policies. Two legal 
changes were particularly important for women in the corporate labour market. The 
Supreme Court decision of 1971 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. endorsed a results- 
oriented interpretation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act’s sex discrimination provisions.
It focused attention on the discriminatory consequences - not intentions - of an 
employers actions (Gilbert Shaeffer 1980: 277-278). Secondly, the scope of the 
Executive Order 11246 was increased. The Executive Order was issued by President 
Johnson in 1964 and prohibited discriminatory employers from holding federal 
contracts. It was amended to include sex discrimination by Executive Order 11375 in 
1968. So as to improve the policy’s overall effectiveness, from 4 December 1971 the
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Office of Federal Contract Compliance insisted that all businesses holding 
government contracts have a written affirmative action plan. These plans should 
include objectives for increasing the representation of women in all job categories in 
which they were underrepresented and timetables for meeting these objectives 
(Gilbert Shaeffer 1980: 277-278 and 309; see also Steinberg 1988: 190; and 
Greenberger 1980: 118-119 on Executive Orders 11246 and 11375).
These legal changes precluded some changes in corporate practices - for example 
AT&T undertook a high profile Affirmative Action project, which culminated in a 
multi-million dollar consent agreement, signed by the company, the EEOC and the 
Department of Labor, and subject to court supervision. This ‘active’ equal 
opportunities policy cost an estimated $60 million plus over five years. The attention 
AT&T attracted helped to put Equal Opportunities and Affirmative Action on the 
agenda of large corporations (Gilbert Shaeffer 1980: 278).
Government agencies tended to target large corporations, because they had larger 
numbers of employees, greater symbolic significance and the capacity to implement 
the policy through employee training and personnel departments (on these issues see 
Gilbert Shaeffer 1980: 279, 286-93). Similar policies also had a significant impact in 
education and especially recruitment of students in higher education, with an obvious 
impact on the qualifications of labour market entrants. Some smaller employers were 
exempt from equal opportunity laws.
The Reagan Administration targeted Affirmative Action more quickly than it did 
equal pay. A direct attempt to weaken contract compliance rules in 1981 met with 
strong opposition and was abandoned. Nevertheless, general retrenchment reduced 
the effectiveness of the Office of Contract Compliance. The Justice Department, 
which had previously helped to expand the scope of equal opportunities policies, 
began to attack it on grounds of reverse discrimination against white men (Steinberg 
1988: 152 - 154, especially 153). The impact of the Reagan Administration serves to 
highlight sectoral differences in changes in the gendering of the US labour market. 
The corporate labour market had changed with women’s presence in senior
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managerial and professional positions increasing. By the early or mid 1980s this 
change appears to be largely self-sustaining although equal opportunities, particularly 
in education continued to contribute to it. By contrast, women’s access to skilled craft 
employment (tenuous even during the late 1970s) was heavily hit. The prospects for 
young working class women were restricted to the rapidly expanding ‘junk job’ 
sector. Women found work in two increasingly differentiated labour markets, with 
few bridges between them (Power 1988: 153-154 - firms ‘may be willing to accept 
women with advanced degrees from respectable business schools without the ‘whip’ 
of affirmative action’; see also Esping-Andersen 1990).
Changes in the pattern of both welfare and corporate employment during the 1970s 
seem to have had a common source, the political and legal changes which date from 
the early 1970s, suggesting that increases in the supply of jobs for women and women 
for jobs were both important. These changes were influenced by government policy 
and the judiciary, which were themselves pressured by organised feminists. Later, 
however, increasing opportunities for exit from welfare to corporate work may have 
weakened the commitment of middle class women to state support for welfare 
provision.
5.5 Conclusions: the implications for welfare state theory
A number of distinct, mutually incompatible and unconvincing interpretations exist of 
the relationship between welfare and female employment expansion. Esping- 
Andersen has asserted that US post-industrial employment pattern is a product of 
‘unfettered’ markets (1990: 215, see also 201, 202). Others are committed to the 
argument that from ‘the 1950s to the 1970s the expansion of employment in the 
welfare state was ‘the single most important impetus behind the greater economic 
mobility of women and minorities” (Ginsburg 1992: 111, (mis)citing Eisenstein 
1984: 118, in turn citing Camoy and Shearer 1981: 464). Some theorists bundle 
market and state together in one overall modernization process, although many 
modernization theorists imply that economic forces were fundamental. All these 
positions use flawed conceptions of the welfare state and produce distorted views of 
broader social, economic and political developments.
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Economie ‘modernization’ theory explains changes in gender roles primarily in terms 
of the incentives which women face (Becker 1981/1991). Becker detects a threshold 
change in the US economy in 1950, after which women’s employment grew steadily. 
Such an account oversimplifies the story considerably. Rather than one general 
process, patterns of women’s employment were influenced by several distinct, if 
interconnected, dynamics. In one sense we should not expect a general theory to deal 
with the detail of a particular case. However, the generality of Becker’s approach 
may be questioned - it is clearly rooted in the US case.
One aspect of this modernization approach requires further attention. Becker’s 
treatment of politics is somewhat unclear. Generally he views political processes as 
broadly efficient (Becker 1983; 1985; see Dunleavy 1991: 25-26 for discussion). On 
the other hand, he disparages the impact of feminist politics, claiming that the 
women’s movement was ‘a response to other forces’ rather than an ‘independent 
force’ (Becker 1981:251). The story told here of the women’s path into paid 
employment in the US certainly shows that both ‘politics’ in general and feminism in 
particular were influential.
The non-modemization literature is sophisticated and rooted in daunting quantities of 
empirical evidence (Rein 1985; Esping-Andersen 1990). Nevertheless, good evidence 
and valid points are often constructed into unconvincing arguments around 
misconceptions of the welfare state. Difficulties exist more in the implications drawn 
from direct and explicit claims rather than the claims themselves. Problems arise in 
the conflation and confounding of, and slippages between, distinct positions on, or 
conceptions of, the welfare state.
Esping-Andersen’s claims that US post-industrial employment patterns are ‘market- 
powered’ or produced by ‘unfettered’ markets (1990: 225, 215) rest uneasily with his 
general account. His overall analysis commits him prima facia to the view that they 
were produced by the welfare state, albeit in the attenuated form of the ‘liberal welfare 
state regime’. As if aware of this difficulty, Esping-Andersen himself makes an
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explicit, although rather unconvincing (and unconvinced?), attempt to reconcile these 
positions. ‘A welfare-state-based explanation would appear at odds the American 
market-powered trajectory, yet many of its peculiarities are directly associated with 
welfare-state residualism’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 225). While I quibble with little 
in either part of this sentence, as a whole it is problematic. Esping-Andersen’s rather 
guarded discussion (as shown in the use of the phrase ‘directly associated’ in the place 
of ‘explained ... ’ or ‘caused by’ in the second part of the sentence) implies that the 
‘welfare state’ can be deployed as a causal force, even when it fails to develop.
The argument that the business enterprise filled the need left by the weak 
development of state welfare has a functionalist and teleological tone (although one 
mitigated by emphasis on the ‘tax-expenditure side of the American welfare state’ 
1990: 225). Europe’s welfare state employees and some US managers and workers in 
business services do not just fulfil the same needs - those employed in business 
services in the US appear as welfare state employees manqué. The contingent, but 
path shaping, processes by which business services emerged are left uninvestigated. 
Instead their development is ‘explained’ by the non-development of the welfare state, 
which is presented as a ‘welfare-state-based’ explanation. The implication is that the 
welfare state is a kind of telos - towards which progress is made even despite 
appearances.
Esping-Andersen’s comments on the ‘unique interplay of private and public in the 
American system’ are based in an important dimension of US politics and society and 
hint at more adequate explanations (1990: 225). The difficulty is that Esping- 
Andersen does not take this interplay sufficiently seriously. If it is ‘unique’ then it 
should not be understood as a failed - or even underdeveloped - welfare state. 
Moreover, if the ‘privateness of the market is to ‘seriously question[ed]’ due to the 
unique US private- public interplay (Esping-Andersen 1990: 215; 225) what is left of 
‘unfettered’ markets powering post-industrial employment development?
Esping-Andersen explicitly discusses the ‘fettering’ of (labour) market; that is, its 
political, legal and social construction (see 1990: 4; 225-226). He draws attention to
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the encouragement of ‘the market adhere to such lofty ideals’ of equal opportunities 
and notes the effectiveness of the ‘Equal Opportunity type of approach’ in promoting 
female employment (1990: 226). However, explicitly justifying this position, he 
attributes these policies to the ‘peculiar American welfare state’ rather than, say, to a 
‘liberal’ traditional of individual rights based on public interest litigation and 
progressive regulation, rather than redistributive welfarism (on which see Lowi 1964 
and Majone 1996).
By contrast, Esping-Andersen does not discuss conventional ‘core’ of US welfare 
policy, such as AFDC. These policies may have influenced welfare clients/claimants 
and welfare employees. The first of these influences may not represent a major 
deviation from the ‘unfettered’ market due to the low levels of benefits and gaps in 
the welfare system. However, if welfare ‘regulates’ the labour market, the US looks 
less like a case of ‘unfettered’ market development. ‘Regulation’ might involve the 
rise and fall of programmes in reaction to fluctuations in the labour market and the 
patterns of political protest (see Piven and Cloward 1971; 1977).
Welfare employment might also be relevant - immediately after noting Rein’s (1985) 
documentation of ‘singular importance of welfare services as an avenue of female 
employment-entry’ cross-nationally, Esping-Andersen suggests that in ‘line with 
Rein’s findings’ government’s role was ‘at best, modest’ in the US. While the 
substance of both these statements may be true, Esping-Andersen elides two distinct 
notions - of welfare services and ‘government’s role’ - to derive the unwarranted 
conclusion that in the US ‘women’s employment is largely produced in the market’ 
(1990: 201).
Esping-Andersen’s general analysis is rooted in a contention that markets are 
politically constructed and bounded - in principle he is sceptical about the notion of 
the ‘unfettered’ market (see, for example, the discussion of markets as political 
constructions - 1990: 4). In the US case he has not taken the logic of his analysis far 
enough. If an unfettered market cannot exist (which may be why he puts scare quotes 
around ‘unfettered’), it is difficult to sustain the argument that state welfare
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necessarily ‘drains’ economic performance. Equally, however, there is no reason to 
assume that all ‘fetters’ on markets are due to the welfare state, even if a variety of 
distinct welfare state regimes are identified.
Esping-Andersen allows a number of mutually inconsistent concepts to motivate 
different parts of his analysis, while seeming to unite them in a single notion ‘welfare 
state regime’. This gives the impression that the ‘welfare state regime’ notion can 
explain the US case. On close investigation this impression turns out to be superficial 
and the coherence of Esping-Andersen’s earlier welfare state concept (1990: 18-23) is 
itself compromised by stretching it to cover this range of phenomena, as we shall see 
in chapter eight.
An overall reading of Esping-Andersen’s account conveys the impression that welfare 
is not a significant cause of women’s employment in the US. Most other analyses of 
the relationship between female employment and welfare in the US misconceive the 
nature of the ‘welfare state’ in a different way, and therefore overstate its role in the 
development of female labour force participation. Ginsburg opens his analysis of the 
US by dismissing the claim that it ‘might not be considered to be a welfare state at all’ 
on the grounds that ‘there is no question that the US has a welfare state’. Thus he 
clearly elides the state form notion of the welfare state with the idea that it is a sector 
of state activity (Ginsburg 1992: 98 - emphasis added). He overplays the role of 
government as a direct employer, by inaccurately associating welfare with the state 
(and the state with welfare). Ginsburg argues that from ‘the 1950s to the 1970s the 
expansion of employment in the welfare state was ‘the single most important impetus 
behind the greater economic mobility of women and minorities”  (1992: 111). 
Although welfare employment was important, this claim is misleading.
First, welfare employment may not be can be properly understood as a single 
influence. Nor is it obvious what would count as other single influences for 
comparative purposes (is ‘non-welfare employment’ a ‘single impetus’?). Secondly, 
the association of this ‘single’ impetus with (welfare) state employment is contestable. 
It depends on defining ‘the welfare state’ to include private sector welfare industries -
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by the mid 1980s the majority of women employed in social welfare industries in the 
US were private sector employees (Rein 1985: 43). The inclusion of these industries 
within the welfare state might be justified to the extent that they depend upon 
government finance or were regulated by the state - but such a justification would 
have to be developed explicitly (as Piven 1985 begins to do).
Ginsburg's argument relies on a quotation from Eisenstein (1984: 118, itself citing 
Camoy and Shearer 1981). Eisenstein actually makes a subtly but significantly 
different point (the tone of the surrounding text helps to account for the mistake). The 
argument is that ‘increased public spending’ after 1950 increased the ‘economic 
mobility of women and minorities’ (Eisenstein 1984: 118) not that welfare state 
employment causes female employment growth. This claim is consistent with Erie 
and Rein’s (1988) evidence that direct government welfare employment had some 
impact, but the indirect influence of (particularly federal) government on women’s 
employment in welfare industries at state and local levels and in the private sector was 
more important.
Several influential analysts of US politics and public policy have developed 
sophisticated arguments about the interaction of government, welfare and gender. 
Despite its sophistication these arguments are marred by a flaw similar to that in 
Ginsburg’s analysis (Eisenstein 1984; Erie and Rein 1988; Brackman, Erie and Rein 
1988; Piven 1985; Steinberg 1988; Flammang 1987; Abramovitz 1988; Gordon 
1988). The claim is that ‘the gender of state power’ has changed somewhat. If this 
argument is to hold water the US must qualify as a welfare state.
The changing ‘gender of state power’ analysis integrates political and economic 
aspects of welfare and women’s employment. The expansion of welfare brought 
middle class women employment and poor women ‘benefits’. It provided these two 
groups of women with a common interest in welfare, and brought them together in 
such a way as to create (the potential for) a cross-class gender political alliance, which 
- in turn - serves to protect welfare provision. Welfare employment also helped to put 
women into government jobs, which placed them in positions of state power. Further,
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the ‘public’ experience given to women provides potential launching pads for political 
careers.
A story of this sort could be constructed around an analysis of women’s labour market 
position, particularly in social welfare industries. Even as late as the ‘Reagan 
revolution’ employed middle class women were likely to work in welfare and these 
welfare workers were likely to be in the public sector. Nearly two thirds of women in 
‘middle class’ - professional, administrative and technical - employment worked in 
social welfare (Erie and Rein 1988: 183 - Table 8.3; Brackman, Erie and Rein 1988: 
217) as did almost 59 per cent of college educated women workers in the early 1980s 
(Rein 1985: 168 - table 17). Within the welfare sector ‘better-educated women are 
much more likely to be found in the public sector, while it is the less-educated women 
who are crowded into the profit and non-profit sectors of social welfare’ (Rein 1985: 
43). Middle class women - who play a key role as potential political leaders are 
concentrated in the most ‘welfare statish’ labour market sectors.
However, these analyses are marred by overemphasising government employment, 
government contribution to welfare employment and even welfare employment itself. 
Taking the last two issues first we have seen that, the overall contribution of social 
welfare employment, whether in the public or private sectors was comparatively small 
in the US. Viewed comparatively, then, government played a small role in female 
employment growth. We have seen that three per cent of human services employees 
worked for the federal government in the early 1980s. Government employment 
accounted for 20 per cent of female employment growth from the early 1960s to the 
mid 1980s (149 per cent in Germany and 106 in Sweden). By the mid 1980s the 
proportion of employed women working in government was less than 18 per cent in 
the US, nearly 20 per cent in Germany and over 55 per cent in Sweden (human 
services employment data from Erie and Rein 1988: 179; see Esping-Andersen 1990: 
202 on government employment growth).
Several analysts emphasize actual contact between women of various classes (Piven 
1985; Gordon 1988). Its significance is not stated explicitly, but cross-class contact is
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seen as significant in subjective consciousness o f ‘objective’ common interests. 
However, in the 1980s only 3.3 per cent of women worked in services which would 
provide regular contact (higher than that the German, but lower than in Britain - 4.2 
per cent - and much lower than in Sweden -15.1 per cent - Rein 1985: 155-158 tables 
4 -7 ). Outside Sweden, these levels do not seem high enough for common 
consciousness development - either the consciousness developed for other reasons, or 
it did not emerge in the ways analysts anticipated.
The emphasis on government and welfare employment misjudges the role of other 
sectors for women’s employment. Sometimes analysts argue explicitly that corporate 
sector employment has been overrated. We have seen arguments that the ‘much- 
touted move of women into corporate America’ (Brackman, Erie and Rein 1988: 217) 
has not really occurred and that ‘private industry does not have a good record of 
hiring professional... women’ (Eisenstein 1984: 118). As already noted, this 
portrayal not accurate. Equal opportunities and affirmative action policies helped 
women into the corporate labour market. Many analysts attribute or assimilate these 
policies to the US welfare state (see Esping-Andersen 1990; Eisenstein 1984: 114 - 
138). One justification for this position is that welfare, civil rights and gender rights 
all emerged from the same political period in the 1960s and early 70s, as a product of 
intersecting social and political movements.
Equal opportunity and affirmative action are probably better conceptualized in 
‘Regulatory State’ rather than a ‘Welfare State’ terms. They rely on individualist 
liberal conceptions of rights rather than welfare statist notions of social rights. The 
development of these liberal rights may disclose tensions within the overall set of 
rights when extended to women and emphasize the complexity and inevitability of 
politics and government even within a market oriented individualist system. On the 
other hand, my argument may overstate the coherence of welfare state theory, and 
underplay the importance of liberal rights within the ‘welfare state’.
Many analyses which posit a close relationship between social welfare and women’s 
employment contain a grain of truth, particularly when made prospectively (see
187
especially Piven 1985 and Erie and Rein 1988). Overall, however, if  government and 
welfare employment provides the conditions for a gendered political coalition, these 
conditions are less propitious in the US than elsewhere, especially if actual contact 
between female welfare state employees and clients is required. Finally, exit options 
exist to other forms of employment, particularly for middle class women. If the 
existence of these options reduces the likelihood of loyalty to the welfare state and 
voice within it, they are likely to be exhibited less in the US than elsewhere.
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Chapter Six: The Netherlands: a limited and late feminization of the 
labour market in a generous, transfer based welfare regime
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6.1 Social Policy and the path of women’s participation in the 
workforce
Since 1945 Dutch female labour force participation has been low and social policy 
strikingly sexist. Elite consociation characterized politics and society was divided 
into ‘pillars’. None of these characteristics has remained wholly unchanged since the 
war. State welfare provision and the ‘pillars’ have changed dramatically. State 
welfare policy had laggard status until the 1960s, when it began to develop rapidly.
By the early 1970s Holland had one of the most generous, expensive, ‘regimes’ in the 
world - the only non-Scandinavian regime classified as ‘socialist’ by Esping-Andersen 
(1990). Similarly, the restrictive - conservative - Dutch social ‘pillars’ appeared to 
break down remarkably rapidly. By 1970 the Netherlands had become known for 
liberality and tolerance exemplified by a thriving, internationally known ‘alternative’ 
culture (on the distinctiveness of the Dutch welfare regime see Cox 1993; Flora 1986; 
Therbom 1989a; Wilensky 1975 and van Kersbergen 1995 - the definition of the 
pillars is due to van Kersbergen: 43). Even the path of female workforce participation 
changed after the 1960s, from the stagnation of the early post-war period to modest 
growth, while remaining comparatively low. The rate remained under 30 per cent until 
1974. During the previous fourteen years it had grown from about 25 per cent. 
Thereafter the growth rate increased, with female labour force participation topping 
35 per cent in 1980, and 40 per cent in 1983. Nevertheless, even at the end of the 
1980s the rate remained one of the lowest in Europe.
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Chart 6.1 The Netherlands - Female Labour Force Participation'
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Chart 6.2 Smooth of female labour force participation
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' It is important to note that the ‘jump’ in the data in the late 1980s was largely a consequence of a 
redefinition of the series by the Dutch government, rather than a sudden increase in the rate of female 
labour force participation. These OECD data remain the best - most ‘comparable’ - comparative data 
series to which I have access.
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Chart 6.3 Rough o f  female labour force participation
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During the early post-war years Dutch state welfare was very limited, although the 
state underwrote various voluntary welfare organizations. As a consequence (state) 
social policy could not have had a major direct impact on wom en’s workforce 
participation. Nevertheless, social policy indirectly influenced wom en’s position in 
Dutch society. It was centrally implicated in the development and sustenance o f the 
‘pillars’. Indirectly, then, social provision contributed to the maintenance o f  social 
values and structures which restricted wom en’s workforce role.
Two apparently dramatic changes occurred between the late 1950s and the early 
1970s. The Dutch ‘welfare state’ moved from bottom to top o f  the international 
‘league table’ and Dutch society was subject to a ‘silent revolution’ o f  
‘depillarization’ (see inter alia Cox 1993; van Kersbergen 1995; Therbom 1989a). 
Although these processes were interconnected, their precise relationship - particularly 
the direction o f  causality - is much less clear partly due to the widely used but flawed 
concept o f  ‘pillarization’. The need for a critical analysis and partial reconstruction o f  
the ‘pillarization’ concept means that the question o f periodization will be given 
considerable attention. Analysis o f  the ‘concept pillarization’ paves the way for a 
more convincing periodization o f  ‘depillarization’ and the explosive growth o f  social 
policy focusing on complex causal chains linking the two.
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I argue that social policy development played a key part in the ‘collapse’ of the pillars. 
In turn, social changes labelled ‘depillarization’ weakened traditional gender roles. 
Thus - indirectly - social policy helped to cause the change from stagnation to modest 
growth in female labour force participation after 1974. However, rapid growth and 
high levels of female paid work are not automatically produced by high levels of 
expenditure and wide population coverage in social policy. Although the weakening 
of the ‘pillars’ opened space for women to join the workforce, the level of female 
labour force participation remained comparatively low throughout the 1970s and 80s. 
Moreover, Dutch social policy’s direct impact on women’s incentives to work was 
restrictive, at least until the mid-to-late 1980s.
6.2 Periodizing the Dutch case: the question of Tlllarization’
An adequate account of the (somewhat unusual) development of Dutch social policy 
is necessary before its relationship with women’s role in the workforce can be 
analyzed. Although detailed analysis suggests (perhaps inevitably) that the causal 
chains of social policy development are complex, it remains important to take a view 
on the direction in which they tend to operate. Conventional ‘sociology of politics’ 
(Sartori 1969) accounts suggest that social change precipitated new policy patterns. 
The standard account of Dutch politics points to a paradoxical relationship between 
deep social division and elite accommodation (see particularly Lijphart 1975; 1977). 
The emphasis on elite autonomy in ‘consociationaT theory might seem incompatible 
with a ‘sociology of politics’ position. However, Lijphart’s work was intended to 
modify and extend ‘sociological’ pluralism, rather than repudiating it (1975: 2 and 
generally 1-15, 181-195). He tends to treat the ‘pillars’ as driven by social dynamics - 
paying little attention to the potential feedback effects of elite consociation on the 
mass pillars (compare with Scholten 1980 and 1987a and Wassenberg 1982).
Analysis of social policy suggests that it may have helped to trigger social 
transformation in the character of society (see especially Cox 1993, while neither 
Therbom 1989a nor van Kersbergen 1995 develop this sort of argument, both could 
be read as taking issue with the convention analysis). Important though these accounts 
are, their potential is partially undermined by ambiguities in the concept of
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‘pillarization’. In order to provide an adequate periodization of the path of 1) social 
policy development and 2) the position of women in the labour market, the twin 
concepts o f ‘pillarization’ and ‘depillarization’ require analysis.
Existing analyses tend to organize post-war Dutch experience into two periods. 
Together with a number of ‘modernizing’ social tendencies, the development of state 
social policy occurred relatively late in the Netherlands. Once initiated the Dutch 
‘welfare state’ grew rapidly, to very high levels. There is difficulty in dating precisely 
when the first period of weak welfare development ended and period of rapid growth 
began. When the issue of women’s labour market position is introduced, this picture 
clouds further. Although the 1960s mark something of a turning point, by 
international comparison both the levels and rate of change in women’s workforce 
participation seem relatively low. The position of women in the labour market 
suggests, first that there are important limits to the liberalization associated with 
‘depillarization’ and second, as noted above, a ‘large’ welfare state is not 
automatically associated with high levels of female labour force participation.
The ‘pillarization’ and ‘depillarization’ concepts distort analysis of social policy and 
women’s role in the workforce in several interconnected ways. The precise scope of 
the pillars is rarely identified adequately. A general presumption exists that the pillars 
are basically a form of social organization. However the extent to which political 
factors should be included within the pillars is unclear. This ambiguity is particularly 
problematic when the ‘pillars’ are deployed as explanatory variables, and makes it 
difficult to deal with policy feedback effects. Questions of structure and process are 
generally conflated in discussion of the ‘pillars’. The terms ‘pillarization’ and 
‘depillarization’ suggest that each is a monolithic process, whereas historical analysis 
suggests that tendencies towards ‘pillarization’ and ‘depillarization’ coexist in Dutch 
society for significant periods of time.
The Scope of the Pillars
The scope of the pillars is unclear. Primarily they refer to the structure of Dutch 
society, depicted as ‘highly integrated yet segregated’ (van Kersbergen 1995: 43)
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social worlds based on religion and class. The social worlds organized ‘the entire 
existence of an individual from nursery school via sporting club, trade union, 
university, hospital, broadcasting and television corporation, to the burial society’ 
(Kossman 1978: 304, cited in van Kersbergen 1995: 255; see also Scholten 1980, 
Wassenberg 1982 and Lijphart 1975 - Lijphart uses the term ‘bloc’ in place of ‘pillar’ 
here). A ‘member of an organization for one purpose can only legitimately choose an 
organization for another purpose within the same pillar’ (Therbom 1989a: 202). The 
pillars seem to shape individuals within ‘social worlds’.
This description of the scope of the pillars includes no reference to political parties. 
How far Dutch political organization falls within the pillars remains unclear. We 
might expect that the encompassing social worlds of the pillars would ‘shape’ politics 
as well as individual social outlooks. The ‘pillars’ are sometimes depicted as shaping 
the party system. More problematically, the elite politics of coalitions, cabinets and 
‘corporate’ institutions in and around the state are sometimes included ‘within’ the 
pillars, albeit in an inconsistent and fitful manner. Lack of clarity on this issue is 
compounded by an apparently paradoxical relationship between social segmentation 
and elite consociation.
Ambiguity over their scope reveals deeper flaws in the way the pillars have been 
conceived. If the primary definition of the pillars is ‘social’, then the presumption is 
that social take priority over political causes. Attention tends to be distracted away 
from policy feedback effects. Secondly, the social characteristics of the pillars often 
appear as essential, static features of Dutch society. Such a depiction of the pillars as 
social stmcture is ill equipped to explain change. Elite political factors are sometimes 
presented as core elements of the pillars in order to account for change - especially 
‘depillarization’. However, to use elite politics in this way it needs some autonomy 
from its ‘social base’ creating ambiguity over whether aspects of (elite) political 
decision-making ought to be included within the scope of the pillars.
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The conflation of structure and process
The ambiguous treatment of the scope of the pillars is linked a confounding of 
structure and process. Analysts rarely discuss the ‘pillars’ or the ‘pillared structure’ or 
‘organization’ of society. The language of process is used to describe structure or 
organization. For example, van Kersbergen writes of ‘ highly integrated yet 
segregated sub-cultural organisation named pillarisation (1995: 43, emphasis added) 
and authors also speak of ‘pillarized’ organizations. While this usage sometimes gives 
the appearance of accounting for change, it may not result in a sufficient challenge to 
the underlying conception of social structure as natural and immobile. It generally 
results in a static representation of processes.
The slippage between structure and process allows authors to hold an apparently rich, 
but basically contradictory position. On the one hand the pillars are primarily 
presented as the structure or essential nature of Dutch society. There is a sense of 
permanence about them. They are sometimes even reified - given an existence above 
and beyond the elements which constitute them. Instead, the slippage between 
structure and process in analysis of the pillars effectively occludes agency, while 
superficially dispensing with the need for such a consideration. The use of the 
language of process gives the (misleading) impression that analysts have dealt 
adequately with the issue of change, particularly the breakdown of the pillars (or 
‘depillarization’). As well as giving a spurious sense of agency to the structure it 
validates occasional and ad hoc inclusion of non-structural elements in the core of the 
pillars (keeping in mind the relevant structures are primarily presented as ‘social’). 
‘Pillarization’ itself comes to be seen as a cause (attributing agency to a process), a 
consequence and an overall description. Already complex and tangled causal chains 
become further obscured. Taken together with the ambiguity over the scope of the 
pillars this slippage results in a structuralist tendency in much work on Dutch politics.
An alternative focus on decision-making raises issues of the role of social and 
political agents pursuing strategies to (re)create of the (social worlds of the) pillars, 
that the image of elite accommodation associated with consociationalism fails to 
capture. Important moves towards such an approach have been made. In its most
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striking version, this analysis emphasizes the political construction of the pillars as a 
means of social control. Particular attention is paid to religious (especially Catholic) 
forces attempting to limit the impact of socialism (Scholten 1980; see also Scholten 
1987a; Wassenberg 1982; Cox 1993). While this analysis improves on earlier 
formulations, it nonetheless treats pillarization monolithically, imputing it with undue 
success. Greater emphasis on policy in the construction, maintenance and erosion of 
the pillars would push the argument further. Despite the widespread use of a language 
of process, the ambiguous conception of the pillars has inhibited analysts from 
understanding the pillars processually. A wholeheartedly diachronic analysis of the 
pillars - as processes rather than structures - might be fruitful. Indeed some of the 
better accounts, particularly those concerned with social policy, contain elements of 
this sort. They touch on social policy feedback into politics and social organization as 
well as the political sociology of social policy creation.
The co-existence of tendencies towards ‘pillarization’ and 
‘depillarization’
The terms ‘pillarization’ and ‘depillarization’ might be used helpfully to denote 
general processes, which require explanation. Their use tends to imply that a single 
basic process is occurring. However, tendencies towards ‘pillarization’ and 
‘depillarization’ have coexisted in Dutch society for significant periods of time. Even 
during periods generally characterized by pillarization, depillarizing counter 
tendencies existed (and vice-versa). Questions concerning which tendency dominated 
at a particular moment and whether a period in which pillarization dominated gave 
way to an episode of decisive depillarization are essentially matters for empirical 
analysis. In a developed approach of this kind the pillars would be understood as 
social and political projects which need continual (re)creation. Consideration would 
be given to agents in social institutions, rather than oscillating between attributing 
agency to social structures and solely to political elites.
‘Pillarization’, ‘depillarization’ and the path of social policy 
development
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A more steadfastly processual view of pillarization allows the paradoxical quality of 
the relationship between patterns of social organization and elite accommodation to be 
analysed more precisely. The conventional interpretation of Dutch politics suggests 
that elite accommodation was required if strong social segmentation was to be 
politically sustainable. Otherwise pillared ‘vertical pluralism’ might have broked up 
the Dutch state. Closer investigation reveals that consociationalism has coexisted 
with significant conflict, even within governing coalitions (see Therbom 1989a: 215 
and Cox 1993: 49, 221 for illustrations of this point in a welfare policy context). 
Arguably, however, the social vitality of the pillars also resulted from political threats 
to their integrity and autonomy. If the pillars ceased to be politically controversial 
their raison d 'etre partly dissipated. Pillarization processes may require both 
accommodation - consociationalism - and conflict. The pillared/consociational form 
of society and polity might run continual risks o f self-destmction and be sustained 
only as a (series of) temporary settlements.
There is a widespread assertion that pillarization ‘shaped social policy and institutions 
in characteristic ways’ (Therbom 1989a: 207). However, as welfare was shaped by 
the pillars, stmggles over welfare were part of pillarization processes, animating, 
strengthening and (re)producing the traditional values and social divisions of the 
pillars. The institutionalization and comparatively lengthy endurance of segmented 
welfare provided by societal organizations (albeit often in partnership with the state) 
was integral to pillarization. The role of social welfare in shaping the pillars is 
reflected in the fact that the socio-political usage of the word ‘pillar’ appeared first in 
a social welfare context in the 1930s (Therbom 1989a: 207 contends that the origin of 
the term demonstrates that the pillars shaped social policy, I suggest the opposite).
The switch from ‘pillarization’ to ‘depillarization’ is particularly difficult to explain in 
conventional terms. It also raises issues about the relationship between the 
breakdown of the pillars and social policy, the periodization of social policy 
development and women’s labour market position. The key issue is whether 
depillarization caused changes in social policy, as the conventional wisdom seems to 
suggest, although some social policy specialists partly disagree. While some accounts
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do provide rich material for a critique of conventional conceptions, confusion over 
‘pillarization’ continues to weaken their analyses. Cox’s (1993) otherwise friiitful 
analysis of the ‘anomalous’ Dutch case in the context of comparative welfare state 
theory exemplifies the difficulties which arise from the pillarization notion.
Cox is clear on the empirical issues involved. His argument is based on the 
observation that most major structural alterations to welfare policy occurred before 
wide ranging changes in the social bases of politics, at least as they are conventionally 
dated. Early on he suggests two ways of squaring this circle: ‘either the changes 
observed and identified in the 1970s were already well under way much earlier, at the 
beginning of the 1960s, or the politics that surrounded development actually brought 
on these later changes’ (Cox 1993: 53). In the end, he fails to make a clear choice 
between them.
Cox identifies four important interconnected factors: changes ‘elite thinking’, 
alterations in corporatist relations, the development of welfare policy and changes in 
patterns of social organization and mobilization. The ‘flawed’ conventional argument 
is that changes in the social bases of politics undermined corporatist patterns of 
policymaking, which opened the possibility of rapid expansion of welfare. Instead he 
argues that changes in elite ideas (eventually) resulted in the alteration welfare policy, 
which in turn helped to cause social change. However, he is inconsistent about which 
of these facets of Dutch society fall within the scope of the pillars.
Cox follows conventional definitions of pillarization, concentrating on the 
organization of society. This concept ‘refers to a social organization based on vertical 
and functional separation of social groups, or vertical pluralism’. If it is primarily 
understood as ‘social’, pillarization can then have ‘political effects’ expected to be 
‘especially evident in the party system’ (Cox 1993: 60). In some places, however, 
Cox expands his definition of ‘pillarization’ to include corporatist patterns of 
decision-making and ‘elite thinking’ about politics and policy. In consecutive 
paragraphs Cox moves between inconsistent definitions of the scope of the pillars and 
dates ‘depillarization’ from markedly different points in time. First, he criticizes the
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conventional view that social change alters the (corporatist) pattern of policymaking, 
in turn producing new welfare policy developments. Criticizing this view he states 
that ‘the breakdown in pillarization began’ ‘in ... 1967’, placing it after key changes in 
welfare policy. He distinguishes pillarization from increased parliamentary 
assertiveness and the alteration of corportatism (Cox 1993: 213),
When tracing welfare changes to new ideas developed by exiled elites during the 
Second World War, Cox alters his image of ‘pillarization’ and view of the timing of 
its breakdown. ‘In contrast to the claims of the many scholars in the 1970s who 
asserted that a silent revolution had caused a change in Dutch politics’ he argues that 
‘the breakdown of pillarization began much earlier’. It is somewhat unclear what it is 
earlier than - presumably the date of 1967 and either the ‘silent social revolution’ or 
the ‘change in Dutch politics’ or both (1993: 213). In order to shift the date back in 
time, Cox also increases the scope of his conception o f ‘pillarization’ including new 
thinking by exiled elites within it. The ‘breakdown of pillarization’ may have begun 
during the second world war (Cox 1993: 213-214).
Cox’s emphasis on ‘new thinking’ and the impact of policy on politics is refreshing, 
but ambiguous. Cox seems to suggest that policy can remake politics (welfare 
development contributed to widespread social change - ‘depillarization’ in the social 
sense Cox 1993: 58-59). However, although the ‘desire for change was expressed by 
an elite’ before the ‘upsurge of discontent in society’, Cox’s account suggests first that 
‘dramatic political change’ in the form of ‘a grass-roots upsurge of discontent in 
society’ allowed welfare reformers ‘to push through dramatic [welfare] reforms’. 
Secondly both elite ideas and grassroots discontent are aspects of ‘the breakdown of 
pillarization’ which comes to be presented as a ‘cause’ of welfare policy development. 
The relationship between society, politics and policy remains muddled (Cox 1993: 
213-214).
Reconceptualization of the pillars and of pillarization shows that they are social and 
political constructs. The early post-war period can be seen as a period of conflict over 
the existence of the pillars, won by those wishing to strengthen the pillars (especially
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Catholics) with paradoxical results. ‘Victory’ itself reduced the significance of the 
pillars, making them more difficult to sustain, both in terms of popular sentiment and 
by allowing greater scope for elite consideration of existing welfare reform ideas. 
Newly confident Catholic groups began to build institutions which eventually 
undercut some sources of Catholic autonomy.
6.3 The initial phases: from the second world war to the 1960s
The level of female labour force participation was remarkably low in reflecting the 
strength of the pillars. The conceptual problems with the notion of ‘pillarization’ 
have relatively little impact on the analysis of the relationship between social policy 
and gender at this stage. The pillars did impose a powerful social discipline in the 
Netherlands, which had the effect of limiting social change. There are specific 
reasons why it was particularly restrictive of female participation in paid employment. 
The confessional pillars (particularly the Catholics) held strong traditional views on 
the place of women. While confessional forces were powerful within society, women 
occupied traditional roles. Within the Catholic pillar (although, perhaps somewhat 
uncharacteristically also within Protestantism) a sceptical pre-capitalist attitude 
prevailed towards the (labour) market (Therbom 1989a: 234). This tradition strongly 
valued social participation. Welfare provided by organizations within the pillars 
staffed by (often female) volunteers illustrates this point. The strength of the pillars 
in social policy contributed to, and was partly predicated on, the weakness of female 
mobilization in the paid workforce. (The Dutch birth rate was comparatively high in 
the immediate post-war period, which probably contributed to low female labour force 
participation (Therbom 1989a: 209). In the short term the birth rate would entail a 
relatively heavy domestic burden likely to be carried by mothers, which would 
militate against paid work outside the home.)
So far the account of the low level of female labour force participation is compatible 
with conventional interpretations of the pillars. Even during the immediate post-war 
period, however, the politics of social policy bolstered the pillars rather than just 
being shaped by them. Despite not being as radical as is often assumed, social 
democratic proposals for the development of state welfare during this period did
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threaten the autonomy of the religious (especially Catholic) pillars. The resistance of 
confessional political and socio-economic agents did not simply block social policy 
development and (re)shape or perpetuate it in traditional, segmented, largely 
voluntary, form, although they did achieve all this (Cox 1993: 130-131) at least in the 
short term. The generation of political controversy around the pillars made them 
appear valuable and thus probably contributed to their social strength.
The creation of the Ministry of Social Work in 1952 illustrates this point. It is 
sometimes described as part of a ‘foundational political compromise’ on social policy 
which van Kersbergen characteristically states ‘mirrored the ‘pillarised’ organisation 
of society’ (1995: 129). However, more than it was a ‘compromise’ it represented a 
Catholic/confessional victory over the original social democratic plans. Associated 
with this compromise state social policy institutions were reconfigured. The new 
Ministry of Social Work restricted the scope of the Ministry of Social Affairs which 
had been controlled by the Social Democrats in the Red-Roman coalitions and 
provided the base for attempted Social Democratic social policy innovation. The new 
Ministry came under Catholic party control and took responsibility for social services. 
It underscored the responsibility of voluntary organizations within the pillars (Cox 
1993: 129; van Kersbergen 1995: 93). The creation of the Ministry of Social Work 
had the effect of invigorating the ‘social policy’ within the Catholic pillar. The effects 
of this invigoration were equivocal, if not paradoxical for Catholicism and the pillars.
The weakness of state welfare development in the first decade after the war was not 
directly responsible for low levels of female labour force participation, although some 
women participated in the largely unpaid voluntary welfare provision. Instead, the 
weak development of state welfare and low female labour force participation were due 
to the strength of the pillars and the way they bolstered traditional values. Debates 
over social policy may have strengthened the pillars and, indirectly promoted 
traditional values and gender roles.
6.4 Continuity and Change: 1970s and 80s
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In the mid 1970s the female labour force participation growth rate increased. This 
change is best regarded as a product of the breakdown of the pillars. Dutch society 
was becoming increasingly secular and the decline in the ‘social discipline’ capacity 
the pillars allowed traditional gender roles to change. Social policy was indirectly 
implicated as one element contributing to the breakdown of the pillars. However, the 
direct impact of state social policy was to inhibit women’s workforce participation. 
Although it grew more rapidly during the 1970s, female labour market participation 
remained comparatively low. Social policy contributed to this low level in several 
ways. Dutch social policy was remarkably sexist, providing few incentives for women 
to work. Its transfer-bias resulted in comparatively little direct state welfare 
employment. The timing of state welfare development meant it became closely 
associated with and facilitated labour shedding. This occurred at precisely the time 
when women were increasingly entering paid work. More speculatively, the use of 
transfer-oriented state welfare as an avenue out of work may have precluded the 
development of more active labour market policies. The state seems to have locked-in 
to a passive form.
The breakdown of the pillars I: change in female labour force 
participation
In comparative terms the change female labour force participation in the mid 1970s is 
less striking than its failure to occur earlier. However, from having been a notably 
traditional society, Holland become famous for its officially socially tolerated 
‘counter-culture’. From having been a welfare laggard, it had become a welfare 
leader. The (modest) change in female labour force participation occurred late 
compared to these changes, indicating that it occurred only after society had been 
thoroughly shaken-up. Secularization was particularly striking. The proportion of 
Catholics attending Mass fell from 71 per cent in 1961 to 33 percent in 1975. 
Confessional voting declined - the Catholic party fell from 31.9 per cent of the vote in 
1963 to 26.5 in 1967 and merely 17.7 per cent in 1972! By 1972 only 38 per cent of 
Catholics voted for ‘their’ party (Therbom 1989a: 210). These changes were central 
to ‘depillarization’.
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However, if the breakdown of the pillars is to be used as an explanation of the change 
in women’s workforce participation, it must be remembered that the breakdown was 
itself a complex interweaving of processes, in which social policy played an important 
role. The concept of ‘depillarization’ misrepresents these processes, at least as it is 
usually used. The social policy literature rightly rejects that policy change was caused 
by depillarization (see Therbom 1989a; Cox 1993; van Kersbergen 1995), although, 
as we have seen, it is insufficiently critical of the depillarization concept. For the 
most part this view is rejected because the major social policy reforms before 
breakdown of the pillars.
A more fundamental objection exists. Developments in Dutch policy and society 
since the early 1950s, particularly within the key Catholic pillar, often show mutually 
reinforcing interactions between political and social demands, institutional 
developments and welfare reform. A generous transfer-based state welfare system 
emerged from these interactions and began to erode the social, and religious, 
substance of the pillars, and their capacity to exert social discipline. Social policy 
development was intimately involved in the breakdown of the pillars, not simply its 
cause or consequence. Factors which explain the breakdown of the pillars are indirect 
causes of female labour force participation change. Women’s workforce participation 
seems not to have contributed to ‘depillarization’ - its treatment as a consequence of 
‘depillarization’ seems justified.
Erosive social policy change partly began within the Catholic pillar - we have noted 
that the creation of the Ministry of Social Work had paradoxical consequences. It has 
been described as the moment at which the Dutch (party) politics came to be inscribed 
with a comparatively unusually sexist character. The sexism of the Catholic and other 
confessional parties, is usually taken for granted. The main claim that Dutch politics 
is comparative sexist concerns Social Democracy. It is characterised as 
‘patriarchically sexist’ (Therbom 1989a: 216) - committed to the ‘traditional family’ 
as ‘the ‘cornerstone’ of society’ (van Kersbergen 1995: 93). While it may be valid, 
the assertion that Dutch politics is particularly sexist often lacking in detail or are 
confused.
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Van Kersbergen presents the most detailed account of how sexism ‘came to dominate 
Dutch politics’. It is profoundly equivocal. He asserts that a fundamental agreement 
on gender already existed between Catholic and social democratic forces, but he also 
suggests that it occurred as a consequence of a Catholic victory (van Kersbergen 
1995: 93). Again the formation of the Ministry of Social Work is key. Various 
elements with which we are concerned were brought together: social policy, elite 
politics, the pillars, and gender. Van Kersbergen has two points to make; the first 
relates to a victory of Christian over social democracy the second to evolving notions 
of gender.
The key analysis begins with a statement that Catholic and social democratic forces 
were already committed to a common notion of gender - embedded in ‘the traditional 
family’. He goes on to analyse the creation of the Ministry of Social Work as Catholic 
victory over social democracy. Finally he suggests that this victory meant that the 
‘predominance of a traditional ideology in the role of the family as a fundamental 
constituent of society came to dominate Dutch politics’ (1995: 93, emphasis added). 
The implication that this was a new consequence of (the institutionalisation of) 
Catholic political success is strengthened because of its impact on the ‘traditional 
patriarchal structure of Dutch society' where the ‘existing’ structure is described as 
merely ‘reinforced’ (1995: 93 emphasis added).
This analysis reflects confusion about the relationship between the pillars and elite 
consociation. If political elites are basically regarded as emanations of the ‘social’ 
pillars they would reflect the sexism present within the pillars. But van Kersbergen 
implies that Social Democrats initially had some autonomy from their social ‘base’. 
He then suggests that sexism became dominant in Dutch political - including among 
Social Democrats as a consequence of a clear Christian Democratic victory (van 
Kersbergen 1995: 93) and example of neither elite accommodation nor- seemingly - 
social determinism.
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Therbom asserts unambiguously that sexism in Dutch poltiics originated in 
confessional parties and subsequently ‘spread to Dutch Social Democracy as well’ 
(1989: 216), but does not explain the spread of the ‘infection’. This account of the 
spread of sexism is not inconsistent with consociational elite accommodation, 
although it would still inherit the tensions and ambiguities inherent within the notion 
of pillarization and its relation to the politics of consociation. How elite 
accommodations feed back into the social structures or organizations of the pillars 
remains particularly problematic.
A ‘pillarization’ analysis of the creation of the Ministry of Social Work risks 
distracting attention from agency. Detailed accounts of the ‘moment’ of Catholic 
victory are likely to be filled with agents activities. Nevertheless, if the episode is 
then described as a manifestation of a monolithic process, its subsequent impact 
(sometimes with unintended or even paradoxical consequences) may be downplayed. 
The Catholic Ministry of Social Work ‘victory’ altered the context for later action 
particularly by invigorating social policy actors within the Catholic pillar, with 
paradoxical consequences. Several Catholic universities developed degree courses in 
social work. Their graduates gradually displaced traditional volunteers and altered the 
character of Catholic social policy and its cohesive capacity within the pillar. A 
‘professional’ ethos (setting and meeting standards) replaced the ‘emissaries of a 
religious community’ role (Cox 1993: 139). Moreover, they concentrated on service 
delivery so increasing referred those needing income assistance to municipal agencies. 
Eventually welfare professionals became advocates of welfare reform and increasing 
the state’s role.
Professionalization of welfare provision cannot be wholly explained by the increased 
self-confidence of Catholic social Ipolicy actors. However, the ‘victory’ gave 
Catholic Universities confidence that the ‘pillars” strength within social policy could 
be consolidated. Their attempt to do so was externally influenced. They looked to 
‘models’ of social work professionalization provided by the Social Work curricula of 
US and UK Universities (Cox 1993: 138-139), suggesting non-deterministic
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‘diffusionist’ theory might be useful. Many existing versions of this perspective place 
insufficient emphasis on the internal preconditions of such external influences.
There is also evidence of generational change within Catholic politics during the 
1950s, with youthful radical party factions emerging into positions of some power. 
They advocated closer relations with Social Democrats, sometimes even moving from 
Catholic to Social Democratic organizations. By the mid 1950s the issue had 
provoked sharp conflict (particularly after a bishop’s 1954 mandate which forbade 
Catholics to listening to ‘social’ radio broadcasts see Cox 1993: 135). The existence 
of these factions indicates that social change was occurring. Moreover, such 
generational change might be regarded as a carrier of modernization.
In addition to maintaining the Red-Roman coalition, the new problem emerged of 
appeasing left factions within Catholicism. Increasingly welfare reform became an 
area in which legislative progress was possible, albeit on the basis of delicate 
negotiation. It became the common glue binding the coalition and the Catholic party 
itself (Cox 1993: 136; van Kersbergen 1995: 132). The last ‘Red-Roman’ coalition 
was negotiated in this atmosphere in 1956. Although the Catholics retained control of 
the Ministry of Social Work, the negotiations’ success depended on the replacement 
of the traditionalist Their, by the reformist Klompé, as Minister (Cox 1993: 136-137).
Once welfare reform began in earnest (with pensions in 1957) it seems to have 
contributed to declining pillar cohesiveness (and disciplinary capacity). If the state - 
not the pillar - provided social benefits, individual incentives to maintain the pillars 
declined - particularly as the new state system was very generous -as the Catholics 
insisted in the face of social democratic concern about potential costs. The acceptance 
of the state involvement social provision, revealed a latent expansionary potential 
within Catholicism (see Therbom 1989a: 212-213). The importance of providing 
benefits at levels adequate to support families, the idea that social provision should 
allow individuals to maintain their previous social status and an emphasis on moral 
rather than economic incentives to ensure that families provided for themselves all
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had expansive implications. In principle the earlier system had been financially open 
ended - limited only by its voluntary nature and discipline within the pillars.
Welfare reform was a precondition for the expansion of social spending. Reform may 
have contributed to an erosion of the social discipline associated with the pillars, itself 
causing some expansion. However, it was the interaction of new welfare provisions 
with other social and economic changes that resulted in dramatic social expenditure 
growth. The gradual weakening and eventual abandonment in 1964 of wage restraint 
policy was key. These changes led to a wage boom which caused employment 
rationalization in labour intensive industries (van Kersbergen 1995: 132) The social 
acceptability of rationalization depended on the new generosity of welfare which 
together caused costs to escalate rapidly. These changes began to occur in the 1960s 
alongside the erosion of religious observance and shortly before change began in 
female labour force participation.
The change in wage restraint policy itself requires some explanation. It suggests the 
public was increasingly demanding from the late 1950s onwards, which itself amounts 
to societal change and suggests that further such change was occurring (van 
Kersbergen 1995: 132). As with state welfare expansion, the breakdown of the wage 
restraint system is partly a story of social democratic resolve broken by Catholic 
populism. This ‘populism’ indicates that elite attitudes to social pressure had 
changes. It is usually explained as being a product of electoral competition (Cox 
1993: 135; van Kersbergen 1995: 133) which implies that electors are not pre­
committed to their ‘pillar’ party.
Overall, ‘depillarization’ is a complex tendential process (or set of interacting 
processes) which require explanation. It appeared as sudden set of social changes - a 
‘cultural landslide’ in which the ‘hard crust’ of the pillars broke up and ‘the religious 
grip of the population loosened dramatically’ (Therbom 1989a: 210). Changes in 
female labour force participation occurred after the completion of this complex 
change. Some evidence of changing employment opportunities for women emerged 
from detailed analysis of ‘depillarization’, while being partly disguised by the concept
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itself. For example, replacement of charitable volunteers by professional social 
workers provided women with new paid employment opportunities. Generally, 
however, changes in women’s labour market participation seem to have resulted from 
not contributed to the breakdown of the pillars.
The breakdown of the pillars II: continuity in female labour force 
participation
Even after 1974 the participation of Dutch women in the workforce remained 
comparatively low. Social policy helped to restrict it in two main ways. First, the 
form of social policy restricted the incentives for women to work and presented 
comparatively few employment opportunities for women. Secondly, growth in 
female labour force participation needs to be placed in the context of general Dutch 
labour market conditions, which were influenced by social policy. The reforms of the 
1950s and 60s facilitated dis-employment. More speculatively, the passivity of social 
policy may have prevented active labour market policy from emerging (van 
Kersbergen suggests that a connection exists 1995: 132, albeit assuming that such 
policies have a social - rather than Christian - democratic character). These factors 
may reflect the relative passivity of political leadership in consociational polities. The 
form of welfare provision may have reinforced the Dutch state’s bias towards 
passivity.
Although social policy changes indirectly contributed to female labour force 
participation growth the new forms of social policy also constrained that growth. 
Moreover the generosity of the new system did not necessarily make it a ‘social 
democratic welfare regime’ nor did it take the ‘social service’form of Swedish social 
policy. Dutch social democracy contributed to the re-orientation of Catholicism 
towards state welfare, but social policy is essentially transfer-based, reflecting 
Christian democratic priorities.
State welfare reflected and reinforced Christian democratic priorities on the family 
and gender roles as well. Indeed, as we have seen, these values had come to dominate 
social democracy as well. The pension legislation of 1957 reveals the profoundly
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sexist character of Dutch social policy. The legislation, which was introduced by a 
social democrat, was clearly based on a breadwinner model of the family. It gave 
married women no independent right to a pension, whether or not they had been 
employed. Instead, married men received a larger pension than single people. The 
policy was only changed in 1985 under pressure from the EEC (Sainsbury 1991: 86; 
van Kersbergen 1995: 131; Therbom 1989a: 216).
Other aspects of Dutch social policy were structured similarly. Married women were 
largely excluded from the extended unemployment benefits introduced in 1965. The 
main form of unemployment insurance provided benefits for only a 26 week period. 
1965 legislation gave rights to benefits above basic assistance level for a two year 
period. Unless a women was the family breadwinner, she was ineligible for this 
benefit. Only in 1987 was this legislation changed (Sainsbury 1993: 83). The 
exclusion of married women from a number of benefits would not, of course, directly 
bar women from participating in the labour force. Such exclusions limit the 
incentives to work (married women do not qualify these additional benefits). 
Housewives were sometimes explicitly covered by pension and disability 
programmes, although women could not directly or individually claim some of them.
A family could qualify them on the basis of the housewife’s eligibility (Cox 1993: 
166).
Generally low levels of employment provided the context for low female labour force 
participation levels. Male labour force participation shrank while female participation 
grew. Dutch politics had long been characterised by some ambivalence towards 
formal employment (Therbom 1989a: 234). Even during the 1960s and certainly in 
the 1970s it became a low employment state (Therbom 1986; 1989a). The 
combination of the ending of wage restraint with welfare reform led to the shedding of 
employment in labour intensive industries and provoking rapid social policy cost 
increases. Initially, it seems that politicians did not intend to use social policy in this 
way. Subsequently, however, social policy appears to have been part of a dis­
employment strategy. The role of disability programmes is particularly striking. They 
grew dramatically during the late 1960s and 1970s (by more than 100,000
210
beneficiaries in 1975-6). Employers used them to shed workers after the oil crisis. 
Other benefits, including special assistance programmes for artists (which helped to 
fund Dutch counter-culture), kept some young people off the job market. In this 
context, low female labour force participation levels are unsurprising (see Therbom 
1989a: 234 on dis-employment strategies and 232 on growth in numbers of disability 
claimants; Cox 1993: 154, and 166-167 on artists benefits).
Gradually social policy and dis-employment became locked together, with welfare 
policy used to reduce labour force participation. The commitment of politicians and 
resources to this approach meant that alternative, more active uses of social and labour 
market policy, such as those followed in Sweden and Germany featured little on the 
political agenda. The form taken by Dutch social policy seems to have reflected and 
reinforced the passive nature of the Dutch state. Elite consociationalism contributed to 
immobilism in political decision-making (see Therbom 1986: 153-155 and 1989).
The expansion of Dutch social policy did not provide large numbers of welfare jobs, a 
source of employment for women in some other states. This does not make the state 
responsible for low levels of female labour force participation, unless that Dutch 
social policy could have taken another, more service-oriented, form. The 
acceptability of this sort of argument depends upon the identification of a point in 
history at which it an altemative path might have been taken (Elster 1978; 1983). It is 
not clear that such a point can be identified. More modestly, the transfer from of state 
welfare can help to account for differences between the Netherlands and other 
countries.
6.5 Conclusions: implications for welfare state theory
Overall, social policy was intimately involved in the processes by which the ‘hard 
cmsf of the Dutch pillars broke down. The breakdown of the pillars was the main 
prerequisite for an increase in the rate of female labour force participation. Social 
policy had an important but indirect impact on changes in the pattem of female labour 
force participation. More strikingly, however, these changes took place late and left 
female labour force participation at a comparatively low level. Despite dramatic and
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rapid social change, gender roles in employment seem to have changed little and 
slowly in Holland. Social policy features in the explanation of this phenomenon in 
two ways. First, Dutch social policy is strikingly sexist, even in international 
comparison. As such it has not provided incentives for women to work. Secondly, 
rather than promoting work, as the social policies of some other states have done, 
Dutch state welfare has become a tool for restricting and rationing employment. In 
addition, the scale of Dutch social policy has meant that it used up resources which 
might otherwise have been devoted to other projects. It seems to have reflected and 
bolstered a general passivity in the Dutch state. Finally, the transfer rather than 
service orientation of Dutch social policy is associated with low levels of public 
employment.
Dutch social policy is implicated in restricting, not promoting female labour force 
participation. An extremely generous and expensive pattem of social policy emerged 
in the late 1950s and 1960s. The Netherlands is the only non-Scandinavian country 
which Esping-Andersen classified as a socialist welfare state regime (1990). In terms 
of its role in ‘dis-employment’ and the image of the family and the role of women 
inscribed within it Dutch social policy seems rather ‘conservative’.
Dutch experience contradicts important aspects of ‘modernization’ theory. Despite 
being a relatively wealthy Northern European nation, the Netherlands was a welfare 
laggard long into the post-war period. It then experienced a rapid growth of its 
‘welfare state’, unaccompanied by particularly rapid economic growth. Moreover, 
although female labour force participation seems to have grown after the ‘welfare 
explosion’ it remained at a low level compared to most other wealthy countries.
Social change in the Netherlands seems to have been significantly triggered by policy 
innovation, rather than the other way round. Those modernization theorists who grant 
a significant autonomy to ideas (perhaps emphasising non-deterministic variants of 
policy diffusion arguments) might draw most comfort from the Dutch experience. 
Ideas from outside the Netherlands, from the UK, Germany and especially the USA 
do seem to have had a particularly important influence on Dutch social institutions 
and policy making.
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Social democratic or power resources approaches do not seem to fare particularly 
well either. First, the Dutch developed a wide-ranging and expensive welfare state 
despite having comparatively weak Social Democratic party. Secondly, classifying 
the Netherlands as a ‘socialist’ welfare state regime is problematic given when the 
striking differences in the labour market position of women in Holland and 
Scandinavian and the contrast between transfer and service oriented systems.
However, the overall explanatory approach favoured by power resource analysts finds 
some support. First, patterns of partisan politics played an important role in the 
development of Dutch social policy - ‘politics mattered’ both structurally and in terms 
of political agency. Secondly, the precise character of the welfare regime seems to 
make a difference, perhaps even more than proponents of ‘power resource’ theory 
suggest. The approach is essentially concerned with the feedback effects of social 
provision on politics - which may be sensitive to variations in institutional form 
(notwithstanding attempts to suggest the contraiy see Pierson 1994: 28-29, compare 
with the more conciliatory comments made from a similar US institutionalist 
perspective by Skocpol and Amenta 1986: 151). These effects appear to play a major 
role in the shaping of women’s role in the Dutch workforce. Clearly, the Dutch case 
raises issues for both modernization and social democratic theories.
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Part Two: Theoretical analyses
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Chapter Seven: Women, Welfare and Modernization Theory
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7.1 An outline of the argument
The empirical evidence presented above tends to undermine ‘one path’ views of 
change in women’s participation in the formal, paid workforce. Emphasis on diverse 
national trajectories mirrors, and may reinforce, the conclusions of comparative 
political economists who emphasize several distinctive state-society configurations in 
the provision of welfare. In the light of these findings the theoretical underpinnings 
for the expectation of ‘one path’ change need to be considered particularly carefully. 
In this chapter, I consider the most important cluster of such analyses - theories of 
‘modernization’.
For the purposes of this analysis I treat ‘modernization’ inclusively, in two ways. 
First, the ‘logic of industrialism’ approach is included within the broad family of 
‘modernization’ theory {pace Hage, Hanneman and Gargan 1989; Flora and Alber 
1981 and see the discussion in Pierson 1991: 32). These analyses form the standard 
version of modernization theory and take a generally sociological form. These 
theories are open to a number of well known theoretical critiques (Barry 1970 is 
particularly biting on sociological theories of politics). Two seem particularly 
pertinent here. First, sociological theories of modernization tend to be oriented to the 
analysis of system stability rather than change. They analyze change in comparative 
static terms. Secondly, they emphasize social complexity - the ‘ multi dimensionality ’ 
of society - although they also resolve this complexity into a (functional) unity. The 
emphasis on complexity can give these accounts a rather descriptive quality. In 
addition to these difficulties, I show that these accounts do not analyze the 
relationship between ‘the family’ and ‘modem society’ adequately. The logic of their 
analyses leaves little room for the family.
The second dimension of inclusiveness is more controversial. I argue that putatively 
rational-choice or economic analysis of gender relations associated with the ‘Chicago 
School’ is a ‘modernization’ theory. The ‘Chicago School’ is sharply critical of 
sociological method. Its members make sweeping claims for micro-economic 
analysis. Although others have discerned an underlying functionalism in ‘Chicago 
School’ analyses (Field 1981; Field 1984; Elster 1985; Gordon 1984) my argument
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the ‘Chicago SchooF analysis of households and families can be treated as a 
modernization theory is a novel contribution.
The treatment of the ‘Chicago School’ gender analysis as a modernization theory sets 
up a critique of its conceptual foundations. Underlying the logic of the ‘Chicago 
School’ analysis is a distinctive notion of specialization. Individuals become 
increasingly specialized through the life long acquisition of ‘human capital’, which 
increases general well being by increasing efficiency and facilitating gains from trade. 
These patterns of specialization and human capital development amount to an 
analysis/description of ‘marketization’. Despite its claimed basis in sound 
microfoundations and deductive logic, the ‘Chicago’ analysis is grounded on casual 
empiricism which qualifies its underlying logic. Simple observation of households 
(and families) leads to an assumption that market and household sectors of activity 
exist, eaôh with sector specific human capital in which individuals can specialize. 
Once identified, this sectoral analysis (an ad hoc restriction of specialization) 
contrasts with the fastidious and logically consistent absence of the ‘sectoral’ 
categories (manufacturing, service and so on) in ‘Chicago’ analysis. Boh 
economic/rational-choice and standard sociological, modernization theories fail to 
account for the existence of households/families, or acknowledge that they represent a 
restriction to the general logic of ‘modem’ society.
Conventional sociological modernization theory and the ‘Chicago School’ share an 
underlying optimism about the transition from ‘traditional’ family forms and gender 
roles that is odd that no major new right rational choice analysis of changes in gender 
roles exists. Indeed, the fundamentalist religious and populist US new right is 
ambivalent about modernity, criticizing large corporations (particularly in cultural 
and entertainment industries) almost as roundly as government agencies. Modernity 
is viewed as pathological, compared to pre-modem or early modem ‘family 
capitalism’.
Although ‘modemization’ theory appears to fit poorly with the empirical evidence 
presented in earlier some valuable insights may be retrieved from it. First, the social 
democratic theories analyzed in the next chapter go further to acknowledge the
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variety of welfare state forms, or regimes, which may help to account for variations in 
female labour force participation. However, these theories tend to exaggerate the role 
of the welfare state in changes in female labour force participation. Although 
modemization accounts do not locate the welfare state precisely enough in the 
broader processes with which they are concerned (industrialization, extension of the 
market, urbanization, democratization and so on), they do contextualize it.
Secondly, modemization theory might help to explain differences in welfare 
provision between advanced industrial and other societies. In the case of welfare 
development, it may be that common pattems of modemization, and particularly of 
economic development, provide the necessary conditions for the emergence of 
welfare policies, but do not dictate the form they take (see Pierson 1991: 16-21 for 
an argument of this sort). State welfare policy development might be a general 
tendency, variable in form as well as extensiveness. Unless modemity is the final 
destination of social and political development the implications of variation in the 
form of state welfare for divergent changes after modemity remain important.
Just as some analysts argue that a widespread expansion in the role of government in 
welfare provision occurred between 1920 and 1975 (dates which correspond roughly 
to Pierson’s cross-national periodization of welfare state development, see 1991: 115- 
132; 1998: 111-128 and Alber 1988), changes in women’s roles are often understood 
as a general tendency in advanced industrial societies. The view that changes in 
gender roles are a general tendency in advanced industrial societies may be grounded 
partly on a lack of awareness of the variability in the position of women but it may 
also have more defensible roots. Particular configurations of welfare, and indeed 
broader state-economy configurations, may constrain, block or basically alter the 
general tendency in various ways, while others might channel it in diverse directions. 
It is worth emphasizing that my empirical focus is only on one aspect of women’s 
position. Some of the states which show little change in women’s labour market 
position show considerable change in other dimensions of gender relations. Despite 
little change in women’s participation in paid work, the female presence in the 
German legislature was transformed during the 1980s, largely under pressure from 
the Greens. Even if relatively little endogenous pressure for change has existed
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within a particular state, exogenous pressure and lesson-drawing (increasingly 
discussed under such headings as ‘globalization’, ‘internationalization’, ‘regulatory 
competition’ and ‘policy transfer’) make it unlikely that any state will remain wholly 
untouched by change in gender roles.
If cross-border diffusion processes are to be given a significant role, the changeability 
of ideas as they move should be emphasized (see Boyer 1997). This is likely to be 
true whether the ideas concern state policies or social roles. Thus the addition of 
insights from diffusion models to modemization theory to account for some cross­
national diversity within it, perhaps moving it in the direction of a recent debate about 
‘models of capitalism’ (Albert 1993; Crouch and Streeck 1997). This would 
represent a significant modification of the theory begging questions about how far the 
concepts of modemization and modemity should be stretched.
7.2 Scope and evolution of the modernization theory and its 
application to welfare state development
The purpose of this section is to assess modemization theories of welfare state 
development. Modemization theory can encompass the analysis of all states and 
societies. Identifying which parts are relevant to the present analysis is relatively 
difficult, a difficulty compounded by two arguments 1 make here. First, some work 
has been inappropriately included under the banner of ‘modernization theory of the 
welfare state’. Secondly, much ‘Chicago School’ work should be included within the 
scope of modemization theory (there are striking parallels between these accounts 
and the standard sociological theory of modemization). This treatment of the 
‘Chicago School’ is based on work which is not mainly concemed with the (welfare) 
state, instead focusing primarily on gender roles - the family and the household 
(Becker 1981; 1991). Nevertheless, this ‘rational-choice’ or ‘economic’ analysis does 
consider the (welfare) state. It is also located within a ‘Chicago School’ analysis of 
regulation and the state, which shares some of these features.
Putting the welfare state in its place?
Modemization theorists do not overplay the role of ‘the welfare state’. The theory 
goes some way towards contextualizing the welfare state within other social and
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economic processes. Thus the orientation of ‘all institutions ... in terms of social 
welfare aims’ and the potential transformation of ‘the ‘welfare state”  into “ welfare 
society” are subjected analysis (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 147), as is the impact 
of ‘the welfare state’ on ‘real welfare’ (Wilensky 1975). This contextualization could 
act as a corrective to the tendency, noted in the country studies, to overstate the role 
of welfare policy in the explanation of changes in gender roles.
Although the role of the ‘welfare state’ is not overemphasized in these accounts, 
neither is it identified clearly. Poor specification of the welfare state’s role is largely 
a product of modemization theory’s (implicit or explicit) functionalism. Rather than 
modernization being analyzed into its various elements, these elements are 
homogenized, or subsumed, within the overall approach and relationships between 
state welfare policy, economic growth and changes in gender roles remains 
un(der)specified. Modemization theories usually place economic developments near 
the centre of their causal accounts. They start from the position that both the 
development of the welfare state and general changes in gender roles are caused by 
economic factors. Moreover, together with the inclination to treat social change as a 
unity, emphasis on economic causes produces little explicit discussion of the 
interaction between the welfare state and gender roles. Even where modemization 
theorists do not privilege the economic, the overarching process concept of 
modemization tends to homogenize of diverse elements (Flora and Alber 1981), 
amounting to a functionalist ‘explanation’ of welfare state development.
Many texts treated as ‘classics’ in the welfare state literature deal with broader 
questions of social change rather than the welfare state (particularly Kerr 1960 and 
Bell 1988). Even when it is considered, interest in the welfare state per se is often 
superficial (with an early and important exception Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965). 
Analysts seem interested in the welfare state as a test case for more general theories 
(see Kerr 1960 and Wilensky 1975; 1976 who seems to be centrally concemed with 
the welfare state; as well as the discussion in Esping-Andersen 1990: 18). The 
exception is an important one. Wilensky and Lebeaux’s analysis of Industrial Society 
and Social Welfare (1965) pays considerable attention to the detail of welfare 
provision (in the USA). It also presents comparatively extensive analysis of changes
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in family organization and gender roles. I subject this text to particularly close 
scrutiny.
One consequence of the concern with broader social change is that the welfare state is 
mostly used as a dependent variable, rather than an independent one. Relatively little 
attention is paid to welfare policy feedback, which requires close attention to the 
specific forms taken by welfare (for a discussion see Pierson 1993; 1994 - the use of 
‘welfare’ as an independent variable is central to Esping-Andersen 1990). Even 
where welfare state ‘impacts’ are discussed - as in Wilensky’s work on ‘backlash’ 
and ‘real welfare’ - little interest was shown in the form of the welfare state. Instead, 
treating state welfare relatively monolithically, the analysis examines its aggregate 
impact, for example, on income distribution (Wilensky 1975).
The treatment of Bell’s The End o f Ideology in the welfare state literature is 
particularly odd. This work was intended to run against the current of the 
sociological mainstream. Bell was critical of academic sociology, decrying both 
formalism and quantification. Moreover, he explicitly eschews holism - closely 
related to the functionalism of much modemization theory - in favour of an explicitly 
partial approach, concemed with causality (1988: 413 - 414). In retrospect, his work 
may seem more typical, less idiosyncratic than he intended, perhaps serving as a 
waming of the difficulty of standing outside the ideas of the time. On the other hand, 
one is left with a sense that fewer analysts of the welfare state have read The End o f  
Ideology than have cited its rather striking title.
The ‘Chicago SchooT: methodological prescriptions 
By contrast with more sociological traditions, there is relatively little ‘general’ 
analysis o f ‘modemization’ from the Chicago School (but see Posner 1980/1988). 
Analysis of gender roles provides the context for analysis of the transition from 
traditional to modem societies. Sociological modemization is more concemed with 
the welfare state than with gender roles. ‘Chicago School’ welfare state analysis is 
largely a secondary product of analysis of gender. Although there is a ‘Chicago 
School’ tradition of state analysis, initially in terms of ‘regulation’ and ‘law’, 
subsequently more generally (see Stigler 1971/1988; Peltzman 1976/1988; Posner
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1971; Becker 1983; 1985/1988), little of it is directly concemed with the ‘welfare 
state’.
‘Chicago School’ analysts argue that rational choice or economic methods can 
explain all social phenomena (a position with which Becker himself is particularly 
closely associated). It claims to deduce clear and falsifiable claims from a few clearly 
stated assumptions. Parsimonious explanations are preferred to descriptive accuracy. 
In the words of a critic, for the ‘Chicago School’
‘...the ultimate task of microeconomic and game theory to 
provide a dynamic theory of the origin, persistence, and change 
of institutions, using a model that does not make appeal to ‘ad 
hoc’ exogenously specified rules or norms.’ (Field 1984: 683).
Becker's own contributions have mainly applied economic analysis to sociological or 
political issues (crime, the family and interest group behaviour). Those who adopt 
different methods have been criticized severely
... economists cannot resist the temptation to hide their own lack 
of understanding behind allegations of irrational behaviour, 
unnecessary ignorance, folly, ad hoc shifts in values, and the like, 
which is simply acknowledging defeat under the guise of 
considered judgm ent...
Naturally, what is tempting to economists nominally committed 
to the economic approach becomes irresistible to others without a 
commitment to the scientific study of sociology, psychology or 
anthropology. With an ingenuity worthy of admiration if put to 
better use, almost any conceivable behaviour is alleged to be 
dominated by ignorance and irrationality, values and their 
frequent unexplained shifts, custom and tradition, the compliance 
somehow induced by social norms or the ego and the id. (Becker 
1976:11;13)
Becker claims to have adhered consistently to a methodology grounded on three 
assumptions: 1) individuals engage in maximizing behaviour, 2) that markets exist, 
and 3) that individuals have stable preferences, which do not differ importantly 
between individuals (Becker 1976: 5; Becker 1981: xi - x; Becker 1991: x; but see his 
analysis of political preferences 1983; 1985 which is discussed below and criticized 
sharply in Dunleavy 1991: 102-103). The first claim is an uncontroversial statement
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of the basic assumption of rational choice theory; the other two require more 
attention.
The assumption that markets exist is difficult to evaluate. It could immediately 
undermine the claim not to appeal to social norms. The existence of markets might 
imply that a framework for exchange exists based on law or custom, preventing the 
emergence of a Hobbesian state of nature. Becker's own words are not terribly 
helpful
... the economic approach assumes the existence of markets that 
with varying degrees of efficiency coordinate the actions of 
different participants - individuals, firms, even nations - so that 
their behaviour becomes mutually consistent. (Becker 1976: 5) *
Moreover, in later formulations (which are specifically associated with gender 
analysis) assumptions about the existence o f markets become less clear. The 
conceptualization of other social arrangements as ‘implicit’ markets, guided by 
‘shadow’ prices, is introduced, although these terms are not clearly defined. Becker 
assumes that (implicit or explicit) markets are in equilibrium (Becker 1981: ix;
Becker 1991: x) - which may be similar to the claim that markets ‘coordinate ... 
actions ... so th a t... behaviour becomes mutually consistent’. A system which is in 
equilibrium can change only as a result of exogenous influences. It amounts to an 
assumption of system stability, especially when associated with the assumption of 
stable preferences.
The Chicago School position on preference stability is that the mainstream economic 
assumption that individual tastes or preferences are ‘given’ is insufficiently assertive. 
It has been associated with the modest notion that analysis of the formation of tastes 
or preferences should be left to psychologists or sociologists. For the ‘Chicago 
School’, preferences remain the same across individuals and over time. They refer to 
a small number of underlying ‘commodities’, which individual time and market 
goods combine to produce, rather than ‘market goods’ themselves. The production of 
these commodities involves skill (or human capital) which may be acquired. Activity
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specific human capital improves efficiency in that activity. People can acquire 
human capital in activities ranging from taking heroin, appreciating music, as well 
productive skills. If preferences are stable then individuals are fundamentally alike 
(presumably irrespective of gender, among other individual characteristics) and 
behavioural differences are largely environmental (although see Becker 1983: 393, 
and the discussion in Dunleavy 1991:102 -103, on the malleability of ‘political’ 
preferences).
Becker and the ‘Chicago School’ in general fail to live up to their own 
methodological standards - as I will show. They implicitly (and sometimes more or 
less explicitly) resort to functionalist explanations of long run change. Moreover, the 
analysis of the households, families and changes in women’s rate of participation in 
the formal workforce rely on ad hoc, exogenously specified factors.
Modernization theory: Parallels between sociological and ‘Chicago 
School’ variants
This analysis claims that sociological modemization theory and the ‘Chicago School’ 
share a great deal. As well as illustrating the parallels between them, my purpose is 
to criticize their reliance on functionalism. Both approaches structure their analyses 
around the distinction between traditional and modem societies. Each claims to 
explain change, but actually compares distinct ‘stages of development’ assuming that 
comparative static analyses explain the changes between ‘stages’. Both use 
‘specialization’ as a defining feature of ‘modem’ societies and as an explanation of 
change from traditional to modem, introducing a circular element into the analysis. 
Both approaches describe considerable societal complexity, but resolve this 
complexity into an underlying unity. This resolution is achieved by a reliance on 
functionalism.
The ‘traditional ' and ‘modern ' society distinction is a defining feature of 
modemization theory, albeit often implicitly. Key works by Wilensky and Lebeaux 
and Becker use it explicitly, although its full significance is not acknowledged. It
'The questionable acceptability of claims about the capacity of collective actors, especially nations, but 
also firms, in a methodologically individualist account is worth noting.
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provides a fundamental tool structuring the analyses of social change. The basic 
contrast between traditional and modem societies is closely related to distinctions 
between status and contract, community and society and mechanical and organic 
solidarity. Sometimes modem society is associated with industrial society and the 
factory system, at others it is associated with ‘the market’ having a wide scope. All 
of these theories see ‘traditional’ societies as being based on familialism (the 
extended family is the most important social and economic unit) while in ‘modem’ 
societies economic activity is mainly in the market, factory and state.
The dominant image of modemization in the welfare state literature centres on 
industrialization and economic development. In its most influential versions it 
privileges economic explanatory factors (especially Wilensky 1975; 1976 - ultimately 
economic may be subordinate to technological change - ‘good procedure is first to 
assume that changes in technology are more basic, more causal, than other social 
changes, and then to look for exceptions and specify conditions’ Wilensky and 
Lebeaux 1965: 343 and passim 337 - 351). The emphasis on economic development 
as an explanation of welfare state development or changes in gender roles is shared 
by sociological and economic modemization theories. For all that rational-choice 
modernizers emphasize (micro)economic method, the basic substantive explanations 
appealed to are economic as well (Becker 1981; 1991).
There is some debate within sociological modemization theory on the place of 
economic explanations. Several analysts suggest that the multi-dimensional quality of 
modemization should be emphasized, even at the expense of greater ambiguity (see 
Flora and Alber 1981: 36-37 - see also the discussion in Pierson 1991: 32). The 
proposal seems to be that ‘the logic of industrialism’ should be distinguished from 
modemization. The operationalization of modemization by measures of GNP has 
been particularly severely criticized (Hage, Hanneman and Gargan 1989). There is 
considerable validity in these arguments, but they should not be pushed too far.
First, even critics of the ‘logic of industrialism’ treat non-economic explanations in a 
rather undifferentiated way - appealing to general and common processes of 
democratization. Secondly, Wilensky’s position - the main target for these criticisms
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- should be considered in more detail. He uses both the ‘logic of industrialism’ and 
‘modernization’ concepts, although he makes more use of the former one (see 
Wilensky 1975: 47; 114). Especially in his early work he was clearly concerned with 
a complex and multi-dimensional conception of ‘urban-industrial’ society, developed 
within a broadly Parsonian framework (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 33, 63, 69; 
work which he continued to cite favourably Wilensky 1975: 15). He argues that 
''modern industry and its major effects come wrapped in an all-or-nothing package’ 
(Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 348), emphasizing both the economic determination, 
and the complex unity of modernity. Finally, Wilensky sometimes appears concerned 
to disparage the impact of social democracy (particularly the claim that it could result 
in divergent public policy patterns) rather than political explanations as a whole (see 
the discussion of the functional equivalence of Christian and social democracy in 
Wilensky 1981).
Comparative Statics
Modernization theories generally present comparative static rather than dynamic 
analyses, although they claim to present accounts of moàçmization - a process of 
change. The change between forms of society is inferred by contrasting 
characteristics of each form. Apparent explanations of change from traditional to 
modem society often evaporate on investigation. The explanation turns out to be 
embedded in the theory’s (acknowledged or unrecognized) premises. This criticism 
of sociological accounts of political phenomena is well established (Barry 1970). It is 
more surprising to find that the supposedly rational-choice ‘Chicago School’ also 
commits these explanatory misdemeanours (Becker 1981; 1991).
The strategy of contrasting various states, or even stages of change is nicely 
demonstrated in Wilensky and Lebeaux’s (1965) relatively neglected analysis o f ‘the 
welfare state’. Particularly in the first part of the book, descriptions of early with late 
stages of a given process (such as industrialization or urbanization) are contrasted as 
are optimistic with pessimistic interpretations of each process. They attempt to apply 
a Parsonian (variant of the) contrast between traditional and modem societies to 
social change (a difficult issue for stmctural-functionalism given its heavy emphasis
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on system maintenance). They contrast stages in a process of change giving an 
impression of dynamic analysis.
The Wilensky and Lebeaux analysis of industrialization is found in consecutive 
chapters on 1) the early and 2) the later impact of industrialization on society. It 
finesses the problem of how industrialization began. Essentially they associate critical 
evaluations of industrialism (and urbanism) with the earlier stages of these processes. 
Thus the ‘early’ chapter concludes with sections on Initial Polarization of Social 
Classes and Early Labor Protest (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 84 - 89), which detail 
difficulties experienced during early industrialization. Even this early period is not 
characterized as wholly negative. Positive elements of the early experience are built 
upon in the next chapter. It suggests that more mature interpretation of industrial 
society becomes possible.^
A quote from the final section of the last chapter of the first part of the book, 
appropriately entitled ‘Appraising the Indictment’ serves to illustrate the general 
approach.
The central theme running through our picture of urban-industrial 
America is this: We can perhaps view most of the targets of 
complaint as transitional, passing results of industrialization 
under nineteenth century conditions. Coercive recruitment and 
painful transformation of peasant immigrants into urban- 
industrial workers; the insecurities of the factory system, the 
uncushioned impact of the dilution and obsolescence of skills; the 
dehumanization of work (whether through backbreaking labor or 
machine-paced, repetitive routine); class polarization; community 
disintegration — these decline as economic growth continues. A 
new welfare bureaucratic society emerges - more stable than its 
early forms suggest, richer and more varied than men had 
dreamed when they observed the harsh initial development. 
(Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 132-133)
The entwining of normative and positive elements in this analysis should be stressed. 
As values play a central role as a method of system maintenance in structural- 
functional theory, extensive discussion of norms is not surprising. A society which
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cannot reproduce the value system which supports it is likely to change. Again, it is 
unsurprising that the early negatively valued phase of industrialization is seen as 
unstable, while the later phase is positive and stable. However, the analysis is 
sufficiently ‘flexible’ to allow the reassertion of ‘pessimistic trends’ within mature 
industrial societies to be envisioned (see, for example Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 
110-114).
Characteristically, rich description of the contrasting characteristics of early and late 
stages on industrialization is provided. Modem societies are characterized by much 
smaller families and households, and by a much greater scope for formal market 
activities. In other words modem societies are defined as being made up of 
household and market sectors. The insurance and education functions of extended 
families and large households in traditional societies have been taken over by markets 
and the state. However, hints are given about underlying causes of these changes. 
Specialization is the most important causal mechanism mentioned, although even this 
concept is used almost as much to characterize later industrial society, rather than as a 
cause of changes in society (see, for example Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965 : 90 - 106).
The economic or rational-choice variant of modemization theory also analyses the 
characteristics of traditional and modem societies in comparative static terms (see 
Becker 1981: 237 - 244, 1991: 342 - 349). Mirroring ‘sociological’ descriptions of 
‘modernization’, the traditonal-modem distinction structures key passages which 
purport to explain changes in gender roles. As a consequence an exercise in 
comparative statics takes the place of a dynamic account, despite the claim to explain 
an ‘evolution’. The ‘Chicago School’ shares the generally positive normative 
evaluation of ‘modemity’ shovm by the sociological analysts. With some 
justification, economic analysis of politics and society has often been associated with 
‘neo-conservativism’ or the ‘New Right’. While this association may have been true 
within the ‘Chicago School’ at one time, it seems no longer to hold, despite some 
claims to the contrary (Winegarden 1988; Becker 1981; 1983; 1985/1988; 1991; 
Peltzman 1976; 1989; Posner 1980/1988).
^The same approach is adopted in the analysis o f cities and the process of urbanization. Hostile 
interpretations of urban life are associated with the early stages o f urbanization, the later stages o f the 
process overcome early problems and result in a stable, sustainable modem society.
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No clear discussion of the breakdown of traditional societies is undertaken - the 
implication is that modem society replaced traditional societies because of its 
economic efficiency - a view which is supported by the ‘evidence’ that a ‘very small 
proportion of the world’s population ... lives in primitive societies today’ (Posner 
1988: 206). It seems that advanced societies are successful because they are efficient, 
and we know that they are efficient because they are successful. More generally, the 
same factors are described as characteristics of modem society and causes of the 
change from traditional society, introducing further elements of circularity. The role 
ascribed to the (welfare) state is typical. It is described as a feature of modem 
society, but also treated as a cause of modemization, a factor undermining traditional 
society. The ‘Chicago School’ has moved towards viewing politics and government 
in modem societies as broadly ‘efficient’ (see Becker 1983; 1985/1988 Peltzman 
1976; 1980/1988; 1989).
Specialization
Specialization is attributed a central role in modemization theory. It appears as a 
cause of change between traditional and modem societies and as a characteristic of 
modemity. On some readings ‘specialization’ plays the central role in each approach. 
‘Specialization’ appears to describe a process, but is used primarily statically, to 
describe the diversity of roles within modem society. In both approaches 
specialization means that small differences in ‘initial’ abilities or endowments can 
account for large differences in ‘roles’ (see Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 64; Becker 
1981: 14-37; 1991 : especially 4, but also 54 - 79). Specialization does retain some 
processual connotations. It is also associated with efficiency and closely related to 
the conception of the market (making it difficult to present either as the cause of the 
other) in both perspectives (compare Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 249 with Becker 
1981: 190-191).
The ‘Chicago School’ analysis of specialization reverses the conventional economic 
analysis that differences in factor endowments explain specialization, which captures 
comparative advantages. Instead, comparative advantage is produced by specialized 
(human and other) capital investments. This view dovetails with the ‘Chicago’ view
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of preferences - individuals are initially similar, later differentiated by human capital 
investment (Stigler and Becker 1977). More trade seems to occur between countries 
with similar, than between those with vastly different, factor endowments (see Becker 
1981: 20 - 21). Although the ‘Chicago School’ analysis of gender issues seems to be 
based on specialization, it is actually founded on an untheorized, ad hoc restriction on 
the logic of specialization.
Functionalism
The use of functionalist arguments to resolve the appearance of complexity into an 
underlying unity is a further feature of both sociological and ‘economic’ theories. 
Urbanization, the growth of government, the development of secondary and tertiary 
sectors of the economy other factors are resolved into the underlying concept of 
industrial society. ‘Sociological’ modemization does this most clearly - often 
appearing to dispense with clear accounts of causality. Despite their commitment to 
parsimonious explanation, putatively economic analysts of gender present distinct 
economic explanations and introduce a significant role for the (welfare) state in 
accounting for changes in gender roles. Questions are begged about the relationship 
of the state to other areas of human activity (especially about how state activities 
complicate the attainment of general equilibrium).
The tradition of sociological modemization theory is largely explicitly (stmctural) 
functionalist in method, drawing heavily on Parsonian sociology. Their 
functionalism (apparently) resolves complexity into underlying unity. The 
comparative static and functionalist characteristics of these theories may be 
connected. If functionalism is concerned with social stability, it is predisposed to 
present accounts of distinct, relatively stable historical epochs. It is not well equipped 
to account for a basic shift between forms of social organization.
It is more surprising that ‘economic’ analysts of gender roles fall into functionalism, 
given their aggressive hostility to non-economic reasoning. ‘Chicago School’ 
analysts end up roundly contradicting their own theoretical strictures in their analyses 
of long-mn change - particularly in Becker’s account o f gender relations, and state 
analysis. The implicit functionalism of this analysis (and in North 1981) has been
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noted before (see Field 1981; 1984; Gordon 1984; Elster 1985: 241). It may be a 
consequence of attempting to explain large scale social change within a micro- 
economic framework.
Becker discusses a series of factors which influence the change from traditional to 
modem society, most of which are also presented as characteristics of ‘modem 
societies’, although the relationships them are rarely explored explicitly. Modem 
society is presented as complex. This presentation of connected elements of 
modemity, without a clear explanation of the causes o f their emergence, means that 
Becker does not live up to his own standards of parsimonious explanation, leaving a 
legacy of confusion and ambiguity. Moreover, a suggestion of functionalism may 
creep into the analysis. Becker has some difficulty in distinguishing the impact of the 
increasing scope of the market from that of the (welfare) state. The market operates 
in tandem with ‘other organizations of modem societies’ including the state (Becker 
1981: 244 - he discusses the education system and various forms of insurance - both 
market and state 1981: 252-253).
Hints from the Treatise’s first edition about the relationship between the state and the 
family were developed in the 1991 edition, showing that the reading of Becker which 
stresses pathological public policy impacts is mistaken. Instead Becker
...believe[s] that a surprising number of state interventions mimic 
the agreements that would occur if children were capable of 
arranging for their own care. Stated differently, our belief is that 
many regulations of the family improve the efficiency of family 
activities. ...
The efficiency perspective implies that the state is concemed with 
justice for children, if ‘justice’ is identified with the well-being of 
children .... The efficiency perspective does not imply, however, 
that the effect on children alone determines whether the state 
intervenes. The effect on parents is considered too. The state 
tends to intervene when both gain, or when the gain to children 
exceeds the loss to their parents. (Becker 1991: 363)
As well as disclosing a value position not normally associated with the economic 
perspective these statements violate basic principles of rational choice analysis. 
Motivations are attributed to an abstract entity (or at best a collective actor) -  the state
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is ‘concerned with justice’. It also trades the interests of parents off against their 
children. Becker partially acknowledges this change in tone, being at pains to point 
out that he
... cannot prove that efficiency guides state involvement in the 
family. But [I] will show that state interventions in the market 
for schooling, the provision of old-age pensions, and access to 
divorce are consistent on the whole with the efficiency 
perspective. (Becker 1991: 363)
Becker appears ambivalent here, perhaps reluctant to embrace fully a functionalist 
approach to the state and the family. He does suggest interest group activity might 
influence state policy, perhaps implying that they provide the mechanism by which 
individual interests result in collective justice. Some of his other work embodies the 
claim that the activities of interest groups do provide a sufficient explanation of the 
efficiency of public policy (Becker, 1983; Becker 1985; see also Peltzman 1989, for a 
strong claim about Becker's achievement in reconciling the activities of government 
with the efficiency perspective). However, Becker’s discussion of interest groups in 
relation to state-family interactions does not follow his general analysis of interest 
groups. Even his general position is somewhat panglossian, embodying assumptions 
of perfect information, frictionless adjustment and so on (Becker 1983; 1985). In 
addition, his analysis of the state and family assumes that the interests of children too 
young to vote or participate politically (perhaps even of future - i.e. unborn - 
generations) are somehow taken into account by interest groups and in public policy 
making. Becker's own acknowledgment of the absence of proof that justice guides 
‘family’ policy the conclusion that he not provided a positive economic explanation 
difficult to resist (Becker 1991: 362-379). It amounts to ‘acknowledging defeat’ 
although perhaps without ‘the guise of considered judgment. ’ (Becker 1976: 12)
The introduction of the state complicates the analysis of the substantive causes of 
modemization. Becker asserts that economic growth should be regarded as the 
primary causal influence on the transition from traditional to modem society (and the 
evolution of the family). However a second, political, causal influence is also 
offered, without making clear its relationship economic causes. They appear to have 
parallel, perhaps mutually, re-enforcing impacts. When read together with the hints
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of functionalism in the analysis of the state, this image removes Becker’s account of 
modem society from the parsimony usually associated with rational-choice (although 
it does not match the complex descriptiveness of stmctural-functionalism).
The ‘Chicago’ analysis implies that the state takes on responsibilities which the 
family used to fulfill. Although the tone of Becker's discussion is overwhelmingly 
optimistic, state interventions could be easily re-cast into a more ‘pessimistic’ 
discourse of undermining the family. Oddly Becker does not consider the incentive 
implications of his argument that the state is functionally equivalent to an ideal, but 
non-existent, family. We are left questioning what makes families cohere when the 
state takes on services which (some) families would otherwise provide. Becker’s 
optimism may have been based on his inaccurate belief that he had developed a cast 
iron explanation of the existence of the household/family.
I have set out the broad scope and evolution of modemization theory welfare state 
analyses. The welfare state is one part of ‘modernization’, but the theory fails to 
specify the particular contributions of various components of modemization, instead 
treating them as a complex unity. Particular attention has been paid to similarities 
between ‘sociological modemization’ and the ‘Chicago School’. The analysis has 
established the legitimacy of treating the ‘Chicago School’ as a variant of 
‘modemization theory’, showing that it fails use its own methods consistently.
My analytic strategy has been to consider the Chicago School and sociological 
modemization theories together, in order to draw attention to their underlying 
similarities. As a consequence, I may have concentrated on economistic and 
deterministic variants of modemization theory at the expense of its more open and 
multidimensional forms. For example, some theorists consider the manner in which 
‘modemity’ diffused across political and cultural borders (compare Wilensky 1975; 
Wilensky, Luebbert, Hahn and Jamieson 1985 with Flora and Alber 1981, see also the 
discussion in Pierson 1991; and for a good discussion of ‘diffusion’ see Boyer 1997).
I do not think that this risk is especially severe for two reasons. First, at least when 
applied to the welfare state, even the more flexible versions of modemization theory 
deploy an explanation which is essentially organized around a unified concept of
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‘modernization’, without paying a great deal of attention to the nature of that concept. 
Secondly, I believe that the most influential versions of the modemization approach 
are those associated with Wilensky. Particularly from the mid 1970s onwards his 
work on the welfare state is marked by a deep conviction that welfare differences 
were of relatively little significance.
7.3 The analysis of gender in modernization theories
If it occurs at all, analysis of gender in modemization theories of welfare state 
development generally takes the form of discussion of family and household 
organization. Many modemization analyses of welfare state development hardly 
consider gender roles or family organization (see Wilensky 1975; 1976; 1981). Other 
modemization analyses which have been influential in the comparative welfare state 
literature (despite their marginal concem with state welfare) often consider gender 
issues only briefly. By contrast the ‘economic’ or ‘rational choice’ variant of 
modemization theory is primarily concemed with household and family organization, 
with welfare state analysis a secondary product of this concem. Despite the limited 
attention paid to gender issues, distinctive forms of family and household 
organization are a (perhaps the) defining feature of traditional and modem societies. 
Kerr describes the family in modem industrial society in terms which are generally 
echoed by (both sociological and ‘rational choice’) modemization theorists:
There is no place for the extended family in the industrial society; it is 
on balance an impediment to requisite mobility. The primary family 
constitutes a larger and more mobile labor force. The function of the 
family under industrialism is constricted: it engages in very little 
production; it provides little, if any, formal education and 
occupational training; the family business is substantially displaced by 
professional management. (Kerr 1960: 35-36)
However, the logic of this analysis raises questions about the sustainability of 
households and families under the pressures of modemization and modemity. In both 
sociological and rational-choice versions of the theory (but particularly the latter) the 
existence of the family/household is ‘protected’ by an ad hoc retreat from the general 
logic of the analysis.
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Sociological Modemization Theory
Where gender roles are considered in more detail, the account follows similar lines to 
general modemization analyses - different stages of modemization are compared 
descriptively and normatively. Thus, when Wilensky and Lebeaux raise gender roles 
in the discussion of ‘The Early Impact of Industrialization’ two interpretations of 
changes in gender roles are discussed. The first suggests a pessimistic view of the 
conventional family’s future. ‘[Tjhe family is disappearing’ and ‘The decay of the 
family, our most important primary group, heralds the further decay of civilization 
itself’ The second acknowledges change in gender roles and the shifting of functions 
previously fulfilled by the family to other social institutions, but suggests that ‘the 
family is simply changing its organization, and will emerge strengthened, better 
adapted to a democratic society.’ Characteristically, Wilensky and Lebeaux argue 
that these positions stem from ‘different value premises’ but ‘[b]oth ... are correct in 
their facts’ (1965: 67 - 68).
Wilensky and Lebeaux argue economic development and industrialization processes 
cause changes in family organization. The ‘traditional’ family and modem industry 
are ‘mutually subversive’; modem industry ‘must force the breakup of the 
economically self-sufficient extended family’ (1965: 68). The generalization of the 
factory system (an aspect of industrialization) is specifically mentioned as a cause of 
changes in ‘the family’. The statement that ‘[t]he factory system creates a family 
system which best fits its needs ...’ has a flavour of functionalism, but this 
explanation is better fleshed out than many. The factory system ‘requires’ that 1) 
large numbers of workers are 2) mobile and 3) highly motivated (Wilensky and 
Lebeaux 1965: 81).^ This explanation is easily translated into one with more 
acceptable ‘microfoundations’. Factory employment provides strong incentives for 
people to move in order to work. By implication, mobile workers cannot maintain 
‘traditional’, i.e. multi-generation, households. Thus the degeneration of larger 
households begins.
In addition, industrialization directly lowers the value of children. ‘[T]he shift from 
self-sufficient agriculture to the factory system makes children less valuable
hn a section entitled Variations in the American Family System. See also pages 72 - 3.
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economically’ (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 71). Children change from being an 
economic asset into a drain on family resources. This change results from 
specialization, which increases the costs of educating children. Although we have 
seen that Wilensky and Lebeaux do not use specialization wholly as an external cause 
of changes in modem societies, it is cited as a specific cause of alterations to family 
patterns (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 71). Large family size acts as an encumbrance 
on both parents and children in the struggle for ‘status’ (a necessary corollary of 
industrialism although one perhaps intensified by ‘the culture of capitalism’). This 
provides a second way in which economic development alters family structures, 
lowers the requirement for domestic work, and therefore embodies and facilitates 
changes in gender roles. As the economic value of children falls, parents become 
willing ‘to limit family size by using rational birth control’ (Wilensky and Lebeaux 
1965: 71)."
Sociological modemization theory addresses the question of the limits of this erosion 
(what is left of the family) inadequately. The image of the ‘modem’ family is based 
on the experience of middle class suburban families (Wilensky and Lebeaux: 1965: 
125). The extended family is replaced by a tight knit nuclear family in which
[mjarriage is idealized as a total intimacy. The belief is strong 
that romance should play a part in courtship and people should 
marry for love.
The system also favours equal rights and obligations for the 
parties in a marriage. Since love cannot be forced, the contract 
is voluntary and each side is supposed to be a frilly responsible 
partner. (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 70)
The normative evaluation of changes in gender roles is more ambivalent than the 
discussion of other facets of modemization which are ultimately exonerated. 
Negative descriptions of changes in gender roles continue far into the text (Wilensky 
and Lebeaux 1965: 73-79) - positive aspects of gender role change occurs after other 
aspects of modemization have been categorized as beneficial. The evaluation 
remains equivocal, witness
 ^Notice that the technology of birth control plays a secondary role here. A change in values makes use 
o f an advance in technology, rather than a change in contraceptive technology causing a change in 
values, reversing the general causal pattern assumed by Wilensky and Lebeaux (1965: 343).
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...there are reasons to believe that mature industrialization will in 
itself bring new patterns of family life, and perhaps reverse the 
long-term trend towards family instability’
and
another group of recent studies point to the emergence of new, 
perhaps more stable patterns of family life (Wilensky and 
Lebeaux 1965: 128, 125; emphases added).
Thus the normative attachment to the ‘traditional’ seems stronger in discussion of the 
family than elsewhere. It colours the categorization of caring for children, cooking, 
washing dishes and decorating the home as feminine leisure activities, rather than 
work (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 196 - they do sometimes consider the drudgery 
of housework: 68). Elsewhere Wilensky explicitly considers the limits to changes in 
gender roles. Although contradicting his general emphasis on technological and 
economic factors, he states that gender ‘norms’ are likely to block some changes in 
gender relations. Women’s ambivalence about such changes means that they will not 
carry through a feminist ‘revolution’ in the family (Wilensky 1968: 239-243). As 
well as ruling out the possibility of ‘fundamental’ change, this essentialization of 
norms about gender leaves very little room for cross-national variation or for 
consideration of the extent to which changes in women’s consciousness diffuse across 
space.
The ‘Chicago School’
‘Rational-choice’ modemization theory based the distinction between traditional and 
modem societies on differences in characteristic household/family form. Traditional 
society is depicted as organized around households/families, while modem society is 
differentiated into markets and households. In effect, ‘modem society’ is defined as a 
society divided into public and private - market and household - ‘sectors’. ‘Chicago 
School’ claims is to provide an economic analysis of the existence of households and 
families. On closer investigation this claim is cannot be sustained.
In their evaluation of changes in the family ‘rational-choice’ are more whole­
heartedly positive than sociological modemization theorists. Becker refuses to
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deplore the passing of traditional family forms (Becker 1981: 244). Nevertheless, a 
certain ambivalence about the future of the family remains. The analysis of family 
evolution is based on comparative static analysis of traditional and modem society, 
but modem society is not the end of the story. Whether they amount to a refinement 
o f modemity, or a change beyond it, developments in the latter half of the twentieth 
century are treated separately (Becker 1981: 245; 1991: 350). The account of 
developments ‘after modemity’ sometimes seems to suggest that the ‘modem’ 
nuclear family itself might be under threat.
The assumption that households exist is embedded in the notion that the market and 
the household are two distinct sectors. However, Becker does not demonstrate why 
two - household and market - sectors exist. One way to illustrate this point is to 
consider the nature of these two ‘sectors’. The market can be understood as a single 
sector only by contrast with the household sector. Within the market individuals gain 
by specializing - indeed Becker’s concept of the market is very close to his notion of 
specialization. By contrast, the household sector is one in which individuals are 
conceived of a ‘specializing’ in a myriad of specific tasks. Rather than deducing the 
existence of households from clearly stated first principles, Becker asserts, seemingly 
by a casual empiricism, that they do exist. He then considers how households might 
be reconciled with rational-choice principles, inventing a distinction between 
household and market sectors of the economy and, wrongly, assuming that 
specialization between these two sectors follows the same logic as specialization 
within the market.
TjThousehold and market sectors exist then Becker can show that all, or almost all, 
members of a rational household will be specialized in one sector or the other. 
Whatever the circumstances no more than one household member would work in both 
sectors. Consideration of the acquisition of human capital suggests that this division 
of labour would not be flexible. Individuals would become more and more expert in 
the activities of their sector, and therefore able to command a higher and higher 
‘price’ within it, increasing the gains from trade. However, if the logic of market 
specialization holds good as an explanation of changes in gender roles then there is no
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obvious reason to expect the household sector to survive/ Once the fallacious nature 
of this conceptual distinction is exposed, the structure of Becker’s analysis is 
undermined.
Becker's conception of ‘commodities’ plays an important part in the account of the 
existence of households. It suggests that consumption is much more active than the 
traditional theory assumed. Market goods need to be ‘processed’ in order to be 
consumed, at the very least requiring some of the consumer's time. Much household 
activity is construed as the (necessary) production of commodities out of market 
goods using the time of the household worker. The theory of the division of labour 
between household and market activities is based on the idea that a core of 
‘household’ work producing commodities from market goods is unavoidable.
However, there is no principled reason why (most of) this work could not be carried 
about by specialized agents in an explicit market^ implying that households need not 
exist. If Becker’s dynamic notion of the specialization is applied, there would be a 
pressure for greater and greater specialization. It is difficult to see how the myriad of 
tasks evoked by the expression ‘household work’ could resist the logic of 
specialization transforming them into explicitly priced market activities. Indeed, this 
is the logic of Becker’s own view of the change from traditional to modem society. 
The possibility that household activities might merge into explicitly marketed 
activities must be entertained. This possibility (which might be called the 
‘Manhattanization’ of society) would mean that no group of activities could be 
considered as a ‘household sector’. All cleaning could be done by specialized 
market cleaners, cooking undertaken by restaurants, take aways, or be ‘pre’prepared
 ^In the second edition o f the Treatise Becker presents what is effectively an analysis o f the limits to 
specialisation in the family. They are based on the inability o f children to make effective contracts. 
Becker ends up arguing that the state steps in to correct for these inefficiencies see 1991: 362 - 379).
 ^There is probably a residual amount o f effort which is unlikely to be put out to tender. Even a 
MacDonald's hamburger, or a meal cooked by another member o f a household, requires time and effort 
to consume, time and effort which is difficult logically to distinguish from household work (or from 
leisure activities). However Becker subsequently argues that the logic o f specialisation implies that at 
most one member of any household would work in both the market and household sectors. Although 
he does not actually state it, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that some individuals in these 
households do actually specialise completely in market activities, in other words they do absolutely no 
household work. Clearly Becker is prepared to ignore the residual effort which any individual must 
put in to consumption, or at least he is prepared not to classify it as "household" work.
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to be reheated in a microwave and so on - a possibility that Becker does not seem to 
have grasped fully.
In other words, the analysis represents a limitation o f the logic of specialization, 
based on a casual empiricism rather than a deductive model. The households sector 
constitutes an ad hoc assumption of the sort he deplores in the work of others. The 
endurance of the nuclear family is an assumption o f his theory, rather than something 
demonstrated by it. The failure to provide microfoundations for the notion of the 
household sector has ramifications for other aspects of Becker’s work. Although 
Becker himself does not conceive of it in this way, he seems to search for other 
foundations for the existence of the household sector. Two that seem to lie behind his 
work are arguments from biological difference and from history.
Biological/sex differences
Biological or sex differences are used relatively little in sociological modemization 
theories, which tend to concentrate on norms. There is an ambivalence about 
biological or sex differences in Becker’s analysis. Thus, on the one hand he states 
that
...biological differences in comparative advantage between the 
sexes explain not only why households typically have both sexes, 
but also why women have usually spent their time bearing and 
rearing children and engaging in other household activities, 
whereas men have spent their time in market activities. (Becker 
1981:23)
On the other hand in the first edition of the Treatise he stated that biological or sex 
differences were not particularly important (Becker 1981: x). Forcefully reiterating 
this view in the expanded edition, he nevertheless acknowledges that he
‘ evidently conveyed the impression to many ... that I rely[ed] 
only on biological differences ... to explain the division of labour 
between household and other activities. That is certainly not my 
intent...’ (Becker 1991: 4).
Becker seems tom between the necessity of making additional assumptions in order 
to ‘explain’ families and his basic methodological position which implies that he
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should seek explanations which do not rely on ad hoc assumptions, even ones 
sufficiently ‘scientific’ to be rooted in genetics. It should be remembered that 
Becker has elsewhere sought to explain human behaviour as rooted in a set of 
preferences which are essentially the same for all individuals (Stigler & Becker 
1977). It is problematic for him to admit that a very large portion of human 
behaviour results from differences between women and men.
A very small difference in initial conditions (which might be caused by biology or 
discrimination against women) could result in a completely specialized family 
division of labour. One family member would specialize in looking after children. 
Becker suggests that mothers have a comparative advantage in looking after children, 
based on the casual observation that ‘a mother can more readily feed and watch her 
older children while she produces additional children than while she engages in most 
other activities’ (Becker 1981: 22).
The ambivalence about the role of biological and genetic factors is revealed by 
Becker’s treatment of the genetic element in family specialization. Rather than 
accepting that individual might want to reproduce for genetic/biological reasons, he 
suggests that as biological parents share genes with their children, they have 
privileged information about them, and therefore have a comparative advantage in 
caring for them. So Becker makes out a kind of biological case for parents (mothers) 
specializing in looking after their own children. However, this case does more to 
illustrate his ambivalence about the use of biological explanations - notably his use of 
genes combined with a reluctance to accept a genetic or biological urge to reproduce 
than to explain the existence of families.
Whatever its merits, this recourse to biology does not amount to an explanation of the 
distinction between household and market sectors. The generalization from child 
bearing and rearing to other household activities is not explicitly explained at all. It 
amounts to an assumption that it is more efficient for a mother with children to cook 
and clean for a ‘shadow’ wage than to engage in any other work, perhaps from the 
home, for a money wage. This is an empirical claim, and provides no theoretical 
basis for the distinction between household and market sectors. Moreover it runs
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counter to the general logic of specialization. It does not rescue Becker from having to 
make the ad hoc assumption that households exist.
Becker also uses sex differences in another way. They mean that men and women are not 
perfect substitutes for one another - indeed, men and women may be complimentary in 
the production of some commodities. He considers complementarity in household but 
not market production. Complementarities ‘cannot be unimportant’ because ‘women are 
becoming less specialized in household activities, and men are spending more time at 
household activities’ (a seemingly causal empiricism Becker 1981: 24). It is important to 
be clear about this point which provides the logic behind his earlier assertion ‘that 
biological difference probably have weakened the degree of specialization’ in the 
family/household (Becker 1981: 14). This argument about the weakening of 
specialization within the family is quite different from the implicit limitation to the logic 
of specialization involved in the assertion a household/family sector exists.
Historical evolution
In places Becker also suggests a historical ‘explanation’ of the existence of household 
(Becker 1981: 237 - 244). Even here he begins by assuming that households and families 
existed in traditional societies. Indeed the extended family living in a household was the 
main form of social organization in such societies. Becker believes that
... if modem society evolved from traditional society with the 
characteristics emphasized in this chapter, the individualism and 
nuclear familialism of modem society would have evolved from the 
extended families and kinship groups of traditional society. (Becker 
1981:244)
If Becker relies on an account of the existence of households as a legacy of history then 
historical has priority over deductive economic analysis. This account does not confront 
the crucial question of why households and families have not been destroyed by the logic 
of specialization, which is used to account for the transition from traditional to modem 
society. ‘Rational-choice’ modemization theory suggests that modem society is efficient 
‘...because family functions ... are more effectively handled by markets’ (Becker 1981 : 
244).
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The discussion does not present a clear order of causation. There is an implication 
that economic change is primary and causes other changes, although this claim is only 
made clearly in the context of later discussions for changes in gender roles, rather 
than directly as a cause of the emergence of modem society (Becker 1981: 245). As a 
consequence, the stylized and comparative static ‘historical’ account plays a very 
significant, if unacknowledged, part. By structuring the account around the 
distinction between traditional and modem societies an implicit justification for the 
existence of families is provided - they are a ‘legacy of history’. We are back to what 
amounts to the unstated assumption that household activities have some common 
elements which mean that they coalesce into a ‘sector’, which prevents them from 
being subject to the logic of specialization.
Faced with gender issues sociological and rational-choice variants of the 
modemization theory display a peculiar ambivalence. Both see changes in 
family/household forms as a general product of the process of modemization, which 
they view broadly as positive. However, both assert that gender roles will not be 
wholly revolutionized by modemization, without relying on biological determinism 
(at least in a full blown form). Without recognizing the fact, sociological and 
rational-choice modemization theorists depend upon a particular exception to their 
general logic of analysis (in both cases closely related to the concept of specialization 
and a material - technological/economic - determinism) to ‘protect’ something 
‘traditional’ about gender roles and household/family forms. The ambivalence 
involved in granting this particular exception to their analyses is reflected in their 
accounts of changes in female labour force participation.
7.4 A critical assessment of modernization theory and its analysis of 
women’s role in the workforce
Modemization theorists generally share an expectation that women’s involvement in 
formal work increases over time, which is a corollary of the family losing many of its 
traditional functions. In as much as they are interested in gender roles, this interest in 
focused on changes in dominant family and household forms. The arguments they 
develop imply that these changes have a fairly direct impact on female labour force
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participation. However, often modemization theorists do not specify clearly the 
causal relations in operation, a lack of clarity which is, I think, indicative of a deeper 
flaw of the theory.
Kerr’s assertion that
... economic growth and a transference of women's work from the 
household to the market go closely hand in hand (Kerr 1960: 35- 
36 emphasis added - Kerr took it from Lewis 1955: 116 - but 
placing the quote in its original context does not fully clarify the 
question of causality, although it does imply that economic 
growth is more fundamental)
is typical of this vagueness about causality. If modemization theorists share a basic 
image of the pattem of change in female labour force participation, they diverge in 
their interpretations of some of its aspects. Through its impact on family/household 
organization modemization appears to be the ultimate causes of greater female labour 
force participation. The passage fi-om Kerr (and Lewis before him) seems to define 
modemization in terms of economic growth, although several differences in emphasis 
exist, with attention paid to factors ranging from economic growth and industrialism 
to the factory system and the extension of the market. However, differences over the 
characterization modemization have relatively little impact on their discussion of 
changes in women’s labour market participation. The significance of these 
differences tends to diminish due to the tendential functionalism of these theories and 
their depiction of modemization as a complex unity.
The granting of priority to rich description over the specification of causal 
mechanisms is exemplified in Wilensky and Lebeaux’s work
[ajdvancing industrialization not only puts an increasing per­
centage of the whole population in the labor force; it not only 
changes the proportions between employed men and women, but 
it also gives the edge to married women. At midcentury, the 
number of married women at work exceeded for the first time the 
number of single women at work, a trend that seems to be 
continuing. Women work to supplement family income (an 
aspect of rising levels of aspiration for self and children), to 
support their families (a necessity, for an increasing number head 
broken families), to achieve ‘self-fulfillment’ (a reflection of the 
changing definition of woman's role), and because the
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opportunities have increased (an aspect of the shift toward work 
assignment on the basis of ‘what you can do’ and the fact that 
women can do an increasing proportion of the jobs available)
(Wilensky and Lebeaux 196^ 5: 74).
The mechanism by which industrialism 1) changes the proportion of women in the 
workforce and 2) particularly ‘gives the edge’ to married women, is unclear. Three 
changes in the motivation or incentives for women to work are listed which could 
form part of an explanation of changes in gender roles. The first of these incentives 
would also contribute to changing the position of married women in particular (the 
second might make a similar contribution in the cases of women who were married 
once upon a time). However all three of these changed motivations are a presented as 
a consequence of other changes which are themselves caused by or associated with 
industrialization. Thus they are presented as part of an overall complex 
interdependent notion of industrialization or modemization, more than as mechanisms 
by which industrialization influences gender roles.
In keeping with his increasing emphasis on economic growth within modemization 
processes in welfare state analysis, Wilensky subsequently attributed changes in 
gender roles, and particularly women’s participation in the paid labour force, largely 
to economic development (Wilensky 1968: 236). Rather than assimilating a variety 
of cultural, ideological, political and social factors into the process of modemization, 
he contrasts their impact (unfavourably) with that of economic growth factors. 
Wilensky argues that economic growth is much more important than egalitarian or 
feminist ideology in explaining growth in women’s workforce participation 
(Wilensky 1968: 236-239).
‘Chicago School’ analysts argue that the traditional family collapsed due to its 
inefficiency. This inefficiency is associated with changes in the pattem of women’s 
employment due to alteration of the (mainly monetary) incentives they face. A 
stripped down version of this argument might be: more women work as women’s 
(presumably relative) wages increase. Unfortunately Becker’s argument is not 
presented as clearly as this - it is rather confused. A rather unconvincing argument 
about the role of the state is made. Moreover, the relationship between economic 
change and the role of the state is left unclear. Although these difficulties are
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associated with broad characteristics of the ‘Chicago’ approach to some extent, they 
are also grounded in a specific conceptual flaw in the analysis of gender which is also 
present in some of Wilensky’s work.
Briefly, attention should be drawn to the fact that economic growth, changing earning 
power of women and the state are not the only hypotheses considered in the 
‘Chicago’ analysis. Becker explicitly refuses to attribute causal significance to 
modem contraceptives, despite the fact that he believes that changes in women's 
fertility are important. Changes in fertility are seen as a result of changing economic 
opportunities for women, occur whether or not technologically sophisticated forms of 
contraception are available. Becker also echoes Wilensky’s disparaging of the 
independent impact of feminism and changes in women’s consciousness (see 1981 :
251 on both these points).
Two differences between sociological and rational choice accounts 
Before going on to discuss these issues, attention must be drawn to important 
differences between the sociological and ‘Chicago School’ analyses. First, they part 
company in their more detailed consideration of changes in the pattem o f women’s 
employment. Sociological modemization theorists suggest that (exogenous) changes 
in the character of work have made it more compatible with traditional female ‘roles’. 
Although the reasons for changes in the nature of work are rarely examined in detail, 
they are generally associated with ‘modemization’. Thus, some industrial and 
(prefiguring later ‘post-industrial’ analyses) most service sector work dovetails with 
social norms conceming femininity, and therefore draws women into the formal 
labour market (Kerr 1960: 201; Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 322 - 325; Wilensky 
1968). As this view amounts to a conventional wisdom, Becker’s silence on this 
subject is striking (Becker 1981; 1991 - however, Fuchs 1983: 132, uses an 
‘economic’ approach which he attributes to Becker and does discuss the service 
sector). The silence is in keeping with the ‘economic’ principle that norms and 
values cannot be used legitimately as explanatory variables.
Second, despite the emphasis on rich and inclusive description, rather than 
parsimonious explanation, conventional modemization analysts do not deploy the
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welfare state as a major explanation of changes in women’s involvement in paid 
work. Instead the welfare state and changes in gender roles both appear as 
consequences (or characteristics) of modemization, and the relationship between 
them is not explored in detail. To the extent that it is discussed, the impact of the 
welfare state is mainly considered for its impact on the supply of (service sector) 
work appropriate to female norms (see Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 323-325). By 
contrast, the (welfare) state is seen as having a major impact on family and household 
organization in the ‘Chicago School’ analysis (Becker 1981: 237-256). This impact is 
on the supply of women workers (as they are ‘freed’ of family responsibilities) rather 
than the supply of ‘female’ jobs in welfare services.
Economic factors
For ‘sociological’ modemization theorists the general pattem of causation is from a 
cluster of factors such as urbanism, industrialism and the development of the factory 
system - presented as aspects of economic development and hence of modemization 
(although each may have some specific characteristics of its own) - to a variety of 
other changes (such as the development of a service sector as well as changes in the 
characteristic structure of families and in gender roles). Gender roles change initially 
in the area of female labour force participation (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965: 64-65). 
However, in work directly focused on the question of women’s formal employment, 
Wilensky suggests that there is a ceiling to the level of female labour force 
participation and to the achievements of women once in work. He argues that women 
will be restricted to a certain number of feminized occupations. Moreover, even 
within these sectors, the senior jobs are likely to go to men. The explanation of this 
ceiling to women’s opportunity could be explained by the unequal distribution of 
domestic responsibilities, an issue which Wilensky does discuss (1968: 242-243). 
However, contradicting his earlier claim that technological or economic factors 
should be regarded as primary, Wilensky explains the limits on women’s labour 
market opportunities in ideological or normative terms. According to Wilensky 
ideology cannot explain differences between levels of female labour force 
participation, but it can be used to explain why women will not gain employment 
equality with men and themselves feel ambivalent about movement in that direction 
(1968:241-243).
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For ‘Chicago School’ analysts the fundamental cause of changes in female labour 
force participation remains economic (Becker 1981: 245), although the state also 
plays a role. On inspection, the character of the economic mechanism at work is 
ambiguous. For Becker, economic growth altered the ‘earning power’ of women, 
changed the pattem of incentives faced and therefore influenced the choice between 
market and non-market work. However, it is not clear whether changes in relative 
wages or an absolute improvement in prosperity is the key here. Moreover, the 
analysis is ambiguous about the role of thresholds of economic development (which 
may be related to supply-side bottlenecks). There is also a hint that a further factor, 
the rate of change in the economy, has a part to play.
Becker seems to suggest that absolute increases in prosperity are the trigger for 
changes in female labour force participation, but, in general the ‘Chicago School’ 
focuses on the role of relative prices (in this case, presumably relative wages). A 
close reading of Becker’s work does not resolve this ambiguity - although he 
discusses increases in the earning power of women, he does not make the comparison 
with the earning power of men. Changes in relative wages might alter gender patterns 
of household work, but would not automatically change the quantity of housework 
required overall. Thus, changes in relative wages would not necessarily imply that 
household constraints on labour force supply were insignificant. In short, such 
changes might imply that men did more housework, or more precisely that the 
household division of labour and the gender division of labour would be decoupled.
A casual empiricism shows that male labour force participation rates have generally 
experienced a decline in advanced western democracies, while female rates have 
risen, which could lend general support to a relative wage change hypothesis.
The analysis of the impact of an absolute increase in prosperity (‘economic growth’) 
on women’s participation in the paid labour market is potentially circular. An 
increase in women's wages, without altering relative to men's, is economic growth. 
Although never clearly defined, Becker's view of economic growth is bound up with 
the notion of the extension of the market, and increasing the specialization of the 
division of labour. Indeed, as we have seen, he suggests that specialization itself is
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the ‘ultimate’ cause of gains from trade, and hence of economic growth. Although it 
is not wholly clear that Becker regards the movement of women from the household 
to the market as a form of ‘specialization’, he should do so. When this implication of 
Becker’s account is drawn out, it becomes clear that it is circular, with 
‘specialization’ presented as both a cause and a consequence of economic growth.
At the end of the Treatise Becker confuses the account further by introducing an 
additional distinct argument. Instead of the level of economic development, the pace 
of economic change might be a crucial factor in explaining difference in gender roles. 
Becker makes the claim in the context an argument that a sufficient slowing of the 
pace of development could eventually ‘... reverse the [recent] trends in ...’ the labour 
force participation of married women and ‘other forms of family behaviour’ (Becker 
1981: 255 - 256). By implication, in periods of rapid economic development, women 
are drawn out of the household and into the formal labour market. This approach 
might imply a sustainable change in gender roles if Becker's earlier characterization 
of modem societies as in a state of continual change is emphasized. It is difficult, 
however, to see such changes in gender roles as permanent.
Emphasis on the rate of economic change rests somewhat uneasily with another 
assertion Becker makes about the economic mechanisms which influence women’s 
workforce participation. His analysis of late modemity is almost wholly couched in 
terms of the incentives which entice women to work in the formal labour market. 
However, the burden of his analysis of the existence of household/families and their 
gendered character suggests that important ‘supply-side’ factors inhibit women’s 
participation in the labour force. Indeed, his analysis of the inauguration of the latter 
half of the twentieth century (the late modem period) is centrally concemed with 
discontinuities in the supply of women in the labour market. ‘Thresholds’ of 
economic development must be passed before increases in female eaming power 
translates into greater female labour force participation (according to Becker the US 
passed this threshold in the early 1950s 1981: 247-250).
These thresholds are understood primarily in terms of the human capital investment 
decisions of women, rather than other forms of supply side constraint. Women will
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only start to invest in ‘market oriented’ human capital after their eaming power has 
passed the threshold. Emphasis on thresholds suggests that change is structural - the 
decoupling of gender and household divisions of labour would prove difficult in the 
short term, whether under the influence of a change in relative wages or an absolute 
increase in prosperity. Therefore the timing of the impact o f economic development 
and increases in women's eaming power on female labour force participation is 
difficult to discern or predict. Nevertheless, in principle, it is difficult to reconcile 
Becker’s emphasis on the rate of economic change with that on thresholds.
If Becker were explicitly to pull together a story about the supply side of female 
labour (most of whose elements are already hinted at in his discussion), he would 
change focus from the expansion of the eaming power of women and an implicitly 
narrow conception o f economic growth to a wider conception of modemization which 
would include the notion of the expansion of the market as well as the erosion of 
family functions. Moreover, because female labour force participation has an 
influence on pattems of marriage and decisions about fertility, which themselves 
could conceivably have an influence on female labour force participation, Becker's 
theory would rapidly achieves a complexity which approaches that of sociological 
analyses.
The Welfare State
The explanation of changes in female workforce participation in terms of general 
process of modemization is that social policy makes only a small contribution.
Female labour force participation is sometimes thought to be caused by the same 
forces which produced the welfare state, with no interaction between the two (see 
Kerr 1960, for example). Wilensky and Lebeaux attribute some significance to the 
welfare state, although generally in its guise as an employer, rather than as part of the 
egalitarian normative rationale for the welfare state. The welfare state provides many 
of the jobs which provide ‘appropriate’ work for women, although, even here, as we 
have seen there may be important limitations on women’s potential careers (Wilensky 
and Lebeaux 1965: 322-325; Wilensky 1968: 235)
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By contrast, even in the first edition of the Treatise the state is seen as having an 
important and seemingly independent impact on the character of the family, 
particularly through altering the conditions of female labour supply. There is some 
discussion of the (pathological) influence of specific ‘welfare’ programmes on, for 
example, the fertility of unemployed women. Becker asserts that ...[p]rograms 
providing aid to mothers with dependent children ... [have induced a]... decline in the 
labor force participation of mothers ... (1981: 97). However, this element of Becker’s 
analysis is not nearly as important as some commentators seem to assert (see, for 
example, Winegarden: 1987, 1988). Instead, Becker is primarily optimistic about 
modernity, regarding it as a product of economic growth, as we have seen. In 
addition, even in 1981 Becker recognized that welfare state programmes had replaced 
reliance on the family as a form of insurance, in a way which has reduced the 
significance and role of the family. By implication women were freed from their 
domestic roles and allowing them to participate more fully in the labour market 
(Becker 1981: 252-253). The discussion of the state’s role might imply that supply 
side restrictions of the labour market participation of women existed, at least until 
they were removed by state intervention. Implicitly then, the notion that women 
would be able to increase labour supply easily in response to an increase in demand 
signaled by wage changes is qualified.
Arguably Becker displays a certain ambivalence over the normative evaluation of the 
role of the state in the 1981 edition of the Treatise. For example, in his main 
discussion, and positive evaluation, of modem societies (Becker 1981: 242-244) 
considers the impact of the development of the market as the bearer of modernization. 
He emphasizes various factors which play an important part in this process, including 
the rise of (non familial) insurance and education. However, these factors are 
identified as ‘market insurance’ and ‘market education’ (Becker 1981: 242, 243), 
with no acknowledgment of the state’s role in the development of these practices and 
no identification of when it developed. Becker implicitly identifies the causes of 
changes in gender roles with economic development, and, to some extent disguises 
the impact of the state within his discussion of modernization.
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More important than this ambivalence, however, Becker does not clearly distinguish 
the impact of the state from that of the market, nor analyze the relationship between 
them. In fact, he expresses an explicit functional equivalence between ‘the growth of 
public programs’ in the twentieth century and ‘the growth in the nineteenth century of 
private-market life insurance’ (Becker 1981: 252) in their impact on the role of the 
family and, by extension, on female labour force participation. This equivalence 
between private market insurance and state programmes implies that Becker’s 
positive evaluation of economic development should be expanded to include the 
development of the welfare state.
The implication of Becker’s discussion in the Treatise j  first edition is that the 
influence of the state and economic development are essentially parallel. The state 
provided programmes similar to market insurance and education. They removed 
functions related to the education of the young and the care of the elderly from 
families. By stripping away the functions of the family, the state (and economic 
growth) has freed women to participate in the formal labour market. Thus, in his 
consideration of the impact of the state, Becker introduces an additional ad hoc 
explanation of changes in the organization of families, further adding to its 
complexity/diminishing its parsimony. It is worth noting that this discussion of the 
state is embedded in consideration of the characteristics of modem societies.
The additional complexity introduced by parallel impacts of the state and economic 
growth influences on gender roles is consistent with a functionalist view of the role of 
the state. The sense that this putatively ‘economic’ explanation actually has 
functionalist underpinnings can be drawn out of Becker’s account in the first edition 
of the Treatise. It is powerfully bolstered when the explicit and more extended 
analysis of the state in the final chapter of its second edition is considered, in which 
together with the market, the state is seen as promoting ‘efficiency’. Beyond the 
bland assertion that all changes are consistent with ‘efficiency’, this perspective gives 
us little purchase on the empirical question of the impact of the (welfare) state on 
changing patterns of female labour force participation.
7.5 Conclusions
252
Modernization theory encompasses a sociological variant (conventionally deployed in 
the welfare state literature) and an economic variant associated with the ‘Chicago 
School’. Both of these variants provide us with ‘one path’ models of the impact of 
the welfare state on the employment trajectories of women in advanced capitalist 
societies. These ‘one path’ accounts may result from the explicit deployment of a 
deterministic (usually economistic) explanation, the use of complex, but essentially 
(functionally) unified accounts of modernization or a conceptually bizarre 
combination of the two. Nevertheless, neither variant of modernization theory 
provides us with much of a handle on the patterns of diversity and divergence found 
in the forms taken by social policy and national patterns of women’s employment.
Wilensky’s discussion of diffusion processes illustrates his deterministic view of what 
constitutes an adequate explanation (see Wilensky, Luebhert, Hahn and Jamieson 
1985: 12-15). The purpose of this discussion is to question the usefulness of 
‘diffusion’ theories. However, in Wilensky’s eagerness to do so, he deploys mutually 
inconsistent arguments. First, he calls doubt onto the ‘independent influence ‘of 
borrowing from one’s neighbor”  because patterns of social policy emulation coincide 
‘with patterns of economic growth and the spread of liberal ideologies’ (Wilensky, 
Luebhert, Hahn and Jamieson 1985: 13). This position suggests that the latter two 
factors should be regarded as prior to the former one, and that they wholly determine 
the process of social policy development leaving no space for policy emulation. 
However, he also suggests that evidence which implies that social policy 
development occurred initially in countries at a lower levels of modernization 
(Germany) and were adopted later in countries at a higher level (the UK) means that 
the model ‘loses its power to predict social-policy development’ Wilensky, Luebhert, 
Hahn and Jamieson 1985: 14 - emphasis added).
Within a less deterministic framework it is possible to view social policy 
development as requiring, but not being the inevitable concomitant of, a certain level 
of economic development. Given such a level, the timing, form and perhaps even the 
very existence of social policy is a matter of imagination and political choice. If 
coming up with the idea of (particular forms of) social policy is understood as a 
creative process, once it has been conceived in one place, it becomes available for
253
emulation. Moreover, after a policy has been implemented in one place, a particular 
policy (idea) would be expected to gain a greater ‘reality’ and have a stronger chance 
of being copied elsewhere.
However such emulation should not be regarded as inevitable - although perhaps not 
requiring the creativity needed initially. Further, all cross-national emulation should 
be expected to involve some modification of the policy or idea being copied, as the 
context into which it is brought will differ from that from which it originated (see 
Boyer 1997 for a discussion of this point). Building on the insights of the ‘family of 
nations’ approach, we might expect greater - and quicker - diffusion between 
countries which share some common linguistic, institutional or other features. 
Geographical proximity may also make diffusion more likely and faster.
An approach of this sort can provide an alternative interpretation of economic 
development itself. Wilensky views the level of economic development as an 
‘internal characteristic’ of a country, while (policy) diffusion is seen as an external 
factor (Wilensky, Luebhert, Hahn and Jamieson 1985: 12). However, the emergence 
of capitalism or industrialism can be understood as a creative innovation which 
occurred at particular points in time and space and was subsequently emulated 
elsewhere. In this context it is particularly important to emphasize that this emulation 
took place both within the economy (entrepreneurs copying one another) and at the 
level of state policy (governments driving forward the industrialization of particular 
territories). It may be useful to borrow from these images of economic diffusion to 
understand processes of diffusion in gender roles, which also include influences at 
state and non-state levels. If economic change is viewed in this way, then space is 
also opened for a view of ‘modernization’ as providing the conditions for change 
rather than determining it (along similar lines to Pierson’s re-interpretation of these 
issues in relation to welfare state development 1991: 6-39). This approach allows us 
to retain some sense that common changes may have occurred or be occurring. 
However, it leaves considerable space for the resources and pressures of 
modernization to be used by social and political actors.
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Chapter Eight: Women, Welfare and the Social Democratic and 
Power Resource’ Models
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8.1 An outline of the argument
Over the past twenty years the comparative political economy of the welfare state has 
been one of the most vibrant and fruitful fields of social science research. It has been 
substantially concerned with the strengths and weaknesses of ‘social democratic’ 
accounts of welfare state development. In early analyses, emphasis was placed on 
(various facets of) working class mobilization, with particular welfare states placed 
along a continuum between ‘residual’ and ‘institutional’ forms. Over time, emphasis 
has shifted away from these ‘linear’ accounts and greater attention has been given to 
the historical specificity of different forms of welfare state.
‘Power resource’ theory is, rightly, one of the most influential analytic approaches 
within this field (Esping-Andersen’s 1990 analysis is the key work). The ‘welfare 
state regime’ concept has facilitated wide ranging comparative analysis whilst holding 
out the possibility of theoretically useful generalization. Equally, however, the 
significance of the historical specificity and ‘structuration’ o f ‘welfare states’ is 
acknowledged, resisting the temptation to reduce each regime to a thinly understood 
‘case’. Moreover, Esping-Andersen’s analysis rests on a monumental effort in the 
construction and analysis of a comparative data-set on the welfare state.
At its most ambitious comparative ‘welfare state’ analysis is nothing less than an 
attempt to analyze distinct forms of capitalism (whether nationally or more broadly 
based). Welfare state analysis provides finer grained distinctions within capitalism 
than other styles of comparison (such as Albert’s 1993 influential account), 
identifying many more forms of welfare capitalism. Indeed, if all the categories and 
distinctions developed in the welfare state literature could be combined, almost every 
‘welfare state’ would be ‘model’.
Notwithstanding its influence and ambition, the achievements of the power resource 
approach rest on insecure conceptual foundations. This insecurity is rooted in a 
failure to distinguish adequately between two meanings of the expression ‘the welfare 
state’. ‘The welfare state’ concept can refer to the ‘character’ of a state - it making an 
ontological claim about it. It is also used to refer to a sector of state activity. My
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focus on female labour force participation, a topic which is within the scope of 
mainstream comparative welfare state analysis, but is right at its margin allows the 
nature of the conceptual flaw and its significance for theory to be seen clearly. As well 
as undermining important aspects of the power resource analysis, this conceptual 
confusion is present elsewhere in the comparative literature. Indeed many authors 
conflate the ontological and sectoral concepts of the welfare state or slide from one to 
the other, resulting in an exaggeration of the importance of ‘the welfare state’.
Despite the attempt to capture the variability of ‘welfare states’ through the 
development of the notions of different ‘worlds of welfare’ or ‘welfare state regimes’ 
within the mainstream power resource framework, a number of scholars argue that it 
remains partly trapped within the ‘social democratic model’ (Pierson 1991 : especially 
at 215; Castles and Mitchell 1993; van Kersbergen 1995; and, from various feminist 
positions, Lewis 1992; Lewis and Astrom 1992; Orloff 1993; O’Connor 1993). There 
is a good deal which is useful in these critiques. However, as they are not grounded in 
an adequate distinction between the ontological and sectoral definitions of the welfare 
state, many of these accounts misdiagnose problems in power resource analysis and 
overplay the extent to which a social democratic ‘bias’ within welfare state theory 
constitutes a flaw within it. In developing their own accounts, many of these analysts 
are actually trapped themselves by the elements of conceptual confusion which are 
present in power resource analysis.
1 ground a (sympathetic) critique of the power resource approach on the distinction 
between ontological and sectoral images of the welfare state. As a consequence, the 
power resource analysis wrongly depicts the (form of the) welfare state as a primary 
cause of patterns of women’s participation in paid employment, and the changes to 
these patterns. 1 argue that the approach basically misconstrues the policy 
configurations of ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ states. However, 1 believe that there is 
some justification for a ‘social democratic’ bias in normative aspects of the discussion 
of ‘the welfare state’ as a form of the state, at least if it can be modified and 
augmented to take gender better into account.
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Although providing a generally adequate account of developments in Sweden, the 
claim that the welfare state is a primary causal force is less persuasive outside 
Scandinavia. Esping-Andersen ' s description of the pattern of rapid entry into the 
formal workforce in the USA is accurate. Women also gained some access to the 
high-wage, high skill segment of the economy, although they have been 
disproportionately represented in the low wage sector of the ‘dual’ labour market. 
Equally, the limited growth of female labour force participation in Germany and the 
comparatively strong hold of traditional forms of employment in the labour market 
are accurately described by Esping-Andersen. While ‘liberalism’ in the USA and 
‘conservatism’ in Germany do have important consequences for women’s labour 
market participation, these consequences do not necessarily, or primarily, operate 
through welfare policy. A closer consideration of the policy configuration of the 
Dutch state and the impact of this configuration on women’s role in Dutch workforce 
than Esping-Andersen provides renders the notion that the Netherlands has, or is, a 
‘social democratic welfare state regime’ problematic - at the very least the ‘social 
democratic’ quality of the Netherlands is restricted to social policy. Although Esping- 
Andersen’s contribution remains singular - in my view the most important made over 
the past twenty five years - ultimately, his attempt to provide the comparative analysis 
of welfare with adequate conceptual and normative foundation fails.
Lack of clarity concerning the two meanings of the expression ‘the welfare state’ has 
had unfortunate consequences beyond Esping-Andersen’s work. Partly, this flaw has 
been imported into other analyses where concepts have been borrowed from the 
power resource framework. Where analysts have sought to develop alternative 
perspectives by means of modifying and adapting concepts from the power resource 
analysis, their critical revisions of the initial framework have rarely gone far enough. 
While my principle concern here is with debates around the concept of ‘welfare state 
regimes’, the ambiguity discussed here is present in some other analyses of the 
welfare state. For example, as we have seen in the case study of the US, a self­
consciously left-wing and ‘critical’ account, which might be expected to be sceptical 
about the claims of states to be welfare states slips egregiously from the ontological to
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the sectoral conception of the welfare state. Ginsburg answers the concern that the US 
might not be a welfare state with reassurance that it certainly has one (1992: 98).
8.2 The scope and development of the social democratic model and 
its relation to other forms of comparative policy analysis
It will be clear by now that I am primarily concerned with the ‘power resources’ 
approach (and especially the work of Esping-Andersen), but my analysis covers much 
more. It includes: ‘politics matters’ studies; working class mobilization; families of 
nations accounts; analyses o f ‘social capitalism’; feminist ‘power resource’ analysis; 
some variants of institutionalism and studies of Scandinavia as well. Aside from 
modernization theory, much of the comparative analysis of ‘welfare states’ falls 
within my scope here. In some ways the label ‘social democratic’ is not an accurate 
description of all these approaches; some of the analyses on the list (arguably 
including Esping-Andersen’s 1990), were explicit attempts to move away from the 
‘social democratic’ approach.
What is ‘social democratic’ about the ‘social democratic model’?
The normative (ontological) definition of the welfare state in power resource theory is 
intimately related to its conception of social democracy and the ‘social democratic’ 
experience of Scandinavia. The elision of the distinction between this ontological and 
the sectoral conception of the welfare state results in their empirical analysis of non- 
Scandinavian states being skewed by ‘social democratic’ assumptions. In addition, 
some analysts who attempt build on Esping-Andersen in order move further beyond 
the ‘social democratic’ approach by adopting and modifying the ‘welfare state regime’ 
framework fail to address this flaw decisively, and so remain trapped by it. The 
critique of social democratic bias may be trapped by these assumptions itself (see van 
Kersbergen 1995; Orloff 1993; O’Connor 1993).
The social democratic approach remains a key pole in debates about the welfare state. 
Many current approaches developed from more explicitly ‘social democratic’ roots 
(compare Castles 1978; 1989; 1993). Finally, other labels may be equally misleading - 
comparative political economy would encompass too much - including modernization
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theories, while comparative public policy focuses too closely on government outputs, 
rather than social outcomes.
From continuum to typology
The theoretical and methodological evolution of the social democratic theory is a 
story of the change from a ‘linear’ account of welfare state development to analysis of 
multiple ‘welfare state’ forms. Despite appearances to the contrary, my argument 
suggests that this change cannot be fully achieved unless basic conceptual 
clarification is undertaken. The ‘linearity’ of the early literature is widely recognized 
as problematic and closely related to its social democratic bias. It refers to the idea 
that welfare states vary along a (single) continuum (usually) from ‘residual’ to 
‘institutional’ ideal types (a distinction often attributed to Titmuss 1958, but see also 
Wilensky and Lebeaux 1958). Its origins have been accurately diagnosed. They 
include: metatheoretical assumptions about progress; the use of the welfare state to 
test general theories about power and consequent lack of interest in the welfare state 
per se\ the (related) weakness of conceptual and normative analysis of the welfare 
state; an idealization of the Swedish and/or Scandinavian experience (so-called 
‘Swedocentrism’); the crude use of OLS regression techniques (especially those 
which used all western industrial democracies as equivalent and undifferentiated 
‘cases’); as well as an approach basically rooted in a ‘social interpretation’ or a 
‘sociology of politics’.
The (surprising) lack of interest in social policy (see also Esping-Andersen 1990) of 
much of the early welfare state literature contributed to its ‘linearity’. In it, the 
welfare state was used as a testing ground for general theories about power and 
development. Little attention was paid to conceptual and normative analysis. This 
lack of interest in the welfare state was compounded by an over-concentration on 
Sweden (and other Scandinavian states). Depicting Sweden as a ‘model’ weakens the 
impetus for conceptual analysis of, and the development of the normative justification 
for, the ‘welfare state’. The Swedish experience served these functions. Focusing on 
Sweden reflected and reinforced the literature’s social democratic bias. Its particular
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welfare state configuration and social democratic political dominance (and, latterly, 
women’s position in social welfare economy) were use to develop ‘general’ models.
Sweden’s use as the ‘model’ welfare state is revealed in the structure of many 
influential studies. A number of them were designed as studies of Sweden (or 
Scandinavia) in comparative perspective (Castles 1978; Stephens 1979; Korpi 1983 - 
see Shalev 1983 for a critique o f ‘Swedocentrism’) - often combining detailed 
analysis of Sweden, with a broader statistical analysis of other cases. Even where 
more detailed single country or comparative case studies were developed, Sweden 
was often chosen for analysis, because it was identified as an ideal type of a 
universalist or social democratic welfare state (see, for example, Ruggie 1984).
The use of cross-sectional statistical methods (particularly OLS regression analysis) 
also contributed to the ‘linear’ bias many of the early studies, although perhaps they 
were not essentially tainted in this way (see Shalev 1983 for the critique but compare 
Esping-Andersen’s use of OLS techniques 1990). The technical bias of these analyses 
was strongly reinforced by their spuriously scientific ‘confirmatory’ mood, rather than 
a more open ‘exploratory’ one. On the basis of a very small number of cases results 
were presented as though they decisively confirmed that, say, working class strength 
or economic openness caused welfare state development. OLS techniques and 
‘Swedocentrism’ tended to reinforce one another because Sweden was usually at the 
top of comparative ranking of welfare states. After a period during which grand 
claims were made on the basis of this sort of analysis, the debate settled down, and a 
number of factors were widely agreed to be influential.
The character of the data has had an impact on the results achieved in the early 
literature. The availability of reasonably comparable and moderately trustworthy data 
for advanced industrial countries was a precondition for the literature to develop. By 
the mid-1970s various international organizations, particularly the OECD (but also the 
ILO and UN) were publishing a range of relevant and broadly comparable statistics. 
However the heavy reliance on these ‘official’ statistics arguably distorted the 
literature by restricting the sorts of questions which could be answered, and perhaps
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even those which the analysts would think of asking (Castles 1989: 5-7; Esping- 
Andersen and van Kersbergen 1992). As has been hinted at above, the use of the 
available comparative data tended to homogenize welfare states into a small number 
of aggregate indices (such as total government spending, social security spending) 
which did not necessarily capture what was conceptually significant (Esping- 
Andersen 1990: 19).
The ‘linearity’ of these analyses was not simply a technical matter. The background to 
the social democratic theory, is a Marxist influenced ‘social interpretation’ of politics, 
which makes ‘class’ central. Korpi’s anti-Leninist Marxism (1980; 1983) emphasizes 
the ‘social’ (for example, in his comparison of societal bargaining and corporatism) 
showing significant similarities with a ‘sociology of politics’ approach (see Sartori’s 
1969 critical discussion; and Baldwin’s 1990 critique o f ‘social interpretations’ of the 
welfare state).
The ‘working class mobilization’ approach did discuss mobilization, effectively as 
series of strategic choices would have positive or negative feedback effects on the 
space for future mobilization. Detailed examinations of Sweden analyzed the 
institutionalization of working and ruling class power resources at moments of 
‘historic compromise’ between classes (Korpi 1983). Nevertheless, workers and 
capitalists sometimes appear as the two basic classes and the struggle between them as 
the basis for the explanation of political change. Despite an interest in the role of 
‘intermediary’ classes - particularly in alliances and coalitions - the approach seems to 
assume that major changes are produced by the (inter)action of the two primary 
classes of any historical epoch. Class coalitions are important so far as they allow one 
of the major classes to achieve ‘historic’ change.
If analyses of the Swedish case grant some space to coalitions and compromise, the 
tension between these factors and (basic?) class analysis plays out differently in 
broader comparative analyses. Cross-nationally, patterns in party politics and 
industrial relations appear primarily manifestations of underlying class power. The 
extent of welfare state development seems to be attributed primarily to differences in
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underlying social structure, as revealed by differences in patterns of working class 
organization (although emphasis on ‘organization’ might leave some space for politics 
- also see Esping-Andersen and Friedland 1982 for a qualitative coalitional 
comparison).
Much work has sought to move beyond the widely recognized weaknesses of ‘linear’ 
analyses (see especially Esping-Andersen 1990; Castles 1989; 1993) Important strides 
in this direction have been made. However, neither the ‘welfare state regime’ nor the 
‘families of nations’ approaches have yet produced an adequate conceptual basis for 
the comparative analysis of ‘welfare states’. Both these approaches are potentially 
concerned with institutions, although their similarities may be disguised as analysts 
seek to emphasize the distintictiveness of their own analyses (against one another and 
the ‘new institutionalism’). Of course, the approaches are not identical. The ‘welfare 
state regime’ analysis does not effectively locate welfare policies within the state’s 
overall policy configuration, while the ‘family of nations’ approach may lose sight of 
these policy configurations within the broad ‘national political culture’. Greater 
attention to the precise location of welfare policy within the state’s overall policy 
configuration, might help to build a common basis for future research.
Historical paths, Institutional specificity and clusters of regimes 
Notions of ‘power resources’, the implied strategic conception of class struggle and 
related emphasis on class coalitions gradually came to have a new significance as 
institutions were increasingly emphasized. For example, the power resource notion 
implies that a class might ‘invest’ its resources of power in particular (state or 
societal) institutional arrangements. If wisely done, these investments may enhance 
the power of the class, if foolishly, they may weaken it. Welfare state development 
was increasingly viewed in terms of alternating formative moments (historic 
compromises) and periods of relative stability or ‘normal politics’. Its strategic 
choices in the institutionalization of particular policies would feedback to help sustain 
or undermine the coalition. An increasing variety of paths and patterns of ‘welfare 
state’ development were analyzed. The welfarism of Bismarck in Germany and von 
Taaffe in Austria were seen as pre-empting working class politics. (Esping-Andersen
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and Korpi 1984 discuss continental Europe as well as Scandinavia; Esping-Andersen 
1985 compares developments within Scandinavia.)
Initially, however, the social democrats still assumed that the welfare state was 
essentially about class. The strategies and coalitions formed to create the welfare 
state, and created by it, were class strategies and coalitions. These classes seem to 
provide the dynamism of any coalition (implying that the possibility of a middle class 
welfare state is theoretically excluded - see Baldwin 1990 for a critique of this 
position).
Eventually, both the causes and the consequences of the welfare state became 
detached from a primary focus on class. Traditions of absolutist rule and catholic 
party strength (as well as working class strength) came to be seen as important causes 
of a number of distinct welfare state regimes. Although initially interested in the 
organizational capacity of the working class, as a more differentiated power resource 
analysis of the welfare state developed, the consequences of the welfare state for other 
groups, including state officials and women, came into focus (Esping-Andersen 
1990).
Reconsidering the normative underpinning of the welfare state 
Initially, social democrats justified their interest in the welfare state because it 
reflected and expanded working class power. As this justification faded, interest in 
the normative underpinnings of the welfare state increased with particular attention 
paid to social rights of citizenship (Marshall 1949/1992 - see Esping-Andersen 1985; 
1990; Korpi 1989). Ironically, however, this normative analysis was strongly 
influenced by traces of class analysis. Effectively, a welfare state is one in which 
citizens have social citizenship rights, and these rights are defined by their capacity to 
de-commodify labour power (Esping-Andersen 1990). According to this definition, 
very few states approximate to welfare state status.
Developments within the power resources framework had parallels elsewhere. For 
example, Castles’ work moved away from ‘the cross-national aggregate data analysis
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mode’ (1989: 2) towards a greater concern with the ‘puzzle, paradox or critical case’
(1989: 10) in the context of general explanations (although within a universe of fewer 
than 25 cases, at least eight were treated as puzzling - a relatively large number). 
Initially this endeavour was presented as the second stage of the earlier research 
project, ‘with objectives substantially unchanged’ (Castles 1989: 2), but a third wave 
moved decisively beyond the earlier account - rather than regarding national 
experiences as hard cases within a general explanation particular explanations would 
work for groups of states or ‘families of nations’ (1993).
8.3 The analysis of gender in the Social Democratic and Power 
Resource’ Models
Greater space was opened for the consideration of gender issues as greater diversity of 
form in welfare provision came to be accepted. Initially, if gender was considered at 
all, it remained right at the margins of the analysis (for example, Korpi 1983: 154- 
156), with one major exception (Ruggie 1984) the ambition of which was partly 
thwarted by its research design. Some feminist analysts acknowledged and 
challenged the ‘working class mobilization’ approach, mainly (but not wholly) 
focusing on Scandinavia (particularly Hemes 1987, but also Piven 1985 and the 
contributions in Showstack-Sasson 1987). Acknowledgment of a greater diversity of 
welfare state forms also seems to have resulted in more consideration of gender in the 
mainstream analyses (see Esping-Andersen 1990; Schmidt 1993). However, feminist 
reactions to these theories (which also build on earlier feminist analyses) point the 
way to a gendered comparative analysis of welfare (Lewis, 1992; O’Connor 1993; 
Orloff 1993; Daly 1994; Lister 1995).
‘Linearity’, the welfare state and gender roles
‘Linear’ accounts welfare state development left relatively little space for the analysis 
of gender issues, especially given their emphasis on class. The landmark analysis 
illustrates this point nicely (Korpi 1983). While Korpi is sympathetic to the women’s 
movement, he does not explicitly link the statement that ‘...the perceptions of sex 
roles seem to be less traditional in Sweden than in most Western countries’ to 
working class mobilization or ‘institutional’ social policy. In fact, the only explicit
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connection he makes between class and gender is more defensive. He challenges the 
view that the cultural conservativism of workers makes them hostile to gender 
equality as being based on ‘meagre’ evidence. It fails to recognize the fact that 
workers are more progressive ‘on concrete reforms to increase equality between the 
sexes’. He seems to suggest that ‘... demands for equality and equal opportunities 
between the sexes ...’ develop according to a distinct feminist logic, as a 
‘...continuation of the long historical struggle for the equal rights of women’. The 
position of women seems to be treated as incidental to welfare state development 
(Korpi 1983: 154-156).
In principle, the position of women could be viewed as a product of the welfare state 
or indeed of the same forces which produced a particular ‘welfare state’ form. Ruggie 
provides the main analysis of this sort (a ‘statist social democratic’ analysis 1984) 
which is basically ‘linear’ in form and ‘social democratic’ in substance but displays 
considerable ambivalence about the role of the state and policies aimed specifically at 
the position of women. Ultimately, better research design would show that the 
‘linear’ and social democratic quality of the argument to be unsustainable.
This analysis is ‘linear’ in its identification of a ‘continuum produced by ... two ideal 
types’ of welfare state (Ruggie 1984: 12). Broadly speaking the UK ‘liberal welfare 
state’ corresponds to the notion of a residual social policy system while Sweden 
approximates to the ‘corporatist welfare state’ or institutional social policy (Ruggie 
1984: 12-17). With the possible exception of the US, other ‘welfare states’ are 
apparently located along this continuum. The relationship of the US social policy 
system to these ideal types is not entirely clear (the analysis sometimes appears to be 
an attempt to help the US select between the Swedish and British examples). The 
favourable position of women in Sweden is largely understood as an outcome of non­
gender factors, powerfully reinforcing the ‘linearity’ of the analysis. Emphasis is 
placed on same explanatory factors (particularly working class mobilization) as those 
stressed initially by social democratic theorists. The core proposition is that ‘the 
differential role of the state vis-à-vis women workers ... reflects the differential status 
of labor moxQ generally’ (Ruggie 1984: 298).
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As we have seen the ‘linearity’ of the social democratic literature is associated with its 
‘social interpretation’ of politics (Sartori 1969; Baldwin 1990)and becomes difficult 
to sustain if the state can have ‘autonomous’ or ‘feedback’ (Lowi 1964; Pierson 1994) 
effects on social outcomes. However, ‘statism’ was weakly conceptualized in 
Ruggie’s analysis - the issue of whether autonomous or feedback state effects exist is 
not resolved clearly. The role of the state is set in opposition to ‘economic 
determinants’ and ‘women specific factors’ rather than with other social factors, 
including class/labour, which are largely assimilated with the state. The relationship 
of the ‘state centred’ perspective and the (then) dominant social democratic anti-statist 
‘societal bargaining’ analysis is largely left hanging (see Ruggie 1984: 165, 251).
The second area of ambivalence concerns the role of ‘women specific factors’ and 
gender policies. The argument that gender equality requires ‘specific measures’ was 
made at times (Ruggie 1984: 162). However, the potential success of these measures 
requires a powerful general framework for equality. Moreover, specific equality 
measures for working women in Sweden are often attributed to working class 
mobilization, and, in formal legal terms these measures seem weaker in Sweden than 
in the UK, but practically they are more effective.
Although only at the margins of the statist social democratic account of gender,
Ruggie raised some questions about the sustainability women’s position in Sweden. 
First, occupational segregation remained higher in Sweden than in the UK (Ruggie 
1984: 61, and in more detail in 1988). Secondly, she noted ‘an apparent halt in further 
progress for women’ and argued that further selective measures for women are 
necessary for the re-starting of that progress. Moreover, Ruggie stated that ‘[t]hus far, 
women workers in Sweden have allowed their interests to be pursued by dominant 
coalitions speaking on their behalf implying that some specific female mobilization 
might be required ‘[f]or the successful achievement of their [women’s] employment 
pursuits’. Nevertheless, for Ruggie, for this opportunity for further political/policy 
developments to emerge ‘women must be incorporated into labor, and labor must be 
incorporated into the governing coalition’ (Ruggie 1984: 345 - 346 - greater emphasis
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on female political mobilization in 1988). Several peculiarities of the Swedish 
situation - particularly the extreme occupational segregation by gender - were 
effectively glossed over, making it appear ‘better’ for women than the evidence 
warrants.
Her explanation o f changes in women’s workforce participation would not have been 
generally sustained had Ruggie’s research been designed differently. The analysis of 
the Swedish and UK cases is very helpful, but it is not clear that they both represent 
ideal types of the welfare state, never mind that they represent the extremes of a 
‘continuum’ along which other welfare states are ranged. The analysis relies too 
much on the peculiarities of the particular states examined. As a consequence, 
generalizing results from these two cases is dangerous.
The flawed research design also makes it difficult to establish the causes of the 
particular advantages for working women in Sweden or the weakness of the position 
of women in the UK. Factors such as the evolution of family law in Sweden in the 
early part of the twentieth century, and the consequences of an ongoing debate on 
population and gender cannot be ‘controlled’ out of the analysis in a study of this 
kind. All in all a broader comparison than that of the UK and Sweden would have 
avoided these mistakes.
Beyond linearity: feminism, social democracy and power resources 
Although no single wide-ranging comparative analysis of gender and welfare has 
emerged, the theoretical basis for such an account has begun to be laid. Largely (but 
not wholly) ignored in the mainstream literature feminist scholars have been analysing 
the relationship of the welfare state and women’s position in a variety of countries 
since the early 1980s. The relationship between women’s political agency and 
‘welfare state’ developments which address their concerns has been a particular issue 
here (see, for example, Piven 1985 on the US; Balbo 1987 on the UK; Hemes 1987 on 
Scandinavia). This concern mirrors the social democratic interest in class. The 
literature on Scandinavia was notably vigorous and applied social citizenship concepts
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to the position of women. It engaged with the mainstream ‘power resource’ analysis 
to some extent (Hemes 1987; Siim 1988; 1991; Leira 1989).
Increased awareness of the variety of ‘welfare state’ forms dramatically increased the 
potential for dialogue between ‘mainstream’ (particularly ‘power resource’) accounts 
and more explicitly gendered or feminist analyses. For a start, more space for the 
consideration of gender was made within the ‘mainstream’, albeit without adequately 
integrating it into the analysis - Esping-Andersen (1990) again stands out as a turning 
point. Gender is considered briefly in the conceptual and normative analysis of 
welfare states, and at more length in parts of the empirical analysis. Women are 
effectively ignored when attention turns from general issues to the detailed conceptual 
and normative specification ‘the welfare state’ (this much has been criticized in 
subsequent feminist work, as we shall see in a moment). Moreover, he considers 
women mainly in the second part of his account, where the impact of social policy on 
labour markets is analyzed, rather than the first part, which concerns the internal 
configuration of welfare policies. Nevertheless, each of the forms of welfare is 
associated with a distinctive causal pattern, implying that a variety of causal forces 
combine in a number of different ways to bring various welfare regimes into being, 
and potentially allowing that gendered factors might be relevant. The potential for 
this dialogue was also improved by the increased attention paid to the conceptual and 
normative basis of the welfare state, a previously somewhat neglected issue in the 
comparative literature.
The key question concerns whether and how the broad pattern of explanation 
proposed in the power resource analysis might be extended to explain variation in the 
position of women. In principle a number of alternative possibilities exist. For 
example, the analysis of gender is sometimes effectively reduced to an aspect of the 
situation of the working class. According to this approach, changes in gender relations 
would be caused by the same factors which change the position of the working class. 
Along similar lines, other analysts treat changes in gender relations as a kind of 
unintended consequence of the development of the welfare state. Power resource 
analysts have regarded the working class as a major protagonist for the welfare state
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while at the same time being shaped by it. Sometimes advocates of this approach 
suggest that as a result of the (unintended) mobilization of women, gender divisions 
are on the point of taking a similar place class conflicts in the structuration of the 
welfare state.
By contrast, some analysts argue that the welfare state has always been as much a 
matter of gender as of class (for example Gordon 1988; Abramovitz 1988). Mostly, 
those presenting this sort of analysis suggest that the welfare state bolsters patriarchy, 
rather than (potentially) emancipating women. A certain amount of historical work 
has been done on the influence of women in the formation of the welfare state. 
Although this work does provide a basis for arguing that as well as becoming 
important in the future, gender power resources have been important in the past. 
However, this work generally accepts that proposals made specifically to enhance the 
position of women were (mostly) unsuccessful during initial period of welfare state 
formation. No-one has (yet) made a detailed case that differences in women’s 
mobilization/power resources have already introduced cross-national welfare state 
variations.
Families of Nations
Gender issues have also found more space within the second major ‘multi­
dimensional’ approach - the ‘families of nations’ school. However, in these analyses 
welfare policies and the overall state policy configuration are replaced by broader 
notions of political culture clustering into ‘families of nations’. This approach 
suggests that the fundamental differences between nations are rooted in clusters of 
traditions and the institutions to which they give rise, designated by the notion 
‘culture’. The fundamental explanation of the ‘clustering’ of various policy regimes 
and social characteristics lies with the common cultural roots of ‘families’ of nations. 
There is no presumption that ‘policy’ or ‘the state’ play a fundamental role in the 
structuration of society. Instead such social characteristics as the levels of inequality 
or female labour force participation may be as much a product of the underlying 
culture, as they are of, say, the character of the welfare state. Indeed, the welfare state 
itself might be regarded as a distinct cultural product.
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Thus key ‘family of nations’ analyses of welfare pay little attention to gender (Castles 
and Mitchell 1993), while an exploration of the gendered nature of labour force 
participation deals with welfare policy only at a very general and aggregate level 
(Schmidt 1993). The ‘concept’ which motivates the account of low levels of (change 
in) female labour force participation is ‘being a ‘Germanic’ country’ (clustering 
Germany, Austria and Switzerland). However, emphasis on these ‘Germanic’ 
countries makes it difficult to account for Italy and Ireland which both show 
(according to Schmidt’s own data for 1960 and 1985) low levels of, and little change 
in, women’s participation in the formal labour market. Nor does it make sense of the 
Dutch case where the overall level of female labour force participation remains the 
OECD’s lowest, despite some change, or the Japanese experience of a fall in women’s 
participation, albeit at a level a higher level. Moreover, the ‘Germanic’ states 
encompass at least two types of ‘welfare state’, as both categorizations place 
Switzerland within the ‘liberal’ group, while Austria and Germany are ‘conservative’ 
(see Schmidt 1993: especially Table 5.2 at 182; Castles and Mitchell 1993; Esping- 
Andersen 1990).
Feminist power resource analysis
Building on the insights of earlier accounts of welfare in particular states or small 
groups of states in the 1990s feminists began to develop frameworks for general 
comparative analysis (Lewis, 1992; O’Connor 1993; Orloff 1993; Daly 1994). These 
accounts criticize, but also build upon, the social democratic analysis of the welfare 
state (particularly Esping-Andersen 1990). They have made two main contributions. 
Some have pointed to states which do not fit within Esping-Andersen’s comparative 
typology as far as gender relations are concerned (see, for example, the role of France 
in Lewis 1992).
Secondly, many feminists have developed a critique of the normative and 
methodological bases of Esping-Andersen’s analysis (Lewis 1992) and develop 
alternatives which could form the basis of gendered typologies for comparative 
analysis (O’Connor 1993; Orloff 1993; Daly 1994). They engage with the workerist
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bias of the concept of ‘de-commodification’ used as the normative basis for the 
welfare state. Typically they attempt to broaden it into a concept of ‘independence’ or 
‘autonomy’ by adding new ‘dimensions’ of social, economic and political life which 
cover ‘hidden’ areas of women’s dependency and point to potential state policies (and 
perhaps other social changes) which might contribute to the emancipation of women.
8.4 A critical assessment of social democratic theory and its analysis 
of women’s role in the workforce
I turn, now, to the core of my argument. I have already suggested that there is a lack 
of clarity about the definition of the ‘welfare state’ concept. Ontological and sectoral 
usages of the notion - whether a state is or has a welfare state - need to be 
distinguished from one another more sharply. The key effect of this conceptual 
confusion is to exaggerate the significance of ‘the welfare state’ in contemporary 
political economy. For example, changes in gender relations, particularly in women’s 
participation in the formal labour market, are falsely attributed to the welfare state, as 
we have seen in the case studies of the USA, Germany and the Netherlands.
Power resource analysts point to the weakness of earlier welfare state conceptions, as 
well as investing some effort in developing a seemingly clear conceptual framework 
for welfare state analysis (Esping-Andersen 1990: 1-5; 18-23). It is ironic that, while 
claiming to sweep aside the conceptual weakness of the earlier literature, the power 
resource school itself remains trapped by a very similar flaw - it does not use a clear 
and consistent conceptualization of the welfare state. The mainstream power resource 
approach has revolutionized the comparative analysis of welfare states, allowing 
greater space for the analysis of distinct ‘welfare state regimes’. However, the extent 
of this achievement is questionable. The analysis of non social democratic welfare 
state regimes is certainly inadequate - the concept of the ‘welfare state regime’ itself 
may be problematic. Moreover, because they have not engaged with it at a 
sufficiently fundamental level, even critical engagements with power resource 
analysis have perpetuated some of its flaws.
272
At root, the theoretical and normative facets of the power resource analysis are 
basically concerned with the welfare state as a form of the state but its empirical 
account is grounded on a sectoral view of welfare provision, and primarily concerned 
with social policy. The empirical analysis periodically does allude to the ontological 
concept of the welfare state, thus, falsely sustaining the impression that the analysis is 
integrated. The normative analysis provides the impression that the welfare state is at 
the heart of the national political economy, but suggests that few, if any, states qualify 
as welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990: 22 - 23). The more sectorally oriented 
concepts deployed in the empirical analysis allow all established capitalist 
democracies to be classed as welfare states. In combination, such claims make the 
welfare state appear as the central characteristic of contemporary capitalist political 
economy. The elision of the distinction between the ontological and sectoral images, 
and exaggeration of the importance, of ‘the welfare state’ 1) are closely bound up with 
the continuing social democratic bias of the power resource approach, 2) entwined 
with the notion of ‘welfare state regimes^ and, 3) confuse its analysis of stratification.
Confusion of the ontological and sectoral welfare state conceptions is entangled with 
the continuing social democratic bias of power resource analysis. Social democratic 
(and mostly Swedish) characteristics underpin the ontological definition of ‘the 
welfare state’ - its conception as a form of the state. There is some justification for 
this approach - ‘welfare’ may come closest to being the ‘purpose’ of the state in 
Scandinavia. However, this sort of definition comes close to equating ‘welfare 
statism’ and social democracy. In comparative analyses covering a number of states, 
power resource analysts effectively shift to a sectoral welfare state definition. In so 
doing states within which social policy (and the broad configuration of policy) is 
organized around principles quite distinct from - perhaps inimical too - ‘welfare’ and 
social democracy come into the analysis. Because the sectoral and ontological 
conceptions of the welfare state are not distinguished from one another, some ‘social 
democratic’ elements taint the comparative analysis of social policy (compare with 
Castles and Mitchell 1993; Pierson 1991).
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In principle, power resource theory espouses an unequivocally broad conception of 
the welfare state. For example, Esping-Andersen aims ‘to follow ...[a]... broad 
approach’ to the welfare state ‘fram[ing] its questions in terms of political economy’. 
‘In the broad[...] view ... issues of employment, wages and overall macro-economic 
steering are considered integral components in the welfare-state complex ’. Here the 
welfare state encompasses more that ‘conventional social-amelioration policies’ also 
considering ‘employment and general social structure’ (1990: 2). Moreover, he 
argues that ‘our personal life is structured by the welfare state, and so is the entire 
political economy’ (1990: 141). This perspective may be sustainable for a social- 
democratic, de-commodifying ‘welfare state’ (the welfare state as state form). Other 
state policy configurations may be organized according to quite different principles, if 
they are ‘organized’ at all. Employment, wages, macro-economic steering and, 
indeed, social policy itself may be mutually inconsistent, and/or directed towards 
objectives other than the welfare of the citizenry, such as military capacity or 
sustaining a particular economic structure.
The ontological image of the welfare state is deeply entrenched in the normative 
concept on which the power resource analysis is grounded, the social rights of 
citizenship. This notion suggests that the distinct forms of (welfare) state and (social) 
citizenship are mutually constitutive. Focusing on workers as individuals, power 
resource analysts suggest that if welfare provisions are to constitute social rights, they 
remove workers from market-dependence - or de-commodify labour. A state is a 
welfare state if it de-commodifies labour. This rule has important implications and 
limits, as I will show in the next section on the (ontological) welfare state’s normative 
foundations. Subsequent sections consider the ‘welfare state regime’ concept going 
on to consider its relationship to stratification and the labour market, in each of these 
areas showing that the analysis is flawed by slippage between ontological and sectoral 
conceptions of the welfare state.
Citizenship: De-commodification and autonomy; workers and women 
De-commodification is an odd concept on which to ground welfare state analysis. It is 
a negative notion, the opposite of commodification. As commodification is closely
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related to market liberalism defining the welfare state in terms of de-commodification 
constructs it as ‘anti-liberalism’. De-commodification definitions of the welfare state 
make it difficult to distinguish between ‘social democratic’ and ‘conservative 
(familialist)’, but anti-liberal capitalist social policy. Esping-Andersen attempts to 
distinguish them by identifying conservative social policy with ‘pre­
commodification’. However, it is not clear how pre-commodification could be 
distinguished fi*om de-commodification in the analysis of contemporary welfare 
states. Moreover, this notion re-introduces a whiff of linearity to the analysis if 
conservatism is treated as ‘pre-commodification’, liberalism as ‘commodification’ and 
social democracy as ‘de-commodification’. Ironically, many comparative analyses 
have also defined the social policy of most states negatively, by its failure to reach 
social democratic standards (on this point see Shalev 1983; Baldwin 1989; 1990; van 
Kersbergen 1995).
If a welfare state is a state in which citizens have social rights, then we should be 
suspicious about the almost exclusive focus on workers in mainstream power resource 
analysis, as a number of feminist critics have argued {inter alia Lewis 1992; Orloff 
1993; O’Connor 1993; Daly 1994; Sainsbury 1996). Shifting attention back to 
citizens may help to correct the negative ‘anti-liberal’ bias of power resource analysis, 
and hence to distinguish welfare states from conservative social policy. The key 
attribute of citizens is their autonomy or independence, albeit within a particular 
social context.
In fact, a closer examination of the principle of ‘de-commodification’ itself leads 
swiftly to a notion of independence or autonomy - a ‘de-commodified’ worker is 
clearly understood as independent of market forces. Esping-Andersen (1990: 28) 
gives more than a few hints that for a state to qualify as a welfare state the market 
independence of a worker must not thrust him (or her?) back onto familial 
dependence, although these hints are inadequately developed in the argument. The 
argument over the substance of individual ‘autonomy’ is essentially an argument 
between liberalism and social democracy. Analysis of the social capitalism of 
Christian Democracy from within a modified ‘power resource’ perspective is
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somewhat ambivalent on this point. Although state policy might be regarded as ‘de- 
commodifying’ male workers, removing them from the direct ‘whip’ of the market, 
the purpose of state policy is self actualization not independence, and self 
actualization is substantively defined in terms of finding oneself within relations of 
familial (and broader social) mutual dependence (van Kersbergen wants to retain a 
notion of Christian democratic de-commodification, but is much more convincing on 
the substantive basis of Christian democratic social policy - 1995: 97-98,174-228).
The question of the relationship of de-commodification and independence or 
autonomy as a founding normative value for the welfare state understood 
ontologically raises gender issues. Some self-styled feminist power resource analysts 
have explicitly developed a normative and conceptual analysis of the welfare state as a 
form of the state in terms of independence/autonomy, or, more precisely 
‘independence within interdependence’, as they argue that complete independence is 
normatively unattractive and empirically unattainable (O’Connor 1993; Orloff 1993). 
However, even here, the failure to ground the critique of mainstream power resource 
theory on a distinction between ontological and sectoral welfare state concepts limits 
the plausibility of otherwise important contributions.
After developing the argument that the welfare state ought to be defined in terms of 
independence within interdependence, some feminist power resource analysts do not 
push the argument through to its logical conclusion. Orloff s influential (1993) 
argument is that the power resource theory has analyzed three ‘dimensions’ of the 
welfare state (state-market relations; stratification; and social citizenship rights/de­
commodification), but that these need to be gendered and supplemented by two more - 
access to paid work and the ability to form and maintain autonomous households. In 
effect, she misses the difference between power resource theory’s conceptual 
foundation (de-commodification/social rights) and the framework for the comparative 
analysis of social policy in terms of stratification.
A combination of the social democratic bias of power resource theory with the 
inadequate distinction of the ontological and sectoral conception of the welfare state
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may make stratification and de-commodification appear as two ‘dimensions’ of 
welfare state analysis which work on the same conceptual level. However, de­
commodification is so closely theoretically entwined with ‘socialist’ welfare 
stratification principles and hence the social democratic welfare state regime that the 
latter does not constitute a fully separate concept (a point is nicely demonstrated in the 
‘family of nations’ critique - Castles and Mitchell 1993: 102 - 105). In effect, the de­
commodification concept is the normative core from which the analysis of social 
democracy and liberalism develop, with the account of conservatism based on distinct 
empirical indices, which are not grounded in a conceptual or normative analysis.
The feminist position develops a richer normative definition of what constitutes a 
welfare state, building on arguments around de-commodification, and augmenting 
them with discussion of ‘access to paid work’ and ‘the ability to form and maintain 
autonomous households’ - two new gender ‘dimensions’. Orloff explicitly considers 
whether these ‘dimensions’ of the welfare state ought to be regarded as aspects of a 
‘unitary concept of individual independence, or better yet, a concept of self- 
determination within webs of interdependencies (complete autonomy does not exist)’. 
Ultimately, however, she rejects this approach, preferring ‘that separate dimension 
deal with different social relations’ (1993: 320). Had a deeper critique of the 
mainstream power resource analysis been developed, then the grounding concept of 
independence within interdependence could have been used to define various social 
and social policy ‘dimensions’, rather than being seen as opposed to them.
Three further characteristics of the feminist power resource approach are worth 
noting. First, even the three ‘dimensions’ do not seem to be of equal status. That 
relating to ‘autonomous households’ seems to be conceptually prior to those relating 
to access to paid work and de-commodification. The latter two dimensions are 
practical pre-conditions for, but not automatically constitutive of, autonomy of, and 
within, households. Second, the dimensions amount to a descriptively and 
normatively rather ‘thick’ substantive account of what ‘independence within 
interdependence’ would look like. Finally, because this account is a substantive 
statement of the characteristics a state (society and economy) would have to display in
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order to qualify as a welfare state its application as a framework for comparative 
analysis of social policy may be limited. Its implication is that even fewer states 
qualify as welfare states than the power resource normative analysis would allow (as 
Orloff herself hints 1993: 303 fh. 1). Because it does not concern itself with an 
analysis of social policy in states which fail the test for welfare state status, or the 
political forces which created ‘welfare states’ (aside from remarking that organized 
women attempted to influence the formation of ‘welfare states’, but generally failed to 
have a decisive impact), it may not have much purchase on empirical variations in the 
configurations of welfare policy provision.
There is a sense then, in which the social democratic bias of power resource analysts 
is justified, when compared to other mainstream analyses of the welfare state. Using 
the notion of the social rights of citizenship to define the welfare state means that such 
a state takes a distinct form, in which the full range of state activities are implicated in 
and subordinated to ‘welfare’. Indeed, for a state to qualify as a welfare state in these 
terms, it must have considerable influence over the broad trajectory of the political 
economy as well. Non-social democratic traditions of social policy many indeed 
mean that workers are not wholly treated as commodities and indeed, may bulk large 
within their domestic political economies. However, the purpose and general impact 
of these policies may be to contribute to the construction of a ‘conservative’ status 
bound pattern of labour market stratification. It is hard to reconcile this form of social 
policy with the normative definition of the ‘welfare state’. The feminist critique 
demonstrates that the power resource analysis is flawed by social democratic and 
workerist biases, but that these flaws allow too many states to seem to qualify as 
welfare states.
Welfare State Regimes
Power resource analysts put the welfare state regime notion to a number of mutually 
incompatible uses. It plays a central role in disguising the elision of the ontological 
and sectoral conceptions of the welfare state, helping to hide the continuing social 
democractic bias in the power resource approach and exaggerating the importance of 
‘the welfare state’ in contemporary political economy. Within power resource theory
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the concept of the ‘welfare state regime’ refers to a broad (ontological) conception of 
the welfare state. However, it is also deployed to facilitate the comparative analysis 
of social policy in a wide range of established capitalist democracies. Variation is 
allowed in ‘welfare state regimes" while they all retain something in common as 
"welfare state regimes’, leaving the precise scope and status of ‘welfare state regime’ 
unclear. How far is it a ‘sectoral’ concept, concerned with the internal organization of 
social policy, or does it range more widely? What is the relationship of ‘welfare state 
regimes’ to the ‘pension regimes’ and, particularly the ‘labour market regimes’ which 
Esping-Andersen also discusses?
When espousing a broad view of the welfare state as encompassing ‘employment, 
wages and overall macro-economic steering’, Esping-Andersen states th a t... [t]his is 
also why we prefer to employ terms such as ‘welfare capitalism’ and ‘welfare state 
regimes’. ... To talk of ‘a regime’ is to denote the fact that in the relations between 
state and economy a complex of legal and organizational features are systematically 
interwoven’ (1990: 2). This conception sits nicely with a definition of the welfare 
state in terms of de-commodification, according to which the overall policy 
configuration of the state is turned to ‘welfarist’ purposes - a welfare state conception 
which categorizes very few states as ‘welfare state’.
Yet Esping-Andersen does not eschew a general comparative analysis. He uses the 
‘regime’ concept itself to allow more states within the ‘welfare state’ category than 
permitted by his normative analysis, while seemingly making space for greater 
variation among welfare states by introducing three distinctive ‘welfare state regimes’ 
- the liberal, conservative and social democratic regimes (probably the most widely 
recognized features of his analysis). The explicit reference of the ‘regime’ concept 
here is relatively narrow - it is mostly concerned with the internal characteristics of 
social policy, occasionally branching out to the public-private mix in welfare 
provision. These two uses of the regime notion lend the analysis a spurious 
consistency. The question of the scope of the welfare state regime concept requires 
further attention.
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Moreover, Esping-Andersen introduces other ‘regime’ concepts - in particular those of 
pension regimes and, more important, labour market regimes, without ever spelling 
out their relationship to the ‘welfare state regime’. This lack of clarity is relatively 
unimportant in the case of pension regimes which fall ‘within’ the welfare state. It is 
much more problematic in the case of labour market regimes, where Esping-Andersen 
seems to want to eat his cake and have it, by including employment policies within 
conceptions o f ‘welfare state regimes’, whilst also distinguishing them from ‘labour 
market regimes’, and using the latter to validate the former. I will analyze the 
relationship between ‘welfare state regimes’ and stratification before returning to the 
labour market issues.
Stratification
Esping-Andersen’s empirical analysis of stratification and ‘welfare state regimes’ fails 
fully to clarify whether the concern is with stratification within social policy or more 
broadly - it can be read in both ways. Initially, he is mainly concerned with the 
internal organization of social policy and benefits (1990: 55 - 78, although it is 
concerned with the relationship between public and private health care and pensions). 
In other words, he develops a novel, but narrow, analysis of the welfare state as 
‘social policy’ - a sector of state activity. The impact of this ‘internal’ welfare 
stratification on overall social stratification is discussed only in general terms. 
However, in several places he implies that a broader notion of the welfare state is 
being used. Here, as elsewhere, the general implication is that the welfare state is the 
central feature of contemporary political economy, an idea sustained idea by eliding 
the two welfare state concepts.
In his theoretical reflections on stratification, it is unclear whether Esping-Andersen is 
concerned with the impact of social policy on stratification outcomes, or with welfare 
states (or social policy regimes) as ‘systems of stratification’. He implicitly criticizes 
the notion that the welfare state ‘ju s t ... intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the 
system of inequality’ in order to assert that ‘it is, in its own right, a system of 
stratification’ (1990: 23). Yet, later, immediately after re-asserting the notion that the 
welfare state (regime?) ‘is also, and always has been, a system of social stratification’,
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he shifts ground to focus on the impact of the welfare state in ‘the structuring of class 
and social order ... [t]he organization features of the welfare state help determine the 
articulation o f social solidarity, divisions of class, and status differentiation’ (1990:
55 emphasis added) which is similar to the notion of the welfare state as an 
intervention which he originally criticized.
In other words, Esping-Andersen slides between a conceptualization of stratification 
‘within’ the welfare state and the ‘impact’ of the welfare state on general patterns of 
stratification in society (while showing considerable ambivalence about the latter 
view). The conflation of these views may be given some apparent empirical support 
in a couple of cases. In Sweden we might expect the internal features of ‘welfare 
state’ stratification to be broadly the features of societal stratification. Equally, 
welfare stratification and social stratification may follow similar patterns if  large scale 
welfare provision follows patterns of societal stratification, and therefore reflects (and 
perhaps reproduces) them (as may occur in Germany), although the welfare state is 
not the primary cause of stratification in this case. However, in the US case the two 
do not correspond at all.
These stratification issues play themselves out in the encounter between ‘power 
resource’ and ‘family of nations’ accounts of welfare. The manner in which 
theoretical preconceptions about ‘the welfare state’ taint power resource analysts’ 
empirical investigation o f ‘stratification’ is analyzed sharply by Castles and Mitchell 
(1993: 100 - 107). They themselves are explicitly concerned with redistribution, rather 
than with the conferral of status. They sometimes read Esping-Andersen as sharing 
redistribution as a central concern (compare 1993: 98, 104 and 102). When they argue 
that his ‘operationalization makes absolutely no sense in terms of a Socialist principle 
of stratification’ (1993: 104) Castles as Mitchell are, 1 think, arguing about the 
redistributive impact of social policy. Despite the ambiguity, the bulk of Esping- 
Andersen’s empirical analysis of stratification is concerned with the internal patterns 
shown by social policy (or at least the public-private welfare mix), rather than its 
redistributive impact on overall patterns of stratification. In terms of the internal
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organization of (the public-private mix in) welfare, his operationalization does make 
‘a sort of sense’.
The exposure of the lack of clarity in Esping-Andersen’s consideration of 
stratification is helped considerably by the Castles and Mitchell analysis, particularly 
on the issue of whether it is concerned with overall social relations or mainly those 
‘within the welfare mix’. It also contributes a useful analysis of taxation and 
expenditure policy on income (in)equality (as measured by Gini coefficients) and of 
the impact of state policy on general patterns of stratification. However, the full 
significance of this contribution can only be felt in the context of a broader approach 
which analyses relationships between, first, social policy, second, the public private 
welfare mix, third, broader patterns of state policy and finally the overall 
configuration of the political economy.
Moreover, while theoretical debate concerning the nature of the welfare state should 
be analytically distinguished from the empirical and theoretical issues surrounding the 
comparative analysis of state policy configurations and the welfare mix, the two do 
remain interconnected. As far as the definition of the welfare state is concerned, as 
we have seen, the values which seem to lie behind power resource accounts are less 
concerned than is common with ‘equality’ as a foundational normative principle for 
state welfare. If worked through to its conclusion, the power resource approach seems 
to ground ‘the welfare state’ on a notion of autonomy.
Welfare state regimes and labour market regimes 
In its second part The Three Worlds o f Welfare Capitalism, turns to the study of 
welfare states as ‘independent causal variables’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 141). 
Through these analyses, Esping-Andersen treats all established capitalist democracies 
as welfare states, and considers the welfare state in terms of its ‘centrality’ in 
structuring ‘our personal life and the entire political economy’ (1990: 141). The 
empirical analysis of the ‘impact’ of the welfare state is mainly concerned with 
employment, and considers women’s labour market participation in some detail.
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However, the relationship between employment and the welfare state is not fully 
specified.
As we have seen, in his theoretical discussion, Esping-Andersen depicts employment 
policy as closely connected to welfare, arguing that the ‘regime’ concept signifies a 
broad conception of the welfare state, encompassing ‘wages, employment and overall 
macro-economic steering’ (1990: 2). This usage suggests that employment is part of 
the overall welfare state regime (and the regime concept signals an ontological 
understanding of the welfare state). Later the ground shifts subtly. The premise of 
the empirical analysis of labour markets is that different welfare state forms cause 
different patterns in employment, suggesting that employment might be regarded as 
closely connected with, but external to, the welfare state regime. Indeed, the purpose 
of introducing the new concept of the labour market regime is, it seems, (partially) to 
externalize employment from the welfare state. Esping-Andersen’s argument would 
remain broadly plausible, it seems to me, if he can maintain that (variations in) 
welfare state regimes cause (differences among) labour market regimes.
However, in the detailed analysis of the relationship between the welfare state and 
patterns of employment, the language of causality slips away to be replaced by a 
language of association - they go ‘hand in hand’ or ‘tend to coincide’ (Esping- 
Andersen 1990: 142, 159). In principle, of course, even a one-to-one correspondence 
of welfare state and labour market regimes would not demonstrate that a causal 
relation exists, but without such a correspondence a causal relation cannot be present. 
Caution about causality may be well advised. For all the discussion of the dovetailing 
of welfare and labour market policies, there are important examples where they do not 
co-incide. Moreover, detailed accounts of the exemplars of each three welfare state 
regimes fail to show the claimed causal impact on the labour market, although a broad 
association between each of the welfare regimes and patterns of female employment 
can sometimes be shown.
The liberal regime
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The liberal regime is most problematic, in the sense that it is most difficult to assert 
that this regime directly causes a particular pattern of female labour force 
participation, either intentionally, or as its unintentional by-product. Power resource 
analysts depict this pattern as once of extreme inequality, with large numbers of ‘junk 
jobs’ and a small number of good jobs, but a situation in which women and men hold 
broadly equal proportions of each kind of job. As we have seen in the case-study of 
the USA, this approach sometimes gives the impression that the position there is one 
that the unmodified market would produce, rather than being the product of a 
particular interaction of economic activity and public policy (1990: 215). In other 
words, rather than being the product of the liberal welfare regime, the emergence of 
US type patterns of female labour market activity are the product of other forces, 
which simply have not been altered by the ‘welfare state’. In this case it would seem 
more accurate to suggest that this pattern of female employment is associated with, 
rather than caused by, the liberal welfare regime. Moreover, the question remains 
whether both the welfare regime and the pattern of employment would both be better 
regarded as the products of some other deeper social, political or economic forces.
The conservative regime
The conservative welfare state regime, which is particularly influenced by 
Catholicism, is partly based on support for the traditional family, and therefore has a 
rationale for minimizing female labour force participation. Moreover, Esping- 
Andersen provides considerable evidence that female labour force participation has 
not grown rapidly in Germany, the exemplar of conservatism in this account. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear that the lack of growth of female labour force participation 
is a direct consequence of state policy. Explaining why something ‘failed’ to occur is 
problematic. Sometimes the German state appears to be ‘blamed’ for failing to 
follow, say, the Swedish pattern of welfare employment. What evidence we do have 
that German state policies restrict female employment, for example that tax policy 
includes a substantial disincentive for two wage earner couples (see Esping-Andersen 
1990: 159), is presented almost incidentally - as an afterthought to the main thrust of 
the analysis. It is, however, hard to attribute the peculiar mix of a relatively strong 
employment record in manufacturing and extraordinarily weak (public or private)
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service sector growth to the desire to restrict the opportunities for women to find paid 
work, although this employment pattern probably did have that effect. Moreover, the 
strength of manufacturing and the weakness of the service sector are peculiarities of 
Germany, and cannot be generalized to all conservative welfare regimes.
Although some aspects of state policy clearly operate to restrict female labour force 
participation, it seems at least as plausible, if not more so, that both the character of 
the welfare regime and the pattern of female employment can be attributed to some 
deeper common cause. Nonetheless, it is important to allow for some mutually 
reinforcing interaction between them. Schmidt (1993) suggests that the explanation 
may be sought in the ‘Germanic’ character of several low female labour force 
participation nations, although this suggestion brings problems of its own in train. In 
particular, it fails to deal with a number of cases of low levels of and/or limited 
growth in female labour force participation outside the group of Germanic nations, 
including the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy and, perhaps, Japan.
Analysis of ‘social capitalism’ and the impact of Catholicism and Christian 
Democracy on social policy go some way towards addressing the European states 
poorly accounted for in the Schmidt analysis. A key (sympathetic) critique of the 
power resource approach, is concerned with its social democratic bias, and develops 
just such an analysis. However, it also illustrates the widespread nature of confusion 
about the ontological and sectoral images of the welfare state. Moreover, given that 
this analysis is constructed using its conceptual tools (including ‘de-commodification’ 
and ‘welfare state regimes’) it too exaggerates the role of the welfare state in the 
political economy of capitalism.
The analysis of ‘social capitalism’ conflates the welfare state with the broader policy 
configuration of the state or indeed with the overall configuration of the political 
economy. As we have seen in the context of the German case, analysis of the impact 
of the Christian Democratic welfare state on female labour market participation 
actually tests the influence of Christian Democratic political strength. As a result it 
assumes that this influence operates through the welfare state rather than marshalling
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evidence that it does. Moreover, the risk exists that Christian Democratic power is a 
proxy for some other factor - such as the social influence of Catholicism - rather than 
being a causal force in its own right (see van Kersbergen 1995; 144).
The social democratic regime
The social democratic or socialist regime coincides with a full employment regime, of 
a sort which seeks to encourage high levels of labour force participation. While this 
combination may describe Sweden and Norway accurately, it completely misdescribes 
the Netherlands, which is the sole non-Scandinavian example of the social democratic 
welfare state regime. Indeed, although he does not explain why a social democratic 
welfare state regime should fall in this category, Esping-Andersen himself places the 
Netherlands in the category of ‘welfare states that strongly nourish exit and reduced 
labour supply, along with a number of continental European conservative welfare 
states (1990: 159). A similar point can be made in relation to the differences in the 
labour market position of women between France (see Lewis 1992) and Germany, 
both classed as by Esping-Andersen as conservative welfare regimes.
Scandinavian welfare state regimes have a more direct, although arguably initially 
unintentional impact on female labour force participation (subsequently however, 
‘maximum female labour-force participation’ became ‘a principle of social policy’ 
according to Esping-Andersen 1990: 155). The massive expansion of the welfare 
state associated with this regime resulted in a large number of new jobs, which were 
mostly filled by women. Thus the welfare state ‘caused’ an increase in female labour 
force participation. The question of whether the expansion of welfare state 
employment was undertaken in order to provide jobs for women is difficult to resolve. 
Arguably the ‘decision’ to staff the welfare state with women, or at least to expand 
female employment alongside the expansion of the welfare state was made in order to 
prevent the private (‘productive’) sector being deprived of workers. Once women had 
become workers they attained the rights given to workers in Sweden. However, 
female employment in the welfare state, although sometimes attracting similar formal 
rights to those attached to private sector employment, is, in other ways, on quite 
different terms. For example, it is often on a part-time, not a full time, basis. In
286
general, then, the pattern of labour force participation is dramatically ‘gendered’ in 
Sweden, even more so than in the US.
Esping-Andersen’s discussion of the relationship between the welfare state and 
employment seems to work most effectively as a causal analysis in the cases of the 
Scandinavian social democratic welfare state regimes. In other cases, although there 
clearly is an association between the form taken by the welfare state and the position 
of women, particularly in the labour market, it is harder to claim the former directly 
caused the latter. At best, the welfare state reinforced patterns whose fundamental 
causes lay elsewhere. Of the cases Esping-Andersen considers in detail only in 
Sweden can the welfare state be regarded directly as the ‘fundamental force ... in the 
organization and stratification of [the] modem econom[y]’ (1990: 159). The 
Scandinavian, and particularly the Swedish, experience seems to be privileged in the 
analysis, perhaps also privileging the role of the working class, albeit indirectly.
In addition to the concern with the impact of the welfare state on the labour force 
participation of women, Esping-Andersen also hints that the Scandinavian welfare 
state may be having an unintended impact on the social bases of politics. The 
association of women with public sector, welfare state employment and of men with 
the private sector has opened the possibility of politics and industrial relations 
developing a merged gender and public-private dimension. Thus the (social 
democratic) welfare state could have an impact on the (political and industrial) 
mobilization of women, according to Esping-Andersen (1990: 227). This argument 
seems to suggest that one form of the welfare state, or perhaps more accurately, its 
labour market consequences has an impact on political mobilization. Although he 
does not cite them, a more fully developed version of this argument has been made by 
a number of feminist scholars (notably Hemes 1987). In the feminist version of this 
argument it is not only the employment opportunities provided for women by it but 
the wider resources provided for women by the welfare state and the consequent 
manner in which women interact with one another as both employees and clients 
which result in a politicization of gender.
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8.5 Conclusions
Analytical clarity can only be achieved if the normative/ontological definition of the 
welfare state is distinguished from the conceptual framework for comparative analysis 
of national welfare configurations. Once this distinction is established, with relatively 
little re-organization of elements already implicit within ‘power resource’ analyses, a 
coherent normative account can be re-constructed. The conceptual framework for 
comparative analysis of social policy configurations, or national welfare 
configurations requires more work.
Some unease about the conceptual framework of the power resource approach may be 
reflected in the reluctance of analysts, particularly feminists, to use the phrase 
‘welfare state regime’ even as they adopt the ‘regime’ terminology, often in the 
context of a critical review and partial modification of the ‘power resource’ analysis. 
Some have used the notion of a ‘welfare regime’ dropping the reference to the state 
(Lewis 1992), whilst others have preferred the concept of a ‘social policy regime’ 
(Orloff 1993; Daly 1994). Oddly, none of these analysts comment on their deviation 
from the conventional power resource terminology, and one author even attributes the 
‘social policy regime’ notion to Esping-Andersen (1990), claiming it replaced ‘the 
welfare state concept’ (Daly 1994: 105; to be fair to Orloff, she makes her scepticism 
about state’s own claims to ‘welfare state status’ which, so her usage of the ‘social 
policy regime’ notion is internally consistent).
The power resource approach has, rightly, attempted to focus attention on the 
interrelation of social policy with other aspects of policy, and indeed the wider 
configuration of the political economy. However, in doing so, the ontological and 
sectoral conceptions of ‘the welfare state’ have been confused. Indeed, in order to 
achieve analytical clarity four distinct elements need to be distinguished and labelled, 
two which refer to the state or state policy and two to the relationship between the 
state and society. I use the expression ‘configuration’ to emphasize the importance of 
encompassing distinct, and potentially mutually inconsistent, elements within each of 
these notion.
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The ‘welfare state regime’ notion clearly encompasses the configuration of social 
policy within a state (Orloff s and Daly’s ‘social policy regime’ might also be an 
appropriate label here). This conception is rather narrower than the ‘welfare state 
regime’. The national welfare configuration, including the mix of public and private 
welfare provision is also to some extent included within the ‘welfare state regime’ 
concept, although less completely than state social policy narrowly defined (Lewis’ 
‘welfare regime’, stripping the concept of its statist connotations and much of its 
normative baggage, seems apt here). Both of these conceptions are rather ‘sectoral’, 
and need not encompass claims about the overall purpose or consistency of the state. 
Read as an ontological claim about the state, the ‘welfare state regime’ concept directs 
our attention to an overall state policy configuration; and indeed, understood in 
maximalist terms, in which the welfare state is seen as the central political and 
economic characteristic of a society, it is sometimes used so as effectively to define 
the general configuration of a political economy.
If a clearer distinction is made between these two conceptions of the ‘welfare state’ it 
then be possible explicitly to place ‘social policy’ in the broader contexts of state 
policy or the wider political economy. This would require a clear engagement with 
the comparative literature on forms of capitalism (see, in particular Albert 1993 and 
Crouch and Streeck 1997). In the context of sketching in some of the features of such 
an engagement I now turn to the issue of the employment trajectories of women - a 
key, but neglected, factor in the past and likely future political economy trajectories of 
capitalist countries.
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion
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This thesis provides evidence that 1) ‘one path fits all’ models of the patterns of, and 
trajectories taken by, aggregate women’s employment in advanced industrial societies 
perform badly - they cannot account for variations in these patterns and trajectories, 2) 
against the expectations of modernization theorists, these variations are related to 
differences in the policy configurations of (welfare) states, but 3) the social 
dertiocratic power resource literature underplays the role of social institutions, by 
wrongly attributing all - or almost all - cross-national variation to differences in 
(welfare) states. In this conclusion I ‘open out’ the analysis further, to consider the 
implications of women’s employment trajectories for patterns of convergence and 
divergence (and/or of similarity and difference) among ‘welfare states’ and capitalist 
political economies.
The issue of convergence dominated the comparative literature on the welfare state 
during the 1970s and early 1980s, mainly focusing on whether welfare state 
development followed convergent paths in advanced industrial societies (or indeed 
common paths - in this context convergence was often taken to mean commonality, 
relatively little attention was paid to issue of whether the states in question had 
common or disparate origins). Ironically, just at the point when those emphasizing the 
diversity of ‘welfare state regimes’ became dominant, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
together with stronger trends towards globalization (or at least greater attention paid to 
globalization) raised the issue of convergence once again. Taken together, these two 
bodies of scholarship seem to present us with a puzzle. Beyond the welfare state 
literature, one group of scholars has announced the demise of the nation-state (see, for 
example Strange 1997), while another has noted and celebrated the diversity of 
capitalist ‘models’ - although many of those celebrating diversity seek to defend it 
against perceived encroaching uniformity (see Albert 1993).
The ‘organized’ capitalisms of Scandinavia, continental Europe and Japan - 
sometimes referred to collectively as the ‘Rhenish model’ - are pitted against neo­
liberal deregulation associated with the Anglo-American countries, and comparative 
against international political economy (see inter alia Albert: 1993; and the 
contributions in Crouch and Streeck 1997). The ‘Rhenish model’ is often seen as
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more efficient, but difficult to sustain. Tendencies towards convergence around the 
Anglo-American model have been noted as the difficulties of sustaining the Rhenish 
model appear to have grown. There seems to have been relatively little cross­
fertilization between the discussions of the welfare state and of comparative 
capitalism, despite the apparent similarities of the concerns of involved in these 
debates (compare Albert 1993 and Crouch and Streeck 1997 with Esping-Andersen’s 
1990 discussion of degrees of de-commodification which move from Scandinavia 
though continental Europe to North America, where labour is regarded as largely 
commodified).
The recent discussion of patterns of convergence and diversity has largely ignored 
gender issues. This oversight is important, not just because gender roles may be an 
important aspect of convergence or divergence themselves, but also because they may 
have an impact on the aspects of political economy with which convergence theorists 
are concerned. In other words, the analyses of mainstream theorists may be (partly) 
undermined by their failure to take gender into account. My main objective in this 
conclusion is to add to the catalogue of diversity and divergence among capitalist 
countries by underlining the extent and nature of divergence in the patterns of, and 
trajectories taken by, aggregate women’s employment in eighteen OECD states. In 
addition, I show that patterns of women’s employment are indeed an important 
element in the overall configurations of various national political economies. As such 
they both depend upon and support other aspects of these configurations. In other 
words, as well as being bom of and embodying diversity, they feed back into the 
distinctive paths followed by advanced industrial societies and open to each state.
Regarding the pattern of women’s employment as an important feature of the political 
economy of advanced industrial societies which can have significant feedback effects 
means that ‘one path’ or ‘convergent path’ models cannot be regarded as adequate. 
Nevertheless, the emphasis on the distinctiveness of particular (clusters of) cases 
should not be allowed wholly to swamp the sense that some general (or at least very 
widespread) trends exist. For example, important changes in gender roles seem to 
have occurred in most advanced industrial societies in the past thirty or forty years.
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The key issue is how these trends are conceptualized. ‘One path’ models tend to 
present general trends as determining common or convergent outcomes. At least for 
the period under analysis this vision does not seem to be sustainable (although the 
jury should remain ‘out’ on the issue of globalization and the possibility of 
current/future convergence). However, other conceptualizations of general trends and 
common influences which allow for some diversity may prove helpful.
Putting the (welfare) state in its place
We have seen that confusion of the concepts of the welfare state as state form and as a 
sector of state activity has produced misleading analyses. The state’s role in 
contemporary capitalism tends to be exaggerated, perhaps as a consequence of the 
residual influence of a ‘linear’ (one path) social democratic model. This exaggeration 
actually downplays the degree of diversity among advanced industrial societies, 
because it distracts our attention from the social (and perhaps also economic) sources 
of diversity. A clearer analytic distinction between these two conceptions of the 
welfare state should help to eliminate the residual influence of ‘one path’ models.
There is a risk that the exaggeration of the role of the state which is present in welfare 
state analyses of the differences among capitalist countries may also taint analyses of 
convergence. Sometimes it seems to be assumed that differences between countries 
or rely upon differences in state policy. Thus if state ‘autonomy’ declines or is 
destroyed, countries are assumed to have converged. Ironically, International Political 
Economists may be the most prone to this danger. They often protest that they have 
little interest in the nation state, seeing concern with it and with cross-national 
variation as trivial (see the particularly the pointed remarks made in Strange 1997: 
182- 185). Although increasing attention is being paid to the ‘uneven’ quality of 
globalization, nonetheless, vanishing state autonomy is often portrayed as causing a 
reduction in variability (Cemy 1997; Strange 1997).
Comparative analysis of ‘models of capitalism’ also risks attributing differences 
across countries wholly to state institutions and policies, given its concern with 
distinctive ‘models’ of capitalism based on nation-states. Nevertheless, even as they
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agree that a degree of convergence is taking place, some comparative political 
economists are careful to draw attention to other forms of political and social 
(collective) action as well as the scope and limits of the state. While taking the state 
and public regulation seriously they also pay close attention to the role of social 
institutions. Moreover, although they may be, it should not be automatically assumed 
that social institutions are dependent on public regulation (Crouch and Streeck 1997 
and Streeck 1993).
If we are to make sense of patterns of convergence and diversity in contemporary 
capitalism, and in particular to explain patterns of, and trajectories taken by, aggregate 
women’s employment in OECD countries, then careful attention to the role of social 
institutions, as well as the (welfare) state is required. The analytical distinction 
between the welfare state as a form of the state and as a sector of state activity is 
crucial here. The welfare state, understood as a sector of state activity, is likely to be 
a key element in the explanation of women’s employment trajectories in comparative 
analysis. However, by building in a sensitivity to the role of social (and other) 
institutions, some of the wider resonances of idea of the welfare state can be retained, 
without falling into the trap of attributing all cross-national variation to it. The 
welfare state (understood as a sector of state activity) needs to be placed in context, 
which should include the public-private mix in welfare provision, the broader policy 
configuration of the state and the overall configuration of the political economy as 
well as social policy.
General trends, particular (clusters of) cases and the diffusion of ideas 
and policies
A deeper theoretical issue, concerning the relationship between seemingly general 
changes and particular (clusters of) cases, lies behind many of these debates. For the 
most part discussion of convergence, whether in the context of welfare state 
development or globalization and welfare retrenchment, asserts that it is the product 
of common, general forces (compare Wilensky 1975 and Strange 1997). The 
argument is that general forces exist which determine particular cases. Alternatively 
convergence can be seen as a tendency or trend, which faces counter tendencies and
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trends, the outcomes of which are not wholly pre-determined. In itself ‘convergence’ 
is a somewhat abstract analytical subject. It has been rendered more concrete in 
analyses of welfare state development and could be made similarly concrete in studies 
of change in gender roles. In both cases the balance between the general and the 
particular needs to be struck carefully. We have already seen the emphasis placed on 
the diversity of welfare states in capitalist states, nevertheless, many still apply the 
expression welfare state to them all.
Turning to the issue of change in gender roles (and particularly the diversity of 
women’s aggregate employment trajectories), whether and how the position of 
women is changing across advanced industrial societies remains something of a 
conundrum. The evidence of divergence presented in this thesis suggests that changes 
in the position of women have not been determined by some common and convergent 
trend. A view generally supported by work on differences in the position of women in 
advanced industrial societies, mostly in connection to the welfare state (see inter alia 
Hemes 1987; Showstack-Sassoon 1987; Lewis 1992; O’Connor 1993; Orloff 1993; 
Sainsbury 1996; but also Rubery 1988 and Jenson, Hagen and Reddy 1988 on the 
position of women in the economy; see also Lovenduski 1986; Kaplan 1993). 
Nevertheless, emphasis on diversity should be balanced against a more general sense 
that since 1960 fairly basic and widespread - if not common - changes have occurred 
in gender roles in advanced industrial societies.
It is usually assumed - particularly in the literature on social policy - that convergence 
is caused by common patterns of economic development (perhaps underpinned by 
technological change). Divergence is associated with the particular characteristics of 
states, usually attributed to distinctive political, institutional or cultural patterns. One 
way of achieving this balance is to reconceptualize ‘general’ trends and tendencies in 
a less deterministic manner. Rather than assuming that economic (or other) changes 
force states into common patterns, these changes can be viewed in a more open 
manner. In this context, emphasis might be placed fruitfully on the diffusion of ideas 
and policies across national boundaries (Boyer 1997). Long-standing concerns with 
the spatial diffusion of policies and ideas, which have been the focus of increased
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attention recently (under the headings of ‘lesson-drawing’ Rose 1991; ‘policy 
transfer’ Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; and even ‘institutional isomorphism’ Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991) also speak to questions of convergence and divergence.
Only accounts of policy ‘diffusion’ which conceive of causality in non-deterministic 
ways can be used to account for diversity within some tendencies towards 
commonality. This is to alter the traditional treatment of policy ‘diffusion’ within 
comparative welfare analysis (see Wilensky, Luebbert, Hahn and Jamieson 1985: 12- 
15). By contrast, a non-deterministic view of diffusion, which emphasizes that every 
time a policy is copied it is also altered (Boyer 1997), matches the sense that 
convergent trends coexist with divergence and continuing diversity. Such an approach 
stresses the complexity of political economy configurations at the expense of analytic 
parsimony.
There is no reason to assume that diffusion occurs only, or even primarily through the 
state. Social and economic actors can carry ideas across (national and other) 
boundaries. Economic development itself could be viewed as a relatively open 
diffusion process, in place of the deterministic view of economic development often 
deployed in analyses of welfare state development and globalization. Concepts of 
diffusion may be particularly useful in the analysis of changes in gender roles and 
women employment trajectories.
Divergent trajectories for women’s employment in advanced industrial 
societies
The relationship between the level of women’s involvement in the workforce in 1960 
and in 1989 is not especially strong.
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Chart 9.1 Plot o f female labour force participation rates in 1960 and 1989
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Consider a group of the 18 largest OECD countries which have had democratic 
governments throughout the period. The mean level of labour market participation for 
women in 1960 was 43.294, with a standard deviation of 10.325. Three states - 
Canada, the Netherlands and New Zealand - fell more than one standard deviation 
from the mean in 1960, all of them below the mean. The mean level in 1989 was 
60.678, with a standard deviation of 11.233. By 1989 six states fell more than one 
standard deviation from the mean, with two - Italy and Ireland - below the mean, and 
four - Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden - above the mean. Twice as many 
states were more than one standard deviation from the mean in 1989 than in 1960 and 
at the latter date states deviated both above and below the mean. Both these facts 
suggest that women’s labour force participation patterns diverged during the period. 
This evidence of divergence is supported when the change in women’s labour market 
participation is considered. The mean level of change was 17.383 percentage points, 
with standard deviation of 12.616. Despite the fact that the standard deviation is a 
very large percentage of the mean, the level of change in eight of the states falls more 
than one standard deviation from the mean, with Austria, Italy, Ireland and Japan 
considerably below it, and Canada, Denmark, Norway and Sweden well above it.
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More countries which fell below the mean level of female labour force participation in 
1960 fell above it than below it in 1989. Equally, a larger number of states which 
were above the mean level in 1960 fell below the mean for 1989 than remained above 
it.
Table 9.1 Clusters of states in relation to the mean levels of female labour force 
participation in 1960 and 1989
1960 +
1989
+
DNK; FIN; 
GBR; SWE
AUS; CAN; 
NOR; NZL; 
USA
AUT; DEU; 
JPN; FAR; 
SWI;
BEL; IRL; 
ITA; NLD
Chart 9.2 Plot of female labour force participation change between 1960 and 1989 
against its level in 1989
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Almost all those countries which grew most rapidly between 1960 and 1989 were also 
above the median level of women’s involvement in the workforce in 1989. In other 
words, developments since 1960 generally overwhelm patterns before than date. The 
divergence between these two groups - one showing a trajectory of rapid growth to a 
high level of participation, the other a low growth low participation pattern - 
powerfully qualifies any suggestion that convergence occurred.
Table 9.2 Clusters of states in relation to the mean levels of female labour force 
participation change between 1960 and 1989 and its level in 1989
Change 1960 - 1989
+
1989 + AUS; CAN; FIN
DNK; GBR;
NOR; NZL;
SWE; USA
NLD AUT; BEL;
DEU; FRA;
IRL; ITA;
JPN; SWI
The two exceptions, the Netherlands and Finland, fell at the two very bottom and top 
of the distribution in 1960. The exceptionally low level of Dutch women’s 
involvement in the workforce in 1960 means that, despite an above average rate of 
growth during the intervening period, it remained below the mean in 1989. This 
period saw the break-up of an remarkably rigid, ‘traditional’ and strict society, a 
process to which developments in social policy contributed, and which in turn 
contributed to some changes in gender roles, despite the fact that these roles remained 
comparatively rigid at least into the 1990s. Between 1960 and 1989 the level of 
women’s involvement in the formal workforce in Finland declined for a period. This 
pattern of decline which was followed by growth may reflect a relatively late and 
compressed transition away from agricultural employment (in which women often 
play a larger role) to an industrial and service economy.
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The structure of divergence: is it related to the policy configurations of 
welfare states?
The remaining 16 states fall into two groups. Clusters of countries sharing other 
significant features generally fall into one or other of these two groups. The countries 
which grew rapidly to a comparatively high level include all the North American and 
Antipodean countries, the three most populous Scandinavian states and Britain. For 
the most part the low growth states are located on continental Europe, alongside Japan 
and Ireland. Ireland is the only primarily English speaking country which shows a 
low growth trajectory for women’s employment, probably owing to the role of 
Catholicism (and perhaps the economic structure between 1960 and 1989). Together 
with Norway, all ‘settler states’ - Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA - 
show a trajectory of rapid growth in women’s employment between 1960s and 1989 
from a below average level. Together with Britain, they are all predominantly states 
with English speaking populations, thus making the cross-national transmission of 
ideas particularly likely.
Evidence of difference and divergence in patterns and trajectories of women’s 
participation in the labour market seems to be strong. The next issue is how 
difference and divergence in the position of women in the workforce nests within the 
state policy and the overall configuration of the political economy. The states most 
closely associated with various forms of organized capitalism, aside from those in 
Scandinavia, all show comparative low levels of female involvement in the workforce 
by the end of the period. Not all low growth states fall into the category of organized 
or ‘Rhenish’ capitalism - Ireland stands out as a strong exception here - and 
Switzerland may do as well. It seems likely that religion in general, and Catholicism 
in particular has an influence on the levels and developmental trajectories of women 
employment.
Nevertheless, there may be a relationship between (non Scandinavian) ‘organized’ 
capitalism and a low growth trajectory for women’s employment. Socially or 
politically organised forms of capitalism are often thought to be characterised by 
greater stability or rigidity. This stability/rigidity may provide (or include)
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institutional and economic support for more traditional forms of household 
organization. For example the organized, ‘non market’, forms of wage negotiation 
which are centrally important to ‘Rhenish capitalism’ may have sustained the payment 
of ‘family wages’ for male breadwinners. In turn, organized capitalism of this sort 
may derive some of its stability from the continued existence of a substantial 
‘voluntary’ sector located outside of the formal workforce, and from the unpaid work 
of women in the household. The ‘strength and stability of the Rhine model’ is often 
attributed to the ‘interdependence of economic institutions’ (Boyer 1997: 93). If the 
contribution of the form of gender roles and the organization of domestic life need to 
be added to the list of mutually supporting institutions, then the complexity of these 
systems and difficulty of exporting them (or their elements) grows dramatically.
By contrast countries in which women’s employment followed a high growth 
trajectory appear considerably more diverse. The Scandinavian group stands out as 
distinctive, falling into the organized capitalism category, but with the role of political 
organization extending dramatically into what would be ‘domestic’ life elsewhere. 
Even within the group of primarily English speaking countries, considerable 
differences can be identified, distinguishing North America (and particularly the 
USA) from Britain, Australia and New Zealand.
Even in the North American cases, it would be a mistake to identify any of these 
economies as purely ‘market driven’. Through public policies and legal decisions, the 
state has had a considerable impact in the structuring of these markets as far as gender 
is concerned. Nevertheless both through corporations and through the market, 
domestic life seems to have become comparatively strongly ‘commodified’, a pattern 
also associated with substantial inequality as the large private service sector which 
partial replaces domestic work absorbs significant numbers of poorly paid workers.
By contrast the Australian and the New Zealand experience has been of rapid growth 
from low levels of women’s employment. Historically, the regulation of wages was at 
the heart of the social bargain, especially in Australia, and included a fairly explicit 
notion of a male breadwinner earning a family wage (to some extent at the expense of
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other welfare policy and service development). The growth of women’s involvement 
in the paid workforce in Australia lagged somewhat behind other high groAvth 
countries during the 1970s. However, the development of a distinctive feminist 
element in public bureaucracy (dubbed ‘the femocracy’) and public policy both 
reflected the developed nature of feminist sentiments in Australia. Together these 
factors meant that even the a general climate of retrenchment in the 1980s (and into 
the 1990s) policies for women and the family - including some service provision - 
actually expanded (Sawer 1996).
Divergence in women’s employment trajectories: its impact on the 
political economy
Differences and divergences in women’s employment trajectories among advanced 
industrial societies are extensive enough to suggest that they are significant. They 
seem to be associated with particular policy configurations of welfare states.
However, the significance of divergent trajectories of women’s employment is still 
greater if they constrain or otherwise influence the range of feasible options or paths 
for other facets of the political economy or state policy. Here I want to note the ways 
in which these connections have been hinted at in some existing work, but also to 
point out how the failure to attend to gender issues may have flawed otherwise 
interesting analyses of the potential paths feasible for particular countries. Taken 
together, I hope that these brief remarks demonstrate the scope for further work in this 
area.
Within the welfare state literature a number of authors have suggested that due to the 
impact of the welfare state on women, its development - at least in some forms - has 
the indirect consequence of politicizing women (Piven 1985; Piven and Cloward 
1987; Esping-Andersen 1990). In Sweden, for example, where women tend to work 
in the public and men in the private sector, there is some evidence the gender and 
public private sector divisions to some extent became mutually re-inforcing cleavages 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Patterns of both industrial action and political behaviour 
were influenced - for example, a larger proportion of women than men opposed 
joining the European Union, which was seen as posing a threat to state welfare
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provision and the public sector more generally (see also Esping Andersen 1990; 227). 
Some analysts have also attributed the ‘gender gap’ in American voting behaviour to a 
defence of the welfare state.
However, placed in a broader comparative perspective, these arguments appear less 
convincing. While levels of female political mobilisation appear high in Scandinavia 
when measured by the level of female representation in legislatures, for example, 
Scandinavian - and especially Swedish - feminism is usually depicted as 
comparatively weak. Perhaps more tellingly, levels of female representation in 
legislatures are much higher in the continental European states (usually with 
proportional electoral systems) than in the liberal (majoritarian) states, despite the 
‘conservative’ welfare provision and low levels of female involvement in the formal 
workforce in the former and much higher levels of female labour market participation 
in the latter. By contrast, of course, assessments of other aspects of women’s political 
mobilization (feminist movements, access to executive power in government) would 
rate women’s power higher in the USA and Australia than in Germany.
Although the possible impact of changes in the position of women partially induced 
by state welfare policy has been attended to by some authors, the failure to consider 
gender issues adequately may flaw some (of the increasingly voluminous) work which 
seeks to analyse the political economy trajectories now open to various states. The 
‘Swedish model’, for example, is generally thought to have died in the late 1980s or 
early 1990s, and speculation on the topic ‘whither Sweden?’ continues apace. Certain 
Swedish reforms - particularly the deregulation of finance - seem to point in the 
direction of ‘Anglo-American’ liberalism, while others suggest that it may be possible 
to reconstruct a form of organized or ‘Rhenish’ capitalism, albeit of a less ‘social 
democratic’ nature than the ‘Swedish model’ of the past.
Some commentators have suggested that as the ‘German model’ becomes untenable in 
Germany, it may be possible for Sweden to ‘adopt’ - or at least evolve towards - it 
(Pontusson 1997: 68-70). However, if the comparatively restricted level of women’s 
employment was not merely a co-incidental feature of the German model, and
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particularly if the viability of that model was partially predicated upon substantial 
unpaid domestic labour, then its attractions for Sweden do not just appear 
questionable (Pontusson 1997: 69), instead its very feasibility is limited. It is 
certainly bard to envisage widespread social consensus if a requirement of the ‘model’ 
is that Swedish women return to unpaid domestic work in large numbers.
Analyzing Gender: general trends and particular (clusters of) cases 
The debate about patterns of convergence and divergence in modem capitalism has 
largely failed to engage with gender issues, with deleterious analytical consequences. 
At the same time, however, those concerned with gender issues have paid insufficient 
attention to patterns of commonality and convergence or difference and divergence in 
the position of women in advanced industrial societies. The evidence presented here 
suggests that diversity and divergence should be emphasized (compare with the 
‘gender and welfare literature - Hemes 1987; Sbowstack-Sassoon 1987; Lewis 1992; 
O’Connor 1993; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1996 - which tends to concentrate on 
variations in the treatment of women and men in social policy programmes).
Two important and widespread, if mutually exclusive, views suggest that we should 
expect common pattems and/or convergence in the position of women in advanced 
industrial societies. First, the concept of ‘patriarchy’ tends to suggest a basically 
common pattem to advanced industrial societies (although there are, of course, 
important debates conceming the meaning of this concept). By contrast, the view is 
also prevalent that common fundamental changes are occurring, or have occurred, in 
gender roles and the position of women in westem societies, signalled in some 
popular discussion by the notion of ‘genderquake’. However, this image has largely 
developed within particular countries and is usually assumed to have taken a common 
form across the westem world, with little evidence about the dimensions of change in 
gender roles across the range of westem democracies (but in the area of employment 
see Rubery 1988; Jenson, Hagen and Reddy 1988). We are left with a sense that some 
common tendencies towards change do exist, but that they do not overwhelm - or 
have not yet overwhelmed - diversity and divergence.
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Once again it is important to acknowledge the role of the state without exaggerating it. 
The state should be seen as one of a number of elements which provide the 
institutional context for the economy. Rather than immediately attributing women’s 
role in the workforce to the character of the welfare state, we can place the (welfare) 
state in the context of the wider configuration of the political economy. The 
distinction between the direct consequences of (welfare) state policy and its indirect 
impact is particularly helpful. The position of women is sometimes constrained by 
social institutions or the general configuration of the political economy which may not 
depend on state policy. Thus some state policies may seem helpful to women, 
without altering the social institutions or changing the political economy 
configuration which constrains their position. More subtly still some policies may 
help women directly, while indirectly bolstering social institutions which constrain 
them (for example, some German labour market policies help women to get work, 
while contributing to a political economy which is configured in such a way as to 
limit the employment opportunities of women).
It is important to preserve the idea that state policy plays an important role, but that it 
must be kept in context as we turn to consider the concept of diffusion. The notion of 
ideas crossing national boundaries - and also eventually linguistic and other cultural 
boundaries - through channels created by social and economic actors as well as state 
policy is likely to be particularly helpful in the consideration of gender. Although a 
small literature considers the distinctiveness of feminist movements within various 
westem states (Lovenduski 1986; Kaplan 1992), it also provides evidence of cross­
national diffusion of ideas (historically French and US feminism have been 
particularly influential). In other words, as well as the possibility of policymakers 
having their ideas and expectations influenced from elsewhere, those of women could 
be changed in the same way. As with the diffusion of policy there is, of course, no 
guarantee that the diffusion of such ideas will occur at any particular rate, or even at 
all; and again ideas will alter as they diffuse.
In order to consider this idea in a bit more detail, the example of the Scandinavian 
states will be considered. Viewed from the outside, Scandinavian states appear as a
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relatively cohesive group - certainly in the comparative data analysis presented in this 
thesis they stood out as a distinctive group - albeit with Sweden usually identified as 
the ‘leader’ of this ‘leading group’. They have been widely regarded as exemplars of 
social democracy and as leaders in the transformation of the economic and political 
position of women. However, over the past decade important strands in both feminist 
and social democratic research have pointed to (what they regard as) significant 
differences among the states of Scandinavia. Feminists have suggested that the 
Norwegian state lags behind Sweden and Denmark in its treatment of women, power 
resource analysts have pointed to the greater potential for ‘welfare backlash’ in 
Denmark, while social democratic institutionalists have suggested that, even within 
Scandinavia, Sweden followed a distinctive path through and from feudalism which 
resulted in a significantly different modem state form (Leira 1989; 1992; Korpi 1980; 
Knudsen and Rothstein 1994). No doubt these differences in state structure and state 
policy seem more important when viewed ‘up close’ than they do in a more general 
comparative analysis. Nevertheless, some of the gap between these differences and 
the seemingly common or similar pattems in the level of women’s participation in the 
paid workforce could be made up by giving due attention to communication among 
social (and economic) actors in Scandinavia, as well as state structures and policies.
Concluding remarks
We need a clear conception of the scope and limits of the welfare state concept if we 
are to make sense of commonality and variation in women’s employment trajectories. 
Conflation of distinct (sectoral and ontological) conceptions of the welfare state has 
led to an exaggeration of the role of the state in contemporary capitalism. The idea of 
the welfare state as a sector of state activity is more appropriate for comparative 
analyses which include a wide range of OECD countries than the notion of the welfare 
state as a particular form of the state. Nevertheless, some of the resonances of the 
wider concept need to be retained if the narrower one is to be deployed successfully. 
First, this ‘social policy’ view of the welfare state needs to be placed in the context of 
the general policy configuration of the state. Second, due attention needs to be given 
to the social and economic context within which state or public policy is located. The
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interplay of public and private in welfare provision and in the configuration of the 
political economy are both particularly important here.
If the (welfare) state is put in its place (taking it seriously, while recognizing its 
limitations) then diversity in pattems of public policy, the configurations of social 
(and economic) institutions and practices, and the way these factors interlock can all 
be acknowledged. Thus the basis for more compelling analysis of variations in 
women’s employment trajectories can be laid by distinguishing conceptions of the 
welfare state as a sector of state activity from those as a form of the state. This 
distinction opens up the space for the analysis of state policy configurations within the 
overall political economy. Nevertheless, while national political economy 
configurations may be made up of mutually interlocking parts, they should not be 
regarded as completely seamless, nor wholly impermeable to outside influences.
Some factors do seem to be common to a number of OECD states - for example, some 
expression of dissatisfaction with traditional roles among a significant proportion of 
women has emerged at some time between 1960 and 1989 in most OECD countries; 
or, the proportion of jobs ‘open to’ or ‘appropriate for’ women seems to have 
increased, perhaps associated with the relative groAvth of the service sector. It seems 
plausible that, for example, feminist ideas about the roles of women have moved 
across national and linguistic boundaries, albeit being significantly altered in the 
process. I have also noted that ideas about the appropriate organization of the 
economy and about the range of economic products available are likely to diffuse 
across boundaries. While these processes may produce common or convergent 
pattems, the manner in which they can change as they cross boundaries means that 
they need not have identical (similar) consequences in different settings. Viewed in 
this way ‘diffusion’ allows ideas about the role of ‘power resources’ and economic 
development to be integrated, so long as none of these factors are conceived of in 
deterministic terms. Taken together these ideas can provide us with a framework for 
analysis within which it is possible to make sense of pattems of divergence and 
convergence, of particular cases and general influences (albeit at some cost in
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parsimony) in both women’s employment trajectories and the overall evolution of 
capitalist political economies.
However, the diversity of women’s employment trajectories and the ways in which 
they feedback into other aspects of state policy and the configuration of the political 
economy suggest that differences in levels of women’s involvement in the workforce 
and employment trajectories among advanced industrial societies are likely to have an 
enduring significance.
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MA I Methodology
The statistical chapter of this thesis is composed of two sections, one made up of 
cross-sectional regressions, the other of pooled cross-section time-series analyses.
Both techniques have been widely used in the comparative literature on the welfare 
state. Broadly speaking in the late 1980s the relevant literature began to make use of 
the latter technique much more extensively, having previously almost exclusively 
relied on the former one. However the use of cross-sectional analysis has not entirely 
disappeared and indeed is deployed in some of the most influential recent 
contributions to the literature (see Esping-Andersen 1990; Castles and Mitchell 1993; 
van Kersbergen 1995). Each of these techniques poses difficulties.
The difficulties and limitations of cross-sectional regression analyses in comparative 
welfare state studies are well known, nevertheless the technique has been widely used. 
Thus the use of this technique is important in order to engage directly with this 
literature as it has developed since the late 1970s. Most of the difficulties which face 
cross-sectional regressions in the context of welfare state analysis derive from the 
very small number of cases - some twenty five at most, typically no more than 
eighteen - available for study. There are simply not enough data points to test the 
variety of hypotheses proposed in the literature, never mind theories in which they are 
embedded, in single equations, even if the data did capture the dimensions of variation 
deemed relevant by the theory. Indeed the small number of data points means that it 
is difficult to build equations which meet generally accepted standards of statistical 
adequacy. It is also worth noting that some issues of statistical adequacy, for example 
conceming significance, may be of little importance, given that it is at least debatable 
whether the data we are analyzing ought be thought of as a sample fi-om a class, or as 
exhausting the class itself.
The analysis of pooled cross-section and time-series data does not face the issue of a 
scarcity of data (unfortunately sufficiently long series of annual data for the time- 
series analysis of this subject do not exist, at least on the same basis for various 
states). Thus this technique allows for the possibility of adjudicating more directly 
among a number of competing hypotheses, and perhaps even theories. Using this
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technique, then, more inclusive analyses are undertaken. However, particularly with 
some of the rather more theoretically elaborate issues, which are difficult to 
operationalize empirically, except by means of dummy variables, technical constraints 
(which probably often can be traced to the problem of distinguishing between non- 
compossible, but empirically similar, categorizations) - typically problems of 
multicollinearity - prevent the direct comparison of various approaches in the 
literature. As a result a variety of different equations have been estimated, which vary 
the basic model as little as possible. Again however, these equations are comparable 
only at the most general level, although an overall sense of the importance of various 
factors may emerge from the analysis, particularly if the influence of these variables is 
stable in sign, significance and relative size over a number of them.
The pooling of time-series from a number of cross-sections presents the data analyst 
with both the difficulties associated with modeling cross-sectional data and time- 
series data, as well as some difficulties peculiar to pooled datasets (see Stimson 1985 
for a general discussion of these issues in a political science context). There may be 
autocorrelation of errors within a cross-section. Secondly there may problems of 
heteroscedasticity, especially across individual units, but also across groups of cross- 
sections and blocks of time. Thirdly, and especially when pooling time-series from 
political units (Kmenta 1986; Swank 1992) the errors are likely to be cross-sectionally 
correlated.
To minimize the risks from these potential difficulties the regressions were estimated 
using the "pool" procedure in the economometrics package "SHAZAM" (White et al. 
1993). This procedure uses Kmenta's (1986) generalized least squares model 
correcting for cross-sectional hetreoscedasticity, contemporaneous cross-sectional 
correlation of errors, and first order autoregressive errors (see Hicks 1994 for a 
general discussion of pooling options). Particular attention needs to be paid to 
Durbin-Watson test statistics, which test for serial correlation in the residuals of a 
regression. Scores with a value of approximately two suggest that the regression is 
unlikely to suffer from these problems (scores significantly under two suggest positive 
autocorrelation, those over two suggest negative autocorrelation). The results from
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these tests on the two data sets used for pooled analysis suggest that greater 
confidence should be placed in the results from the larger data set, regressions on 
which generally produced Durbin-Watson results closer to two. (In addition, being a 
larger data set, values further from two would be more likely to fall within the margin 
of error.)
Additionally various dummy variables have been used, sometimes as country 
dummies (N-1 countries with Belgium the excluded country), and at other times for 
theorietically defined clusters of countries (developed from Esping-Andersen 1990 or 
Castles and Mitchell 1993). Country dummies act to take out variation across 
countries or groups of countries, so that the impact of the quantitative independent 
variables on the dependent variable can be estimated more efficiently (see Swank 
1992 for the use of a similar method). However, there are advantages (of method and 
theory - see Stimson 1985) to be gained from using categorizations which are derived 
from theory, rather than simply using country dummies.
The first chapter discussed a number of factors which meant that rather than testing 
the various theories considered here in their own terms, the statistical portions of this 
study are better understood as analyses of models derived from them. One of the 
factors mentioned there was the impact of the statistical techniques used. It is worth 
stressing this point again here - the statistical analyses presented were explorations of 
derived models and hypotheses, rather than direct examinations of the (empirical 
implications of the) original theories.
MA.2 Data Sources
Aside from the dummy variables the rest of the data was primarily gathered from the 
OECD - the male labour force participation, female labour force participation, 
employment in the service sector, and value added in government employment, year 
on year economic growth, social security, total outlays of government are from this 
source. As it is not possible to reconstruct a consistent historical series from 
published sources, these data were acquired direct from the OECD - thanks are due to 
Eileen Minihane. The personal taxation variable is derived from OCED revenue
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statistics - again a fully consistent set is not available from published sources - thanks 
are due the Jeff Owens of the OECD. As these statistics give revenue outturns, which 
might be an artifact of the level of employment, they were divided by the total 
employment statistics for individual states. The inflation figures were calculated from 
a series of indices of consumer prices given in an OECD publication Main Economics 
Indicators Historical Statistics: Prices Labour and Wages. These series were 
differenced to give the variable used. Divorce statistics were derived from UN 
Demographic Statistics - various years. The proportion of legislatures made up by 
women was derived from Inter-Parliamentary Union statistics in The Distribution o f  
Seats between Men and Women in National Assemblies International Centre for 
Parliamentary Documentation Series " Reports and Documents", No. 14, with 
information on Sweden before the shift to Unicameralism from Eduards, M "Sweden" 
in Lovenduski and Hills (1981). Sivard 1985 provided some data on the level of gross 
national product and data on the position of women in legislatures and cabinets. Data 
on women's wages relative to men's were calculated from information in ILO Labour 
Force Statistics - various year (hourly wages in manufacturing were used in order to 
maximise the number of countries covered). EUROSTAT Labour Force Surveys, 
Women o f Europe, and Commission of the European Communities 1984 provide data 
on women in part time employment within Europe. Left and religious influence in 
Parliament was calculated from Mackie and Rose (1991). Left and religious control 
of government was calculated from Lane, Mackay and Nev^on (1991), supplemented 
by Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (especially for France - the data for France in 
Lane, Mackay and Newton were inaccurate). Categorizations of political parties were 
based on those in Mair and Castles 1984, supplemented by Mair 1987. The welfare 
state regime variables require special consideration. The statistical techniques used 
have an impact on the nature of the data which it is possible or appropriate to test - 
particularly with respect to the analysis of types of welfare state. These issues will be 
discussed in greater detail below.
Dummy variables have to be treated cautiously in the cross-sectional analysis - a 
binary variable might well distort the equations given that they are estimated on such 
a small number of cases. In the pooled analysis, on the other hand, dummy variables
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play an important part methodologically, as well as being theoretically useful. Thus 
the categorisations of states are handled quite differently in the two approaches. 
Esping-Andersen’s analysis of (liberal, conservative and socialist) dimensions of the 
welfare state is well suited to the cross-sectional analysis, because it captures (or at 
least claims to capture) a quantitative aspect of these dimensions. Moreover, the 
dimensions are not mutually exclusive - any individual welfare state is likely to mix 
some aspects of at least two of the three dimensions of socialism, liberalism and 
conservatism. His measure of the de-commodifying impact of welfare can be used 
similarly. Although Esping-Andersen’s argument is largely concerned with the ways 
in which welfare states cluster, with ‘types’ of welfare state, it is not as stripped down 
a typology as is sometimes thought. Rather than simply allocating countries to a 
particular cell in a two dimensional table, he develops a measure of the influence of 
each welfare ‘type’ within the welfare policies of the states he analyses. In the 
subsequent statistical analysis he uses these variables as if they measured a continuous 
quantitative dimension of these states. The use of these variables in this manner is of 
dubious validity according to the tenets of statistical theory. Esping-Andersen does 
not attempt explicitly to justify this position. Despite these difficulties, I will use his 
measures as variables the cross-sectional analyses. I will do so because of the 
influence of Esping-Andersen’s work on the subsequent literature for the sake of 
addressing the existing framework as directly as possible. The measures Esping- 
Andersen develops derive from snapshots of welfare states in the early 1980s. This 
does not present an additional problem, beyond those already discussed, for the cross- 
sectional analyses, which are of data from this period. However, Castles and 
Mitchell’s analysis is much less quantitative - it is more categorical (identifying 
conservative liberal radical and non-right hegemony types). As a result their typology 
is unsuited to a cross-sectional regression analysis, at least where the use of (a number 
of) dummy variables is inappropriate.
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Table MA I Welfare Regime Characteristics
Strong
Medium
Low
Conservatism Liberalism Socialism
Austria (8) Australia (10) Denmark (8)
Belgium (8) Canada (12) Finland (6)
France (8) Japan (10) Netherlands (6)
Germany (8) Switzerland (12) Norway (8)
Italy (8) United States (12) Sweden (8)
Finland (6) Denmark (6) Australia (4)
Ireland (4) France (8) Belgium (4)
Japan (4) Germany (6) Canada (4)
Netherlands (4) Italy (6) Germany (4)
Norway (4) Netherlands (8) New Zealand (4)
United Kingdom (6) Switzerland (4) 
United Kingdom (4)
Australia (0) Austria (4) Austria (2)
Canada (2) Belgium (4) France (2)
Denmark (2) Finland (4) Ireland (2)
New Zealand (2) Ireland (2) Italy (0)
Sweden (0) New Zealand (2) Japan (0)
Switzerland (0) Norway (0) United States (2)
United Kingdom (0) Sweden (0)
United States (0)
(From Esping-Andersen 1990: 74 Table 3.3)
315
Table MA.2 De-Commodification Scores
Australia 13.0 
United States 13.8 
New Zealand 17.1 
Canada 22.0 
Ireland 23.3 
United Kingdom 23.4
Italy 24.1 
Japan 27.1 
France 27.5 
Germany 27.7 
Finland 29.2 
Switzerland 29.8
Austria 31.1 
Belgium 32.4 
Netherlands 32.4 
Denmark 38.1 
Norway 38.3 
Sweden 39.1 
From Esping-Andersen 1990: 52 Table 2.2
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In the pooled analyses the categorizations of welfare states are operationalized as 
dummy variables. This approach does beg a question about the treating of these 
categories as holding for the entire period under analysis, given that the works from 
which they are drawn only cover parts of it. For the sake of simplicity, because there 
are no evident dates for changing the values of the dummies within particular panels, 
they will be treated as structural characteristics of the states for the whole period 
under investigation. This assumption is easier to justify for Castles and Mitchell’s 
analysis, rooted as it is in relatively unchanging national cultures, than for Esping- 
Andersen’s which is more closely connected to the institutional characteristics of the 
(welfare) state.
The categorical nature of Castles and Mitchell’s (1993) analysis of worlds of welfare 
lends itself to the generation of dummy variables. However, because the full 
categorization of welfare states provided by Castles and Mitchell placed every state 
subjected to empirical analysis in a category, is impossible to use it to estimate an 
equation using dummy variables. The analysis did identify groups of states in which 
political configurations are matched by welfare state types. It seems appropriate to 
use this categorization, as it is most likely to fit the logic of their argument closely - 
making their use as the basis for the generation of dummy variables justifiable. Using 
this categorization it was possible to estimate equations. The states fall into the 
following categories.
Table MA.3 Families of Welfare
LIBERAL 
Ireland 
Japan
Switzerland 
US
Castles and Mitchell 1993: 123 Table 3.7
CONSERVATIVE
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
RADICAL 
Australia 
New Zealand 
UK
N-RH
Belgium
Denmark
Norway
Sweden
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) account is less easily modified for use in pooled analysis. 
It is based in the institutional nature of welfare states at particular points in time
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(usually in the 1980s), it is less clear that it is valid to assume that these characteristics 
existed at other times. This is particularly true for the socialist/deconimodifying 
welfare state, which he explicitly suggests came into existence only recently, while 
the liberal and conservative forms seem to have existed for longer. However, as no 
clear break point is given for any of the states becoming socialist/de-commodifying 
welfare states, in keeping with the deployment of all the other dummy variables, and 
for reasons of methodological simplicity, the dummy variables will be given the same 
value for the whole period. Moreover, the analysis of dimension of the welfare state 
is not really a categorization of welfare state types, although Esping-Andersen himself 
does treat it in this way at times. However, in keeping with some aspects of Esping- 
Andersen’s own discussion, and certainly with the way that his work as been 
appropriated in the literature, the states while he lists as ‘strong’ examples of the three 
dimensions of the welfare state will be transformed into dummy variables (see Table 
MA.l).
These categories are mutually exclusive, in the sense that no state fall into more than 
one of them, and have the methodologically desirable quality of not being mutually 
exhaustive of the states in the analysis. There is also a strong rationale in the 
methodological literature for the use of theoretically based dummy variables to 
motivate successful pooled statistical analyses in Political Science. In general, the 
alternative is an empirical one, in which dummy variable categories emerge from 
statistical analysis, which runs a risk of ‘dredging’ the data for pattems (Stimson 
1985). However, the possibility that the use of these variables measures some aspect 
of the countries under investigation other than their welfare state regimes must be kept 
in mind when they are operationalized in this way.
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